The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges: (The 1st mode)  (This is probably one of the most profoundly certain claims on earth, and it is elaborated, verified and confirmed in great detail throughout the website. The "Brief Foreword" gives the big picture.)

          If you have already read the important Brief Foreword, you can skip it by clicking on the following:
        Contents after the Brief Forward

 Brief Foreword
  The Purpose and the Truth:

          There are five major or leading reasons for this website:

(1) The first is to teach correct principles as there are serious falsehoods taught in the field of nobility and chivalry. (See "Problems and Solutions: The Future of Nobility and Chivalry" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id108.htm) Pope Felix III wrote, "Not to oppose error is to approve it, and not to defend the truth is to suppress it." In other words, silence implies consent and promotes error and distortions.
(2) The second reason is that international law obligates a person with a valid regal claim to assert what is rightfully owned, or face the severe penalty of permanently losing all legal entitlement to it. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "Deposed Sovereignty and Royalty: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost").
(3) The third is that international law requires that a person who claims legal, non-territorial sovereignty is obligated to conclusively prove that the claim is valid and legitimate to the point that it is "beyond a reasonable doubt," and not just "more likely than not." (See "Proof is Necessary and Required" in "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and False Claim" and "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")
(4) The fourth reason is this website is a well-written and documented doctoral project on international and domestic law. A university doctoral degree requires that one make a "significant original contribution to knowledge." In our case, this dissertation, which is, in fact, this website, provides proof far "beyond a reasonable doubt" that our claim is absolutely true, and the important laws that determine when a case is authentic, valid and genuine. Thus fulfilling an international law requirement. (See "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and False Claim")
(5) And fifth, because my good name (Donald E. Goff, Ph.D., DBA, D.Litt. (eq.) and our claim have been unfairly attacked on the internet, the true facts needs to be published and made known. It is, as Edmund Burke emphatically declared, "All that is needed for the forces of evil to win, is for good men to do nothing." It is hoped that the real truth will prevail, not error or inaccuracies. Hence, a good reason for this website. (See "Problem -- Misinformation" and starting with http://www.nobility-royalty.com/beware_of_false_claims_of_sovereignty.htm on the website of The International Commission on Nobility and Royalty)

          To fulfill all these important purposes:

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George Washington declared, "Truth will ultimately prevail [but only] where there [is a concerted effort] to bring it to light." Every single relevant point will be examined in great detail, so that the reader can easily see that all the legal facts are more than adequately substantiated, verified and confirmed.      

          This website is about the lawful transfer of all the international land rights, distinctions and honors of the principality of Halberstadt, which claim has been vetted and recognized by scholars as being legally valid and legitimate. (See "The First of Seven Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and/or "Documents") In other words, this case is not based on hunches, speculation, guesswork, or suspicion. Nor it is based on foolish myths, legends, fabrication, or make believe. It is based on many cold, hard, verified facts -- the law itself. Including the fact that, not just one, but eight legitimate and lawful conveyance or acquisition laws transferred the title and rights thereof to our family. Thus, our claim is not only compelling, but it is truly beyond any reasonable doubt. This is because no other logical explanation can be derived from the facts, and expert legal witnesses have validated the claim as genuine and accurate. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim" and "Documents: Testaments and Witnesses to the Truth")

In other words, this case is not questionable or problematic. The proof is not imaginary. It is as close to being flawless that is possible in this life.

          This page is about one binding method. There are seven others: (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality," "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality" and "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges")

          To remove unreasonable or irrational doubt in any kind of important claim, ". . . it behooves us to place the foundations of knowledge [or a case such as ours] in[to] mathematics." (Roger Bacon as quoted in Stuart Shanker, Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics, 1987 p. 269) Mathematics is one of the surest paths to truth, because the principles behind almost all things are mathematical. Of course, not every thing lends itself to math, but the precise exactness of the laws in this case and the facts thereof, do. For that reason, probability in particular is well-suited to our case. This project was done with the help of two prominent members of the Math Department of Dixie State University. The exacting science of probability shows the claim is not merely a "preponderance of evidence" level situation, making it "more likely than not," or even just a "clear and convincing" case, meaning it is exceptionally compelling. But it is nothing less than the highest confidence level available, which is far "beyond reasonable doubt." This is because it has achieved mathematical certainty.

          The probability question was: "What are the chances that all 40+ separate legal and situational facts would combine to bear a perfect witness that our claim is absolutely true, if it wasn't absolutely and totally true?" That is, when all, not some, but all the evidence points in one direction in a major court hearing and the defense cannot produce any law or any contrary facts, then the conclusion is clear, obvious and unmistakable. Probability provides an even greater assurance or level of certainty.


          Keep in mind that from back-alley dice games to highly sophisticated research in laboratories, the laws of probability have proven themselves to be just as dependable as the laws of gravity.

          The result: an impressive 17,000,000 to one likelihood, if we ignore 40% of the proof (in other words, this is the most conservative figure, for if we use all the evidence, it is not merely a billion to one, but 1.1 trillion to one) that the claim could be anything but a true and genuine transmission of all rights and privileges.

          It is hard to comprehend what a trillion is much less what one chance in a trillion might be. To help, note the following:

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         One chance in 17,000,000, or using more of the evidence, one chance in a 1.1 trillion is an enormous figure or likelihood. It is virtually perfect. There is basically zero probability or no chance our claim could be wrong. On the other hand, this means there is a 100% or 99.999411764703% likelihood that our claim could be anything, but profoundly and beautifully true. As stated several times, this kind of certainty is equal to or greater than any other regal claim that ever existed. The case is that solid. It could hardly be stronger. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")  

          The challenge is to find out for oneself, which means one must give it a fair hearing, due process and due diligence. Otherwise, one will do a great injustice to the verified facts, the historical realities, and the legal truths that saturates this case. But, as a result of such an effort, one would end up knowing a lot about the laws that created the transfer.

          Every new, added and discovered fact of support has acted exponentially to the probability or likelihood that any proposed claim is absolutely true. One chance in 1.1 trillion that this claim is wrong or 1.1 trillion to one odds that it is right certainly puts this case in a category of beyond doubt. This enormous figure is conclusive of the fact. One might as well deny that the sun and moon exist as to doubt, or believe that pigs fly that this case is not of the highest confidence level possible in mortal life.

          For example DNA proof is required to be 100 billion to one that something is an undeniable fact or absolutely true. (David E. Newton, Forensic Chemistry, 2007, p. 146) By comparison, the certainty of our case adds up to over 1.1 trillion to one that honorable laws gave us the principality. This is 1,100 times greater or more sure than DNA evidence is required to be. This says a lot about the immense credibility of the case as an established fact.

          The point is, our claim is not built on flimsy evidence, but on solid rock.

 Evidence in a Nutshell:

          There are three types of belief: (1) a vague belief, (2) a well-supported belief, and (3) a belief that is beyond reasonable doubt. As will be seen, this case is build on the highest level of evidence possible. It is far above any reasonable doubt.

          The point is, no one can just make a grand royal claim and it somehow someway magically becomes legit. It must be legally valid to be rightful. Legality is what divides the sheep from the goats. It distinguishes the true royals from the fakes, the impostors and the counterfeiters. (See "Proof is Necessary and Required" in "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and Fraudulent Claim")

          The following are seven very basic general points. We'll get into the details and the specifics later on throughout this website:
(1) Expert witnesses – testimony of six legal scholars and a German heraldic expert attest to its validity and legitimacy. (See "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and "Documents"),
(2) There is full compliance to all the relevant natural, international, and English laws which validate and confirm the claim to be factual, genuine, and true. This can be seen throughout the website,
(3) There is a plethora of historical support for the legal rightfulness of the claim – there are numerous examples of similar transfers which have occurred throughout the centuries. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred" and "Private Individuals can become Royal Sovereigns" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality"),
(4) the 2002 legal abandonment of all rights of ownership of the principality by the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern. (See "Abandonment" in "Letters from the Imperial Family"),    
(5) Eight legal binding methods concurrently establish the lawful transfer. (See "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges," "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality," "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality" and "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges"),
(6) Five of those transfer modes were established by international law. Three were domestic. However, along with power of English private international law (see "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges"), normal domestic law in England, and most common law countries, have full authority over the legal rights of other sovereign entities that exist or have lawful standing within their own territories. (See "D. Adverse Possession transfers all the rights of an Estate which includes Regal and Sovereign Rights" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") What this means is the domestic modes are just as valid and legitimate as the legal right of the international transfer methods. This comes through either pivate law via English private international law statutes and practice, and/or domestic national law. Both have the legal right to deal with sovereign entities that exist under their jurisdictional authority as a nation.    
(7) There are the legal sworn testimonies given under oath and penalty of law testifying of the truth by the most prominent participants. (See "Documents" and "Contact, Brief Recap and Affidavits"), and
(8) The mathematical certainty of the claim shows that there is only one chance in 1.1 trillion the claim could be wrong. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")


          Reliable evidence, using only 40% of the evidence, places the case at a 100% certainty (a 99.999411764703% probability level), which is several mathematical magnitudes "beyond any reasonable doubt." (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim") The point is, No other logical explanation can be derived from the facts, which is what "beyond any reasonable doubt" means.
         Emerich de Vattel, one of the chief fathers of international law, declared that a whole kingdom or principality may be obtained by one ". . . who has purchased it, or received it in exchange, or acquired it by any title whatever." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book III, chapter 13, no. 98) (emphasis added)

          It must be admitted that there is no a priori [self-evident] reason why the categories of methods of acquiring territorial sovereignty should be considered closed. International law is not so rigid as to exclude new developments. It may well be, therefore that there exists a sixth [or seventh or eight] method of acquiring territorial sovereignty. . . . (F. A. Mann, "The Present Legal Status of Germany," The International Law Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 3, Autumn, 1947, p. 326)

          NEW MODES OF TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION: Title may now be acquired in ways other than those developed over the centuries since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. . . . (William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 6th ed., 2011, p. 299)

          Some new methods that are now widely recognized and used today are international proprietary estoppel, novation, consolidation of title, highest right or best claim, and historic title. Any legitimate method that is a legal and valid mechanism can pass on a sovereign regal entity. According to Vattel, it can be "by any title whatever." And ". . . It is this [kind of legal transfer] which gives the receiver . . . regal [kingly and/or princely] right." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, [1680], vol. 2, John Pawley Bate, trans., chapter 9, no. 19, 1916)

          Our case is a fairly recent event, but just as valid as those of earlier days. The old acquisition modes are still binding, recognized laws today as they were long ago. (See the "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred" and "Private Individuals can become Royal Sovereigns" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" for numerous examples of such in history) That is:

          [Sovereign] territories were transferred back and forth and thus boundaries were [quite fluid] drawn and redrawn as a result of war, conquest, treaties, dynastic marriage, purchase and other transactions. . . . (Robert H. Jackson, "Boundaries and International Society," International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, Barbara Allen Roberson, ed., 1998, p. 161) (emphasis added)

          "Other transactions" includes any other legal or lawful mechanism that works. For example, English private international law can activate the transfer of a sovereign regal entity under English domestic law. That is a fact. (See "English Private International Law activates English Domestic Adverse Possession" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")        

          Because "territories were transferred back and forth," and were fluid, changes in dynasties -- especially German principalities and lesser sovereign entities in Europe were fairly common occurrences. International law validates and confirms this historical practice as legally binding in modern times as well as in the early days of international law. (See the "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred") The international law qualifiers "acquired it by any title whatever" or "other [possible] transactions" for conveying regal sovereign rights demonstrates the flexibility and existence of alternative title transfers in international law. Besides the usual modes of acquisition and loss of sovereignty in international law, "A few novel methods have emerged." (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective: State Territory, 1970, p. 297) This would include three domestic ones governed by private international law. (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction") The point is, sovereignty may be acquired ". . . by any of the recognized modes by which private property is acquired by individuals," which includes adverse possession, proprietary estoppel and the domestic law of best title or best right doctrine. (Professor Pomeroy, "Sovereignty and Territorial Acquisition," The Treaty Making Power of the United States, Charles Henry Butler, ed., vol. 1, chapter 2, section 43, 1902, p. 74) In other words, Halberstadt was obtained by legal and lawful means -- eight of them, in fact, making the transfer definitive and perfect. (See "Eight Legal and Lawful Methods Transferred all the Rights")

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          Putting this all into perspective, if you had a 99.99999999+ chance -- a probability so extraordinary and certain -- that you'd win 100 million dollars tax free, would you take the bet? Most people would in a heart beat. Such a high likelihood is far greater than a beyond reasonable doubt determination, yet those astronomical odds are exactly how sure our claim really is. It is more likely that a person will find a 1,100 pound gorilla sitting in their car after work, than this claim is anything less than conclusive and absolutely true.  

 A Solid Foundation without Weaknesses

          It only takes two relevant and confirmed material facts to achieve a "beyond reasonable doubt" confidence level determination, but we have over 50 verified facts demonstrating the truth and reliability of our claim. 50 is far greater -- far more certain and absolute than 2. This mean our case is 25 times more sure than is needed for a determination of being "beyond a reasonable doubt." But beyond that, the laws of probability makes it virtually certain and undeniable. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")

          The point is:

          You can't build something right on something totally wrong.
          You can't build something powerful and strong on something fundamentally weak and fragile.
          You can't build a great truth on a false paradigm, fantasy or make-believe.
          You can't build something beautiful and lasting on filth, rot or decay.
          To build on drifting unstable sand is a sure disaster.
          You can't build a great building on a weak foundation and expect it to last.

          If the foundation is cracked or built on unsteady ground it’s only a matter of time before it all comes crashing down. The difference between our claim and so many others is that it is built on a foundation that is solid -- based on sovereignty law, historical facts and legal precedence. It is sturdy because it is true.

 Ignorance of the Law

           Law, in general, does not recognize any excuse for ignoring it. There are too many serious consequences involved in paying little or no heed to the law. This is especially true in the field of nobility and royalty. (See "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and a Fraudulent Claim")

          The ancient law, that "ignorance is no excuse" has a long and extensive history. The time-honored Latin term, "Inorantia juris non excusat" means "ignorance of the law excuses not," and "ignorantia legis neminem excusat" means "ignorance of law excuses no one" (Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979, pp. 672-673 and UIA, The Encyclopedia of World Problems & Human Potential; 2018: http://encyclopedia.uia.org/en/problem/158218) These legal maxims were designed to promote justice and represent the ". . . legal principle holding that a person who is unaware of a law may not escape liability. . . ." (Ibid.) Other expressions of the same from ancient Rome are "nemo censetur ignorare legem" -- "nobody is thought to be ignorant of the law" or "ignorantia iuris nocet" -- "not knowing the law is harmful." (Ibid.)

          If the law does not support a claim, the claim is false and can be rejected with impunity. This is because sovereignty and royalty either exist on a legal basis or they do not exist at all. Therefore, judging a dispossessed sovereign claim, such as ours, without knowing the applicable and relevant laws involved, is similar to judicial misconduct or malpractice. Using the totally wrong criteria in an evaluation can lead to an enormous misunderstanding of the fundamental facts involved. Hence, the caution that "ignorance of the law excuses no one." Due diligence cannot take place without a thorough investigation. (See "Questions and Answers continued" for a good example involving ignorance of the law)

          Since our claim is rooted and grounded in the law that sustains it; since that is Its foundation, its core and center, even its very heart and soul, the laws involved must be understood. Therefore, the reader is encouraged to read without bias and learn the fundamentals that created and transferred the lawful titles and sovereign rights.

 Basic Legal Principles:

          Everything that follows -- in other words, the whole claim depends on some well-known, undeniable legal facts in domestic and international law. Many of the laws underlying this case are "legal maxims," that is, they are time-tested fundamental rules of justice and equity recognized as universally rightful and fair to all involved. (See "Legal Maxims" on this page) The following are some of the most basic fundamental principles. The references contained in each statement will take one to detailed explanations, legal citations and verified evidence substantiating each one as important and significant:  

It all started with a valid English Deed of Transfer in the year 2000, that in spite of an investigation costing over $300,000.00 USD by the Solicitors Regulation Authority and the London Tribunal, the conveyance could not be proven fraudulent or false. It was recognized as a legitimate conveyance document. (See "Documents -- Testaments and Witness to the Truth")
Legally, a valid deed of conveyance that cannot provide "good title," such as ours, automatically, by law, becomes an adverse possession case if there is full compliance with all the requirements thereof, as our case did. (See "Adverse Possession cures defects in Conveyances" and "The Adverse Possessor does not need to know that he is Adversely Possessing the Rights to the Property he has taken control of or Factually Occupied" on this page) (See also "Automatic Nature of Adverse Possession in English Law" in "Three more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality")  
It was discovered that sovereign territories, both reigning and non-reigning, can be legally conveyed or transferred through various domestic and internationally recognized legal modes. This is merely a fact. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred" and "Non-Reigning Royal Rights can be Transferred to Others Under International Law" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
In English law, "adverse possession" can fully and completely transfer a private deposed international sovereignty right through "private international law," which law is universally designed to legally solve private legal problems involving a fundamental international component or foreign involvement. It can make domestic laws operative for private international concerns:

. . . Jurisdiction in international cases of a private nature [like the transfer of the private international land rights of the principality] is not governed by international law, but by the domestic law of each state [through private international law]. (Chilenye Nwap, "Litigating Extraterritorial Corporate Crimes in Canadian Courts," Doctoral Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 2012, p. 142)

In other words, private international law can activate or empower domestic adverse possession in transferring international territorial rights of a private nature. That is, "Private international law rules . . . [include a] . . . domestic legal system’s concepts of time bars [statutes of limitation] and adverse possession. . . ." (Christa Roodt, State Courts or ADR in Nazi-Era Art Disputes: A Choice "More Apparent than Real?," p. 432; 2016: http://cardozojcr.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAC205.pdf) (emphasis added)

This important law can also lawfully handle private cases involving sovereignty such as ours. The Principality of Halberstadt is a privately owned legal, non-territorial sovereign entity in international law. ". . . In the case of private international law [situations are usually] of a private character, though . . . one . . . may be a sovereign state [or a deposed royal house that lawfully maintained and preserved their sovereign rights]." (S. S. Gulshan, Business Law, 4th ed., 2012, p. 16) (emphasis added) In other words, ". . . Private international law [can be] between individuals or between individuals and states." (Paras Diwan and Peeyushi Diwan, Private International Law: Indian and English, 1993, p. 47) This law is legally competent to enable or empower domestic laws to transfer a private international sovereign territory, such as, the principality of Halberstadt. (See "The Importance of English Private International Law" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" and "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction" on this page)
Not just the power and authority of private international law, but, if the legal mechanism exists in the nation, their domestic national law can also adjudicate, transfer and alter the rights of a domestic sovereign entity that exists within the domain of a particular nation. This is true as long as an such as act does not violate international law. This legal authority has been demonstrated by decades, even centuries, of legal practice. (See "D. Adverse Possession transfers all the rights of an Estate which includes Regal and Sovereign Rights" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")  
English adverse possession of a proprietary territory in international law establishes "constructive possession." That is, "possession in law" or vicarious possession, which is legally equal to actual possession through a landlord/tenant relationship. "Factual Possession" in English adverse possession law also includes the right of constructive possession through the sovereign (landlord)/tenant relationship. This legal status along with private international law enables adverse possession law to have the legal competence to operate for a deposed or non-reigning sovereignty still valid under international law. (See "Constructive Possession" in "Three more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights of the Principality" and "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" on this page)
Both adverse and constructive possession create immediate secondary ownership of the territory in question, which right is above all others on earth with the exception that the historical owner still has the right to re-establish his possession. However, this right to re-possess only lasts until either the historical owners legally abandon the territorial land, which, in our case, they did in 2002, or the limitations period completes and finalizes the ownership in the adverse possessor, which took place in 2013. Hence, full and complete ownership was transferred to us in this way. (See "Constructive Possession," "1st Legally Binding Transfer of Rights -- Universal and Binding" and "3rd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") (See also "Letters from the Imperial Family")  
Besides three domestic methods that can and did convey the international sovereign entity, three international acquisition methods were also legally competent to transfer a deposed sovereign entity. These methods were fully involved in giving us the ownership rights and distinctions thereof. (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" and "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality")
It is important to understand that all seven methods are legally concluded and finalized without court or any other legal involvements. That is, the statutes and laws involved stand free, independent and clear of any outside meddling and are immediately binding and final when the requirements are met. (See "Automatic Nature of Adverse Possession in English Law" and "Court Involvement is not Required for Occupation to Effect Changes in Sovereignty" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality"),
Official recognition and/or the support of other states, scholars or organizations concerning a change of sovereignty are nice to have, but are irrelevant and unnecessary as the reality of the transfer is a legal fact. The point is, ". . . Sovereignty is neither created by recognition nor destroyed by nonrecognition." (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, edition 15, part 3, vol. 17, 1981, p. 312) Recognition cannot change a false and phony into something true and real, or something authentic into make believe. Truth is truth. Nevertheless, several prominent international legal scholars and experts have confirmed the validity of the claim. (See "Recognition Unessential to being Legitimate and Valid" on this page and "Recognition is Immaterial or Irrelevant to the Situation" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality"),  
Abandonment of the deposed entity in question is a key factor in enabling each transfer mode to work. This made everything possible. (See "Abandonment" in both "Letters from the Imperial Family" and on this page as well as in the "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality"),
The fact that seven valid methods have each legally and lawfully transferred all the rights and privileges of the principality, in and of itself, more than qualifies the case as being far "beyond any reasonable doubt." (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality," "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality" and "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges"),
Four powerful protective laws safeguard what has taken place:

a. "Estoppel" legally prevents the word of the Imperial family from being altered; that is, changed or reversed, because they officially stated through their attorneys that they would not take action against the transfer of the principality (See "Estoppel" in The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges"),
b. English "statue of limitations" also automatically blocks any future potential legal action in England against the transfer, because legally the time for doing so is past and this fact cannot be legally modified (See "Statute of Limitations" in The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges"),
c. "Critical date," a principle of international law, requires that nothing in our situation or case, can be admitted or considered legally relevant or material to any legal action after 2014 -- hence this is also protective (See "Critical Date" in "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges"), and
d. Both the domestic and international principle of "latches," a domestic and international doctrine similar to a statue of limitations, which also prevents or bars the consideration of a case after a period of time generally over 14 years. Laches is connected with the legal maxim: "Equity [or justice] aids the vigilant, not the sleeping ones;" that is, those who sleep on their rights or do nothing in a timely manner. (See "Critical Date" in "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges").

Each of these rules of law prevent any future effort to change the fact that the principality has been properly and permanently lost to the Imperial family, which lawfully abandoned it, and has been juridically acquired by the Goff/Harradine family in perpetuity or forever,
When all the facts are added up, the case is extremely solid, way beyond "more likely than not." It has reach undeniable mathematical and legal certainty. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")

          The legitimate claim for these international property rights are based on law -- the most solid of laws on earth. In other words, every facet of the domestic and international laws involved are fundamentally rooted in natural law -- laws recognized as conclusive in all the earth for every people and culture and for all the ages of mankind. As the Sir William Blackstone declared on natural law:

          It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original. (Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1, 4th ed., 1770, p. 41) (See "Natural and International Law" and "Natural Law and Adverse Possession" on this page)

 Statistical Summary and Conclusion

           When you consider that a "clear and convincing" case (a 70% confidence level) is defined as being so compelling that it is ". . . clear, direct, weighty in terms of quality, and convincing [so as] to cause you to come to a clear conviction of the truth" or "so clear as to leave no substantial doubt," then you can understand that a case like ours is so certain that instead of being a mere 70% likely, is 99.999999% sure. (Burden of Proof – Clear and Convincing Evidence; 2015: http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/civil/charges/1.19.pdf and Robin Meadow, Clear and Convincing Evidence: How Much Is Enough?; 2013: http://www.gmsr.com/article/clear%20and%20convincing%20evidence%20-%20how%20much%20is%20enough.pdf)

          That is, our claim is not only "clear and convincing" or highly compelling, but it is "beyond any reasonable doubt." It is based on "law" -- as all true and valid claims are. (See The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and a Fraudulent Claim) The evidence is straightforward and upfront, because it is based on clear-cut, self-evident laws and circumstances that are verified by affidavits and living witnesses as well as the important legally relevant documents involved.

          When the principles of probability are applied, the odds are 1,100,000,000,000 (1.1 trillion) to one that our claim could be anything other than true. Consider the following comparative statistical facts to understand how great important this finding really is:

You are more likely to be struck by lightening than this claim is not absolutely true (1 chance in 3,000),
There is a greater likelihood you will be killed by an asteroid or comet than our claim to the principality could be false (1 chance in 250.000), and
You are more likely to be murdered today than we are not the rightful holders of all the rights and distinctions of the principality (1 chance in 19,000). (National Geographic. Feeling Lucky? How Lotto Odds Compare to Shark Attacks and Lightning Sticks; 2018: https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/12/131219-lottery-odds-winning-mega-million-lotto)

          1,100,000,000,000 to one is a very staggering figure that describes something that is mathematically certain. It is conclusive. When you think about it, you are more likely to be attacked and killed by a shark in your lifetime (1 chance in 3,748,067). You are more likely to die from the use of fireworks (1 chance in 340,733), more likely to die from drowning (1 chance in 1,134), to be killed in a car accident (1 chance in 84), have a stroke (1 chance in 24), be struck down by heart disease (1 chance in 5), even injured by a toilet (1 chance in 10,000) or hit a deer in the State of Hawaii where deer are truly rare (1 chance in 6,787). (What are the Odds of a Shark Attack; 2018: https://www.thewildlifemuseum.org/exhibits/sharks/odds-of-a-shark-attack) All of these things are more likely to happen to you than that our claim could be false, even if all the odds were added up and compared to it.

          1.1 trillion to one means that the likelihood that our claim is absolutely true is at least 99.999999 percent -- practically perfect as 100% is absolutely perfect. That means for all practical purposes, the claim has a 100% mathematical certainty, or an extremely or enormously high confidence level. It is far too obvious, far too self-evident to deny or doubt. Statistically speaking, the odds are far beyond logical or reasonable doubt. The point is, belief is absolutely warranted and appropriate for a case where the evidence is truly beyond reasonable doubt. It has achieved the highest and most remarkable level of proof that is possible on earth. This makes this case, not only acceptable, not only compelling, but is a profound fact. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")

          The truth is, our claim is incontrovertible. Yet because of widespread bias and misinformation in the field of nobility and royalty, ". . . malice may attack it [and] ignorance may deride it, but in the end, there it is [as real and true as any other regal claim on earth]. (paraphrased from Winston Churchill) (See "PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS: The Future of Nobility and Chivalry" at  http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id108.htm)  

_______(End of Brief Foreword)_______
 

Contents: (Every section and subsection in one way or another provides verified evidence of the truth)
Expert Opinions and Recognitions
Legal Maxims
Important Foreword -- an unimpeachable transfer of all Rights
Preface
Table of Contents

 Expert Opinions and Recognitions
         "There is [obviously] a hierarchy of evidence [in terms of what is decisive in any case]. . . . [Of the various kinds of possible proof available] of primary importance is direct evidence, which is the presentation of material facts by a witness. . . ." (Andreas Kapardis, Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction, 4th ed, 2014, p. 27) "The most common vehicle for proof [to establish and verify facts] is the evidence of witnesses. . . . It is no exaggeration to say that the old common law in this area was predominantly a law of witnesses. . . ." (Colin Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 11th ed., 2004, p. 243)  In other words, "In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word be established [verified or confirmed]," or ". . . shall the matter be established [and settled]." (2 Corinthians 13:1 and Deuteronomy 19:15)
          We have added to two notarized attestations or affidavits as witnesses to what is recorded on this website, and, in addition: the following highly qualified and prominent men have provided relevant testimony to the fact that the claim is solid and lawful. Each vetted the claim and found it to be honest, truthful and sound or in full harmony with international and domestic law.

          (1) Stephen P. Kerr, JD, LLM, MAT, is a Professor of Law with Heritage International University, and former counsel to the Imperial and Royal House of Habsburg -- undoubtedly the foremost expert on non-territorial sovereignty and the law, made the following statement concerning the legal transfer of all rights after reading the detailed report and knowing the facts surrounding its occurrence. He wrote:

May 4, 2014

To whom it may concern:

I have examined Dr. Goff's website www.sra-lso-misconduct.com. His legal arguments are well-founded and solid, and are, therefore, legally valid. The conclusion is that his claims are legitimate and rightful, based on the application of domestic and international public law. (See "Documents")

          Dr. Kerr wrote the two volume book, The Entitlement to Rule: Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law. This unique and masterful book can be seen and read in full at www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com.

           (2) Dr. Adalberto J. Urbina Briceño, Sc.D., a distinguished Venezuelan scholar of Spanish royal and noble ancestry has also investigated into the validity of the claim. He is a specialist in International Law and Politics, a Genealogist, Historian and Theologian. He is the Head of the Public International Law Chair at the Catholic University Andrés Bello of Caracas; and Professor of Public International Law, International Human Rights Law and Roman Law at the Central University of Venezuela. He has served and been recognized and knighted by several European Royal Houses. Dr. Urbina Briceño wrote the following missive:

To Whom it may Concern:

I have analyzed the history of the claim and the legal arguments of Dr. Donald Edward Goff, concerning the Principality of Halberstadt. I consider that these facts and the proceedings and hearings carried out by Dr. Goff before a United States Federal Court, the results of a British Tribunal and a German High Court, to assert the rights, privileges and honours inherent to the aforesaid principality for himself and for his rightful heirs (members of the Goff/Harradine family); are, stricto iure, valid and legitimate, according to public international law applicable to nobility and royalty. (See "Documents" and "What contributions did the three courts provide?" in "Questions & Answers")

           (3) In addition, in Germany, under heraldic law, the claim has been legally registered with the Federal Republic of Germany as a "royal princely house" through the late highly respected heraldic expert Michael Waas of the Westphalian Heraldry Society. (See "Documents") Although Dr. Goff is a special representative of the International Commission on Nobility and Royalty, the facts of the case are unequivocal, therefore, the Commission has independently certified the claim for the Principality of Halberstadt as genuine and authentic, because it is based on a solid legal foundation. (See Documents)
          (4) A solicitor of the Supreme Court of England and Wales, Hugh Cawthorne, LLB, LLM, JD, MEd, gave the following statement on the case. He is also U.S. attorney admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States and a former professor, head of a Law Department and Editor of a major Journal on International Law. He wrote:  

I have read with great interest the materials and citations posted by Dr. Edward Goff on his website. The legal situation and transfer of rights concerning the Principality of Halberstadt is an interesting departure from what we would normally suppose for a valid princely house. However, the facts presented more than adequately demonstrate its legitimacy and accuracy as a lawful claim that is both definitive and solid. (See Documents)

            Being "definitive and solid" means the claim is not weak, but it is strong and sure. The above three experts provide an impressive and powerful witness to this fact. The point is, the evidence for the transfer is real, and the claim has achieved the highest level of assurance or confidence generally available in any court on earth.
          (5) Therefore, the Royal House of Georgia (eastern Europe) could and did officially recognize these facts:

The Royal Commission of the De jure Kingdom of Georgia, as authorized by, His Royal Highness Prince Nugzar Bagrationi-Gruzinski, as the rightful and lawful heir to the Throne and Kingdom of Georgia and other sovereign entities has registered and recognized the coat of arms of the Goff/Harradine royal princely house as it represents their sovereign and rightful claim to the regal rights and privileges of the Principality of Halberstadt. (See Documents)

(6) Heritage International University unequivocally supports our claim. This is no small thing as it is composed of various scholars and legal experts. (See Documents)

          The following are four official 2019 University doctoral dissertation committee members statements on this website, which is Dr. Goff's completed doctoral project. They lend further scholarly recognition of the obvious facts and legal reality of the claim:

Dr. Murray L. Eiland, B.A., M.Sc., LL.M., D.Phil.:

          Microsoft Word Document
Dr. Stephen P. Kerr, BBA, J.D., LL.M., M.A.T., LL.D. hon.:

          Microsoft Word Document
  Dr. Carl Lindgren, BA.Ed., M.Ed., S.Ed., D.Ed.:

Microsoft Word Document
Dr. Kimberly Aldridge, A.A., B.Sc., M.A., Ph.D.:

Microsoft Word Document

          This website is now being prepared and readied by the University, in printed form, for entrance into the Library of Congress and the world archives for university dissertations. (The university's web address is: "https://www.heritage-international.university")

 Legal Maxims

          The following are some highly relevant maxims -- legal truths as pertaining to the lawful transfer of all the entitlements and privileges of the principality:

Occupantis flunt derelict – Things abandoned become the property of the occupier, that is, the person who first takes possession of them after their abandonment. (John Trayner, Latin Maxims and Phrases, 4th ed., 1894, p. 415)
Vigilantibus et non dormientibus succurruntjura jura -- laws must help the vigilant, not those who sleep upon their rights. (George Frederick Wharton, Legal Maxims, 1865, p. 265) That is, those who do not protect their rights lose their rights.
Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litum – government shall limit the right to lawsuits. (George Frederick Wharton, Legal Maxims, 1865, p. 225) That is, statutes of limitation create legal certainty and confidence after the limitations period is finished so they can move ahead without the threat of a vexatious lawsuit or damaging prosecution.
Translated: Long possession produces the right of possession, and takes away from the true owner his action. (E. Hilton Jackson, Law-Latin: A Treatise in Latin with Legal Maxims and Phrases as a Basis of Instruction, 2nd ed., 1905, p. 212) After a statutory period of time, full and complete legal ownership transfers to the possessor. The possessor cannot thereafter be sued after the limitations period.
Translated: Possessor is good against all who cannot show a better title. (“Branch’s Principia Legis et Aequitatis,” Maxims in Law and Equity, William Waller Hening, ed., 1824, p. 110) No one may legally challenge the possessors ownership but the paper owner.
Possessio pacifica pour anns facit jus – Peaceful [unprotested] possession gives a right [a right to title and ownership]. (“Branch’s Principia Legis et Aequitatis,” Maxims in Law and Equity, William Waller Hening, ed., 1824, p. 110)
Melior est causa possidentis -- The cause of the possessor is preferable when two hold the same or similar right. (John Trayner, Latin Maxims and Phrases, 4th ed., 1894, p. 415) Possession is nine/tens of the law.
Venire contra factum proprium (nemini licet) – no one is allowed to act contrary to his or her prior action or behavior. (Bardo Fassbender, "Human Rights Obligations and the UN Security Council," Making Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy, Pieter H. F. Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer, and Michael Waibel, eds., 2010, p. 82) This is the law of estoppel.

          If a man so conducts himself, whether intentionally or not, that a reasonable person would infer that a certain state of things exists, and [another] acts on that inference, he [the person who made the declaration] shall be afterwards estopped. . . . (Herbert Broom, A Selection of Legal Maxims, Classified and Illustrated, 2000, p. 293)

          This means it cannot be retracted and is legally binding on the situation. All of the above principles were involved in one way or another -- supporting and sustaining the laws that created the rightful, legal transfer of the Principality.

          Adverse possession is based on a foundation of well-known time-honored principles of justice and equity, note that all its basic component parts are recognized as legal maxims. "When a principle has been so long practiced and so universally acknowledged as to become a maxim, it is obligatory as part of the law." (William C. Anderson, A Dictionary of Law, 1893, p. 666) A maxim of law is defined as "an established [legal] principle or proposition. . . ." (John Bouvier and Francis Rawle, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, vol. 2, 1897, p. 343) A maxism is "A broad statement of principle, the truth and reasonableness of which are self-evident. The [above] maxims or legal principles support all the basic tenants of adverse possession as just, appropriate and in harmony with universal legal agreement." (Farlex, The Free Dictionary, Maxim: 2016: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/maxim)

          Contrary to popular philosophies of the day, truth does exist. . . . Truth exists outside you and me or our private perceptions of the universe around us. Truths are true whether we wish to admit them as true or not. Truth doesn’t depend on our opinions or the opinions of any multitude of authorities. That's what real truth is. . . .

          Truth is not imaginary. . . . Only irrational persons believe otherwise.

          The self-evident truths expressed by the maxims of common law are true today. They were true yesterday. They were true at the beginning of time and will undoubtedly be true tomorrow and forevermore. They are self-evidently true and accepted as such by all reasonable persons.

          The maxims of common law have been published in old law books for centuries, yet they’re no longer taught today. Law schools ignore them. . . . Our public schools should be teaching the maxims, but they aren’t. So, we live in an age of legal ignorance that could so easily be uplifted by the simple truths contained within these memorable sayings that guided our forefathers to build a nation predicated on their common-sense principles of fairness and justice for one and all alike. (Frederick Graves, JD, Maxims of Common Law,” 2005, p. 35; 2018: https://giftoftruth.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/maxims-of-common-law-jurisdictionary.pdf)

 Important Foreword -- an unimpeachable transfer of all Rights

          Although complex, there are laws at every turn which establish the transfer of all the de jure international sovereign rights, distinctions and privileges of the principality.

          Legal writings are not generally easy or light reading, but can be very heavy and difficult to comprehend and understand. The following is, therefore, an effort to make the claim easier to understand by simplifying and summarizing the basic elements that compose its solid conclusions.

          The way not to get lost in the complicated technical details is to never lose sight of how each detail is being used to support the main thesis. Once a person can see how the component parts fit together, the details can then make sense and the conclusions become more clear and understandable. In any case, the reader is invited to inquire about any questions he or she may have though our email account. (See "Contact, Brief Recap and Affidavits")

          A brief summary of the more important identified legal fundamentals are:

(1) "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred" shows, in law and practice, that sovereignty and its royal rights can be transferred from one person or nation to another by various means in international law. The purpose of this information is to show that the rights of the Principality of Halberstadt could also likewise legally, lawfully and rightfully be transferred. Then the objective is to provide the proof that this is a legal reality, not a supposition based on guesswork, but a fact, because it really happened.

(2) This page presents the expert opinions of several scholars and others recognizing the validity of the claim. Afterwards, a summary or outline of the important legal fundamentals and principles are introduced, which culminate in the transfer of all the rights through a combination of international and English domestic law. These legal facts are:

(a) That the regal and sovereign rights to the said Principality were originally owned and maintained by the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern under international law, even though this was contrary to German national or domestic law,  
(b) International law recognizes that sovereignty and therefore legal rights and privileges can be lawfully transferred or conveyed inter vivos to another government or even to a private individual, (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 14, nos. 214-215)
(c) That a proper legal English Deed of Transfer was created and legalized through a contractual exchange of money in the year 2000 as well as by an official governmental apostille recognizing the fact,
(d) That a binding statement of estoppel was made in 2001 and 2002 which legally abandoned the rights to the principality by denying ownership of it as well as by declaring they would not get involved in the English legal deliberations about the principality,  
(e) That a London Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal recognized the legality of English jurisdiction over the case by legally adjudicating it along with other cases concerning the involved solicitor's actions in regard to them.
(f) The Deed of Transfer, though a legal English document, was never proven to have actually transferred the rights to the principality, or, on the other hand, proven it to be false, wrongful, or fraudulent, after a very thorough investigation by the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) costing over $300,000.00 in U.S. dollars. Because of this, the Deed could not convey "good title" to the property, but it could act as a legal description of the property both claimed and factually possessed. As such, it assisted adverse possession to have legal standing in England. Also, it was necessary that the Deed could not provide "good title," because ". . . possession is never adverse [one of the essential requirements] if enjoyed under a lawful title. . . ." (Buckinghamshire CC v Moran [1990] ch. 623 [1989] 3 WLR 152)
(g) In both the U. S. and England law, "Most adverse possessors think they own the land because they bought it -- [we certainly did]. What they really have is a void deed [in our case, a legal and lawful English deed providing no title or effecting no transfer of rights -- a legal deed that is void] gives color of title [to the situation]. . . ." (Course Introduction -- NYU School of Law, chapter 1: Introduction -- Acquiring Property, subsection Adverse Possession, p. 14; 2016: http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/flies/uplaod_documents/Upham_s99.rtf) "Color of title" refers ". . . to title that may have the appearance of good and valid title to property, but in actuality, there is either no title or a vital defect in the title that makes it ineffective. Thus, by law, color of title fails to establish ownership in land." (Real Property Color of Title Lawyers; 2016: http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/real-property-color-of-title.html) In other words, the conveyance was void -- meaning it was of no legal efficacy and did not transfer any ownership. But the important thing described here is that, by law, in such a situation, the factual claimant gets ". . . a shot [an opportunity] at getting to the statute of limits [or the transfer of all ownership rights through adverse possession, rather than by a defective conveyance deed, because] of being on the land [or possessing it factually through adverse possession law until the statute of limitations automatically turns the key to complete and exclusive ownership]." (Op.cit., Course Introduction)

          Adverse possession was complied with, to the fullest degree possible being in harmony with all and more of its most basic fundamental requirements than are necessary. They are:

        1.  Factual (or legal) Possession,
        2.  Exclusive Possession,
        3.  Open and Notorious Possession,
        4.  Unchallenged,
        5.  Continuous Possession,
        6.  Defined,
        7.  Adverse or Hostile Possession,
        8.  Intention to Possess, and
        9.  Possession must be for the Whole Required Statutory Period. (See "All Nine Requirements were Fulfilled to the Utmost")

            Although somewhat relevant, the following additional items are not directly pertinent to the validity of the claim: 1. registration being unnecessary, 2. English adverse possession and human rights, 3. legal ramifications and 4, the summary. But what is important is that once the twelve years of adverse possession were completed, the statute of limitations automatically came into full power and impact. The effect of the law created a enduring and permanent situation where all the rights, honors, and regal privileges of the Principality were automatically, without any other legal involvement, terminated for the original owners, who had actually forfeited their rights long ago by a failure to protest the legal situation in England, and by the profound and irreversible legal principle of estoppel, which is a substantive law recognized worldwide that prevents ". . . a person from denying, or asserting anything to the contrary of, that which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the truth, either by the acts of judicial or legislative officers, or by his own deed, acts, or representations, either express or implied."  (North Western Reporter, Second series. N.W. 2d. "Cases argued and determined in the courts of Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin," vol. 32, 1948, p. 408) Thus, by law, everything pertaining to the Principality was legally, by well-established and just laws, reassigned to the Goff/Harradine family, who had adversely possessed and claimed the rights for the entire required statutory period.


          Since "the concept of adverse possession does not surrender itself easily to precise or brief definition," therefore, this web page must of necessity be long, and highly detailed to cover all the bases, so that the claim may be substantiated or proven authentic and true. (Barry Magee, Deirdre Fox, Anne Stephenson, Rachael Hession, John Murray and Sean Brody, Conveyancing, 2014, p. 435) The following is complicated, but also consistent, unified and congruent. It is reality based legal concepts that together can enable the reader to see what really happened, and how it created a legally valid and binding case.

The Long and Detailed Legal Report is as follows:

 Preface

           The rest of this page should only be read if one understands and comprehends the "Introduction" article and the article on "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred." If these three articles are mastered, then the following report can make sense.  

            The following is complex legal reading, nevertheless, it is straightforward and obvious in its conclusions regarding the transfer of all the legal, non-territorial sovereignty rights of the Principality of Halberstadt. It is based on just laws, which means, it is not only on the right side of the law, but on the right side of what is just and true according to thousands of years of law practice and recognized equity. More than three prominent legal scholars and experts testify to this reality.(See "Documents")

            This case is a story of justice made right instead of justice gone wrong. It is a story of hard work, sacrifice and, finally, after 14 years, a happy ending came to a long arduous trial for something considered to be of great personal worth and of great value to my family. The legal facts are organized in the following order.

 Table of Contents:

a. Introduction
b. Who Rightfully Owned the Rights of Halberstadt in the Past
c.  The Principality of Halberstadt was and is a Sovereign Entity and therefore a Royal Realm
     d. De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law
e.  Adverse Possession Applies
  (a) Two Major Laws are Most Important and Relevant in this Case
  (b) Like many Transfers of Corporeal Property, there are Aspects of that Transfer that are Incorporeal
  (c) Corporeal Land Qualifies for Adverse Possession and It Includes whatever Incorporeal Rights are Attached or Connected to it
  (d) Adverse Possession transfers all the rights of an Estate which includes Regal and Sovereign Rights  
  (e) Adverse Possession cures defects in Conveyances
  (f) The Adverse Possessor does not need to know that he is Adversely Possessing the Rights to the Property he has taken control of or Factually Occupied
f.  English Jurisdiction and Authority
            (a) Introduction
            (b) Evidence: Legal Documents and Letters
            (c) Pertinent Binding Laws
(1) Estoppel
(2) Abandonment
(3) Failure to Protest
(4) Treaty Law
(5) Juridical Acts
(6) Contract Law
(7) Private International Law and English Jurisdiction
(8) The Statute of Limitations
            (d) Review of Important Points
g. Adverse Possession
            (a) Introduction
           (b) Natural Law and Adverse Possession
            (c) How it Works
            (d) Requirements
        All nine requirements were fulfilled to the utmost:
            (1) Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not actual Possession
   Flexibility
   No Need to be in Physical Possession of the Land
   Proprietary Sovereignty and the Landlord/Tenant Relationship
   In International Law, Deposed Sovereigns are still the Rightful and Lawful Landlords of their Former Territories
   The Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern were Proprietary Monarchs and owned their Territory
   By law, Proprietary Ownership begins Immediately
   Summary
   Our Case and Factual Possession
                      (2) Exclusive Possession
            (3) Open and Notorious Possession
            (4) Unchallenged
            (5) Continuous Possession
            (6) Defined
            (7) Adverse or Hostile Possession
            (8) Intention to Possess
            (9) Possession must be for the Whole Required Statutory Period
    h.   Registration is Unnecessary
    i.   Adverse Possession & Human Rights
    j.    Legal Consequences & Ramifications of Completing an Adverse Possession Claim
    k.  Recognition Unessential to being Legitimate and Valid
   l.   Summary (It is legal, lawful, just and fair)
    m. Eight Legal and Lawful Methods Transferred all the Rights
    n.  Underlying Purpose

 How all the Rights and Privileges of the Principality of Halberstadt were Transferred

 Introduction

           In a nutshell, by implied consent (a legal presumption of estoppel or waiver of rights), a significant international law right, having both an "incorporeal" and "corporeal" land qualities, the rights to Halberstadt legally became subject to the jurisdiction of English domestic property law. It was then adversely possessed for the required twelve years, when the statute of limitations became binding; such that, an international law right was established legally and lawfully conveying the regal rights to the possessor. These basic principles applied in transferring the full rights and honors of non-territorial sovereignty have been used from time immemorial. They can be observed in Roman law, law in the Byzantine Empire, in ancient Greece, Assyria, and can even be observed in the Old Testament as used before the Kingdom of Israel ever existed. In other words, these principles are of ancient as well as modern practice, not only for over thousands of years, but for thousands of cases as a recognize part of natural justice and equity. The legal details follow below.             
            The field of law, as it relates to nobility and royalty, is a complex area of study involving family statutes as well as specific aspects of national, nobiliary and international law. It is generally best reserved for legal experts like any other intricate complicated specialty. That is, some attorneys, not versed in this area of law, would not fully understand the following legal verities as applied to deposed or de jure non-territorial sovereignty. As the expression goes, they might "know enough to be dangerous" or get things all wrong. Nevertheless, the following is written in as basic language as possible to elaborate and give evidence and substantiation to the principles applied. As expressed a number of times in the body, it would be well for anyone wanting to fully understand the legal consequences to read the book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law by Stephen Baca y Kerr, JD, LLM, MAT. It can be accessed in full on the internet at www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com.
            The legal situation, as shall be seen below, is no gimmick or legal trick, it is a time-honored, legitimate way of conveying hereditary rights, entitlements and privileges not only of property on a domestic level, but of royalty and sovereignty on the international level through the law of nations. As stated by Paul Stafford, a practicing barrister:

            The law abhorrers a vacuum, and courts will go to almost any length to support a right that is openly asserted, long continued and never before contested if it can find a legal origin for that right. (Paul Stafford, "Title Challenge," Property Law Journal, vol. 262, 24 January 2011, p. 21)

            The situation discussed is a case of an "openly asserted, long continued and never before contested" claim with "a legal origin." This is the kind of situation that the law supports. As such, the titles, honors, rights, etc., of the Principality of Halberstadt are now the legal and lawful incorporeal property right of D. Edward Goff, Ph.D. and his heirs. The purpose of the web page is to show how this occurred legally and rightfully through abandonment or alienation of the property under both international law, English jurisdiction, and English adverse possession rules and statutes. For anyone truly serious about knowing more or have questions, please contact the author. (See "Contact, Brief Recap and Affidavits")

           One of the most important laws pertaining to the first of eight binding transfer modes is private international law. (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction")

 Who Rightfully Owned the Rights of Halberstadt in the Past?

It is easy to prove that the Imperial and Royal House of Prussia held all the rights, privileges, honors, etc. for the small, but prominent, little Principality of Halberstadt. This is a well-known historical fact that needs no elaboration. Nevertheless, I will add the following
After Napoleon's final defeat, the Congress of Vienna of 1815 declared by treaty law that Prussia would own all the sovereign and property rights of the Principality:

    ART. XXIII. His Majesty the King of Prussia having in consequence of the last war, reassumed the possession of the provinces and territories which had been ceded by the Pease of Tilsit, it is acknowledged and declared by the present Article that his Majesty, his heirs and successors, shall possess anew, as formerly, in full property and sovereignty, the following countries [countries, not mediatized fiefs], [among the many little sovereign entities that were transferred were]  . . . the principality of Halberstadt, with the lordships of Derenbourg, and of Hassenrode. . . . ["in full property and sovereignty" to the Royal House of Prussia]. (Final Act of the Congress of Vienna/General Treaty; 2015: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Final_Act_of_the_Congress_of_Vienna/General_Treaty)

Hence, the heads of the Imperial and Royal House continued to be the Princes of Halberstadt:

Kaiser William I:

His Imperial and Royal Majesty William I, By the Grace of God, German Emperor and King of Prussia; Margrave of Brandenburg, Burgrave of Nuremberg, Count of Hohenzollern; sovereign and supreme Duke of Silesia and of the County of Glatz; Grand Duke of the Lower Rhine and of Posen; Duke of Saxony, of Westphalia, of Angria, of Pomerania, Lunenburg, Holstein and Schleswig, of Magdeburg, of Bremen, of Guelders, Cleves, Jülich and Berg, Duke of the Wends and the Kassubes, of Crossen, Lauenburg and Mecklenburg; Landgrave of Hesse and Thuringia; Margrave of Upper and Lower Lusatia; Prince of Orange; Prince of Rügen, of East Friesland, of Paderborn and Pyrmont, of Halberstadt, Münster, Minden, Osnabrück, Hildesheim, of Verden, Cammin, Fulda, Nassau and Moers; Princely Count of Henneberg; Count of Mark, of Ravensberg, of Hohenstein, Tecklenburg and Lingen, of Mansfeld, Sigmaringen and Veringen; Lord of Frankfurt.

1. H.I.M. Wilhelm II German Emperor & King of Prussia, 2015:
http://web.archive.org/web/20071222124050/http://regiments.org/biography/royals/1859wilG.htm         
2. Rudolf Graf v. Stillfried: Die Titel und Wappen des preußischen Königshauses, Berlin 1875)

Kaiser Frederick III:

His Imperial and Royal Majesty Frederick III, By the Grace of God, German Emperor and King of Prussia, Margrave of Brandenburg, Burgrave of Nuremberg, Count of Hohenzollern, Duke of Silesia and of the County of Glatz, Grand Duke of the Lower Rhine and of Posen, Duke of Saxony, of Angria, of Westphalia, of Pomerania and of Lunenburg, Duke of Schleswig, of Holstein and of Crossen, Duke of Magdeburg, of Bremen, of Guelderland and of Jülich, Cleves and Berg, Duke of the Wends and the Kashubians, of Lauenburg and of Mecklenburg, Landgrave of Hesse and in Thuringia, Margrave of Upper and Lower Lusatia, Prince of Orange, of Rugen, of East Friesland, of Paderborn and of Pyrmont, Prince of Halberstadt, of Münster, of Minden, of Osnabrück, of Hildesheim, of Verden, of Kammin, of Fulda, of Nassau and of Moers, Princely Count of Henneberg, Count of the Mark, of Ravensberg, of Hohenstein, of Tecklenburg and of Lingen, Count of Mansfeld, of Sigmaringen and of Veringen, Lord of Frankfurt.

(Titles of Frederick III at the Wayback Machine (archived March 14, 2007)

Kaiser William II:

His Imperial and Royal Majesty William II, By the Grace of God, German Emperor and King of Prussia, Margrave of Brandenburg, Burgrave of Nuremberg, Count of Hohenzollern, Duke of Silesia and of the County of Glatz, Grand Duke of the Lower Rhine and of Posen, Duke of Saxony, of Angria, of Westphalia, of Pomerania and of Lunenburg, Duke of Schleswig, of Holstein and of Crossen, Duke of Magdeburg, of Bremen, of Guelderland and of Jülich, Cleves and Berg, Duke of the Wends and the Kashubians, of Lauenburg and of Mecklenburg, Landgrave of Hesse and in Thuringia, Margrave of Upper and Lower Lusatia, Prince of Orange, of Rugen, of East Friesland, of Paderborn and of Pyrmont, Prince of Halberstadt, of Münster, of Minden, of Osnabrück, of Hildesheim, of Verden, of Kammin, of Fulda, of Nassau and of Moers, Princely Count of Henneberg, Count of the Mark, of Ravensberg, of Hohenstein, of Tecklenburg and of Lingen, Count of Mansfeld, of Sigmaringen and of Veringen, Lord of Frankfurt.

(Titles of William II at the Wayback Machine (archived March 14, 2007)

As stated in the internet article: "From 1648 to 1918, the 'Princes of Halberstadt' were the Electors of Brandenburg, the Kings of Prussia and finally the Emperors of Germany. . . ." (List of states in the Holy Roman Empire (H); 2015: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_states_in_the_Holy_Roman_Empire_%28H%29) This is a well-known fact. But what most people do not know or understand is how the Imperial Hohenzollerns could still hold all the royal rights of non-territorial sovereignty after the Emperor (Kaiser Wilhelm) and his son, the Crown Prince, abdicated, and the Weimar Republic disenfranchised all the nobility.  
First of all, an abdication only relinquishes one’s own personal rights. All royal prerogatives, without exception are, in such a case, transferred to the person next in line to the throne of that particular territory. Hugo Grotius, one of the fathers of international law, declared that the father's abdication.          

. . . cannot hurt his Children who are already born, because as soon as . . . the Children are come into the World, they acquire a Right of their own by Law. . . .  The Difference between the Children born before the Abdication, and those who were born after, is this, those who were born after had not . . . acquired their Right; and therefore [they have no right to the succession]. . . . (Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 7, no. 26)

As Emperor Francis II of Austria confirmed, "If he [a king or sovereign prince] abdicates then his rights are passed on to his legitimate heirs." (J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin, "The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations," International Organization, vol. 48, no. 1, winter 1994, pp. 116-117) Abdication does not dissolve the monarchy or dissolve a sovereign kingdom, principality, dukedom, county or sovereign lordship.
This is especially true if the abdication was made under duress, coercion or force as was the case with the Kaiser. Abdications of this sort are legally null and void. The situation was so intense in 1918 that people were scavenging fields and gutters for rotting food and the threat of more suffering and more punishment was officially made by the vindictive Allied armies against Germany, if the Kaiser was still in power. To prevent further wrongs, the Kaiser had to abdicate or be killed. "The commander of the German army, summed up the situation by 9 November 1918 when he said to the Kaiser, 'If you won't abdicate, the best thing for you to do was shoot yourself.'" (John Kerr, Germany 1918-39, 2003, p. 10)
History records in various books on the subject that Wilhelm II ". . . was forced to abdicate. . . ." (Wolfgang Chr Fischer, German Hyperinflation 1922/23: A Law and Economics Approach, p. 73) Forced abdications are considered to be invalid in international law. The Kaiser continued to use his exalted titles, arms and the exalted uniforms of the Empire as evidence of the invalidity of the abdication as required by international law to show he did not abandon his claims.
The next question about ownership concerns the survival of these rights in the face of the subsequent Republic's constitutional denial of any legality for the former monarchy. To understand this, one must distinguish between local or domestic law and international law. No matter what the Republic decrees domestically, it cannot alter international rights and entitlements. According to the law of nations, the Imperial and Royal House still holds the proprietary rights to its former territories. This is called de jure non-territorial sovereignty. Phillip Marshall Brown, a distinguished international lawyer, wrote on the sovereignty of dethroned kings and princes and ". . . sovereignty, even though flaunted, restricted, and sent into exile, still persists. . . . There is no automatic extinction of nations." (Marjorie Millace Whitman, 1963, Digest of International Law, 1963, p. 474) That is, ". . . a King who has been driven from his Kingdom by force of arms, and has lost possession [or control] of his [territorial or proprietary] sovereignty, has not thereby lost his [sovereign] right [or his title to the land and its people]. . . ." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 1680, p. 88) The point is, ". . . A Prince, unjustly deposed . . . hath still a Right to his Kingdom. . . ." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 8, chapter 9, no. 9)  This right continues on in the dispossessed royal house, if maintain, because of a special natural law that has been around since ownership and the right to rule began or came into existence. (See "Natural and International Law")
 So what law is this that can keeps these rights alive and what is the criteria to maintain such a high honor indefinitely? The law is called "prescription." It can preserve the right to rule or it can permanently terminate it. To keep the proprietary right of royalty and sovereignty alive, Emerich de Vattel, one of the founders of international law, declared, "Protests answer this purpose. With sovereigns it is usual to retain the title and arms of a sovereignty or a province, as an evidence that they do not relinquish their claims to it." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 145) In other words, ". . . In a [deposed] hereditary monarchy, the right to rule remains with the royal descendant until he has lost it through the long process of prescription." (John A. Ryan, “Catholic Doctrine on the Right of Self-Government,” Catholic World, vol. 108, January 1919, p. 444) If, however, that deposed royal house continues to use its titles and arms as a consistent and unrelenting protest, the terminating power of prescription does not take place. Instead the preserving properties of the law perpetuates the de jure non-territorial right to rule for as long as it is maintained. This is because ". . . prescription hath power to ratify and confirm [in other words, perpetuate] the titles both of Princes and of private men." (George Buck, The History of the Life and Reign of Richard the Third, 1647, p. 144) (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and the article "Deposed Sovereignty and Royalty: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm)
           Hence, even though on a domestic level all sovereignty is terminated and lost, on an international level, it is valid, still binding and can last forever provided the rules are followed. Thus, the Imperial House owned the rights of Halberstadt, under the law of nations, until it was legally transferred.

           Brief Summary Statement: The Royal and Imperial House of Hohenzollern (or Prussia) were the original rightful owners of the non-territorial sovereign rights to said Principality. They maintained and preserved them though the years through the international rules and principles of prescriptive law, which governs the legal right to rule for deposed sovereign entities.

 The Principality of Halberstadt was and is a Sovereign Entity and therefore a Royal Realm

          In the Holy Roman Empire, "A PRINCIPALITY is that territory [state] or country whose sovereign [monarch or ruler] has the title of Prince." William Pinnock and Edwin Williams, A Comprehensive System of Modern Geography and History, 1835, p. 25) [The designation 'prince,' was ". . . given to all degrees of sovereignty . . . even Kings and Emperors are often called Prince." (Ibid.) "A COUNTY . . . is that district possessed by one who has the title of COUNT. . . ." (Ibid.) A "DUKEDOM, or DUCHY, signifies the dominion or territories of a Duke." (Ibid.) Even though such title holders were members of the Empire, ". . . they were absolute in their respective territories, being in effect kings without the title. . . ." (Ibid.) ". . . At present there are no sovereign Barons but such as are members of the German Empire." (Ibid., p. 27)
          "Within determined [a certain type of] territories, princes acted like kings in their own realms. Their principalities were 'statelets.'" (Peter Haidu, The Subject Medieval/Modern: Text and Governance in the Middle Ages, 2004, p. 160.) That is, they are their own little independent countries or nation.

          . . . One of the principal things he [the Emperor] promiseth in his Oath, is, That he will save to every of the States their Rights and Privileges, and disturb none of them in the exercise thereof.  And this is one of those Rights in which the Princes and States of Germany take the greatest Pride; That every one of them can govern their own proper Subjects, according to his own will, or to the Compacts he has made with them. (Samuel von Pufendorf, The Present State of Germany, Michael J. Seidler, ed., Edmund Bohun, trans, chapter 5, no. 5, [1696] 2007)

          . . . The princes were not mere officials of the [Holy Roman] Empire with delegated powers, but true rulers [sovereigns or monarchs] who represented their dominions in the Imperial Diet. . . . (Heinz H. F. Eulau, "Theories of Federalism under the Holy Roman Empire," The American Political Science Review, vol. 35, no. 4, August 1942, p. 663)

          . . . The [Holy Roman] Empire was never a proper monarchy such as France or England. . . .  [The] princes . . . [held] comprehensive royal jurisdiction and royal rights, summarized as superiority, or Landesobrigkeit, over a defined territory. . . .  Superiority . . . possessed by the princes [was] to exercise royal rights over such a defined territory and its inhabitants.  No territory was ever without such jurisdiction and royal rights. . . .  These territories and the royal rights and rights of jurisdiction inherent in them were conceded in perpetuo [which means in perpetuity or forever]. . . .  They exercised plenitude potestatis [sovereignty or a fullness of power]. . . .  For the princes were not vicarii [not deputies], civil servants or representative of the Emperor, but rulers in their own hereditary right. (Robert von Friedeburg, "The Reception of Bodin in the Holy Roman Empire and the Making of the Territorial State," The Reception of Bodin, Howell A. Lloyd, ed., 2013, pp. 308-309 and Andreas Knichen, De jure Territorii, 1658, pp. 130, 168, 171, 174, 189-191, 192, 199, 200, 201-202)

          [In] the eleventh century . . . the possessor of the fief, great or small, possessed all the rights of sovereignty in his domains.  No external or distant power gave laws there, established taxes, or administered justice; the proprietor alone possessed all this power . . . in a word, he was sovereign. (François Guizot, The History of Civilization from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution, vol. 3, 1879, pp. 359-360)

           [Thus the] great feudatories [or fiefs] were petty kings ruling petty kingdoms.  These facts did not escape contemporary notice and so it is not astonishing that legalists categorized duchies, [princes] marquisates, and counties as fiefs of regal dignity. (D. C. Skemer, "The Myth of Petty Kingship and a New Periodization of Feudalism," Belgian Journal of Philology and History, vol. 51, issue 51-52, 1973, p. 270)

          The pivotal nature of the Peace of Westphalia lies in the fact that it recognized the full territorial sovereignty of the member States of the Holy Roman Empire. . . . (R. W. Dyson, Natural Law and Political Realism in the History of Political Thought: From the Seventeenth to the Twenty First Century, vol. 2, 2007, p. 167)

          Although the States of the Empire held internal supremacy all along. Nevertheless, "By this [the Westphalian treaties and accords] . . . the princes of the empire became absolute sovereigns in their own dominions [and the constitution of the Empire now officially acknowledged it]." (Alfred Bradley Gough, "Westphalia, Treaty of," The Encyclopaedia Britannica: a Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information, 11th ed., vol. 28, Hugh Chisholm, ed., 1911, p. 558) "Each prince or king became an emperor in his own realm." (Andrew Vincent, Nationalism and Particularity, 2002, p. 17) "The royal qualities [were] attributed to the various grades of princes [in the Holy Roman Empire] made . . . [them] more comparable to emperors than to the Roman provincial praesides [governors] with whom they had been traditionally linked." (Richard Roy Beneri, "Inferior Magistrates in Sixteenth-century Political and Legal Thought," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, December 1967)  In other words, ". . . their dignity [and status] was [that of a] ‘royal’. . . ." (Ibid.) "A royal family [is] (by extension the ruling house of any monarchy, regardless of the title [whether count, duke, prince, king or emperor). . . ." (Academic Dictionaries and Encyclopedias; 2017: http://enacademic.com/dic.nsf/enwiki/157217/Royalty) That is, "Royals (usually emperors to princely counts) are all considered 'princes' (German: Fürsten)." (Royal and Noble Ranks, Styles and Addresses, 2018: https://www.nobility-royalty.com/id84.htm) They were all royals or members of the royalty. (The International Commission on Nobility and Royalty, Royal and Noble Ranks, Styles and Addresses; 2017: http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id84.htm) In other words, by definition: "Royalty: “Monarchs and their families [are] considered as a group [as royalty]." (Martin Manser, Heinemann English Dictionary, 5th ed., 2001, p. 880)

          The prince’s] powers included regalia [emblems of royalty and prerogatives], rights of majesty (iura maiestatis [the right to be honored and protected in their regal prominence]) and rights of empire (iura imperii [the imperial right to rule]) which they might have acquired either from the emperor [directly by ennoblement] or by prescription. (Ibid.)

          ". . . Their hereditary independence rendered them virtually immune to the emperor's superiority, even though it may have originated by imperial concession." (Ibid.) Thus, the rights to the Principality of Halberstadt and its dignities represented the right of sovereign ownership and royal position or rank. The point is in the German Empire, "Sovereignty . . . could pass by inheritance, testament, investiture, infeoffment, or even sale or lien. Its possession or enjoyment did not require noble status." (The Holy Roman Empire, 2016: http://www.heraldica.org/topics/national/hre.htm#Sovereignty) A commoner, if he had the money, or any other person with financial means, could purchase a county or principality and become a count or prince of the empire and hold the right of sovereignty as a full-fledged royal monarch over a small or large designated territory. "The right to receive the investiture [of such a high honor and distinction] was nevertheless attached to the land, and could not be denied [or prevented] by the Emperor." (Ibid.) Established territorial fiefs held these rights, not families. Such that, ". . . a rich commonwealth [or common person] might buy the sovereign rights and power of a spendthrift prince [who needed money], just as it might buy his landed estate or his manorial privileges." (Edward Augustus Freeman, Comparative Politics: Six Lectures Read Before the Royal Institution in January and February, 1873, 2010, p. 289) Such transfers of high regal status along with the right to rule and govern were not uncommon occupancies.
In other words, in Germany:

          The dominical [royal or feudal sovereign] titles [of duke, prince, count, baron, lord, etc.) were associated with government of territories. Territories gave titles to their owners. E.g. a man became a count, when a king gave him a county. When the county went to a new owner, the old one lost the title [and all his dynastic rights]. (The Imperial Nobility and the Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire, 2013: http://www.mindserpent.com/American_History/religion/pope/prince_elector/constitution
_of_the_holy_roman_empire.htm)

          Many princes of the empire also used the title "by the grace of God," because according to jurists of the time " . . . Plenitude of power [or sovereignty also equaled] the right to use the title, 'Dei Gratia'” -- which is "by the grace of God." (Richard Roy Beneri, "Inferior Magistrates in Sixteenth-century Political and Legal Thought," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, December 1967)
          By definition, a principality is ". . . a territory ruled by a prince or princess. . . . [It is] the position, authority, or jurisdiction of a prince or princess [in other words, a] sovereignty [involving the right to rule]." (The Free Online Dictionary, 2013: http://www.thefreedictionary.com/principality) (emphasis added) If a sovereign entity is transferred or conveyed in one of many possible ways to a man, ". . . It is this which gives the receiver . . . regal [kingly and/or princely] right," depending on the legal status of the sovereign territory. (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, [1680], vol. 2, John Pawley Bate, trans., chapter 9, no. 19, 1916)
          In adverse possession, legally empowered by private international law, everything, every international right, without exception, that belongs to the particular estate becomes the legal and lawful property of the person to whom it is rightfully transferred. By definition, "sovereignty" is "royal rank, power, or authority." (Westster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary, "Sovereignty," 1984, p. 1112) This legal right can be maintained and preserved endlessly or never end. The point is, ". . . The king [or sovereign prince] does not forfeit the character of royalty merely by the loss of his kingdom. If he is unjustly despoiled of it by an usurper, or by rebels, he still preserves his rights. . . ." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter XII, no. 196)

          The question of how long a “de jure” king may continue in this status is answered in Textor’s "synopsis Juris Gentium," which says that "de jure" sovereigns in exile retain their status as long as they do not surrender their sovereignty to the "de facto" government. . . . (David Hughes, The British Chronicles, vol. 1, 2007, p. 358)

          [Deposed] Princes, by keeping the Titles or Arms of a Kingdom, of which they have not been in Possession of a considerable Time, [do so] . . . to preserve their Right. . . . (Professor Johann Werlhof (1660-1711) quoted in Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, vol. 2, Jean Barbeyrac trans., ed. and writer of the notes, Richard Tuck, ed., book 2, chapter 4, no. 1, note 5, [1625], 2005) This sovereign and regal entitlement can be kept alive forever merely by the consistent use of one’s sovereign titles and national arms. (See “Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De Jure Ownership”)
          The Imperial and Royal House perpetuated its rights to the Principality of Halberstadt through international law till they officially abandoned their ownership in 2002. That is, at that time, they washed their hands of it and left the outcome to English legal jurisdiction. In other words, they stated they would not get involved or take any legal action and didn't. (See "Letters of the Imperial House")
          The point is, in English law ". . . even before the [limitations] period is completed, the [adverse possessor] has the rights and powers of an owner, against everyone except the person he has dispossessed." (Judith-Anne MacKenzie and Mary Phillips, Textbook on Land Law, 2013, p. 146) Adverse possession is best understood as a two-stage process: (1) constructive abandonment by the title owner, followed by (2) possession and ownership . . . of the newly abandoned property by the adverse possessor. (Scott Andrew Shepard, "Adverse Possession, Private-Zoning Waiver & Desuetude: Abandonment & Recapture of Property and Liberty Interests," University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, vol. 44, Issue 3, 2011, p. 558) That is, when the former owner abandoned the principality in 2002, by law, we became the exclusive or sole owners thereof. No one else on earth had a higher right to it at that point than we did. It meant that we had all the rights, distinctions and honors of an authentic principality, which is still a sovereignty entity in international law. This meant we became a "royal princely house." (See "3rd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth" in "Three more Legally Binding Transferred all the Rights to the Principality") It then became more powerful, because "once the statutory time passes [12 years for unregistered land, the adverse possessor's] rights become superior [greater than] those of everyone [else on earth]. When no one has greater [or superior] rights [in all the world to the property, obviously the adverse possessor] is the new owner." (Jeffery E. Stake, "The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession," The Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 89, no. 2419, 2001, p. 2422) This is what happened in our situation. We now hold the exclusive de jure constructive corporeal land rights to Halberstadt in international law. ("1st Legally Binding Transfer of Rights" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
           By comparison, sovereignty, nobility and titles in Germany have different meanings and legal values than in England. Note that:

          An English duke might be many times richer than a minor German mediatized prince, his title was theoretically equal, and his political power might be greater — but the German prince and his children counted as royalty, and the Englishman and his children did not. This meant for example that the English duke's daughter would be too low in rank to marry the German prince as an equal. (Sensagent, Medialization; 2017: http://dictionary.sensagent.com/Mediatization/en-en)

          The major difference or distinction in this comparison is that the mediatized German Princes were de jure sovereigns or monarchs and therefore they were "royalty." The English duke, on the other hand, had no de jure or deposed sovereign rights, hence, even though he was considered to be of the high nobility in his country, he was not a royal. But "all Imperial Estates, which were not mediatized [before August of 1806 or the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire], received . . . unlimited sovereignty [in other words, they are royalty]." (The High Nobility and the Imperial Constitution; 2017: http://archive.is/2rSet#selection-1349.64-1353.2) The title of a "count [has] become a title of dignity only [and nothing more], though in Germany, there are now some who still retain their sovereignty." (Ob.cit., William Pinnock, p. 25) Deposed sovereignty is retained exclusively by virtue of the law that governs deposed sovereignty. Otherwise this right does not exist. Like the count, "There are several sovereign Dukedoms in Germany [because of prescriptive law], and also in Italy. [However] all the Dukedoms in Great Britain and France are [merely] honorary [dignities meaning they are without the right to rule]." (Ibid.)

          The sovereigns [after the demise of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 were]  . . . freed from all their ancient ties of feudality not only as reigning princes but as private individuals, are in all respects the equals in rank of the other monarchs of Europe. ("Article 10: Deutschlands Constitutionen," The Westminster Review, vol. 22, 1835, p. 83)

          There are in all more than forty sovereign houses of Europe, but all do not reign over independent lands or principalities. Although many of these houses possess only the title of sovereignty and the right of royal privileges, they are equal in rank to all reigning houses, and their members intermarry freely without loss of title or rank. (George H. Merritt, "The Royal Relatives of Europe," Europe at War: a "Red Book" of the Greatest War of History, 1914, p. 132)

          The principality of Halberstadt was retained by the Imperial House as a proprietary sovereign entity in international law until they abandoned it and declared they would not get involved in whatever took place in England concerning its ownership. (See "Letters of the Imperial House") As we became the rightful, lawful and true owners of a sovereign principality, the Westphalian Heraldic Society registered us with the German republic as a "Royal Princely House." "Royal," because the supreme right to rule makes one a monarch, which makes one a royal by definition.

          Brief Summary Statement: The Principality of Halberstadt, as a small, but prominent State of the Holy Roman Empire, was and still is a sovereign entity legally maintained as such by the Imperial and Royal House of Prussia who were the sovereign princes and rulers of this land until its rights were legally discarded and finally transferred by the law. It should be noted that after the transfer, the supreme right to rule has continued to be maintained and preserved according to the law that perpetuates all the legal rights, privileges, and entitlements of deposed sovereignty.

 De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law

          ". . . [In the] type of government known as ‘patrimonial,’ [are] vested all titles to the land in the hands of the monarch. . . ." (Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom, 2007, p. 160) That is, "[In a patrimonial king] lay the final legal title to all land. All other persons [the citizens] had 'tenures' rather than rights of ownership." (Westel Woodbury Willoughby, Prussian Political Philosophy: Its Principles and Implications, 1918, p. 83) That is, in Prussia, for example, the kingdom of the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern, as in other proprietary kingdoms, ". . . the ownership of land carried with it . . . the right of political rulership." (Ibid.) That is, they owned the land and the people who stayed on that land were subject to the prince's right to rule his land.
          If such a monarchy is illegally deposed, they still own the right to all the land, not under the domestic law of the usurpers, but under international prescriptive law that recognizes all lawful entitlements of a dispossessed sovereignty. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership") Such a deposed or overthrown kingdom or principality continues to hold all the legal rights to rule and own all the property of the territory, but can no longer control the territory. These rights of ownership are called de jure or rightful. The subsequent government is de facto or actually in control of all the land. In other words, there is de jure or dethroned ownership of land on an international level, and de facto control of property on a domestic or republic governmental level.
         Note that, "A de jure government (deposed) is one that has been, and still claims to be, lawfully possessed of sovereignty." (Herbert Wolcott Bowen, International Law: A Simple Statement of its Principles, no. 202, 1897, p. 131) This kind of sovereignty ". . . has the legal right [but not the actual power] to command obedience." (Raj Kumar Pruthi, The Political Theory, 2005, p. 72) In other words, de jure means lawful, rightful, legitimate in principle according to law, while de facto means actual, in fact, in practice, in effect, in control of the territory, whether by right or not.
          ". . . The sovereignty held by the displaced [deposed] legal sovereign [or royal house] is known as De jure Sovereignty." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, 1680, chapter XIV, no. 8) "A deposed monarch remained, in law, a [de jure, legal or rightful] monarch." (Charlotte Catherine Wells, Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France, Issue 1, 1995, p. 198)
          However, not only is there deposed sovereignty, which is defined as being de jure, but there is dispossessed ownership of real property. This ownership is de jure. It is legal, rightful and legitimate, but it lacks actual control over the land. That is, another person or government unlawfully enjoys de facto or actual possession of the land or property in question.

          Consider for instance, possession of a stolen car [comparing it to the stolen land rights of a kingdom or principality]. There is almost certainly an owner who holds de jure title in the car. That owner will also likely be de jure [that is, legally “in possession” of the car or kingdom] for purposes of maintaining various private rights of action to enforce her property [or proprietary] rights [in international law]. At the same time, the thief [the usurping government] enjoys de facto possession of the car [or the whole nation or principality]. The thief, and not the [rightful] owner, can drive the car from place to place [that is, control the government]. The thief can chop the car into pieces, not the owner [the dispossessed royal house has no control at this point]. Thus, the owner and the thief simultaneously own contradictory set of rights. The thief can sell the de facto possessory rights on the black market. The owner, in the meantime, even without actual possession, has title to the car and can sell ownership and the right of possession in licit [that is, in legal] markets, subject, of course, to proper disclosure about the relevant facts concerning the purchase. For simplicity’s sake, we can call this kind of case a de jure -- de facto clash, characterized by the existence of simultaneous lawful and unlawful rights of possession in competing hands. (Abraham Bell, "Title in the Shadow of Possession," Law and Economics of Possession, Yun-chien Chang, ed., 2015, section 4)

          De jure property rights might exist [as in the instance of an illegally deposed proprietary royal house holding the land rights to the whole former de facto domain] without any practical ability to enjoy the rights [except for the use of their lawful titles and valid knighthoods]. . . . Sadly, there will be cases [as just expressed] when the property rights that exist on paper [in international law, but] are utterly useless in the real world. (Ibid.)

          "For example, a man may violate your right to your property by taking it away from you, but your right to that property has not been alienated [you still hold the right], i.e., you are in the right and the robber is in the wrong." (The Capitalism Site: Rights, 2011: http://capitalism.org/category/rights) As Emilio Furno, a supreme court attorney of Italy, explained that:

          The [royal] prerogatives which we are examining may be denied [by a subsequent reigning government] . . . within the limits of its own sphere of influence [that is, within its boundaries, it] may prevent the exercise by a deposed Sovereign of his [royal] rights in the same way [just] as it may paralyze the use of any right not provided in its own legislation. However such negating action does not go to the existence of such a [legitimate de jure] right and bears only on its exercise. ("The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders," Rivista Penale, No.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70)

          The illegally deposed monarch and his lawful successors still own the land under international law even though the de facto republic has full control of it. Domestic law does not recognize this ownership, but ". . . international law recognizes property rights: [of the deposed including the] ownership [of land]. . . .” (John G. Sprankling, The International Law of Property, 2014, p. 27) Again, “Property rights in immovable things – including land . . . are recognized under international law.” (Ibid., p. 33) De jure international legal ownership is actual, lawful ownership even though the owner is dispossessed and has no control over the land. This state of being is also legally called factual or constructive possession or ownership, which will be dealt with later on this website. (See "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" and "Constructive Possession" in "Three more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights of the Principality")

          The following legal relationships still exist in international law (a Landlord/Tenant relationship):

          . . . In kingdoms, though the people may own private property, they live on the Land and hold their property as tenants [who occupy, but do not own the land. They are thus] subject to the King/Sovereign/Feudal Lord. (Team Law, Sovereignty 101: 2015: http://teamlaw.net/Sovereignty.htm)

          "The monarch was lord, ultimately, of all the tenants in the realm, and, therefore, was supreme landlord over all lands occupied. . . ." (Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World, 2006, p. 31) ". . . The original title is in the king or emperor, and that everybody who has an interest in land [in that realm] is a tenant." (Estcourt Rowland Metzner, The Conflict of Tax Laws, 1918, p. 172 and David Wells, “Principles of Taxation,” Popular Science, vol. 48, no. 31, February 1896, p. 443) In other words, the true and rightful owner of the land is the deposed or de jure proprietary, or patrimonial, sovereign in international law. This is de jure corporeal land ownership.
          For example, the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern, as a deposed proprietary, or patrimonial, monarchy, legitimately holds the de jure property right of all the former lands of the Kingdom of Prussia. That is, 134,635 square miles of rightful ownership as it was illegally taken away from them and they maintained this right as required by the rules of prescription in international law. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "Who Rightfully Owned the Rights of Halberstadt in the Past?" on this web page)
          The Principality of Halberstadt is also a proprietary sovereign entity which owns, on a de jure basis, the rights to almost 600 square miles, that is, almost 3% of the Prussian Kingdom. By abandoning ownership of these de jure international legal property rights and abdicating, or turning the legal right to adjudicate the matter over to England in 2002, the Imperial family permanently sustained, supported and assisted in promoting the adverse possession claim, which lawfully had its legal beginning a year earlier in 2001 under English jurisdiction. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family")
          It is important to understand that the principality is not governed by the domestic laws of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is not a German property right. In international law, it is a small, deposed proprietary sovereign entity with factual corporeal or tangible land rights and regal entitlements attached to it. Neither is the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern, the former owners, under the domestic laws of Germany. This House is a sovereign international entity with vast corporeal land rights and royal entitlements. Domestic Germany law has no power or authority over either entity. They are strictly and exclusively international regal land rights through prescriptive law making them completely outside the legal boundaries of German jurisdiction. Jurisdiction or legal authority, from the very onset of the claim to the final automatic transfer 12 years later, was English. No other nation had any legal authority or claim over it.

          Brief Summary Statement: The corporeal land or territory of the Principality of Halberstadt is legally a de jure ownership right still binding, lawful and legitimate under public international law. German domestic laws have no legal authority over it -- only England received exclusive or full jurisdictional rights.

 Adverse Possession Applies

          The next section, after this one, describes in more detail how the case legally and rightfully fell under "English Jurisdiction and Authority." This section is mainly about English adverse possession law.
          First of all, anything that can be owned; such as, a legal, non-territorial sovereign entity in international law, can be sold. And anything that can be owned, and therefore sold, can be adversely possessed under certain circumstances.

For example, "[Domestic] adverse possession [can] apply to territorial rights [even the territorial rights of a deposed sovereign entity that is still valid and legitimate in international law]." (K. L. Bhatia, Textbook on Legal Language and Legal Writing, 2010, p. 108) It did in our case and the reason why it can apply to international territorial rights is because of "private international law." This is because our case had a foreign component -- De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law, which brought "private international law" to bear on the case and legally authorized English jurisdiction to govern and dominate the outcome. This important factor is so important that it has its own subsection. "Private international law" has the legal power to use English domestic laws to effect a irrevocable and permanent change in ownership. (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction")
"'Land' [in English adverse possession authorized by private international law] includes . . . any legal or equitable estate or interest therein." (Limitation Act 1980 38 (1); 2016: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/58#commentary-c809058) This covers or incorporates, not excludes, an international corporeal land right; such as, the principality represents, because it is, in international law, a "legal or equitable estate or interest therein." The point is, "The rules [of adverse possession] are . . . flexible, open-ended and subject to a variety of applications as the circumstances of each case permits." (Martin Dixon and Emma Lees, Q&A Land Law 2013-2014, 8th ed., 2013, p. 222) As such, this law, enabled by English private international law, fully accommodated the rights of the principality through adverse possession.
          Different jurisdictions have different rules, but generally, adverse possession in England cannot be used for Crown lands, public property like highways, city streets, public works, against minors, the insane or mentally disabled, by fraud or deceit, against those who are incarcerated, certain incorporeal hereditaments or landlords whose tenants are under contract. There may be others I have overlooked, but nowhere does it say it cannot be used to transfer private property that contains international land rights. ". . . The unwritten constitution [of England] is that everything is permissible unless it is prohibited by law." (House of Lords and House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK?: Twenty-ninth Report of Session 2007-2008, vol. 2, 2008, p. 102) "On the Continent [it is the opposite, that is] everything is illegal unless expressly permitted by law. That is a fundamental difference between the European system of government and that of the UK." (Ashely Mote, Vigilance: A Defense of British Liberty, 2001, p. 54)
Not only is there nothing in the law against adverse possession transferring the international rights of the principality, but, "Title by adverse possession may be acquired against any person or corporation [whether domestic or international] not excepted [or excluded] by statute." (The Free Dictionary by Farlex, Adverse Possession; 2016: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/adverse+possession) Again, generally speaking, ". . . everything is permissible unless there is a law against it. . . .” (John Alder, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 1994, p. 325) In England:

The relevant principles are not found in statute, not even in the Limitations Act 1980 itself, but have been developed through case law over generations. As judge-made law, these are flexible, changeable and malleable. . . [In fact, it provides an] almost unlimited [number of] circumstances in which a claim of adverse possession can arise. . . . (Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law, 9th ed., section 11.1, 2014, pp. 463-464) (emphasis added)

The impotant point here is that adverse possession provides an "almost unlimited [number of] circumstances in which a claim of adverse possession can [dominate]." This is what we will demonstrate.

 A. Two Major Laws are Most Important to this Case

Lest there be a misunderstanding, legally, the Principality is an "unregistered" property right. It could not be characterized otherwise as it is not a registered entity. It is also important to understand that "The LRA [Land Registration Act 2002] did not change the law relating to unregistered land." ("Is adverse possession a dead duck? Pye v Graham;" 2014: http://www.gardenlaw.co.uk/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=2404) "The old law (the 12-year rule) will remain in place for all unregistered titles." (Robert Abbey and Mark Richards, A Practical Approach to Conveyancing, 2015, p. 26)
This 2002 act, therefore, does not impact the Principality, which can not be classified as a registered property right, because it is not a registered entity. ". . . The rules applicable to unregistered land remain the same, and 12 years occupation nec vi, nec clam, nec precario [which means "without force, without secrecy, without permission"] is still required to obtain title)." (Land Registration Act 2002, Wikipedia; 2015: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_Registration_Act_2002) (emphasis added) Again, ". . . The Limitation Act 1980 . . . still governs land the title to which has not yet been registered, and the Land Registration Act 1925." (Edward Hector Burn, John Cartwright, Ronald Harling Maudsley, Maudsley and Burn's Land Law, 9th ed., 2009, p. 236) (emphasis added) Or, in other words, "The traditional doctrine (unaffected by the significant amendments made under the Land Registration Act 2002 (UK) c 9) still operates in England in relation to unregistered title." (Law Commission (UK) and H M Registry, A Consultative Document, above n 6, p. 208 and Kevin and Susan Francis Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th ed., above n 11, 2009, pp. 183–184) The  point is, the new law, "The Land Registration Act 2002 . . . applies only to registered land." (Gov.UK, Practice Guide 4: Adverse Possession of Registered Land; 2016: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/adverse-possession-of-registered-land/practice-guide-4-adverse-possession-of-registered-land) That is, "Where the land is unregistered, the law as to adverse possession and extinguishments of title continues to be that in force prior to the commencement of the Land Registration Act 2002. . . ." (Andrew Noble, Adverse Possession; 2016: http://www.landandboundarydisputes.co.uk/adverse_possession.php)
In conclusion, the Land Registration Act 2002 has no legal impact on the legal transfer of the Principality -- only the English Limitations Act 1980 and the Land Registration Act 1925 are relevant and binding on unregistered land rights or claims, which includes all the entitlements of that land internationally through adverse possession. Case law created by court decrees are also relevant and will be cited as appropriate to the particular subject discussed.

 B. Like many Transfers of Corporeal Property, there are Aspects of that Transfer that are Incorporeal

          First of all, a "hereditament" means it can be legally possessed, inherited, sold, mortgaged, leased, given away or passed on by a legal Will or marriage. Blackstone said:

          Hereditaments, then, to use the largest expression, are of two kinds, corporeal and incorporeal. Corporeal consist of such as affect the senses; such as may be seen and handled by the body; incorporeal are not the object of sensation, can neither be seen nor handled, are creatures of the mind and exist only in contemplation. [They are intangible or abstract legal rights]. (Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 2, 1794, p. 17) (emphasis added)

          A corporeal [tangible] hereditament is the thing itself which is the subject of the right; an incorporeal hereditament is not the subject of the right, but the right itself. (John and Sarah Austin, Lecture on Jurisprudence, vol. 1, 5th ed., 1885, p. 362)

          Black's Law Dictionary defines an incorporeal or intangible hereditament as anything, that is the subject of property, which is inheritable and not tangible or visible. It is a right growing out of, or connected to, or annexed to, a corporeal thing, but not the substance of the thing itself. "In English law the concept of 'land' includes, within the meaning of this term, the notion of the incorporeal hereditament." (Kevin J. Grey and Susan Francis Grey, Land Law, 2007, p. 14)  The important things to remember here is ". . . these rights are treated as part of the land itself. (Bryn Perrins, Understanding Land Law, 3rd ed., 2000, p. 26) They are part of the land because they are integral parts of the tangible or corporeal land. "[Incorporeal land rights] distinguishing feature is that the law of real property applies to them, just as it applies to corporeal land. . . ." (Robert Edgar Megarry, Charles Larpum, Sir William Wade, Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property, 2012, p. 1358) In other words, "'incorporeal hereditaments' [such as, sovereignty, titles, regal land honors and distinctions, etc.] . . . belong to a defined list of rights recognised by the law of property as being, like land itself, a species of 'real property' to which the rules of land law apply." (The Law Commission, Consultation Paper No 186, Easements, Covenants and Profit a Prendre, 2008, p. 11, 2013: http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/cp186_Easements_Covenants_and_Profits_a_Prendre_Consultation.pdf)  Adverse possession is a law of property or a land ownership law that is capable as much as any other English acquisition law to transfer the estate's corporeals and incorporeals.         
          We have to keep in mind the words and definitions used in the law as they can seem complicated and hard to fathom, but they eventually make sense, the better you understand them. There are reason why land is divided up between corporeals and incorporeals, even though, ". . . all rights are [actually and in truth] incorporeal, those of ownership as well as . . . others . . . because the right cannot be the thing (i.e. [the] material object [itself]), for rights cannot be objects of themselves." (Charles Reinold Noyes , The Institution of Property: A Study of the Development, Substance, and Arrangement of the System of Property in Modern Anglo-American Law, 2007, p. 181) They are intangible. The fact is, ". . . All rights are intangible, including all proprietary rights [or rights of ownership]." (Jan H Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law: Contract and Movable Property Law, vol. 2, 2013, footnote 196) That is, the ownership right itself is movable wherever the owner dwells or vacations.

          . . . Incorporeal things [such as rights] are not the objects of sensation, but are creatures of the mind [called legal fictions or abstract ideas that are legally binding], being rights issuing out of a thing or things corporeal. . . . (A. J. Marvin, "Alvah Bradley et al vs. Levi F. Bauder," The American Law Register, vol. 19; 1980, p. 781 and The Electric Law Library, Thing; 2016: http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/t024.htm)

          Intangible things cannot be picked up. They have no form or substance. They aren't made of anything. Ownership of land is intangible, but not the land itself. It is the ownership right that is incorporeal. Royal titles are incorporeals as well. They are rights that come with the ownership of all the rights to a legally valid sovereign principality. All such "interests" in property are intangible entitlements. However, territory is "real property" or land. Therefore, the principality is legally and lawfully a corporeal property case or an "estate in land." This is because Halberstadt is a proprietary or owned, legal, non-reigning sovereign entity in international law. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law")         
          If a man was in feudal possession of an estate, he [was in] . . . actual possession of it in a formal [official or legal] way [even though his tenants actually possessed the land]. . . . (G. Wood Hill, The Law of Real Property in England, 1898, p. 38) In other words, the landlord, sovereign prince or king had "actual possession," by law, even though the tenants (his subjects) were in real corporeal possession of their land in the territory. In other words, by law, a landlord-sovereign/tenant relationship makes the landlord -- the sovereign proprietary prince in this case, legally in "actual possession." That is, by law, it is the same thing as, or legally equivalent to, actual or "corporeal possession." This is a universal understanding of this kind of situation. This legal corporeal possession by the lord of the land and lord of the territory is called "factual" or "constructive possession." (See "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" in this page or "Constructive Possession" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
          It is important to note that not only does both corporeal and incorporeal transfers take place in adverse possession, but in a total of eight different legally binding methods all the rights were delivered to the Goff/Harradine family. (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality," "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality," and "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges") In conclusion, what was transferred was ". . . not only corporeal [the de jure ownership of the territory or land], but likewise incorporeal things [the de jure sovereign and royal entitlements and rights that are attached to it]. (Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law, 1832, p. 65)
          Although, most of this web-page relates to an adverse possession transfer of all rights, it is important to remember that two other domestic and five international transfer modes each achieved the change in ownership individually.

 C. Corporeal Land Qualifies for Adverse Possession and It Includes whatever Incorporeal Rights are Attached or Connected to it

          Obviously, adverse possession primarily pertains to corporeal land, but it also includes the incorporeals connect to it. English land terms can be quite confusing. The English legalized Deed of Transfer provided the legal description required for adverse possession law on what was actually claimed. It specifically states that ". . . all Rights, Honours, Privileges and Emoluments (if any) appertaining thereto. . . ." were transferred. All rights to the "Principality of Halberstadt" and its "titles" are included in the corporeal land conveyance deed (about 600 square miles approximately .2% of the de jure kingdom of Prussia), ". . . excluding the Demesne lands, the corporeal state [or land] of the feudal Barony and any Advowson [land within its borders]." In other words, this was the description of a conveyance of tangible land as well as land rights, regal honors and ruling entitlements, and therefore it was a corporeal transfer claim that included some incorporeal attachments. (See "Documents") The land and it attached rights were under property law, not as German territorial land, but de jure corporeal land under international law. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law.")
          In England, "For the purposes of limitation, land is given a wide definition. . . ." (Terence Prime and Gary Scanlan, The Law of Limitation, 2001, p. 241) It covers most things, but "does not include any incorporeal hereditaments" -- "except as provided. . . ." What is provided are "corporeal hereditaments, tithes and rent-charges," the last two being incorporeal hereditaments, "and any legal or equitable estate or interest therein," which can, by definition and practice, also be incorporeal hereditaments as well as corporeals. In other words, incorporeal hereditaments that are "legal or equitable estates or interest[s] therein" are covered by the Limitations Act 1980, which permits adverse possession to operate.
          "Estates in land may be classified as corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments [or both]. . . ." (LawTeacher, Land Law Definition; 2017: https://www.lawteacher.net/study-guides/land-law/land-law-definition.php) There are various ways land ownership can be transferred; such as, by conveyance, mortgaged, adverse possession, prescription, grant, will or gift. Such transfers almost always consisted of both corporeal and incorporeal elements. Halberstadt is mainly a corporeal transfer with some important incorporeals attach to it. "In English law. An honor; a title, station or distinction of honor, -- ]is] a species of incorporeal hereditament, in which a person may have a property [or ownership right]." (J. Kendrick Kinney, A Law Dictionary and Glossary: Primarily for the Use of Students, But Adapted also to the Use of the Profession at Large,1893, p. 257) An incorporeal hereditament is "a right issuing out of, or annexed unto a thing corporeal." (The Law.Com, Dictionary, Incorporeal Hereditament: 2017: https://dictionary.thelaw.com/incorporeal-hereditament) That is, it is an important part of the estate and the titles, etc. transferred with it as an essential part of transferring ownership of an intact, legal, non-territorial sovereignty in international law.
          The Limitations Act 1980 (which legally authorizes and gives lawful standing authority for adverse possession to function) in chapter 58, section 38(1) declares that "'land' includes corporeal hereditaments [and any incorporeals attached to it]. . . ." (Limitations Act 1980 Chapter 58; 2015: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/58) That is both tangibles and intangibles are estates in and of themselves and most corporeal transfers have incorporeal attachments that are conveyed with the land. Land ownership in England, and many other places, is described as "a bundle of abstract rights" or "group of rules" that define it legally. These rules and rights are both corporeal and incorporeal in nature. That is, both qualities are involved in a corporeal land transfer. Being a "legal estate," corporeal through "factual" or "constructive possession," it can be adversely possessed and therefore ownership can be transferred through this means according to the statute along with all the rights connected to it. (See "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" and "Constructive Possession" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality")
          As a valid corporeal legal estate in international law, adverse possession is part of the equation, because of English private international law, which enables international rights or foreign concerns to be subject to English domestic law. (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction") Because of this, the Principality was fully eligible for the Limitation Act 1980 to take a binding effect through these statutes, and because years of English "private international law" decisions empowered English domestic law (adverse possession in particular) to govern the case. (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction")
          Adverse Possession involves the transference of land rights, legal estates and an interest in land. The "interest in land," the rights attached thereof, that the dispossessed Principality of Halberstadt has is profound, and involves the right to rule the land, the royal sovereign title of prince and other regal honors and entitlements. The Principality of Halberstadt was a proprietary monarchy and owned all the land. A proprietary realm is described as follows:

          The King [or sovereign prince of a principality] as a feudal overlord, was the sole and the ultimate owner of all of the land and he granted it to his tenants-in-chief, in return for military and other services, and for the payment of certain customary dues. (Peter P. Ekeh, Warri City: And British Colonial Rule in Western Nigerian Delta, 2005, p. 247) (See "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not actual Possession")

Part of the rights (incorporeal hereditaments) that belong to a legally intact sovereign principality are its titles, distinctions and honors, or that which makes up sovereignty itself, two of which includes ius magestatis, the right to be honored holding royal title and ius honorum, the right to honor others with titles, knighthoods and medals, etc.. These are inseparable parts of any sovereign entity in international law reigning or non-reigning, that was regal and proprietary, such as Halberstadt. The Deed of Transfer, which was legalized according to the laws of England and Wales, described the Principality as being "seised in Fee Simple Absolute in Possession." This means the property claim was defined, in that legal document, as a "legal estate." The Limitation Act 1980 specifies that "legal estates" can be adversely possessed and English private international law empowers international rights to be transferred through domestic law. (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction")
The Limitations Act 1980 (which legally authorizes and gives lawful standing to adverse possession) in chapter 58, section 38(1) declares that "'land' includes corporeal hereditaments [and other intangible rights that belong to it, which will be explained below]. . . ." (Limitations Act 1980 Chapter 58; 2015: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/58). In other words, by law, adverse possession includes the transfer of whatever incorporeal rights are attached or connected to the corporeal land.  

 D. Adverse Possession transfers all the rights of an Estate which includes Regal and Sovereign Rights

         Some have thought that only international law can transfer the right of a sovereign entity or have legal jurisdiction over another sovereignty that exists or is located within the sovereign territory of a particular nation-state. However, this idea is proven false by the fact that the United States Supreme and District Courts and regulations of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) have exercised this authority many times to determine the sovereign rights of the domestic Indian Tribes that abound in their land. In other words:

          Tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the federal government, not states, under Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation (1980). [This is true even though] Tribes are sovereign . . . under United States v. Mazurie (1975). (Wikipedia, Tibal Sovereignty in the United States; 2019: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tribal_sovereignty_in_the_United_States) (See also "The De jure Sovereign Rights of American Indian Tribes" in The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com/id28.htm)

          Congress established a comprehensive matrix of laws regulating Indian affairs and effectively limiting the scope of tribal sovereignty from the beginning days of the Republic. (Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern, 1987, p. 78)

Canada also has a long history of national legal dominion:

          . . . Domestic courts have ruled [for over a hundred years on tribal sovereignty] on the basis for colonial acquisition [that is, that these domestic sovereign entities are under national jurisdiction]. . . . (Douglas Sanders, "The Re-Emergence of Indigenous Questions in International Law," Canadian Human Rights Yearbook, vol. 3, 1983, p. 27)

          The same basic right of dominion exists in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and other countries. (Julie Cassidy, "Sovereignty of Aboriginal Peoples," Indiana International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 9, no. 1, 1998, pp. 65-119) England exercised this right over British India and the sovereign princes that were under their jurisdictional authority. ("The Royal Princely Houses of India and their De jure Entitlements" in The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com/id28.htm)
          The point is, American and Canadian Indian Tribes, the Princes of India and other indigeous people, who have not given their rights away by treaty or abandoned them by the international law of acquiescence, are still intact, legitimate, illegally deposed non-territorial sovereigns in international law. Nevertheless, they are ruled over by the nations under which they dwell.
          Another significant example of this legal dominion comes from the international laws that govern an illegally deposed government, king or sovereign prince in exile, or in situ, who may, because of their sovereignty, by lawful and legal right, ". . . exercise legislative, administrative, and judicial functions." (Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 2003, p. 289) In fact, a legitimate dispossessed government or monarch can operate in ". . . all the functions of a state . . . ," that are within its power. (Op.cit., Julie Cassidy) However, it is ". . . for each [hosting] State to determine the nature and extent of the privileges and immunities of such an entity [that resides in exile on their land]." (Clive Parry, John P. Grant and J. Craig Barker, Parry & Grant Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law, 3rd ed., 2009, p. 248) That is:

          [It is] the duty [of the exiled] to respect the territorial sovereignty [of the hosting government, and its rules -- this government] must prevent a state [or monarch-in-exile] from performing acts which, although within its competence, in accordance with its personal supremacy, would violate the territorial supremacy [of the host]. (F. E. Oppenheimer, "Governments and Authorities in Exile," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 36, no. 4, October 1942, p. 594)

          The prerogatives [of a deposed royal house] which we are examining may be denied [under domestic or national law] and a sovereign state within the limits of its own sphere of influence may prevent the exercise by a deposed Sovereign of his rights in the same way as it may paralyze the use of any right not provided in its own legislation. However such negating action does not go to the existence of such a right and bears only on its exercise. (Emilio Furno, "The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders," Rivista Penale, No.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70)

          In other words, domestic national laws dictate what a sovereign entity under their jurisdiction can do. How much powers are granted depends on the host government’s established law and/or political decisions. Decades and even centuries of legal precedence have confirmed and empowered domestic national law over dependent sovereignties and exiled governments within their borders. It gives these nations the right over the sovereign concerns of those sovereigns, and therefore, they are under their rightful and lawful jurisdiction.
          In summary, these various sovereign entities, existing within the borders, or the legal jurisdiction of a nation, are under a system of national domination through the domestic laws and/or national courts of that nation. In other words, the law of that land has legal supremacy over any sovereign entity within their borders, or that are under the authority of their laws. This is just the way it is -- those laws prevail unless they violate the international legal rights of those entities.
          This profound right of English jurisdiction in our case enabled the laws of English adverse possession, English proprietary estoppel and the English validation, of the highest right of possession, to make the transfer of the sovereign ownership of the principality a legal certainty and fact. With the addition of the international transfer modes, which were also binding, all combined to undeniably confirm our claim as valid and an absolute legal surety. (See "English Jurisdiction and Authority" and "Eight Legal and Lawful Methods Transferred all the Rights")
          This important ability, or prerogative of domestic law, is further established and legally enlarged by "private international law," which also has the inherent power and right to transfer sovereignty and many other things under private law. That is, it provides the legal mechanism to do so. (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction" and "English Private International Law activates English Domestic Adverse Possession" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") (See also "Public and Private Law as it relates to the Transfer of the Principality of Halberstadt" in "The Public and Non-Public Use of Titles in International Law")
          Thus, if corporeal/tangible land is legally transferred to a person under either international or domestic law, he or she is the true owner of that land plus all the rights and responsibilities that go with it, which is his or hers to enjoy as owner. Likewise, if a proprietary principality is legally and lawfully transferred to a person, he or she receives all the rights of that regal entity including all its titles, honors, and privileges. To own a principality, that is still intact as a legal, non-territorial sovereign entity in international law, is to own the sovereign rights and legal entitlements of that territory.
Sovereignty is the highest secular right on earth -- ". . . [it] is a[n incorporeal and a tangible] property right that conveys status, authority and a form of rule." (Kurt Burch, "The 'Properties' of the State System and Global Capitalism," The Global Economy as Visible Space, 1994, p. 48) A ". . . Sovereign [or royal house holds] . . . an incorporeal hereditament or heritage . . ." that is an intangible or lawful right over corporeal land that can be passed on to one's heirs and/or successors. (Noel Cox, The Sovereign Authority for the Creation of Orders of Chivalry, 2014: http://www.reocities.com/noelcox/Creation.htm) Sovereignty is ". . . an incorporeal hereditament. . . ." (Julius Goebel, "The Recognition Policy of the United States," Studies in History. Economics and Public Law, Columbia University editors, vol. 66, issue 1, 1915, p. 31) But being feudal and holding proprietary sovereignty, it was also a corporeal or proprietary ownership. Sovereignty or supremacy is the highest and most important incorporeal hereditament or "interest in" land on earth. It is both incorporeal and corporeal.
Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) explained that "The most notable feature of feudalism is that in its system sovereignty [was] identified with ownership." (Woodrow Wilson, The State; Elements of Historical and Practical Politics, 1894, p. 159) In other words, ownership of the territory meant the right to rule the land. That is, "Men became sovereigns in their own right by virtue of owning the land. . . ." (Ibid., p. 644) The true owner of all the land is its rightful ruler, lord or governing prince.

[These] ancient feudal or royal rights -- the rights which the king, ruling prince or sovereign lord had by virtue of his proprietary ownership over all property in the realm. . . . [has] been inseparable for thousands of years or since the dawn of civilization itself. (Hacettepe University, explanation on the "regalian doctrine" or "jur regalia;" 2008: http://www.maden.hacettepe.edu.tr)

. . . State territory being the patrimonium [owned property] of the head of State [the king or ruling prince], [hence] it was not uncommon to sell the territory of one State to another, to transfer it as a marriage gift, or to dispose of it in the will of the reigning monarch. (Yehuda Zyi Blum, Historic Titles in International Law, 1965, p. 1)

". . . Ownership of a nation [or a principality] is bound up with [or includes] its sovereignty. . . ." (Christian von Wolff (1679-1754) quoted in Henry Reynolds, Aboriginal Sovereignty, 1996, p. 47) In adverse possession, everything belonging to the particular estate in question, becomes the legal and lawful property of the person to whom it is rightfully transferred. That is, a de jure or deposed sovereign entity through a reigning foreign state provided its law, like in England, allow incorporeals to transfer with the corporeal land.
The Deed of Transfer, which is unrelated to what actually occurred through adverse possession except as a legal description, declared the principality to be "seised in Fee Simple Absolute in Possession." In other words, it was describing corporeal land. Or, in other words, ". . . the Feudal Title, together with all Rights [not some, but all Rights, Honours, Privileges and Emoluments (if any) appertaining thereto. . . ." All rights includes the feudal corporeal land ". . . excluding the Demesne lands, the corporeal state [or land] of the feudal Barony and any Advowson [land within its borders]." In other words, it was describing land, even all the corporeal land of the principality with the exception of the land of the barony, or any Demesne or Advowson land. But again, the Deed is only used as a description of what was adversely possessed, not what was conveyed.
It is recognized worldwide that ". . . if the statutory requirements are met [for adverse possession], title passes as though there had been a conveyance through the traditional methods of deed transfer." (Marianne Jennings, Real Estate Law, 10th ed., 2014, p. 372) ". . . A person who has acquired title by adverse possession has as good a title as someone who acquires it by a formal conveyance. . . ." (John L. McCormack, "Title to Property, Title to Marriage: the Social Foundation of Adverse Possession and Common Law Marriage," Valpariso University Law Review, vol. 42., no. 2, Winter 2008, p. 462)
When authorized by a sovereign owner of an international land right, an English domestic conveyance can transfer that international land right. So too, when authorized, domestic adverse possession can do the same. In other words, just as a conveyance of a sovereign principality can be made in another country whose laws allows it, adverse possession can also transfer an intact sovereign entity in a country whose laws are flexible enough to do the same. The flexible English property law can transfer ". . . any legal or equitable estate or interest therein." (Limitation Act 1980 38 (1); 2016: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1980/58#commentary-c809058) The authority to do so came in 2002 when the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern yielded up both their legal international ownership and their right to take action or get involved in the legal dealings in England concerning their international land rights over Halberstadt.  An adverse possession transfer is legally equal to a conveyance and can legally deal with international land rights as well as local domestic ones. The entitlement to administer international rights comes through the authority of private international law. (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction")
The legal outcome of adverse possession is the same as though a transfer were legally conveyed. The end result is identical. Therefore the legal definitions of a "conveyance" and of "land" are relevant and meaningful. English conveyance law is very broadly defined and accommodating. It is more inclusive than exclusive. The Law of Property Act 1925, which is still binding, declares that a sale (a conveyance) of land is very comprehensive and would include everything that the Principality is -- all its sovereign and regal rights. That is, according to English conveyance law:

A conveyance of land [or legal transfer of land rights] shall be deemed to include and shall by virtue of this Act operate to convey, with the land, all buildings, erections, fixtures, commons, hedges, ditches, fences, ways, waters, water-courses, liberties, privileges, easements, rights, and advantages whatsoever, [all rights would include its sovereign rights and regal titles] appertaining or reputed to appertain to the land [that is, it includes sovereignty over the land and the royal prerogatives that belong to the land], or any part thereof, or, at the time of conveyance, demised [transferred], occupied [by factual possession], or enjoyed with, or reputed or known as part or parcel of or appurtenant [belonging] to the land or any part thereof. (Law of Property Act 1925 section 62(1) (emphasis added)

Everything, belonging to the land, every land right, every royal privilege, all entitlements "reputed or known as part or parcel" of the property, is conveyed.  

"Land" includes land of any tenure, and mines and minerals, whether or not held apart from the surface, buildings or parts of buildings (whether the division is horizontal, vertical or made in any other way) and other corporeal hereditaments; also a manor, an advowson, and a rent and other incorporeal hereditaments, and an easement, right, privilege, or benefit in, over, or derived from land; . . . and "mines and minerals" include any strata or seam of minerals or substances in or under any land, and powers of working and getting the same. . . . (Law of Property Act 1925 section 205(1)9) (emphasis added)

The definition of land is also highly inclusive. That is, not only is it tangible land, but the "right, privilege, and benefit in, over, or derived from [the] land" of Halberstadt, in this case, is also includes its regal titles or the "incorporeal hereditaments" that derive from owning all its land rights. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred.")

In essence, what this statutory definition seeks to convey and what is at the heart of land law, is the idea that ‘land’ includes not only tangible, physical property like fields, factories, houses, shops and soil, but also intangible [incorporeal hereditament] rights in the land. . . . [That is] ‘land’ is both the physical asset and the rights that the owner or others may enjoy in or over it. (Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law, 6th ed., 2009, p. 2) (emphasis added)

English domestic law concurs that the rights of the property go with the land. In other words, the vested "private" land rights of the principality, such as, the right to rule, which is a "public" right under international law, adverse possession fully transfers to the new owners or possessor.
After the limitation period of 12 years for unregistered rights, the claimant automatically and exclusively holds all the entitlements and privileges once held by the prior owner, that is, everything which he claimed or possessed for 12 years. In other words, when a person ". . . become[s] the absolute owner in fee in possession . . . [one holds] all the rights, benefits, privileges and advantages arising from that ownership." (Reports of Land Valuation Appeals in Referee's Courts, High Court, and House of Lords: From November 3, 1910, to [June, 1914], vol. 3, 1914, p. 31) "[The] sine qua non [that is, the essential defining quality] of all rights in land [is] the fee simple absolute in possession." (Leslie Turano-Taylor, "Misplaced Trust: First Principles and the Conveyance of Legal Leases to Minors," Modern Studies in Property, vol. 7, Nicholas Hopkins, ed., 2013, p. 115) This means it is the highest entitlement to possession on earth -- no one holds a greater right to it.
The Imperial and Royal House, being a legal, non-territorial sovereign entity, agreed or declared they would not get legally involved in regard to the conveyance of one of their international land rights in England. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family") That is, they left the outcome of the contention in the hands of English law to adjudicate. This had international legal impact, so much so, that the London tribunal stated that, ". . . English law applied to the transactions. . ." not German law. (Tribunal Findings number 181) Again, as Vattel described, a sovereign can, or has the right to, make such a surrender and it has international legal impact:

The agreements and contracts which the sovereign makes with private individuals [to us or by surrendering the case to English authority], in his character as sovereign and in the name of the [deposed] State [through the general secretary and their House attorneys acting officially for and in his behalf as an authentic non-territorial sovereign], follow the rule which we have given for public treaties. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, nos. 214-215) (emphasis added)

In other words, these actions toward us and the English handling of the international land rights of a German principality had the international legal sanction of a sovereign entity. They knowingly, in effect, authorized England to deal with it as they were not going to get involved. This kind of "agreement" or official sovereign statement has the authority of a treaty as stated by Vattel. And "Treaties . . . [can] directly confer international rights upon private individuals." (Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 3rd printing, 1959, p. 350, Jeremy Sarkin, "The Historical Origins, Convergence and Interrelationship of International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law and Public International Law and their Application from at least the Nineteenth Century," Human Rights and International Legal Discourse, vol. 1, 2007, p. 16 and P.C.I.J. (1928) Series B, No 15, at 16-24) The point here is that:

. . . There is no obstacle inherent in international law to prevent states [or a de jure non-reigning monarch in this instance] from conferring international rights on individuals [or another sovereign entity from abdicating international corporeal land rights to English law] and making them [the rights to the principality a] legal subject in that respect. . . . (Anna-Karin Lindblom, Non-Governmental Organizations in International Law, 2005, pp. 55-56) (emphasis added)

That is, the right of jurisdiction over the principality was conferred upon England authoritatively by law giving birth to the right to use English adverse possession laws. Dynastic rights of a "proprietary" monarch were and are now -- still:

. . . a disposable mass [ -- ] for inheritances, compensations, exchanges, securities, cessions, donations, partitions, indemnities, satisfactions, sales, and purchases (Arentin 1981; Grewe 1984: 462-3; Klingenstein 1997: 442). (Benno Teschkee, The Myth of 1648, 2003, p. 231)

In this case, the supreme or highest secular right on earth over the deposed Imperial and Royal House in international law, abandoned their rights over this little German principality and surrendered it to whatever English authority, and English law, was going to do with it. This is where adverse possession comes in.
Since "the law of adverse possession . . . applies to all rights [of] the possession. . . ," it transfers everything -- "all rights," not some, but all that were "factually" possessed. (Stephan Jourdan, Adverse Possession, 2014, p. 7) This includes the private vested rights of the principality which are international in nature, i.e. the deposed, non-reigning or de jure right to rule. ". . . It is this [kind of transfer among others] which gives the receiver . . . regal [that is, kingly and/or princely sovereign] right," depending on the legal status of the territory. (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, [1680], vol. 2, John Pawley Bate, trans., chapter 9, no. 19, 1916) That is, the transfer of "Land [in this case] includes . . . [every] right, privilege, or benefit in, over, or derived from [the] land. . . ." (Law of Property Act 1925 section 205(1)9) (See "Adverse Possession Applies" on this page)
It is important to understand that a transfer by adverse possession is a "juridical act," not a judicial or court act. It is a private or statutory act designed to change a specified legal situation. The point being that ". . . juridical acts . . . can operate as titles by which territorial sovereignty [the internal right to rule] can be (a) acquired [or] (b) lost." (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Prespective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 347) In other words, adverse possession, as a legal juridical act, can transfer a land right that includes the highest secular right on earth – that of sovereignty, whether reigning or non-reigning over a specified territory. This is what took place, but not through adverse possession alone, but seven other domestic and international acquisition laws also "operate[d] as titles by which territorial sovereignty" were legally conveyed. (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality," "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality," and "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges") (See also "Juridical Acts" in "Letters from the Imperial Family") The point is, a ". . . new sovereign succeeds to all the obligations as well as to the rights of the former sovereign." (Francis B. Sayre, "Changes of Sovereignty and Private Ownership of Land," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 12, no. 3, July 1918, pp. 475, 497) The point is:

A state [such as England in our case, obviously] may . . . regulate the manner and circumstances under which property, whether real or personal or [in our case involved in legal] action, within it[‘s borders], shall be held, transmitted, bequeathed, transferred, or enforced. . . . [A state also regulates] the validity of contracts [such as our English contract, which was deemed to be legitimate by a London tribunal] and other acts done within it[‘s borders]; the resulting rights and duties growing out of these contracts and acts [enabling legal transfers]; and the remedies [for contractual flaws, such as the lawful use of domestic adverse possession to legally transfer the property] and modes of administering justice in all cases [if needed and necessary]. . . . (Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, 8th ed., 1883, sections 17-18)

In other words, all the authority existed, especially with private international law, which gave us all the privileges and regal honors and distinctions, which all that the former owners held in the principality.
It has been, and will be in our family for generations to come, and we will continue to preserve and maintain its rights to the fullest degree so as not to forfeit or lose them. We do this by following the rules and laws which govern and perpetuate the regal prerogative and rights in international law. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")

Brief Summary Statement: English adverse possession laws perfectly apply to the intangible and tangible property rights of the Principality of Halberstadt. As will be shown, the legal definition of "factural possession" enabled the proprietary rights of sovereignty to automatically adjudicate outside of court or any legal proceeding and transfer through English law.

 E. Adverse Possession Cures Defects in Conveyances

          Adverse possession exists to cure potential or actual defects in real estate titles by putting a statute of limitations on possible litigation over ownership and possession. Because of the doctrine of adverse possession, a landowner can be secure in title to his land. Otherwise, long-lost heirs of any former owner, possessor or lien holder of centuries past could come forward with a legal claim on the property. The doctrine of adverse possession prevents this. (Wikipedia, Adverse Possession: 2017: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adverse_possession)

Where a purported conveyance [document] is void [defective in some way] from the commencement and the transferee [or claimant] enters into possession under the purported conveyance, his possession is adverse, and after 12 years, ripens into a good legal title, because the adverse possession, commences at once as from the date of the execution of the purported conveyance. (Ram Copal Chaturvedi and M. L. Chandak, Law of Adverse Possession, 1979, p. 457)

Correcting title defects. . . . Adverse possession resolves such problems by protecting the title [ownership] of the person who actually occupies [or has constructive possession of] the land. Lengthy possession serves as proof of title. (Quizlet, Property - 1/28 - Adverse Possession; 2019: https://quizlet.com/36389879/property-128-adverse-possession-flash-cards)

We took possession of the legal de jure principality immediately after obtaining the Deed of Transfer in the year 2000. In 2001, the deed was shown to be defective. We, nevertheless, continued to possession it because we had some circumstantial evidence that it might be legit. But because it could not provide "good title," it automatically became an adverse possession case in 2001. It is universally understood that:

. . . one entering into possession [like we did]. . . under a deed which is afterward adjudged to be void [can’t provide “good title” to the property] . . . may, nevertheless, be regarded as holding adversely [under adverse possession law because it is] . . . founded on a [valid and legal] written instrument [or document]. (Edmund Samson Green, Digest of the Decisions of the Courts of last Resort of the Several States, vol. 1, 1904, p. 64)

          Again, a flawed, but legal conveyance document, can still provide ownership through the application of adverse possession. This is what happened to us. Adverse possession cures defects of title and provides certainty of ownership. The following demonstrates this well-known legal fact.

"Any doubt arising from the fact that the conveyance . . . [was somehow defective] is cured by adverse possession. . . ." (The Lawyers Reports Annotated, book 38, 1912, p. 37)
"Although a deed under which possession of land is taken is invalid for lack of authority in the grantor . . . yet adverse possession . . . will give the grantee a marketable title." (Ibid.)
"Uninterrupted possession [after the statutory period for unregistered land] . . . cures any defect in the title caused . . . by an attorney in fact whose power to convey is not produced." (Ibid.)
"Where the paper links of title is defective [but the deed itself is valid, but cannot provide ‘good title’ as in our case] . . . proof of possession . . . [is] sufficient to establish good adverse possession." (Ibid.)
"A defective acknowledgment . . . renders the title bases thereon unmarketable, and the defect is not cured by a claim of adverse possession for the statutory period, unless all the elements to show such possession are clearly established." (Ibid.)
"A defect in a title . . . is cured by adverse possession for the period prescribed by the statute of limitations." (Ibid.)
"Adverse possession under colour of title [that is where there is a legitimate contract] represents a significant method of curing defective titles. . . ." (Curing Title Defects in Unregistered Land –Adverse Possession and other Remedies, p. 11; 2019: https://ulir.ul.ie/bitstream/handle/10344/4302/Woods%20_2011_curing.pdf?sequence=2)

          By statute and common law in England, a defective conveyance is "automatically" turned into a proper and solid "adverse possession" case, which took place in the year 2001 in our situation. This, of course, is only done if the rules of adverse possession are obeyed. If they are followed, ". . . possession under a conveyance which is void [can't provide good title] . . . is one example of a case where there may be adverse possession." (Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 20-08, 2011, p. 393) The point is, ". . . the passage of time cured [or can cure through adverse possession] the defect in the conveyance," so that a valid transfer is effected. (Ibid., section 6-34, p. 100) Such a transfer is as valid as a legal grant or as binding and effective as a conveyance conclusively and lawfully made.
         The automatic change from a conveyance claim to adverse possession, which was legally automatic, was a direct result of English case law concerning how adverse possession is to be applied, acknowledged and recognized. (See "The Adverse Possessor does not need to know that he is Adversely Possessing the Rights to the Property he has taken control of or Factually Occupied") ". . . "The great purpose [of adverse possession] is automatically [that is, without court or legal involvement] to quiet all titles [make them certain] . . . and correct errors [or defects] in conveyancing." (Henry W. Ballantine, "Title by Adverse Possession," Harvard Law Review, vol. 32, no. 2. December 1918, p. 135)

 F. The Adverse Possessor does not need to know that he is Adversely Possessing the Rights to the Property he has taken control of or Factually Occupied

          "A Court [creating legal precedence or 'case law' authority to this important ruling] held that there being evidence justifying a finding of adverse possession, it was immaterial that it arose from a mistake." (Ervin v Brown, 204 Md. 136, 102A. 2d 806, 1954, pp. 143-144) If adverse possession are present, it does not matter that the claimant did not know that adverse possession was taking place. Knowledge of this fact is unessential and unnecessary to the effectiveness of an adverse possession claim.

          . . . Title will vest in the adverse possessor where there is evidence of unequivocal acts of ownership. . . . It is immaterial that the . . . possession was due to inadvertence, ignorance, or [a] mistake, [-- a lack of knowledge that one is creating an adverse possession situation] is entirely immaterial [to its binding reality]." (Tamburd vs Miller, 203 Md. 329, 100 A. 2d 818, 1953, p. 336)

          I did not know I was following all the mandates of adverse possession. But because I did comply with them to the fullest degree possible, all rights, regal and otherwise, were legally, lawfully, and rightfully transferred to me by the means of adverse possession. The point here is, if a claimant:

          . . . thought, all along that he owned [the land rights and privileges as I did]. [And if] he was wrong about that [after 12 years for unregistered land] he [would] end up owning it in the end by virtue of adverse possession. (John Antell - Barrister, Adverse Possession of Land; 2016: http://www.johnantell.co.uk/adverse-possession-of-land)

          That is how the law works. The point is, "Adverse possession . . . may occur through ignorance or mistake, without any knowledge or awareness on the part of either the paper [or original] owner or the adverse possessor (see e.g. Wilson v Martin’s Executors (1993)." (Kevin J. Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Land Law, 5th ed., 2007, p. 136)

          Brief Summary Statement: The fact that I did not know I was creating a sure and irrefutable claim of adverse possession -- that I thought I actually owned the rights to the Principality by conveyance instead -- is irrelevant and immaterial to the legally binding fact that all the requirements for adverse possession were fulfilled and all the rights claimed were transferred.

 English Jurisdiction and Authority

 (a) Introduction

          First, a definition of jurisdiction:

          Jurisdiction generally describes any authority over a certain area or certain persons. In the law, jurisdiction sometimes refers to a particular geographic area containing a defined legal authority. For example, the federal government is a jurisdiction unto itself. Its power spans the entire United States. Each state is also a jurisdiction unto itself, with the power to pass its own laws. Smaller geographic areas, such as counties and cities, are separate jurisdictions to the extent that they have powers that are independent of the federal and state governments. (The Free Dictionary by Farlex, Jurisdiction; 2016: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/jurisdiction)

          We will be predominantly addressing English statute and common law, or the legal jurisdiction of English national law as it is most relevant to our case, rather than the more limited and confining court or enforcement authority.           
          Second, it is important to understand that the principality of Halberstadt is not governed by the domestic laws of the Federal Republic of Germany. It is not a German property right. It is a small, deposed proprietary sovereign entity in international law with corporeal land rights and regal entitlements attached to it. Neither is the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern, the former owners, under the domestic laws of Germany. This House is a sovereign international entity with vast corporeal land rights and royal entitlements. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law") Domestic Germany law has no power or authority over either entity. They were strictly and exclusively international regal land rights through prescriptive law making them outside the legal boundaries of German jurisdiction. This separation of rights -- domestic and international -- are basic to an understanding of what happened.     
          In other countries, it is possible to obtain Germanic feudal rights and titles as long as the transaction is completed in a country that has legislation in force that provides a mechanism for the buying and selling of feudal hereditaments. This kind of conveyance can transfer the rights of a deposed sovereign entity, because the ". . . international Code specifically provides . . . that sovereignty may be bought and sold. . . ." (Oscar William Coursey, The Philippines and Filipinos, 1914, p. 101) "Sovereignty like anything else may be conveyed [or legally transferred through various authorized methods -- including adverse possession]." (Thomas A. Walker, A History of the Law of Nations, vol. 1, 1899, p. 297) Hugo Grotius declared that, "A free people, or a king, may alienate their territory, in part or in full." (Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 6, no., section 7) In other words, they can abandon or discard it, as was done by the Imperial and Royal House. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family") The right to do these things have been elaborated most extensively in the "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred" web page. The point is, as Grotius also declared that, "The patrimonial [kingdom or principality], as it were, belonged to the monarch as a kind of private domain which he might alienate or dispose of at will." (John Norton Pomeroy, Lectures on International Law in Time of Peace, 1886, p. 133) The rights of supremacy could be conveyed to anyone, a private person, or even business corporation, as in India where the East India Company held sovereignty over the realm by various treaties with the Princes of the land. (Philip J. Stern, The Company-State: Corporate Sovereignty and the Early Modern Foundations of the British Empire in India, 2011) It was a common legal practice to lawfully buy, sell, mortgage, will, give the royal gift of regal sovereignty, or for jurisdictions, or the law, to transfer all rights in former days, and it is still legal to do so now. History is full of such examples as discussed in the above recommended articles and in the book The Entitlement to Rule (http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com).
          Because the 2008 Tribunal upheld or sustained the Deed of Transfer as a valid English legal document, it confirmed the right of English law to transfer an international property right. Not under German domestic law, but the right of a private deposed international sovereign entity. After the limitation period was completed with no protest or legal action to stop it, and an official abandonment statement by the original owners, the transfer was complete and final.  
            The following are the basic fundamental points in regard to English authority and jurisdiction, which will be explained in much greater depth later on:

(1) The Deed of Transfer was created by an English solicitor as a valid and binding English legal document and was officially legalized in England as such by the proper national authorities,
(2) Since the Deed could not be proven as either true or false, it could not provide "good" title or actual ownership. This is in spite of the fact that the Deed of Transfer was a valid legal instrument,
(3) The House of Hohenzollern, through their attorneys, gave official notice that what was taking place in England would not be contested or opposed. That is, no action to stop the possible transfer of the rights to the principality, make a protest about it, or attempt to defend their property from being transferred, would be taken. This activated the law of estoppel, which will be explained and was binding under treaty law. (See "There Letters were Legally Binding" in "Letters from the Imperial Family")
(4)  The acceptance of the case of the Principality, by the 2008 Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, along with some others related complaints, demonstrated English jurisdiction and authority over the matter,
(5) Thus, the jurisdiction of English law was legally confirmed and settled, and
(6) By virtue of this jurisdictional right, it meant that English law could validly be applied to it in the form of adverse possession, proprietary estoppel and holding the second highest right to the principality on earth.
(7) The power of English private international law gave authority to England for an international land and regal right to be use domestic laws to transfer it in total to the Goff/Harradine family.

 (b) Evidence: Legal Documents and Letters

          Some of the additional evidence of the Deed's legality under English law are as follows:

          On April 27, 2000, the London solicitor wrote to my temporary Pre-Paid legal attorney, Barry J. Marcus, Esq., and declared, "The sale of the Feudal Principality of Halberstadt was made under English law" and likewise later in the same letter, he wrote, "You will appreciate that such a sale is made under English law. . . ." (Letter is in personal possession) He reported to another man on September 1, 2002:

            We inform you that we advise BFI [the broker's company] upon various aspects of the sale of feudal titles and ensure that the documentation conveying the feudal titles is valid according to English law. . . . (Tribunal Findings number 134)          

          Although foreign rights, they were properly and legally ". . . drawn in accordance with English Law . . . as the owner[s] of the legal estate[s] in these feudal titles." (Tribunal Findings number 132)            
          The following are some more letters written by the London solicitor expressing English jurisdiction. He wrote to one saying, ". . . the transfer . . . was drawn in accordance with English law and therefore you have the right. . . ." To another, he wrote, ". . . the documentation conveying the feudal titles [are] valid according to English Law. . . ." "The Respondent [the London solicitor] claimed that English law applied to the transactions. . . ." "The honorific titles [the dignities or incorporeal hereditaments] being sold are real, legal entities, and are feudal. . . ." As stated in the law, ". . . Feudal titles, including foreign titles, were classed as a type of interest in land and had to be conveyed as such." (Tribunal Findings numbers 132, 134, 182, 120 and 183)
          "The nature of the transaction[s were] . . . land conveyance transactions[s]." (Tribunal Findings number 244) In other words, they were transferred under English land law. This is why "The Law Society [of England and Wales] had . . . approached the transactions as . . . standard property transactions." (Tribunal Findings number 29) The Deed of Transfer made this an obvious fact. (See "What was Transferred" and "Documents") Thus, "The duties of the respondent [the solicitor involved] in these transactions . . . would be [comparable] to those duties a solicitor would be under in a routine mortgage transaction." (Tribunal Findings number 284) Again, English land law was involved.
            In a letter to Mr. Branscum, one of the investigators, on August 1, 2001, the London solicitor again reiterated that, "The sale of the Principality was conducted in accordance with English law and hence there is no jurisdiction in the United States." (Ibid.)
          The Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) spent well-over $300,000.00 investigating the situation and prosecuting the case before the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in 2008. "The Applicant [the SRA in the Tribunal] had been unable to prove in any of the 13 instances that the titles did not exist or that the purchasers did not get what he had bargained for." (Tribunal Findings number 12) They could not invalidate or disprove the legality of the Deed of Transfer. The solicitor declared that he could ". . . vouch for the legal validity of the sale[s]. . . ." (Tribunal Findings number 111) Hence, the Deed continued to have standing as a binding instrument subject to the laws of England. However, since it could not be proven on way or the other to have effect, it could not legally transfer title to the property in question, but it could function as a lawful description of the claim, which it did.
          This document was legalized much earlier in 2000 by an Apostille through the office of Her Majesty's Principle Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

            [An] apostille refers to a means of authenticating a signature on a document that is recognized by an international body. . . . This ensures that public documents issued in one signatory country will be recognized as [legally] valid in another signatory country [such as, Germany]. (Law & Legal Definition, 2013: http://definitions.uslegal.com/a/apostille)

          The broker's solicitor supported this contention in the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. Under oath, the broker's solicitor made the statement that, ". . . He could genuinely vouch for the validity of the sale because that the chosen law of contract [that] applied [was exclusively English], not the property law of the country of origin of the title [which was German]." (Tribunal Findings number 113) German domestic law, as stated by the attorneys to the former Imperial house, does not recognize the feudal sovereign rights of the former Imperial house. However, international law does acknowledge the rights of deposed houses that maintain and perpetuate their lawful right to rule, which the Imperial Hohenzollern's has done in full accordance with that law. In other words, German domestic law ". . . did not apply to the transaction and was [therefore] not relevant [or material to the case]." (Tribunal Findings number 110) But English law did apply and was therefore fully pertinent and applicable.
           A statutory declaration associated with the case, created by the broker, which was also a legalized English document, declared that everything was done according to the Laws of England and Wales.
          Thirteen separate transactions were examined by the London Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) (11/18 -- 12/1/2008) -- one from Germany (that of Halberstadt), one from Albania, France, England and Croatia, and eight from Ireland. "The SRA was not able and did not seek to prove [in the Tribunal] that any of the transactions were fraudulent." (Tribunal Findings number 222) However, the Tribunal originally accepted English jurisdiction over the transactions as possible acts of fraud, but the SRA (the applicant or prosecutors), realizing it had insufficient evidence for either authenticity or fraudulence, therefore, they altered their original petition.

          The SRA did not seek a ruling on whether the feudal title market was bogus and/or whether the feudal titles sold did exist or whether the Respondent's client was a conman. When the matter was first referred to the Tribunal, the Rule 4 Statement in its original form  would have required such a ruling. The allegations had been amended so that the case had come to focus only on the duties and obligations that the Respondent was under in his capacity as a solicitor and the Tribunal has addressed these issues. (Tribunal Findings number 282)

          Nevertheless, the acceptance of the original case demonstrated the legal right of England to adjudicate the matter. During the intensive 10 day hearings, no complaint concerning English jurisdiction ever took place, even though most of the conveyance deeds involved foreign feudal properties. It was declared ". . . that English law applied to the transactions. . . . (Tribunal Findings number 181) The probable reason for this is because it is a recognized legal fact that international contract law allows participants the legal right to choose which country's laws would govern the contract or deed. In each of the cases, English law was specified. Thus, English jurisdiction was validated and confirmed by the actions of the 2008 tribunal.
          In summary, English jurisdiction and authority over the case of the principality enabled the English law of adverse possession to take place in England and transfer all of its rights to us.

 (c) Pertinent Binding Laws

          The laws discussed below include: (1) estoppel, (2) abandonment, (3) failure to protest, (4) treaty law, (5) contract law, (6) English jurisdiction law, and (6) the statute of limitations rules.

 1. Estoppel:         

          Not only was the Deed written, described and legalized as a valid English document and confirmed as such in the above mentioned tribunal, but estoppel also played an important role in establishing English jurisdiction in 2001 and 2002. The principle of estoppel is a powerful legal rule that can unalterably or permanently change a legal situation. "The law of Estoppel is [part] of a class of incontestable rights. . . ." (Melville Madison Bigelow, A Treatise on the Law of Estoppel, Or of Incontestable Rights, 6th ed. – revised, 1913, p. 4) It has a profound influence on legal situations.

          . . . Estoppel is a rule of international law that bars a party from going back on its previous representations when those representations have induced reliance or some detriment on the part of others. . . . Estoppel is now a firmly established rule of international law and is being invoked and applied in an increasingly wide variety of contexts. . . . (Emmanuel Voyiakis, Estoppel in International Law, Oxford Bibliographies Online [2012], 2013: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0058.xml)

            That is, it is consistently accepted and applied in international courts. (Alexander Ovchar, Bond Law Review, vol. 21, issue 1, art. 5, 2009, pp. 1-33)

            Estoppel [is a legal] impediment, or bar by which a man is precluded in law from alleging or denying a fact, in consequence of his own previous act, allegation or denial, to the contrary. (Alexander M. Burrill, A New Law Dictionary and Glossary, part 1, 1998, p. 438) (In the second volume of Dr. Kerr's book, The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law in chapter two entitled, "The Immediate Loss of Sovereignty," there is more information on this important principle.)

            International law holds that authorized, voluntary statements are, in effect, inviolate and unchangeable. The requirements for such a binding statement are that whatever it is about ". . . is clear, voluntarily given, and relied upon." (Megan L. Wagner, "Jurisdiction by Estoppel in the International Court of Justice," California Law Review, vol. 74, issue 5, October 31, 1986, p. 1785) The statement of the former Imperial house was clear and unequivocal, it was voluntarily given, and it was relied upon it. It fulfilled all the requirements to be binding. That is, the General Secretary and House Attorney officially declared that ". . . The Prince does not wish to take action . . ." against the involvement of English domestic law in relationship to the ownership of one of the family's small international sovereign possessions. (Letter in personal possession, October 2, 2002 -- see "Letters from the Imperial Family") This was literally an indirect act of abandonment or implied consent to what had taken place.
          Estoppel to be legally binding requires "reliance" in both English and International law:

          The essential condition of the operation of the rule of preclusion or estoppel, as strictly to be understood, is that the party invoking the rule must have "relied upon" the statements or conduct of the other party, either to its own detriment or to the other’s advantage. (Gerald Fitzmaurice, "Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear [1962]," Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and the Discipline of International Law, John Graham Merrills, Ed., 1998, p. 63)

          The following is how this took place in three different, but similar ways:

(1) I originally relied on the idea that the Deed of Transfer might be a valid and legitimate conveyance: If the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern were so unconcerned, after hearing about the fact that one of their small sovereign entities was conveyed in England, that they would not care enough to legally protesting it and preserve it, then there is a reasonable foundation for the belief that it might have been an authentic transfer of rights, which for strong social and reputational reasons, they would not want to admit. There were other indirect evidences of validity as well. There were other indirect evidences of validity as well. For one: a friend called His Royal Highness Prince Georg Friedrich, the head of the Imperial House on the phone, and asked him directly about the English conveyances of their legal property in international law, and his response was that he would not confirm or deny that they took place. Therefore, I relied on this possibility and therefore continued to claim the rights to be mine, while I investigated it and pushed others to force the broker and/or solicitor to reveal the full and complete truth about it, which they claimed they could not because they had legally bound themselves to keep this truth undisclosed,
(2) In addition, I relied on the contents of the letters from the House of Hohenzollern: The statement of the Prince through his attorney and general secretary that they would not contest the transfer and their disavowal of ownership allowed me the freedom to focus on English law, which was now a binding and established fact due to their legal acquiescence to English jurisdiction and authority. I, therefore, focused on pressuring the Law Society of England and Wales and the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), then the Legal Service Ombudsman (LSO) as well to help verify and confirm the legitimacy of the conveyance through the solicitor's misconduct in regard to an "undertaking" -- a binding professional promise, which he failed to fulfill. This never worked out, because I could not get them (the SRA) to act on it and force the solicitor to make good on his binding promise. This was the chief focus of my efforts. I relied on the idea of the Hohenzollern or Preussen's non-involvement to continue to push others for the truth and continued to claim the rights to Halberstadt,
(3) I then relied on their word in a different way: As a result of not getting anywhere, being blocked in all my efforts to get the full truth about the conveyance, it dawned on me about twelve years later that the rights were already transferred through adverse possession, and because the House of Hohenzollern abandoned the rights to the Principality, therefore I relied on their statements in a very different way. Since they made the declaration that they would not to contest it, and I acted in good faith according to their word all these years in claiming the rights, all the legal entitlements to the principality were legally and lawfully transferred through another equally powerful and legally upheld route -- a legal mechanism that is just as binding and legitimate, or even more so, than a conveyance, and that is through English adverse possession. If they had taken legal action to contest this, adverse possession would have been completely thwarted or made legally impossible. However, true to their word, they did not contest it or protest it, but let it happen, even though they were aware of it.

            In other words, the former Imperial house, by their actions, put themselves into a situation where they, in effect, authorized and upheld English legal authority over a diminutive part of their de jure, international, proprietary rights.

 2. Abandonment:

             Abandonment has powerful legal implications. "An abandonment of property, or a right, divests the title and ownership of the [former] owner as fully and completely as would a conveyance," or, as fully and completely as though it were sold and he or she, the former owner, no longer owns it or has any claim or future connection to it." (1 Corpus Juris Secundum §12, n. 71) That is, it is permanent, "A title [to sovereignty] once abandoned whether tacitly [by implication] or expressly, cannot be resumed [continued, started over or reconstituted]." (T. Twiss, The Oregon Question Examined, 1840, p. 24) It is final.
            "The consequence of abandonment [in international law] is either that the territory becomes res nullius [having no owner] once again, or that it falls under another State’s sovereignty [that is, it is transferred]." (Marcelo G Kohen, Territory, Abandonment, Oxford Public International law: 2108: http://opil.ouplaw.com/oxlaw/entryview/viewoxlawoxchap/10.1093$002flaw:epil$002f9780199231690$002flaw-9780199231690-e1117)
          Alienation or abandonment is so important in the loss and transfer process that it is mentioned as part of "The modes of acquiring Kingdoms [or a principality in this case] under the Law of Nations are: Election, Succession, Conquest, Alienation and Prescription." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 1680, p. 77) (emphasis added) Abandonment enables changes in the right to rule and/or who rightfully owns the deposed or de jure territory involved. In addition, "in the case of abandonment, there is no usurpation [no theft, no robbery, no one was cheated out] of sovereignty [or property rights] since there are no contemporaneous [or competing] claims." (James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., 2008, p. 230) This is why, it opens the door for various legal mechanisms to transfer the rights to another person or nation.
          "A state [a reigning or legitimate non-reigning sovereign entity in international law] may readily relinquish territory [by an act of] deny[ing] . . . sovereignty or ownership over it." (Gbenga Oduntan, International Law and Boundary Disputed in Africa, 2015, p. 46) In other words, ". . . denial of ownership would mean renouncing [or abandoning] its sovereignty. . . ." (Jon Harald Sande Lie, Developmentality: An Ethnography of the World Bank-Uganda Partnership, 2015, p. 225) To formally deny ownership, as the Imperial family did, is a legally binding form of abandonment -- a renunciation of all rights and royal privileges.  
          Abandonment works domestically as well as internationally. For example, in English law ". . . in cases in which the true owner has, to the knowledge of the adverse possessor, abandoned the land," not as much proof is required to complete and establish the transfer of all rights of ownership to the possessor. (Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law, 8th ed., 2012, p. 447) Abandonment is a key principle in our claim. We encourage the reader to study "Abandonment" in both "Letters from the Imperial Family" and "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality")

 3. Failure to Protest:

          In addition, their willful silence concerning the matter, when they should or ought to have spoken up to protect those rights, acts as a further support in substantiating their statement that they would not take any action against it. Vattel in The Law of Nations, wrote:

            Every proprietor . . . who expressly omits things [or fails to protest] . . . without renouncing his right, sufficiently indicates, by that means [or by that omission], that he would not preserve it at least, if he does not make an express reservation [to the contrary]. (The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 146)

            That is, if no objection is made (to English jurisdiction in this case) after a sufficient period of time, then it is legally interpreted to be a tacit act of approbation, approval or a concurrence.

            When anything is transacted, in which a man is concerned, if he is present [or knows about it] at the time, and does not contradict it, the presumption from his silence is, that he consents to it.  If goods are shipwrecked, or cattle have strayed, and the owner neither sends out to look for them, nor endeavours by any means to recover them, the most obvious construction of his neglect is, that he despairs of finding them, and disregards or gives up any claim that he had to them.  In like manner, if he suffers another to keep possession of his goods, without laying claim to them, when he both knew where they are, and is at liberty to claim them, this neglect is fairly presumed to be a mark of his intention to part with them; and when the owner has thus relinquished them, they become the property of the possessor, as the first occupant of them. (Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacit, 1832, pp. 63-64) (emphasis added)

            Vattel explained:

            People have doubtless a right to consider as true what he [another person] sufficiently evinces [demonstrates clearly or proves] on occasions where he ought to declare the truth; consequently they [can] lawfully presume, that, he has abandoned his right [by his silence]; and if he would afterwards resumes it, they may [rightfully and ethically] oppose . . . him. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 146) (emphasis added)

            That is, what estoppel is all about. Vattel tells us that:

            . . . If [a deposed monarch or] nation . . . does not resist the encroachments . . . if it makes no opposition to them, -- if it preserves a profound silence, when it might and ought to speak, -- its patient acquiescence becomes in length of time a tacit consent that legitimates the rights of the usurper. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 16, no. 199) (emphasis added)

            In other words, the lack of objection, when one should and ought to speak up, legally indicates agreement by the implication of its response. Hence, by estoppel and by failing to counter the legalized conveyance of the former German sovereign feudal properties taking place in England, which they were fully informed about, the former Imperial family accepted English jurisdiction by what is called implied consent or indirect (tacit) agreement. "'Implied consent' is defined to be . . . inaction or silence, which raises a [legal] presumption that the consent has been given." (Judicial and Statutory Definitions of Words and Phrases, vol. 4, National Reporter System, eds., 1904, pp. 3427-3428)

          The principle of laches also has a powerful part supporting the transfer of all rights to the principality:

          Adverse possession is based on the doctrine of "laches." Defined as neglecting to do what should or could have been done to assert a claim or right for an unreasonable and unjustified time causing disadvantage to another, laches is a concept that has existed in the common law for hundreds of years. Laches prevents unreasonable results if a person fails to enforce his/her property rights within the proper time [defined in law as 12 years for unregistered property]. (Adverse Possession: Obtaining Property Ownership Through Squatter’s Rights; 2015: http://real-estate-law.freeadvice.com/real-estate-law/real-estate-law/adverse-possession-squater-rights.htm#ixzz3veEGet00)

          Therefore, in conclusion, considering the above:

          Failure to protest . . . in order to assert, to preserve or to safeguard a right . . . signif[ies] acquiescence or tacit recognition: [such a] State [or deposed sovereign entity] concerned [therefore] must be held barred [precluded] from claiming . . . the rights it failed to assert or to preserve when they were openly challenged by word or deed. (Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law Report, vol. 50, 1976, p. 411)

          Estoppel precludes a party from bringing an action when the party knowingly failed to claim or enforce a legal right at the proper time. In other words, implied agreement along with estoppel and latches has the legal effect of full endorsement and therefore, the dominance of English property law. After 12 years, the English statute of limitations and the act of estoppel precludes any change in this position. The claim thereby stands as legally decisive and final. The Latin term for this is qui tacet consentire videtur, which means "He who is silent is understood to consent." In other words: ". . . Nonperformances or Omissions [as pointed out above] . . . do, in moral account, [legally] pass for Actual Deeds. . . ." (Samuel von Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations, Book 4, chapter 12, no. 7(d) Silence, in certain situations, has profound consequences in changing the legal status of cases.
          Estoppel, as powerful as it is, does not have acquisitive legal power to transfer a deposed sovereign principality in and of itself, but it does have the legal competence and standing to preclude or bar a State or sovereign entity, such as, a reigning or deposed monarchy, from going back on its word. Such that when the former Imperial house gave its word, that they would not interfere or get involved with the legal action taking place in England, they literally gave legal power and authority to the Deed and Declarations, as valid English legal documents, that placed the hereditary regal entity -- the principality, under English property law. That is, in this situation, their legally binding act of doing nothing did not transfer the principality itself, but the juridical impact it had gave English law rightful and lawful jurisdiction.

 4. Treaty Law:

          International treaty law took place when the Imperial House sent formal official letters through their attorneys or legal representatives. This was another powerful legal attestation of the binding nature of their actions that the transfer of rights actually took place and that it was rightful and lawful in every way. This important part of the transfer of legal entitlements is discussed in the sub-section entitled, "Treaty Law" in the "Letters from the Imperial Family" page.

 5. Juridical Acts:

          A juridical act is an action outside of international or domestic court that has legal ramifications upheld as legally binding. Such an act is  "an expression of will that is intended to have legal consequences." (FindLaw, Juridical Act; 2016: http://dictionary.findlaw.com/definition/juridical-act.html) A juridical act can be an abdication, a contract, a treaty, an act of estoppel, a waiver of rights, a declaration of ownership, a disinheritance, a renunciation, and result in a number of other legally recognized gains and losses. They have the enormous power to change things. For example, the legal results or outcome of the "Letters of the Imperial House" created several juridical binding acts further solidifying the ultimate transfer of all the rights, ownership and distinctions of the principality. (See "Juridical Acts" in "Letters from the Imperial Family")

 6. Contract Law:

          Although this is not the only reason, or even the most important point, nevertheless, the combination of the Deed of Transfer and Statutory Declarations specified that English law governed the conveyance. This was the beginning of English dominance over the transfer of a factual corporeal international land right.
          ". . . In English law, there is no legally accepted, formal definition of the word ‘contract.’" (Lee Roach, Card and James' Business Law, 4th ed., 2016, p. 103) However, the following has been offered. It is ". . . an agreement giving rise to obligations which are enforced or recognized by law." (Ibid., p. 103) A deed is a contract, but not all contracts are deeds. That is, "certain contracts must be made in the form of a deed." (Ibid., p. 105) "In English law . . . a deed is a contract or document executed with higher formalities than a single signature. . . ." (Legal News and Guidance from Pinsent Masons, Limitation Periods under English Law; 2017: https://www.out-law.com/en/topics/projects--construction/construction-claims/limitation-periods-under-english-law) In fact, "A title deed is far more than a contract. It is a document that can directly alter property rights and depending on the type of deed, vests rights and obligations between the holder and third parties." (The Law Offices of Stimmer, Stimmer & Smith, The Basics of Real Estate Title Deeds; 2017: https://www.stimmel-law.com/index.php/en/articles/basics-real-estate-title-deeds)
          The Deed of Transfer and Statutory Declarations specified both an agreement and consideration as well as a grant of legal privileges. They had all the trappings of a formal written contract as well as a deed. (See "Documents")  The Hague principles on "choice of law" for contracts specify that ". . . no particular form is required for a choice of law agreement to be valid. . . ." (HCCH, Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, Introduction to the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts, section 1.19; 2016: https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/full-text/?cid=135) Its form could be "express [that is, 'obvious'] or tacit [that is, 'implied']." (Ibid., section 1.4) But it is clearly present in the documents. For example, the statutory declaration concerning the transfer of all the honors and "de jure" ownership of said Principality were "executed in accordance with the laws of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Northern Ireland and Her Majesty's other realms and possessions beyond the seas," through the British Office of the Commonwealth and Foreign Affairs via an apostille. The purpose of such is "as proof of authenticity" of the document itself. That is, that it was legally and lawfully executed and registered as an authentic document.
          Article 9 describes the scope of "choice of law" rights in a contract:

The law chosen . . . shall govern all aspects of the contract . . . including but not limited to: --
a) interpretation;
b) rights and obligations arising from the contract;
c) performance and the consequences of non-performance, including the assessment of damages;
d) the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and limitation periods;
e) validity and the consequences of invalidity of the contract;
f) burden of proof and legal presumptions;
g) pre-contractual obligations. (Ibid., Article 9) (emphasis added)

          That is, it is all inclusive and comprehensive. ". . . It lays down the general rule that the law chosen by the parties governs all aspects of their contractual relationship." (Ibid., section 9.1) Again, ". . . the law chosen shall govern all aspects of the contract [or contract/deed in this case]." (Ibid., section 9.2) One of the "b) rights and obligations arising from the contract" or aspects that English law provides, in regard to the rights of conveyances, is that if the legal deed/contact does not provide "good title," (that is, it is was a legal contract, but was ineffectual), and the de jure corporeal land rights are, in spite of this knowledge, factually possessed, the case automatically turns into adverse possession by judge-created law (case law), which adverse possession if perpetuated eventually gives full ownership to the claimant after 12 years. This is how English law works in this kind of situation, and this is how the principality (a de jure, legal, constructive, factual, international, corporeal, land right with regal hereditaments) was transferred.

 7. Private International Law and English Jurisdiction

Brief Review:

          Before we start a long elaboration on private international law, it is important to note that:

          . . . private law and private international law . . . now provide the basis for a great many [legal and lawful] interactions [especially] between . . .

[1] the public and private law realm, and . . . .

[2] national [that is, the domestic domain], [the] supranational -- [having power or influence that transcends national boundaries or governments], and public international law [the field which can legally transfer the rights of sovereignty]. (Jhon Anderson, “International Law and the Public/Private Law Distinction,” Master’s Thesis, McGill University, 2000, p. 56)

          In other words, private international law, as it is used today, is practically all encompassing and has provided the legal right to transfer the case under adverse possession. It is very powerful, flexible, far-reaching and profound impacting public and private law, transcending national boundaries or governments and the full right to transfer sovereignty. The legal mechanism for the acquisition of the principality existed in English private international law.

Three important truths to remember in this regard:

          (1) It is obvious to anyone who knows the law that a private transaction can exist between an individual and a government, an individual and a another person, or a legal juridical entity; such as, a corporation or a legitimate deposed sovereign entity still intact under international law -- that is, the House of Hohenzollern in our case. The fact is, private contracts between private individuals and states or de jure sovereign entities come under private rather than public international law. The required international or foreign element necessary that activated international private law is that the principality of Halberstadt, like the Imperial House, is a legitimate deposed sovereign entity still intact under international law. Thus, international private law had full jurisdiction and governed the outcome. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "Public and Private Law as it relates to the Transfer of the Principality of Halberstadt" in "The Public and Non-Public Use of Titles in International Law") Note:

          [Private international law] serves largely to promote unregulated emancipation of private transnational actors [such as a deposed sovereign entity still legally intact under international law], with little accountability in return. The activities of multinational [or international] corporations, [or the private dealings of deposed sovereignty], rating agencies, or arbitrators, all yield . . . considerable power outside a domestic, public law framework. . . . [but function under private law]. ("Abstract," Private International Law and Global Governance, Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P. Fernández Arroyo, eds., 2014, iii)

          [It is a mistake to think] that private law never applies to the State or other public bodies [such as a deposed sovereign entity like the Imperal family]. For bodies subject to public law can make use of private law, methods and institutions; there is sufficient unity in the law to confer on all persons, including the State, in both public and private law capacities. . . . Private law governs all acts done in a private law capacity, whether by public bodies or by private persons. (G. Miele, G. Cotzi, and D. Falconi, "Italian Administrative Law," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 3, July 1954, p. 421)

          Thus "Private international law [can have] transnational [that is, international] force." (Donald Earl Childress III, "Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws," University of California, Davis Law Review, vol. 44, no. 11, p. 22)
           (2) English private international law is the private law right that enables English domestic law; such as, English adverse possession to govern private international transactions as long as they have an international or foreign component. That is, international private law established the statutory authority for English adverse possession to transfer all the international rights to the principality of Halberstadt to the Goff/Harradine family. Private international law is central to a number of legal principles that legally conveyed the international corporeal property. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
          (3) Because the "Deed of Transfer" in this case, which was created in the year 2000 to lawfully convey the principality, was a valid legal contract and an extensive investigation by the English Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) could not prove it was fraudulent, nor could it be proven to validly provide "good title;" therefore, the Deed became a legal, but flawed contract. As such, according to law, the defective, but legal conveyance, qualified to become an adverse possession case, because all the requirements were met. This is just how the law works and it legally worked to our advantage giving us full ownership. (See "Automatic Nature of Adverse Possession in English Law" on this page and both "Adverse Possession Cures Defects in Conveyances" and "The Adverse Possessor does not need to know that he is Adversely Possessing the Rights to the Property he has taken control of or Factually Occupied" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")

Private International Law:

           ". . . A king [or sovereign prince] can transfer his right over such a kingdom [a patrimonial kingdom or principality] to whomsoever he pleases." (Andreas Rahmatian, “Indirect Sovereignty through Property Rights,” Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 7, issue 2, article 4, May 3, 2017, p. 77) In other words, ". . . sovereignty is as alienable as a property right." (Andreas Rahmatian, "Indirect Sovereignty through Property Rights," Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 7, issue 2, article 4, May 3, 2017, p. 74) Proprietary sovereignty can be bought and sold especially by a patrimonial monarch who owns the land. Transfers of sovereign territories were common in the past up to and including the 20th century. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred")
          Both reigning and deposed sovereignties have legal personality or international rights. (See "Deposed Monarchs and their Lawful Successors have International Personality as Public Persons under International Law" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") But legal, deposed sovereignty is privately, rather than publicly, owned. That is the meaning of proprietary or patrimonial sovereignty. The rights are privately owned by the monarchy. As such, it can be privately conveyed or sold by contract law in any nation whose laws will allow it. Our legally valid "Deed of Transfer" is an example of this. (See "Documents") Whatever is privately owned can be privately sold, conveyed or transferred as desired. As a generally recognized principle:

          A government [or a patrimonial, non-reigning, de jure monarch], when acting in its proprietary capacity [for example as the private owner of a sovereign territory] would normally be bound by ordinary commercial [law, not public law, but through private contract] law unless otherwise provided by statute or regulation. (American Bar Association, Government Contract Law: The Deskbook for Procurement Professionals, 3rd ed., p. 3)

          Such a private transaction, if done in a foreign land whose laws would allow it, as in England, would immediately be under the rules of "private international law," which law ". . . exists to fulfil foreign [or international] rights, not to destroy them. . . ." (Geoffrey Chevalier Cheshire and Peter Machin North, Private International Law, 10th ed., 1979, p. 692) The rights involved in the conveyance in our case was a deposed sovereign entity still legally intact under the authority of international law.
          The scope of private international law is not just between individuals, but ". . . between individuals and states . . . ," that is, in our case, a deposed state -- the Imperial House of Hohenzolern, that still held the legal status of a non-territorial sovereign entity in international law before they abandoned the principality in 2002. (Paras and Peeyaski Divan, Private International Law: Indian and English, 1993, p. 47) "The central issue in . . . private international law . . . [is] which state will be allocated the legal power to regulate the matter?" (Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution and the Right to Regulate, 2006, p. 21) In our case, it was the laws of England that governed and had dominion.
          Private international law enabled and authorized the transfer of ownership to occur -- first as a legal and substantiated English conveyance in the year 2000, then as an English adverse possession right created in 2001, and afterwards, in addition, as a proprietary estoppel case under equity laws.
          In summary:

          . . . The relation between private international and public international law can, thus, be summed up as follows: Public international law provides the overall legal framework in a global society in which the transnational interactions between citizens of a limited number of different states are governed by private international law. Private international law is therefore a part of public international law. (Jhon Anderson, International Law and the Public/Private Distinction, Master of Laws Thesis, McGill University, March 2000, p. 105)

          [In fact] the Supreme Court of the United States in Hilton v. Guyot in 1895 ". . . defined international law as including public international law as well as private international law. . . . Moreover, one century after Hilton v. Guyot the consideration of public international law and private international law has not fundamentally changed." (Ibid., p. 101) (Hilton v. Guyot (Supreme Court of the United States, 1895), 159 U.S. 113)
          The obvious conclusion is that "Private international law [has] transnational force [and power]." (Donald Earl Childress III, "Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws," University of California, Davis Law Review, vol. 44, no. 11, November 2010, p. 22) The legal right to tackle international legal concerns, having power or influence that transcends national boundaries using domestic law in private matters, is a fact -- a legal reality. (See "Public and Private Law as it relates to the Transfer of the Principality of Halberstadt" at "The Public and Non-Public Use of Titles in International Law")
          In summary, adverse possession is one of many domestic laws for which private international law has full authority. It holds the legal power to validate and establish what laws will be binding for foreign or international concerns of a private nature. Thus, it set in motion the power of English adverse possession and other important laws to provide us with all the rights to the Principality. English private international law rules lawfully established the certainty of the fact that English adverse possession could rightfully governed our claim. As a result of obeying all the requirements mandated by adverse possession, this legally gave us all the rights and regal privileges of ownership. Seven other valid methods of legal transfer also applied to the case, on their own merits, making the transfer of ownership extremely solid. (See "Eight Legal and Lawful Methods Transferred all the Rights")

English private international law -- basics and the connection between public and private international law:

          "Public and private international law are viewed . . . as two separate [and distinct] intellectual streams running parallel." (Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, 2009, p. 2) However, they interlap and influence each other. That is, in many cases, there is no ". . . clear separation in their effects, their social products, or their practice." (Ibid., p. 2) Both can impact sovereignty in their own particular way. In fact, "The [sometimes artificial] distinction between public and private international law obscures the important ‘public’ role of private international law, both actual and potential, in ordering the regulation of private international transactions [worldwide]. . . ." (Ibid.) In other words, private International law also embodies ". . . public principles of global ordering [and regulating]. . . ." (Ibid., p. 3) The point is, ". . . private international law is international in character because it forms part of a single, broadly defined, international system of law." (Ibid. p. 14)
          In other words, ". . . although private international law had taken up its place in the shadow of public international law, the two spheres nevertheless remained connected." (Horatia Muir Watt, Private International Law: Beyond the Schism, from Closet to Planet, p. 26; 2018: http://blogs.sciences-po.fr/pilagg/files/2011/11/PILAGG-Launching-Paper-HMW1.pdf) ". . . Private international law has always served as an interface between the local and the global allowing national cultures . . .  governance of situations beyond their own territorial boundaries." (Ibid., pp. 52-53) In other words, ". . . Private international law has global governance implications. . . ." (Ibid., p. 3) In fact, it is so powerful that ". . . [It] has allowed private economic [legal] power to acquire an informal sovereign status. . . ." (Ibid., p. 25) Therefore, ". . . [It has a] planetary [a full and complete] function . . . private international law . . . [has] power beyond the state [into foreign and international situations]." (Ibid., p. 43)
          "Private International Law is the body of law that governs private relationships [or dealings] that cross national borders." (Private International Law -- Conflict of Laws -- Library Guides at Catholic University of America -- Law Library; 2018: https://libguides.law.cua.edu/c.php?g=625517&p=4361616) "Private international law . . . deals with international transactions between private parties [which was precisely what our case was about]. . . ." (U. S. Department of State definition at Brooklyn Law School negotiations in 2002;2018: https://www.state.gov/s/l/38725.htm) It can be ". . . between persons, companies, corporations and other legal entities [such as a deposed sovereign entity that is still legally intact in international law which provides its] international context." (Tulp/Abogadox, Private International Law; 2018: http://tulpabogados.com/en/our-services/international-law)
          Private international law has the international power that ". . . the rights of sovereignty can be ceded to private individuals. . . ." (Can the Independent Chiefs of Savage Tribes cede to any Private Individual the whole or a part of their States, together with the Sovereign Rights which belong to them in conformity with the Traditional Customs of the Country?, 1884, p. 10 and Egide Arntz, "Argument of Egide Arntz," in Henry Wellington Wack, The Story of the Congo Free State, 1905, p. 524) (See "Private Individuals can become Royal Sovereigns" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") In other words, private international law regulates and governs private legal situations with an international component, such as the principality.

          But by virtue of what principle of international law can it be shown that he who to-day is simply a private individual, may not to-morrow be a sovereign and in possession of full sovereign power? No such principle exists. It has never been upheld by any writer on international law, and the whole history of mankind from the earliest times to the present day contradicts it. Private individuals can become sovereigns and exercise rights of sovereignty. . . . (Ibid., p. 11)

         Private international law regulates and governs private legal situations with an international component. It includes the power to enable a legal transfer of sovereignty through domestic law, such as, adverse possession. The following is how it works, if there is a dispute between parties in international private law, then a court, arbitrator, mediation expert, attorney or even self study can determine or help with the situation, but the law is always the deciding factor, not opinion except where this is permitted. That is, although there is some flexibility built into it, private international law is obligatory and binding. (Vanderbilt University, Topic One: Introduction to Conflict of Laws; 2018: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/wp.../Lehmann-author-changes-ARJ-final-supra-check.pdf) When no dispute exists, as in our case, it is still the law that prevails and it compulsory.
          As to English legal jurisdiction, "according to English [private international] law . . . if the contract was concluded in the United Kingdom [under English law as was ours], [it] is governed by English law. . . ." (Jean G. Robert, LexisNexis Emerging Issues Analysis, Private International Law, 2014 Emerging Issues 7232; 2018: http://www.lette.ca/docs/default-source/articles/private-international-law.pdf?sfvrsn=0) Thus, English jurisdiction is obviously a part of our case. It did what no other law could do.
          Private international law is powerful, broad, flexible and extensive. In other words, "private international law is . . . all-pervading" or all encompassing. (J. J. Faucett and J. M. Carruthers, Private International Law, 14th ed., 2008, p. 7) It covers all possible situations or aspects, which. of course, would include ours. The purpose of private international law is to determine what law applies. In our situation, it is English law in general and adverse possession in particular. But it also upholds and supports the use of English proprietary estoppel and the international laws of prescription, non-belligerent occupation and peaceful or non-violent conquest for a case such as ours.

          By distinction, private international law consists largely of domestic laws, rules and principles. . . .

          [However] private international law is no longer a uniquely domestic domain, but has become a proper and active area of international articulation and codification. It covers a vast area [or variety of issues]. (David P. Stewart, Promoting the Rule of Law and Economic Development through Private International Law, p. 1; 2017: https://www.oas.org)

          ". . . Aside treaties, private international law is domestic law and only its object is international. . . ." (Gerhard Kegel, Introduction, International Encyclopedia Of Comparative Law, vol. 3, Kurt Lipstein, ed., 1986, p. 6) However, since, "its philosophy is international. . . ," it deals with international concerns. (Kurt Lipstein, Principles of the Conflict of Laws: National and International, 1981, p. 2) In other words, it is specifically designed to impact ". . . international transactions and private issues with an international element" through domestic law. (University of Aberdeen, Private International Law LLM; 2017: https://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/courses/details/4420712) In fact, "There is no clear line of demarcation between it [private international law] and public international law. Both are integral parts of the law of nations." (Phillip Marshall Brown, "Private versus Public International Law," American Journal of International Law, vol. 36, 1942, pp. 448-450) "The line between private and public international law has blurred, as has that between issues of domestic jurisdiction and international jurisdiction. There is increasing integration of domestic and international law." (Edith Brown Weiss, "The Rise or the Fall of International law," Georgetown University Law Center, April 2010, p. 351) In fact, "Rules of private international law function [or operate] within a public international law context [because] overlapping jurisdiction is [legally] permitted [and employed]. . . ." (Alan Mills, "Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 84, issue 1, January 1, 2014, p. 198) "[The point is, there has] been increasing recognition of the functional and doctrinal overlap between public and private international law. . . ." (Op.cit., Weiss)

          Public international law has become increasingly concerned with areas that used to be viewed as entirely within the purview of private international law, just as private international law is more often addressing issues that used to be viewed as the primary province of governments. Increasingly, governments are reaching international agreements to facilitate transactions in private international law. (Ibid., pp. 352-353)

          Included in the modes of derivative acquisition [generally transfer of ownership by gift or sale] are transactions at the international private law level [that is, a domestic conveyance of an international item or entity] and also at the public international law level [a conveyance of an international item or entity under international law]. (Cestmir Cepelka and Jamie H. C. Gilmour, "The Application of General International Law in Outer Space" Journal of Air Law and Commerce, vol. 36, no. 1, article 3, 1970, p. 40)

In other words, conveyances of sovereignty can be done by either private international law or public international law.
          "The private sector is also negotiating transnational arrangements that in some cases assume functions that governments could do." (Ibid., p. 353) "Private international law has thus transformed itself from a set of transnational rules governing non-state, commercial entities, to a body of supra-national laws and regulations, which govern relations among many different state and non-state entities." (Milena Sterio, "The Evolution of International Law," Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, vol. 31, issue 2, article 3, 2008, p. 242) ". . . Private international law . . . [concerns] acts, [both] private or public. . . ." (John William Dwyer, Leading Cases on Private International Law, footnote 2, 1904, p. 15) (emphasis added) "Private international law [also] . . . operates within the public international law framework. . . . ['of global governance' or with a worldwide impact]." (Alex Mills, "Connecting Public and Private International Law," Linkages and Boundaries in Private and Public International Law, Veronica Ruiz Abou-Nigm, Kasey McCall-Smith and Duncan French, eds.,  2018, p. 21) Private international law includes international public law rights through domestic law which can transfer public honors through private law. Such sales were by private law wherein sovereignty was transferred. The ". . . sales of [sovereign] territory did in fact occur" on a private basis in history over and over again. (Khin Maung Sein, Public International law: a Practical Approach, 2006, p. 113)

               The primary questions addressed by public international law are:
Jurisdiction -- What nation should have jurisdiction . . . and
Choice of Law -- What nation's laws should be applied. . . . (Expert law, Aaron Larson, What is International Law: 2017: https://www.expertlaw.com/library/international_law/feminist_international.html) (emphasis added)

         "Private international law, jus gentium privatum, is sometimes referred to as 'conflicts of law' because it determines which set of laws apply to private transactions." (Renee Dopplick, What is International Law, Inside Justice; 2017: http://www.insidejustice.com/intl/2009/01/12/what_is_international_law) Thus, English private international law activated, or set in motion, the power of English jurisdiction and law which made English adverse possession and all the relevant domestic rules active, so that the principality would be transferred legally and lawfully.          
          German domestic law did not, and still does not, apply to the case, because the Federal Republic of Germany, or any subsequent de facto government, has any legal jurisdiction over the international legal rights of any former de jure kingdom, principality or empire that once ruled the land they now govern.
          In general private international law:

          . . . does not offer any immediate solution for a particular dispute [or legal problem] but operates indirectly. [That is, it does not solve the issue at hand, rather] it only indicates the legal system which is to provide the rule to be applied in determining the particular issue. (Kurt Lipstein, Principles of the Conflict of Laws: National and International, 1981, p. 2)

          PIL [private international law] does not give a final decision. It is comparable with a railway inquiry room. By approaching the inquiry room you can only a ascertain the platform from which a particular train leaves. It is the train [the domestic law that is activated] that reaches you to your destination not the enquiry room [the rules of private international law]. (Salauddin Saimum, Private International Law; 2017: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/private-international-law-salauddin-saimum-5989072056078135296

          In our case, the inquiry clearly and unequivocally demonstrated that it was English jurisdiction and English law that established the legal transfer of all rights. In other words, independent of a jury, court or judge, ". . . the rules [themselves] tells us which county's law apply." (Gerhard Dannemann, "Common law-based contracts under German law," Boiler Plate Causes, International Commercial Contracts and the Applicable Law, Ciditta Cordero-Moss, ed., 2011, p. 4) That is,
          [Private international law governs] all [private law] actions and transactions [of an international or transnational nature either] in a Court of Justice or out of Court [that is, either way -- in or out of court] . . . [they] are valid [and binding]. . . . (Jan Helenus Ferguson, Manual of International Law: For the Use of Navies, Colonies and Consulates, vol. 1, 1884, p. 146) (emphasis added)

Outside of court, this law made it possible for the domestic law of adverse possession would have full power to determine the outcome in our case. Private international law provides the guidance and the authority for domestic law to govern.

          Private international law deals with a variety of topics [or possibilities] such as contracts [like ours], marriage and divorce, jurisdiction [that is, that English law governs in our case], recognition of judgments, child adoption and abduction, and the like. (International Legal Research Tutorial, Private International Law; 2017: https://law.duke.edu/ilrt/def_terms_3.htm)

          [It] . . . is simply a branch of the civil law of the State evolved to do justice between litigating parties [where there is a foreign component] . . . or [merely about a] personal status [or legal issue] involving a foreign element [as in our case]. (Wharton's Pocket Law Dictionary, Ar Lakshmanan, ed., 2010, p. 590)

          Private international law is not a separate branch of law in the same sense, as say the law of contract or of tort. It is all pervading [or all pervasive and broad in its approach]. . . . ‘It starts up unexpectedly in any court and in the midst of any process . . . quite unlooked for . . . whether substantive, or [in a] simple procedure. (Frederic Harrison, Jurisprudence and the Conflict of Laws, 1919, pp 101-102)

          ". . . All that these principles [the rules of private international law] can determine [that is, all they can do is resolve] what system of laws shall be used in determining the real matter. . . ." (Albert Hutchinson Putney, International law, Conflict of laws, Spanish-American laws, Legal Ethics, vol. 12, 1908, p. 79) This law is used both in court and in non-dispute or conflict circumstances. It's chiefly ". . . responsible for designating the law applicable to certain relationships, cases and situations with a private law dimension (e.g. marriages, contracts, torts/delicts, adoptions and successions). . . ." (Mateusz Pilich, Basic Notions of International Law; 2017: http://polishprivatelaw.pl/basic-notions-of-private-international-law)
          Private international law covers legal problems for individuals, two or more people, a company or several corporations, government entities, and even countries in dealing with an individual, or with any of the above concerned stakeholders where there is a trans-national issue involved.
          As, in our case, private international law has jurisdiction over situations involving private individuals and a sovereign entity including a deposed sovereign. For example, "A juridical person . . . is a legal entity having a distinct identity and legal rights and obligations under the law." (JHU Democ Elec 2; 2018: https://quizlet.com/176811836/jhu-democ-elec-2-flash-cards) (emphasis added) A deposed sovereign house "is a legal entity" and is a subject of international law having legal personality provided, of course, that the supreme right to rule was preserved as required in prescriptive law. (See "Deposed Monarchs and their Lawful Successors have International Personality as Public Persons under International Law" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") They have, as defined, "a distinct identity [as a royal house] and [has] legal rights and obligations under the law [as legal sovereigns]." In other words, a dispossessed de jure or non-reigning king or sovereign prince is a juridical person by legal definition.
          With that is mind, "Private international law concerns . . . natural and juridical persons. . . ." (Michael Bogdan, Private International Law of the Forum, 2012, p. 285) (emphasis added) Since deposed sovereigns are juridical persons, then it is obvious that such a person or his legitimate successors, the head of a dispossessed royal house can be governed by or subject to domestic private international law. It is important to understand that private international law rules can decide cases between individuals and a sovereign state, such as, ours. That is, ". . . In the case of private international law [situations are usually] of a private character, though . . . one . . . may be a sovereign state [or a deposed royal house that maintained rightfully and lawfully sovereignty]." (S. S. Gulshan, Business Law, 4th ed., 2012, p. 16) (emphasis added) In other words, ". . .Private international law [can be] between individuals or between individuals and states." (Paras Diwan and Peeyushi Diwan, Private International Law: Indian and English, 1993, p. 47) It ". . . has binding rules [for situations] between states and individuals . . . ," not just between individual people and others entities such as corporations. (Seyyed Ibrahim Hosseini, Alo Arya and Mehran Ahmadi, "Nationality in Private International Law," Indian Journal of Science and Technology, vol. 8, no. 12, June 2915, p. 5) Again, ". . . Transactional situations (in private International law). . . may involve individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other groups." (Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law, vol. 1, 1956, pp. 2-3) Again, ". . . Transactional situations [in private International law]. . . may involve individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other groups." (Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law, vol. 1, 1956, pp. 2-3) ". . . A sovereign State [can] voluntarily assume a purely private law obligation. . . ." by making a private law contract. (Adam J. Mambi, Rule of Law vs. Rulers of Law, 2011, p. 54) However, because of the immense power of a sovereign, care must be taken to ensure fairness. The recommendation is that:

           A private party dealing with a sovereign counterpart can further optimise its legal position by insisting that the law of a jurisdiction, which is known to be favourable to private parties and to arbitration generally, govern the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. (Lexology, McDermont and Emery, Drafting Tips for Contracting with Sovereign Parties; 2013: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a22bf2dd-cd0b-441f-a0f4-638d35b8572d)

          England was such a place with benevolent and just laws to protect both the sovereign and the individual. For ". . . when a sovereign contracts with persons who are not subjects of the State [as in our case], whether it be with a private individual, or with a Nation, or with a sovereign, the rights of [both] parties are [or should be] the same in each case." (Emerich de Vatel, The Classics of International Law, vol. 3 issue 4, no. 214, James Brown Scott, ed., 1916, p. 186)
         The point is, a state can contract with a private individual, which means a proprietary monarch, being the personification or embodiment of his kingdom or principality, can contract with a private individual. Such a contract can be for the sale of a sovereign entity. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred") This is a recognized right in international law. ". . . States [or sovereigns truly can] enter into commercial, or other private law, transactions with individuals." (Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity, 3rd ed., 2013, p. 36) And a proprietary deposed monarch can transfer his territorial sovereignty rights to another person through private law, or in our case by contract law. In other words, English law had the legal mechanism to do this, because the conveyance of corporeal land includes all the incorporeal rights that belong to it. (See "Adverse Possession transfers all the rights of an Estate which includes Regal and Sovereign Rights.")
          In our case, the foreign or international component that activated "private international law" was that the principality was an intact legal, non-territorial sovereign entity under international law. There was also a legitimate English Deed of Transfer that was defective in that it could not provide "good title," but was a bonefide and valid legal document. In such a situation, adverse possession could and did take over the case, because private international law has the legal right to govern such situations and it unequivocally provided that domestic law (adverse possession in particular) would have full jurisdiction to cover what had happened. That is, by judge made law, or legal precedence in England, a flawed, but valid conveyance contract, can, by adverse possession, transfer the full and complete ownership designated in a faulty document, if the requirements thereof are satisfied. This is what happened in our case. (See "Adverse Possession cures defects in Conveyances" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
          When confronted with a legal problem with a foreign or international element, ". . . the decision-maker [whether judge, mediator, solicitor, or concerned individual] must look to the rules of private international law [to solve which law must dominate so that the main issue might be properly and legally settled according to the proper law]." (Law Society Journal: The Official Journal of the Law Society of New South Wales, vol. 36, 1998, p. 69) The are international law firms which deal with issues concerning the determination of what law applies to various situations in order to solve "conflicts of laws" issues inside or outside of court. In fact, courts often close proceedings if the parties agree to settle things amicably out of court using the proper rules of private international law. This can be done through mediation, arbitration or privately on one's own.
          One of the reasons private international law allows private inquiry into what law is binding is explained by the following important principle -- that of the core issue of predictability:

          Predictability matters both outside of court and inside. On the outside, it is important for parties to be able to know which law will govern their conduct so that they can adjust their behavior accordingly. They should be able to know what laws they are subjecting themselves to for reasons of fairness and efficiency. (Kermit Roosevelt, Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., 2015, pp. 30-31)

          "Legal interpretation is a rational activity that gives meaning to a legal text." (Abaron Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, 2005, p. 3) It should be the activity of all people to know the law that affects them personally. But who can interpret the law? The answer is anyone! That fact, of course, does not make an individual's personal interpretation binding on others. It is the law itself that is binding. But if one does not understand the law, the law can administer a terrible blow with teeth enough to maim or ruin a person’s whole life. It is important to keep in mind that ignorance of the law is no excuse; therefore, ". . . ‘the Law of Interpretation’ has a claim to guide the actions of judges, officials, and private interpreters [private citizens]. . . ." (William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs, "The Law of Interpretation," Harvard Law Review, vol. 130, no. 4, February 2017, p. 1082) That is, individuals who are not lawyers often need to be interpreters of the law in everyday life circumstances to ensure they are legally safe and well-grounded in their decisions, because of the ". . . legal principle holding that a person who is unaware of a law may not escape liability [or the consequences thereof. . . ." (Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979, pp. 672-673 and UIA, The Encyclopedia of World Problems & Human Potential; 2018: http://encyclopedia.uia.org/en/problem/158218) When laws are obscure, one may need to have legal help, but when the law is straight-forward, upfront and obvious, any reasonable person can perceive what the law is really saying. That is, if the law is self-evident and it is being enforced as is, then it is clear and unequivocal -- leaving no doubt about how it is to be interpreted. This is case for how private international law interacts with the transfer of the Principality of Halberstadt empowering English adverse possession to govern the outcome.
           It was so clear, definitive and obvious as in our case, along with the findings of the London Tribunal, and expert opinions from three prominent international lawyers that English law dominated, not German, or the laws of any other country. These three factors preclude any need for further clarification. The answer was far too obvious. Private international law is binding and its conclusions are unmistakable.
          "There are no special courts of Private International Law. . . ." Its use can take place inside or outside of court ". . . in the midst of any process [such as ours]. . . ." (Frederic Harrison, "The Historical Side of the Conflict of Laws," The Fortnightly Review, vol. 26, 1879, p. 561) Private international law can be used by anyone to identify what law is binding on one's legal questions. In other words, it operates to the benefit of any legal issue in or outside of court to determine what laws apply whether foreign or domestic to a particular situation.
          Where there is no dispute between two or more parties, no court, tribunal or mediation is required for private international law matters to govern or be binding. It can be used to solve a legal jurisdiction problem. It is merely common sense that, ". . . If there is no dispute [no court involvement] . . . [you simply] apply the private international law [rules] . . . to identify the law governing the contract [situation or issue]." (Camilla Dalbak, "Ship Management Agreements and Third Party Claim," 2006, p. 37; 2017: https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/22827/ShipxManagementxAgreements.pdf?sequence=1)     
          That is, in these circumstances (arbitration, mediation or in a non-dispute case, "The law [or legal jurisdiction] applicable [to a situation] . . . will . . . be determined in accordance with the existing rules of private international law. . . ."  (Carlos Esplugues Mota and Louis Marquis, New Developments in Civil and Commercial Mediation: Global Comparative, 2015, pp. 74-75, 77) The point is, private international law is not merely for court, arbitration or mediation or any kind of dispute, but it is a way to determine which laws rightfully govern a situation that has an international or foreign aspect to it.
          However, if court was involved in our case, English law would still have been applied, because:

          In English law, notwithstanding the international aspects of a case, the court will apply English law, as the lex fori, to any dispute unless one party refers to another law. Even if there is an express choice of law clause, that chosen foreign law will be assumed to be the same as English law unless there is some proof of the foreign rule [making any significant difference]. (Peter Machin North, Essays in Private International Law, 1993, p. 61)

That is:

          . . . If neither party pleads the applicability of foreign law, the court will apply English domestic law to the issues in dispute. (Mukarrum, "A Comparative Study of the Fundamental Juridical Nature, Classification and Private Law Enforcement of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Agreements in the English Common Law of Conflict of Laws, the European Union Private International Law Regime and the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements," Doctoral Thesis, the University of Aberdeen, 2015, p. 287)
          In other words, court-made law in England is that English law prevails in dealing with international situations. That is, the above is the law -- it is what is practiced in a common law system. In other words, "The common law [as in England] is the body of law formed through court decisions, as opposed to law formed through statutes or written legislation." (Translegal, [English] Common Law and Judicial Precedent; 2018: https://www.translegal.com/lesson/8162) This is the ". . . doctrine of judicial precedent, the principle under which the lower courts must follow the decisions of the higher courts, rather than on statutory laws." (Ibid.) English law dominates in our case for this reason and for the following three points:

(1) there was no other party having legal standing or the right to request that another law applies, because the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern officially through their lawyers abandoned the property in 2002 by denying they owed the principality, even though they did own it once as part of their patrimony under international law. They also declared that they would not interfere or get involved with the English legal dealings concerning it; thus, supporting and establishing their intention to wash their hands of the case and let it take its course in England. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family")
(2) the only other law that was material or relevant to the case was international law. Germany domestic law had no legal authority or legal rights, when it comes to a principality that once belonged to a deposed, legal, non-territorial sovereignty in international law. That is, the principality was completely out of the jurisdiction of modern-day Germany, and
(3) international law has nothing legally relevant to the case except that the principality was and still is a legal proprietary sovereign entity under prescriptive law, which is the only law on earth that maintains deposed sovereign rights and entitlements as long as it is properly maintained and preserved. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")

          Therefore, according to English Common law, English law had full jurisdiction and controlled the outcome. That is, either inside or outside of court, English law prevailed.
          Last of all, with all of the above in mind, no wonder the London tribunal that accepted our case having a foreign or international component, declared that English law governed it -- that is, ". . . English law applied to the transactions. . ." not German law. (Tribunal Findings number 181) The point is, the barristers and solicitors involved declared that German domestic law ". . . did not apply to the transaction and was [therefore] not relevant [or material to the case]." (Tribunal Findings number 110)
          The rules of private international law legally and lawfully sustained and supported English legal jurisdiction in general and adverse possession in particular as the English law that legally and automatically applied to the case.
          In conclusion, private international law changes the focus from national to global concerns. Hence, it governs cases having international jurisdiction between private parties -- corporate and otherwise. In our case, it was between a deposed, legally sovereign entity and us. The power of private international law is so great internationally that legal experts are increasingly introducing it "into conversations about global governance." (Karen Knop, "Lorimer's Private Citizens of the World," European Journal of International Law, vol. 27, issue 2, May 2016, p. 459) "Private international law. . . is best comprehended from an international perspective . . . as a regulatory system of global governance." (Alex Mills, “Variable Geometry, Peer Governance, and the Public International Perspective on Private International Law,” Private International Law and Global Governance, Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P. Fernández, eds., 2014, pp. 261-262) In other words:

          [The] standard distinctions . . . between state law and international law . . . between public and private law; between monism and dualism . . . [is not what is valued, rather] whatever arrangement is most likely to work [is what is considered], paying no heed to these distinctions [between domestic and international law and private and public international law]. (Brian Z. Tamanaha, "What Is International Law?," Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-07-01, October 7, 2016, p. 61)

Private International Law -- general principles:

          Many changes in this law have come since the early 1900's, however, they do not impact our case as it is not in contradiction to any of the new rules, such as, the Brussels Convention, the Modified Convention, the Rome Conventions and the Lugano Convention. Our case is chiefly a matter of national legal or statute authority rather than local judicial or court authority. Private international law involves both the jurisdiction of the law on a national basis to a case, such as ours, as well as court or enforcement authority for various disputes having a foreign or international component.

          English law is not set out in a single civil code. It is a common law system, based on a combination of legislation and precedent. This has enabled English law to be flexible, adaptable and practical. . . . Within broad parameters, . . . [there is] the legal freedom and flexibility to agree to whatever terms they want on their transactions. . . . (Practical Law: International Transactions; 2016: http://us.practicallaw.com/1-504-0104?source=relatedcontent)

          In fact, as stated before, ". . . The unwritten constitution [of England] is that everything is permissible unless it is prohibited by law." (House of Lords and House of Commons, Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK?: Twenty-ninth Report of Session 2007-2008, vol. 2, 2008, p. 102) "On the Continent [it is the opposite, that is] everything is illegal unless expressly permitted by law. That is a fundamental difference between the European system of government and that of the UK." (Ashely Mote, Vigilance: A Defense of British Liberty, 2001, p. 54)
          Situations and circumstances are not put into straight jackets where there is no room to adapt. More than other jurisdictions, "in essence [the bottom line of] the rules of Private International Law in England are made from the precedents with the ultimate view of doing justice." (S. M. Masum Billah, "Origin and Development of Private International Law;" 2016: https://www.academia.edu/1734551/Origin_and_Development_of_Private_International_Law?auto=download) In other words, the major focus in England is what is "pragmatic and ethical." (Ibid.) Rendering or denying justice is a big concern. Because of this, there is a great deal of accommodation, hence:

          English law is widely used in international transactions (often in conjunction with local laws) across a variety of jurisdictions, especially where deals involve the Middle East, Africa, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, India, Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). (Ibid.)

          To an extent almost unimaginable even 30 years ago, national [or domestic] courts are called upon to consider and resolve issues turning on the correct understanding and application of international law. (Phillip Sales, Q. C. and Joanne Clement, "International Law in Domestic Courts," The Law Quarterly Review, vol. 124, July 2008, p. 388)

          The law system in England is fair and pliable and yet still "clear and well-established . . . [They have created a] fully developed jurisprudence and a universally well-respected judicial system." (Ibid.) Demonstrating worldwide potential jurisdiction, ". . . English courts are often used to resolve disputes involving parties based in other countries. The reasons behind a party’s choice of the English courts can be many and varied . . . ." (Can you bring a claim in the English court?; 2016: https://www.thelibrarybook.net/view.php?res=http://www.withersworldwide.com/news-publications/can-you-bring-a-claim-in-the-english-court--2.pdf&keyword=Can+you+bring+a+claim+in+the+English+court%3F+-+Withersworldwide) One of those reasons is that "the English legal system has a dependable, high-calibre and trustworthy judiciary," and fair and resilient laws to work with. (Op.cit., Practical Law)
           In other words, jurisdiction in England is highly inclusive, comprehensive and accepting in nature, so that foreign disputes can take place in English courts and/or operate under its laws. That is, national law is interpreted to be adjustable enough to govern.
          As a direct result, English law has the full authority to accommodate the adverse possession of a deposed international land right just as it covers scores of other legal distinct situations worldwide. In fact, the Law Society of England and Wales promotes ". . . England and Wales as the jurisdiction of choice for the resolution of disputes arising all over the world."  (England and Wales: The Jurisdiction of Choice; 2016: http://www.eversheds.com/documents/LawSocietyEnglandAndWalesJurisdictionOfChoice.pdf)      
          English law and English jurisdiction has become the ". . . preferred venue for international disputes." (Ibid.) In fact, ". . . extraterritorial [beyond national borders] jurisdiction [which can include foreign international incorporeal and corporeal land rights as in our case] in private law cases . . . are now commonplace." (Jennifer A. Zerk, Extraterritorial Jurisdictions: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights sphere from Six Regulating Areas, Report 59, June 2010, pp. 144-145) (emphasis added)
          Jurisdiction is consent-based or highly voluntary. We not only had original English territorial jurisdiction by virtue of a valid legalized English contract/deed, but there is, in addition, the juridical abandonment of the principality by treaty law and estoppel, and the legal standing established by the 2008 London Tribunal, all of these things settled, or vested, England and its laws as having perfect legal dominance over our case, which is supported by English private international law.
          Although not impacting our case, since the exit from the EU in 2016, changes in English private international law will take place as they are eventually negotiated in the years to come. What is unclear for private international law are the governing principles of the EU treaties -- (Brussels I, Lugano, Rome I, Rome II) and how they will, in the future, alter the legal practices in Britain. Some suggest that English private international law will become more flexible and adaptable and less bound by the semi-flexible treaty codifications of how private international law functions.

Normally, wherever the property is located, that nation has sole jurisdiction over that property, but not in this case:

          Most, if not all, nations follow the law of situs or location as part of their domestic private international law when it comes to real property. That is, ". . . The law of the situs is the governing law for all questions that arise with regard to immovable property [or real estate in private international law]." (James J. Fawcett and Janeen M. Carruthers, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: Private International Law, 14th ed., Sir Peter North, consulting editor, 2008, p. 1199) This is an almost universal rule. Jurisdiction almost always belongs to the nation where the land is located. That is:

          If . . . the primary purpose of the contract is to transfer the property, then the entire contract will be evaluated under the law of the state where the property is located. (Wikipedia, Choice of Law; 2017: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Choice_of_law)

          The problem with this is that the property (or territory of the principality) does not exist in the lex situs of any nation or state. Not one. It exists only as a corporeal constructive possession, an abstract legal entity in international law, which is outside of the law jurisdiction of any nation or state. The point, it will be obvious that lex situs does not apply in our case. In other words, in private international law, there is ". . . the legal maxim that special rules take precedence over general rules (lex specialis derogate legi generali), since the special rules are designed for and particularly suited to the case." (Xandra E. Kramer, "The Interaction between Rome I and Mandatory EU Private Rules," Research Handbook on EU Private International Law, Peter Stone and Youseph Farah, eds., 2015, p. 258) Now more on how the general situs rule does not apply.
          In English private international law, if the property in question is abroad, it is usually classified as immovable and therefore under the law of the land where the territory is located. However, this is, if and only if, ". . . the lex situs [the country where the land is located] classifies the property as immovable." (Ibid., p. 473) In addition:

          ‘Escape clauses [that is, exceptions] . . . of the Rome Convention [of which England is a part] provided that the presumptive [usual or commonly used] rules of that article “shall be disregarded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected’ with a country other than the country designated by those rules. (Symeon C. Symeonides, Codifying Choice of Law Around the World: An International Comparative Analysis, 2014, p. 196)

          In other words, if the choice of law is

          . . . ’manifestly more closely connected' with a country other than that indicated by the preceding paragraphs of that article [in the Rome Convention, which England subscribes to], the law of that other country [England in our case rather than Germany] shall apply." (Ibid.)

          The biggest thing, though, that changes everything is the fact that the foreign element involved is international corporeal land rights. Since the lex situs in our situation is international, rather than being German or any other domestic nation, then we have to know how international law classifies deposed patrimonial sovereignty. The answer is, it is a constructive right only. (See "Constructive Possession" in "Three more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality;" and "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" and "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law")    
          Constructive possession or ownership in international law is concerns corporeal or real ownership, just as real as in domestic law, but it is a movable right far removed from what is defined as an immovable land right in the law of most domestic nations. This is because property rights of deposed governments and royal houses are inseparably connected to sovereignty law and prescriptive rules. Movable or immovable legal classifications or definitions do not exist in any formal international law. In other words, there is no foreign or national situs where the property right belongs. Its ownership is constructive, which means it is classified as being de jure, legal and rightful rather than being in actual control and in possession of the property. De jure constructive or factual rights are ownership rights without possession. Nevertheless, "at law, a person with constructive possession stands in the same legal position as a person with actual possession." (Constructive Possession -- dict.cc; 2017: http://www10.dict.cc/wp_examples.php?lp_id=1&lang=en&s=actual%20possession) "Constructive possession is a legal theory used to extend possession to situations where a person has no hands-on custody of an object." (The Free Dictionary, Law of Possession; 2017: https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Constructive+Possession) It is called "possession in law." (Ibid.) That is, they are possessed legally, but not actually or in fact. Dispossessed sovereign rights of this kind have, in effect, no location, no body, you cannot touch them -- they are not corporeal or tangible in the ordinary sense. They are legal constructs, abstracts or ideas concerning the property or territory in question. They do not physically exist, but have a legal existence as powerful and real as a corporeal possession. Nevertheless, they are movable, because they go with the person or deposed royal house who owns them on an international level, rather than on a national basis. The rule of situs, therefore, does not apply to deposed proprietary sovereignty or sovereign land ownership as in domestic law. If anything, they can be looked at as movables that represent actual corporeal possession.
          However, if it was defined as an immovable or tangible, which it is not, then it should be noted that:

          Contracts relating to immovables are governed by their proper law as contracts, so far as the lex situs of the immovables does not prevent their being carried into execution. (Co. v. De Beers consolidated Mines Ltd. [1910] 2 ch. 502 quoted in Janeen Margaret Carruthers, "Beyond the Ineluctable: An Examination of Choice of Law Rules in Property," vol. 2, Dissertation for the University of Glasgow, March 2002, p. 259)

          What this means is, if the case were defined as being an immovable right, if the country where the land is located does not, by law, interfere with it or have legal power over it, then as in our case, English law again would be in full control, because no reigning domestic country exists as far as this particular international legal land right is concerned. This is because, the ownership of the principality of Halberstadt is a legal, non-territorial sovereignty in international law and has nothing to do with the current de facto government of Germany. Therefore, in private international law, "Contracts relating to land are governed, not by the lex situs [the location of the territory] as such [not under the legal authority of Germany], but by their proper law [the law of the English contract]. . . ." (J. H. Morris, Cases and Materials on Private International Law, 4th ed., 1984, p. 351) In this case, it is not governed by Germany, but by England where the "contract" was created and its "proper law" governs through international private law, because international law doesn’t interfere; that is, it "does not prevent [it] being carried into execution." So in summary, if the transfer of the principality is defined as an "immovable," it is still lawfully under English law.
          Throughout the world in most nations in private international law, "personal property [or movables are] also generally governed by the law of its location at the time of the relevant events." (Kermit Roosevelt, Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., 2015, p. 14) All of the significant or material events took place in England. For movables, ". . . contracts [are universally] governed in the main by a principle encapsulated in the Latin phrase . . . lex loci contractus, the law of the place of contracting." (Kermit Roosevelt, Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., 2015, p. 10) In our case, it took place in England and in no other country or nation was involved in the least.          
          It is important to understand that "rights are, in principle, movable [not immovable] and only exceptionally [rarely] are regarded as immovable in accordance with fictions established by the law." (A. N. Yiannopoulos, "Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Comparative Law," Louisiana Law Review, vol. 22, no. 3, April 1963, p. 563)
          English law on movables or intangibles chiefly follows two tracks, both of which declare the law of situs other than in England null and void:

          (1) First, it is ". . . the place of the sale which [has been] most commonly employed [in private international law for movables in the past]." (John Westlake, A Treatise on Private International Law: With Principal Reference to Its Practice in England, 1880, p. 157) The place of the conveyance contract was in England under English law. That is:

          . . . In the case of transfers of movables, the relevant applicable law is that applicable at the location of movable in question at the time when the act in question [the conveyance contract] is alleged to have affected title to that movable [or intangible right]. (European Commission, Applicable Law -- England and Wales; 2017: http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/applicable_law/applicable_law_eng_en.htm)

          The "act in question" (the conveyance) exclusively took place in England. Hence, English law is again upheld or  vindicated as the law of the transfer. In terms of intangibles -- what is legally started in England legally stays in England.

          (2) Second, the most common determiner for movables or intangibles is:

          . . . One of the most significant rules [on] which . . . law [is to be] applied in any given situation was the [called] proper law. This is the law which seems to have the closest and most real connection to the facts of the case. (The Law Teacher, The Doctrine of Proper Law of Contract; 2017: https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/commercial-law/the-doctrine-of-proper-law-of-contract-commercial-law-essay.php)

          This important rule again along with the others validates English jurisdiction because England has the closest and most authentic connection to the facts of the case. The original contract, the investigations of the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), and the English Tribunal -- everything in this case is deeply involved and connect to England.
          It is important to understand that jurisdiction does not belong to the Republic of Germany where the territorial land of the principality is located, but is a moveable corporeal or constructive ownership entitlement and sovereign right to rule and own all its honors and distinctions. The ownership right of the principality once belonged to the sovereign dispossessed Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern on an international rather than domestic level. The principality has been legally and lawfully transferred to us, because we held constructive and adverse possession of it long enough without legal action or complaint for the statute of limitations to kick in. (See "Who Rightfully Owned the Rights of Halberstadt in the Past?" on this page.
          As explained, since 2001, the rights created by a legal English conveyance contract that could not provide "good title" automatically by the law of the land, became an adverse possession case. Then in 2002, the Imperial Family, the original owners, legally alienated or abandoned their ownership and jurisdiction over the principality -- literally washing their hands of it. By abdicating the legal situation, they left it to run its course under English law, which ultimately under adverse possession delivered all ownership entitlements to us. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family")
          In conclusion, relative to the law of situ, or location in private international law, it does not apply to international land rights of a depose intact sovereign entity. The law of situ applies exclusively and only to the rights of reigning nations, that actually have power, control and the right to enforce their own domestic laws over the land. That is, the Federal Republic of Germany does not and never had any jurisdiction or enforcement rights over a dispossessed former kingdom or principality that only exists in international law. The point is, the only country on earth that had legal standing or legal rights over the case was England. This is verified legal fact was upheld by the London tribunal, which declared, ". . . English law applied to the transactions. . . ." (Tribunal Findings 181)  

Private international law provisions:

          Factual situations [such as in our case (See "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession")] with foreign contacts [or involvement] shall be judged, in regard to private law [English domestic adverse possession law in this case], according to the legal order to which the strongest connection exists [for the person involved, which for us is England]. (Kurt Siehr, "General Problems of Private International Law in Modern Codifications," Yearbook of Private International Law, vol. 7, 2005, p. 30)

          English domestic law, which includes adverse possession, is part of English private international law.

          If there is no conflict [as in our case where there was no complaining or contesting party], that legal order governs, with which the factual situation has the strongest connection [which again is England]." (Ibid., p. 31)

          Extra-territorial jurisdiction, which we have been discussing under English private international law, has one main ingredient necessary for it to work in our case other than by choice of law; that is, ". . . It must be agreed [permitted or approved by] . . . the legal authority in the external territory. . . ."  (Extra-territorial organizations and bodies, 2016: http://www.palmhof.eu/adpage.php?zoek=Extra-territorial%20organizations%20and%20bodies) The "legal authority in the external territory" was the deposed Imperial German government under the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern. Since this House through their attorney's abandoned and alienated the principality -- gave it up to whatever England law would do with it, they literally permitted, approved or agreed that English law should govern the case (See "Letters from the Imperial Family")

The jurisdiction in our case was of the law itself, rather than the jurisdiction of a court or law enforcement agency, because no conflict or dispute exists in this case:

          "Jurisdiction generally describes any authority over a certain area or certain persons. In the law, jurisdiction sometimes refers to a particular geographic area containing a defined legal authority." (Roisin Lautmanp and Kevin Curran, "The Problems of Jurisdiction on the Internet," Pervasive and Ubiquitous Technology Innovations for Ambient Intelligence Environments, Kevin Curran, ed., 2012, p. 164) However, there are different types of jurisdiction, there is jurisdiction of the law itself and jurisdiction of courts, law enforcement, regulatory agencies, etc.
          We are referring to the legal authority of English law and how as it applies to our case, not court authority. "Jurisdiction [of this kind] relates to [legal] authority derived from the country's constitution or laws. . . ," not merely to its tribunals, but its statutes in particular. (Quizlet, Mid-Unit Terms; 2016: https://quizlet.com/75528913/mid-unit-terms-flash-cards) Obviously, "the requirements for adverse possession are governed by state statute and [by judge-made law in England]. . . ." (Justia, Real Estate and Property Law; 2016: https://www.justia.com/real-estate/docs/adverse-possession.html) By judge-made law in England, as the legally valid deed/contract could not provide "good title," which by definition means ". . . one which conveys no property to the purchaser. . . .," it automatically switched into an adverse possession case. (Amy Hackney Blackwell, The Essential Law Dictionary, 2008, p. 46) This is chiefly because it was continued to be claimed in the only way it could be as required by "Factual or Constructive Possession" rules. (See also "All Nine Requirements were Fulfilled to the Utmost") That is, ". . . possession under a conveyance which is void [such as ours which could not provide good title] . . . is one example of a case where there may be adverse possession." (Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 20-08, 2011, p. 393) (emphasis added) In other words, ". . . The passage of time [statute of limitations] cured [or can cure through adverse possession] the defect in the conveyance," so that a valid transfer is effected. (Ibid., section 6-34, p. 100)
          Both Australian and English law provide that a ". . . possession under . . . a void contract [such as ours] were held to be in adverse possession [provided, of course, that the rules of adverse possession were fully complied with as in our case]." (Pamela O’Connor, "The Private Taking of Land: Adverse Possession, Encroachment by Buildings and Improvement Under a Mistake," University of Western Australia Law Review, vol. 33, footnote 23, 2006, p. 36) (emphasis added)
          In conclusion, the laws of England and Wales perfectly fit our case. These laws were activated by English private international law, which "under the Rome Convention (in force since 1991) the laws of the legal system specified in a contract must be respected. . . ." (Business Dictionary, Private International Law; 2016: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/private-international-law.html) The point is, "The legal system specified in [the] contract" was English.
          Even if the Deed of Transfer and Statutory Declarations did not mention the law of choice as English, the Rome Convention, subscribe to by England, supports, in article 1251, states:

          In the absence of an agreement of the parties on the applicable law, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which the contract is most closely connected. (Friedrich K. Juenger, "The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law," Louisiana Law Review, vol. 60, no 4, Summer 2000, p. 1148)

In other words:

          One must look at all the circumstances, and seek to find what just and reasonable persons ought to have intended if they had thought about the matter at the time they made the contract. (The ‘Assunzione,’ [1954] 1 A11 ER 278, 292 quoted in Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Private International Law and the Internet, 2007, p. 124)

          Again, all, not some. of the legal circumstances surrounding the case revolved around English jurisprudence and nowhere else. So, both by choice of law and by implication, English law is the law of the contract.
          The country most closely connected with the English contract is obviously England, which is why all the solicitors, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, and the Queen’s Counsel barristers involved concluded that English law had jurisdiction. The point is, there was no complaint, no controversy, no conflict, no legal challenge against what is so extremely obvious. English law wins hands down.
          There four main rules in private international law relevant to our case for making a determination of what laws will be binding are as follows:

(1) lex loci contactus -- apply the law of the place where the contract was made, which was in England,
(2) lexl loci solutionis -- apply the law where the contract is performed, which again was in England,
(3) choice of law -- apply the law specified in the contract, whether obvious or implied, which was once again English,  
(4) lex situs -- if land, apply the law where the land is located, except in a case of constructive ownership in international law, which is a legal abstract or intangible that is just as binding as though it were actual land. Nevertheless, it is a right and it is a moveable right that can be applied in any country on earth whose laws like that of England can accommodate it.

          All four of these rules make English law the proper law in governing our claim to Halberstadt. They enabled English adverse possession to operate. To reiterate, "The general rule is that the law of the country where a contract is made [England in our case] governs, as to the nature, the obligation and the interpretation of it." (The Peninsular and oriental Steam Navigation Cp. V. Shand, Moo. P.C. (1865), N.S. 200 and also Standard Bank of South Africa, Limited v Efroiken and Newman, 1924 AD 171) This stands unless a contrary intention can be establish, which did not exist in the Deed of Transfer of our case. The legal maxium described in lex loci contractus. However:

          English law in deciding these matters has refused to treat as conclusive, rigid or arbitrary criteria such as lex loci contractus [the law of the place of the contract, which was in our case England] or lex loci solutionis [the law of the place where payment occurred which was also in England or the performance was finalized -- the contract was legalized in England], and has treated the matter as depending on the intention of the parties to be ascertained in each case on a consideration of the terms of the contract, the situation of the parties, and generally on all the surrounding facts. (Peter Edward Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts, 1999, p. 104)

          In our case, there is no other intention specified or implied than English law, the contract even specifies English law. The situation exclusively revolved around English rather than any other nation, and all the surrounding facts including the barristers, solicitors, lawyer, and the London tribunal all point to England law as dominating.

          . . . One of the most significant rules [in private international law] is that the law to be applied in any given situation will be the proper law. This is the law which seems to have the closest and most real connection to the facts of the case, and so has the best claim to be applied. (Maxim of Private International Law; 2017: http://www.bdlawsource.com/?p=2794) (emphasis added)    

          "The term 'proper' refers back to . . . the law proper to the contract or the contractual term or issue involved." (Revolvy, Proper Law; 2017: https://www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Proper%20law) From the onset, English law has governed and dominated every particular and every facet of the case from beginning to the end. No other law was so involved. International law offered a supportive role for the most part. It is obvious, therefore, that English law had "the closet and most real connection to the facts of the case, and so has the best claim to be applied." It was applied and is a key to understanding the three ways that simultaneously transferred all the regal sovereign rights, privileges and distinctions of the Principality of Halberstadt.
          In conclusion, private international law sustained our claim and the right to use adverse possession to transfer all the corporeal and legal rights of the principality.

Adverse possession comes under English private international law and practice:

          "Private international law rules . . . [include a] . . . domestic legal system’s concepts of time bars [statutes of limitation] and adverse possession. . . ." (Christa Roodt, State Courts or ADR in Nazi-Era Art Disputes: A Choice “More Apparent than Real?,” p. 432; 2016: http://cardozojcr.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAC205.pdf) (emphasis added) In English private international law, the law of the transaction or original Deed of Transfer, which is English, prevails:

          An example of [private international law designating the law of the contract] is found in the law of adverse possession. If A continues to be in adverse possession of P’s land for a period of twelve years or more, A becomes the owner of the land and P’s ownership is extinguished. (Paras Diwan and Peeyushi Diwan, Private International Law: Indian and English, 1993, p. 578)

          In fact, all relevant English domestic laws that apply are binding on a case if the rules of English private international law sustains it. What this means is that domestic adverse possession and all other pertinent domestic laws are part of private international law, if they are material to a case, because that is how private international law works. Adverse possession can have a foreign element like any other unusual situation. In our case, it concerned the ownership of private international land rights, which were movable rights, abandoned and given up to English legal dominion and authority.
          One more important point that further validates our claim: the trend of private international law is ". . . toward increased respect for party [individual] autonomy in determining the rules, applicable to [justice and] private relationships." (Robert A. Braud, "Balancing Sovereignty and Party Autonomy in Private International Law: Regression and the European Court of Justice," University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Paper 25, 2005, p. 29) In other words, flexibility is dominating over strict rule enforcement. There is no straight-jacket. This represents a rejection ". . . of similar rules of private international law that may be predictable in statement but inequitable [unjust] in the application." (Ibid.) That is, in England and Wales, accommodation based on justice, and the desire of the participants, has the greatest weight and governs jurisdiction. This is done because of the basic ". . . pliability of private international law. . . ." (Christa Roodt, "State Courts or ADR in Nazi-Era art Disputes: A Choice ‘More Apparent than Real,’" Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 14, no. 421, 2013, p. 446) That is, even though our claim already qualified under all the normal rules, the flexibility and versatility of English private international law and practice makes English legal authority over the situation even more conclusive.
          In summary, there was the jurisdiction of a valid English contract, choice of law rules, estoppel, and the official juridical act of abandonment and alienation by the Imperial House that also qualified as a treaty of cession forsaking or wavering all rights so the English law could deal with it without interference or objection. All of these legal realities declared the same thing -- that English law rightfully reigned over the case and adverse possession transferred all the rights, privileges, honors and distinctions to this regal international sovereign entity to our family as a newly owned possession. Jurisdiction and legal standing was further confirmed, or legally reaffirmed, by the acceptance and adjudication of our case, along with some others, by the 2008 London tribunal and its findings. (See "Evidence: Legal Documents and Letters")

 8. The Statute of Limitations:

          The final legal point in this sub-section is the statute of limitations created through the English Limitations Act 1980. As an accepted rule promoting justice, limitations have been made binding all over the world by most countries:

          The [important] rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights. . . . They are meant to see that a plaintiff [or prosecutor] does not take [unfair advantage by] delaying tactics but seeks [to] remedy [the situation] within the period stipulated. (Gaurac Mehta, Universal's Master Guide to Judicial Service Examination, 2010, p. 126)

          They protect ". . . a defendant [who] might have lost the evidence to dispute . . . [in some adversarial claim against him]." (Ibid.) The fact is, through time there is always a ". . . loss of documents, fading of memory, death of witnesses . . . [etc.]" (Ibid.) "It is [also equally] unfair that a defendant should have a claim hanging over him for an indefinite [unending] period [of time]." That is, a long dormant threat of ruin or injury ". . . [has] more of cruelty than justice in [it]."  (Ibid.) This is the reason why limitation periods are called "statues of repose or statutes of peace" as they create certainty, confidence and peace of mind. (Ibid.) Justice is not served if things are left forever unsettled and a potential lawsuit could be held against one for the rest of one's life. It could also open the door for prolonged blackmail, intimidation or bullying. This, in itself, justifies limitation periods.
          Although not followed in every country, nevertheless, this kind of statute is a natural law principle that is a universal law, or principle of justice, still binding on all people in all ages of time. (See "Natural and International Law") It is at the heart of the effectiveness of English adverse possession for unregistered land.

 (d) Review of Important Points

          Several important considerations are highly relevant to this case:

(1) The possession had to be hostile, contrary or opposite to the original owner’s interests in the property, or the rights had to be abandoned, otherwise an adverse possession claim could not take place,
(2) Having a knowledge of the English conveyance of an Imperially owned principality, the German attorneys, who answered my questions for and in behalf of the Imperial House, did not object, but rather ignored the legal situation that potentially could mean the forfeiture of an international legal right to a sovereign feudal entity, except to say that no legal action or protest would be levied against the English conveyance situation. They also denied ownership of the principality (an act of alienation) and that they were not a party to the original conveyance, all of which was necessary to make adverse possession work,
(3) The act of taking possession of the said legal entity was, therefore, taken without permission, approval or authority from the former Imperial house. If it were otherwise, if permission were granted, adverse possession, as defined in the law, could not have taken place,
(4) The letters of the Imperial House qualified under international treaty law making the abandonment of the principality and their abdication of jurisdiction permanent,
(5) Estoppel made their official letters irrevocable,
(6) Their acquiescence or lack of protest and/or taking legal action further made their statements irreversible again sustaining English legal authority over the situation,
(7) The Deed and Declarations designated English Law as its contractual law of choice in all its ramifications,
(8) The "Declaration of Ownership" unmistakably confirmed that the possession claim, at its very core, has always centered around, the specific contents of the Deed of Transfer as a English legal document and the legal description of the intangible property involved,
(9) The broker and his London solicitor have separately specified and confirmed that English law applied to the legal documents, which had legal standing by the fact that the Deed of Transfer was drawn up as a valid English legal document and its legal standing was further established in Great Britain through a government apostille under the auspices of the Foreign office of Her Majesty's Principle Secretary of State,
(10) Therefore, the law chosen and the law applied not only for the conveyance, but for the possession throughout the years was unequivocally English -- no other nation's law was applied. In other words, from start to finish, the possession was entirely rooted and grounded in the rule of English law. Private international law legally empowered the domestic laws to be binding in our case,
(11) The London Tribunal accepted a trial of possible fraud, in relation to the 13 entities considered, further establishing English legal rights and jurisdiction over the case. Fraud was not proven or attempted, because of insufficient evidence, despite a thorough, very costly and highly detailed investigation by the SRA, but the fact of initial acceptance under such allegations further sustained and confirmed English legal authority and that English law was governing the fate and outcome of the principality,
(12) A statute of limitations protects the future of the transfer of ownership and makes permanent certainty of what would otherwise could have remained a constant threat of instability.

          With the legal fact of English jurisdiction in mind, the next section will discuss the requirements for English adverse possession and how each mandated imperative was fully complied with and was therefore fulfilled in every way.

          Brief Summary Statement:

          In review, English jurisdiction was established by:
(1) A valid, legal English "Deed of Transfer" drawn up by a licensed solicitor in London, which specified that it was an English legal document,
(2) This proper legal document was legalized in the year 2000 by an Apostille through the office of Her Majesty's Principle Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the United Kingdom of Great Briton and Northern Ireland,
(3) The House of Hohenzollern, knowingly through their attorney's decided not to protest the English legal transfer of the Principality; and declared they would not get involved or take any legal action to prevent it one way or the other. (See "Letter from the Imperial Family") Thus, they legally abandoned the case or left it entirely up to English authority. This became binding through both the international and domestic principle of estoppel, applicable treaty law, and juridical legal authority of the official letters,
(4) The House of Hohenzollern also officially denied ownership of the rights to the Principality, which was an act of alienation, because they did own it under through international prescriptive law as a legal, non-territorial sovereign entity. (See "Letter from the Imperial Family") Thus, they opened the door for a more solid adverse possession to create a new ownership for all its regal rights, honors and distinctions, which was already under adverse possession law in 2001.
(5) Lastly, the 2008 London Tribunal legally demonstrated actual English authority over the Principality by accepting it for adjudication along with several other cases.
(6) English private international law activated English domestic law to govern the case, which enabled adverse possession to be applied.
          All of these important facts made English adverse possession legally and lawfully possible, which is how all the rights of this minor sovereign entity went from abandonment to new, perfect and unequivocal ownership.

 Adverse Possession

 (a) Introduction

"Adverse possession meant acquisition of something, which originally belonged to someone else, that was neglected by the former owner for a period fixed by law." (R. H. Helmhoiz, Natural Law in Court, 2015, p. 36)

          Rather than land theft, adverse possession is more akin to a bloodless coup d’état, in which a new ruler ousts the old office holder and steps into her place. Just as the leaders of a successful coup d’état [a coup or takeover] turns into a new government that has authority over its subjects, so too is a successful adverse possessor retroactively transformed into an owner and immunized on this basis from liability for her initially wrongful invasion of another’s land. (Larissa Katz, "The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law," McGill Law Journal, vol. 55, no. 1, March 2010, para. 47; 2019: https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/mlj/2010-v55-n1-mlj3862/039836ar)

          Adverse possession is built on three basic fundamental premises:
(1) the "factual," not actual, possession, claim, or use of the property right,
(2) the abandonment of the property by the owner through acquiescence, lack of legal action or negligence, and
(3) the statute of limitations, which bars the original owner from attempting to retake his former the property.

It allows ". . . unused land or property [otherwise wasted] to be used for the betterment of the society and the community." (Ibid.) "In fact . . . the statutes regarding adverse possession are still with us after 4000 years because they are so valuable [to society]. . . ." (Adverse Possession, p. 2; 2015: http://dirt.umkc.edu/archives/dirt2003/mar2003/adverse%20possession%20artilce1.doc) It is an ". . . extremely useful concept of law. . . ." (Ibid., p. 1) In fact:

          The harmonious functioning of society requires [adverse possession], for otherwise nearly all modern ownership would be uncertain. . . . How could it be proved that former owners had a clear [or perfect] title? Memories fail, witnesses die, documents perish. New claimants could constantly arise, especially unscrupulous ones, basing their pretensions on forgotten transactions centuries old. Present owners would be obliged constantly to prove and reprove their right to their property against all comers. Few would wish to buy property that must remain in constant jeopardy. The only remedy for such a situation is the extinction of all titles and claims that go back beyond the memory of the present generation or such time as the civil law sets. (Fr. Austin Fagothey, Right And Reason: Ethics Based on the Teachings of Aristotle & St. Thomas, 2nd ed., chapter 29, "Titles to Property" {Prescription}, 1959)

           "The aim of the statutes of limitation is to prevent citizens from being oppressed by stale [antiquated] claims, to protect settled interests from being disturbed, to bring certainty and finality to disputes and so on." (1 Natwest v Ashe [2008] EWCA Civ 55; 2014: http://www.radcliffechambers.com/media/Misc_Articles/Out_of_Time__Recent_Developments_in_Limitation_-_2013.pdf)

          The following is a list of a few practical and ethical purposes of adverse possession:

(1)  "The duty [to] . . . begin an action for repossession within 12 years – cannot be regarded as excessive or unreasonable." (Pye v UK, Grand Chamber judgment, dissent, [0]-[12]) "The slothful, negligent owner ought to bear the risk of losing his property if he does not care enough to assert his ownership right." (DocSlide, Property Law Outline; 2016: http://documents.tips/documents/dana-property-law-outline.html)
(2)  It permits a person to feel confident in their land rights, enough to make improvements and maintain the premises rather than let it become derelict. This is because the possessor immediately obtains a qualified guarantee of title – a fee simple absolute right -- against all but the true owner. Once the 12 year limitation is complete for unregistered land, the past owner is legally barred from having any right to the property. His ownership is fully and completely terminated. The adverse possessor is then the exclusive owner having the highest entitlement to the land rights and privileges on earth.
(3)  It facilitates certainty of title and reduces the cost of title insurance for unregistered land that has been adversely possessed or owned for 12 years whose title is now unimpeachable, or is no longer open to question,   
(4)  It has the purpose to protect, encourage and reward those who truly make good productive use of their land rights or property, for example, anyone who persevered for a long period in farming otherwise unused or abandoned land, so helping to feed a hungry nation, was deemed to be the true owner and possessor of that land,
(5)  It is to penalize the slothful, indifferent, or unproductive owner who is negligent, irresponsible or careless about his rights and his property, which property therefore might otherwise fall into total ruin or be a blight on society or other's property values,
(6)  It encourages owners to better monitor and use their land, or be more vigilant and careful over such an important finite and limited resource,
(7)  It creates certainty of title, it protects innocent third parties who wish to purchase the land,
(8)  It has the potential of keeping abandoned unused land in the property market where it can be possessed, owned and made beneficial again,
(9)  It resolves cases in which there was no documentary record of the exact position of boundaries,
(10)  The statute of limitations solves the problem of "stale" evidence, in litigation, because with the passage of time witnesses die and cannot testify, evidence is lost, stolen, or destroyed, and memory fades, which can ruin the chances for justice and increase the likelihood of inequity and corruption. "Otherwise, long-lost heirs of any former owner, possessor or lien holder of centuries past could come forward with a legal claim on the property. The doctrine of adverse possession prevents this." ( (Wikipedia, Adverse Possession, 2016: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adverse_possession) Because after 12 years, the land automatically belongs to whoever the possessor is and to no one else,
(11)  It prevents numerous costly legal disputes over worn out claims, reducing the burden of litigation as well as protecting and securing ownership by legally barring obsolete and outdated claims that are of no useful purpose, but merely cause unnecessary conflict and unrest. That is, without a limitation on recovery lawsuits, land rights would always be subject to protracted, never ending uncertainty. Limitations reduce potential threats, cure title defects making them solid, sure, and dependable, and eliminating uncertainty,
(12)  It results in the stabilization of land titles thereby safeguarding third parties, such as, purchasers, lenders and insurers, because 12 years of proven possession ensures that good title has been obtained. So the buyer, lender or insurer can depend on the property having a good and marketable legal title,
(13)  It solves the problem of abandonment wherein rights are discarded and the land is being wasted, unused or can become derelict and hazardous. Adverse possession solves this difficulty by attracting individuals who will invest in the land, make good use of it and improve it. The point is, abandoned property is not useful to the nation. Worse, "[It] can quickly become a haven for undesirables, a rendezvous for drug dealers, a danger to children, a fire hazard – and an eyesore that drags down surrounding property values." (Legally Claim Free Land and Property; 2014: http://ippg.yolasite.com/resources/Legally%20Claim%20Free%20UK%20Land.pdf) An article entitled "Adverse Possession Benefits -- An Overview" add some additional insights to the need and benefits of this important law that the items above and below only slightly touch on:

a. Loving Care
A family who lives in the Realty dwelling treats it like their home, caring for it as they would their own in the hope that someday it will become theirs permanently.
b. Mold and Mildew.
Adverse possessors typically keep the air conditioning system running summer and winter. This prevents dangerous buildup of mold and mildew that excessive humidity would cause if the A/C didn't operate for extended time.  As you know, mold constitutes a serious danger to health.
c. Pestilence
Adverse possessors typically keep the dwelling free of termites, roaches, bedbugs, spiders, centipedes, rodents and other vermin that constitute a health hazard to humans and that actually damage the dwelling, often necessitating costly repairs.
d. Druggies
Adverse possessors prevent drug dealers, marijuana grower, cocaine/crack/crystal meth addicts and other ne'er-do-wells from partying in and damaging the dwelling from neglect.
e. Thieves
An unoccupied house often falls prey to thieves who steal appliances, plumbing fixtures, doors, window coverings, copper wiring and plumbing, and flooring.  It costs the owner a fortune to replace these and put the house in condition suitable for selling it.  Adverse possessors prevent thieves from stealing those things.
f.  Vandals
Vandals and street thugs often see an unoccupied dwelling as a target of opportunity;  they break windows, destroy carpets, urinate or defecate on the floors, break holes in walls, destroy the roof, turn on the water and let water from stopped up sinks flood the floor, jam metal and other objects down into the plumbing, break toilet and sink porcelain, and so on. Cleanup and repair can cost the owner a small fortune. Adverse possessors keep such damage from happening by increasing the vandals' risk of capture.
g.  Freezes
Adverse possessors typically mind the effect of the weather on plumbing and windows. They install protective coverings to prevent violent storms from breaking windows.  They wrap water pipes or let outside faucets drip during freezes to keep them from bursting.  An unoccupied house gets no such respectful care, and related repairs can become costly.
h. Maintenance
Residential realty always need routine maintenance such as lawn-mowing, hedge-trimming, edging, filling in of holes dug by dogs and other creatures, painting, landscaping, fixing broken windows, and so on. An occupant will typically do all this work, but the owner must pay to have others do it if no occupant lives there.
i. Everybody Wins
Adverse possessors keep the property in good shape, pay taxes and HOA dues, keep the community safer than otherwise, and help to increase property values.  I imagine that rightful owners of common sense will see adverse possessors as a boon, not a bane, to the rightful owner, to the adverse possessor's family, to the municipality, to the neighborhood, to the courts, and to law enforcers. (https://bobhurt.blogspot.com/2011/03/benefits-of-adverse-possession.html)

(14)  No property taxes are generated from abandoned land. It serves neither the owner nor the community, and
(15)  It encourages the worthy poor to believe they have a chance to rightfully own property and get out of the rut of dependency on the government. "Even where the possessor does little with the property, at least he has done more than the owner who . . . has done nothing at all. The utilization of land is valuable [of immense worth] to society as a whole." (Jeremy S. Williams, "Title by Adverse Possession," Valparaiso University Law Review, vol. 6, no. 1, 1971, p. 29)
(16)  ". . . To check on their land at least once every 12 years to ensure no unauthorised person is in occupation, is not onerous [not troublesome, unfair or asking too much]." (John Antell -- Barrister, Adverse Possession of Land; 2017: http://www.johnantell.co.uk/adverse-possession-of-land)

According to history:

          . . . The English law of adverse possession had ancient origins. For example, a concept [a form] of adverse possession was codified in Mesopotamian legal codes dating to around 2000 B.C. (Robert C. Ellickson and Charles A. Thorland, "Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel," October 1995 Faculty Scholarship Series, paper 410, Chicago-Kent Law Review, vol. 71)   

          In other words, it is a just and ancient and modern natural law that is fair and beneficial to society.

 (b) Natural Law and Adverse Possession

          . . . The instinctive sense of property is implanted in him: he feels that he has a right, he knows not why, to keep whatever he is the first to possess. This feeling is born with him, and it accompanies him, with undiminished force, through every period of his life, and through every vicissitude of intellectual and moral attainment. This feeling is common to all men; and therefore, whilst it creates, it protects private property: those who are accustomed to measure their sense of justice by their natural feelings will feel under a natural obligation to respect in others the right which the same feelings prompt them to assert for themselves. Thus occupancy [possession] becomes the natural foundation of the right of property. . . . (Richard Jebb, "General Principles of Law," Encyclopædia Metropolitana; Or, Universal Dictionary of Knowledge, vol.  2, Edward Smedley, Hugh James Rose and  Henry John Rose, eds., 1845, p. 704)

Thus:

          . . . It is to be observed that the right by prescription is sanctioned by a strong instinctive feeling or prejudice of our nature; and, in point of authority, the universal practice of mankind, in every age, has been to respect it. (Ibid., p. 707) (emphasis added)      

          Natural Law is the highest law of all mankind. It is universal and ageless. It applies to every culture and all people on earth. It is important to discover what is right and just in any situation. Adverse possession is based on what is right, best and good. It is a form of prescription. (See "Natural and International Law")        
          The wisdom applied in adverse possession is generally that ownership naturally goes to the one who cares the most for the property. This idea has been around throughout all history. The negligent and acquiescent owner loses out to the individual that utilizes, cares for and invests in the property. It is similar to the judgment of King Solomon over the two women who had babies. One died and both claimed that the live baby was theirs. The king, after hearing their stories, insightfully ordered the baby to be cut in half and give each an even part of the baby. At that moment, one women pleaded tearfully not to do this, but to give the baby to the other women. Seeing this true concern and love for the child, the king gave the baby to this women. He declared that it was her child because she truly cared for it. (1 King 3:16-28) This general principle, the King Solomon doctrine, operates in the practice of adverse possession. Some legal academics call this the "Doctrine of Efficacy or Personhood:"  

          This doctrine attempts to measure the strength of a person’s "attachment" to the land [rights and privileges] and awards title to the claimant with the strongest attachment. The theory is that the possessor who maintains and improves the land has a more valid claim to it than the owner who never visits or cares for the land. (Richard J. Norejko, "Adverse Possession," Fair and Equitable, vol. 4, no. 5, May 2006, p. 4)

          Because the true owner has essentially abandoned the land [as the Imperial House of Hohenzollern did] while the adverse possessor has embraced it through his possession, it becomes appropriate as a matter of law [and a matter of justice] to transfer title to the person with the strongest attachment to the land. (Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law Review, vol. 10, 1897, pp. 476-477)

          Hence, ownership is obtained through this law by those who value the property, work for it, and preserve it, not those who abandon property. This is also founded on the concept of utility -- a "use it or lose it" principle.
         Over time, the person who neglects his rights loses his emotional attachment to the property that he no longer regards as his own, or does not care enough to protect and safeguard it. While the possessor, who uses, maintains and improves to the property becomes more and more attached and deeply connected to the land rights which he possesses and uses. To deprive him of it would be far more wrenching than there would be pleasure in the former owner in keeping the property which he or she has neglected and been careless about. This is the Solomon doctrine, which recognizes attachment and possession as identifying the superior, true or most rightful owner. The point is:

          . . . Where the science of law has attained its highest state, there is no purer, stronger, better title to property than that acquired by production [which is clearly related to attraction, use and improvement]. To him belongs the harvest whose toil has produced it [and cared for it]. . . . This is the natural [and original] mode of acquiring property; while succession, purchase, gift, are derivative. [This truth] is not only the oldest, but the most meritorious; because what is held by this title must have been earned by the sweat of the brow [investing and making improvements in it as required by adverse possession law]. . . . (Eaton S. Drown, A Treatise on the Law of Property in Intellectual Productions in Great Britain and the United States, 1879, p. 4) (emphasis added)
In other words, the adverse possessor is the hero, the benefiter of society, not the villain.

          The ideal landowner constructed by the laws of adverse possession is clearly no threat to civilized society. On the contrary, he is [beneficial] settled and stable, and honours both man-made and natural laws. His cultivation involves hard work . . . invest[ing] his physical, intellectual, and emotional energies [into it]. . . . (Kate Green, "Citizens and Squatters," Land Law: Themes and Perspectives, Susan Bright and John Dewar, eds., 1998, p. 241)

          The principle [of ownership by use and/or productivity] is as old as property itself, that what a man [or woman] creates by his [or her] own labor, out of his [or her] own materials, is his [or hers] to enjoy to the exclusion of all others. It is based not only on natural right, but also on the necessities of society, being essential to the promotion of industry. Before the time of written law, Abraham maintained his right to a well because he had "digged this well" [creating a natural right of possession, attachment and annexation]. . . . (Op.cit., Eaton S. Drown) (emphasis added)

          "Use it or lose it" is a well-known nature law very observable in nature. It justifies ownership and is justifies loss of all proprietary rights as well. That is:

          . . . The law of nature lays an injunction on the proprietor to take care of his property, and imposes on him an obligation to make known his rights, that others may not be led into error: it is on these conditions alone that she approves of the property vested in him, and secures him in the possession. (Hugo Grotius, The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter 11, no. 141) (emphasis added)

The result:

          If he has neglected it [failed to assert his titles, make his protest, use his rights] for such a length of time . . . the law of nature will no longer allow him to revive and assert his claims. . . . (Ibid.) (emphasis added)

It comes to an end. In other words:

          . . . The law of nature ordain[s] that all men should respect the right of private property in him who makes use of it? For the same reason, therefore, the same law requires that every proprietor who for a long time and without any just reason neglects his right, should be presumed to have entirely renounced and abandoned it. This is what forms the absolute presumption (juris et de jure [the highest presumption of law]) of its abandonment, -- a presumption, upon which another person is legally entitled to appropriate to himself the thing so abandoned [by adverse possession law]. (Ibid.) (emphasis added)

          The point is, as Sir William Blackstone stated, there is ". . . no foundation in nature or in natural law, why a set of words upon parchment should convey the dominion of land. . . ." (Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: In Four Books, vol. 1, 1900, p. 54) "On this view 'property' in land is more about fact than about right; it derives ultimately not from 'words upon parchment' but from the elemental primacy of sustained possession." (Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Land Law: Themes and Perspectives, 1998, p. 18)
          "Statutes of limitation" are also part of the natural law even though they are obviously also positive or man-made laws. Natural law considers it to be unfair for a person to live under a constant threat of a vexatious law suit, that is, an unending threat or intimidating prospect of financial loss or personal ruin. There must be an end and a new beginning possible for a fresh start. It is also extremely difficult to achieve justice where the evidence has long since deteriorated, been ruined, lost or destroyed, or is no longer in available for a defense. A "statute of limitations" eliminates these problems. Such laws are to bring an end to disputes and promote peace.

          It is more important that an established and peaceable possession [of 12 years] should be protected than that the law should assist the agitation of old [abandoned or neglected] claims. A statute which effects this purpose is "an act of peace." Long dormant claims have often more cruelty [and wrongs associated] than justice in them [as they promote legal conflicts, insecurities, and uncertainty in all parties rather than settling matters on a permanent basis]. . . . (Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, 6th ed., Charles Harpum, Stuart Bridge & Martin Dixon, eds., 2000 at para 21-001)

Hence, by rational reason and common sense:

By the law of nature and the municipal code of every civilized nation, [adverse] possession by an individual excludes the claim of every other person to the article of property in question. (Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, 8th ed., Richard Henry Dana, Jr., ed., 1866, p. 23)

Adverse possession is a part of the natural law, which is the law of universal justice to benefit all mankind. (See "Natural and International Law") Adverse possession is a conglomerate of legal maxims -- powerful truths of justice learned through the centuries. (See "Legal Maxims") in "Its theoretical basis is quite elegant and intellectually sound." (Malcolm E. Rosser IV and Elizabeth Moseleu Guse, "Adverse Possession in Oklahoma: An Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone?," The Oklahoma Bar Journal, vol. 72, no. 9, March 10, 2001, p. 723)  
          "In the case of abandonment [as in our concern], there is no usurpation [no theft, plunder or robbery] of sovereignty [or property rights] since there are no contemporaneous [simultaneous] competing claims." (James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., 2008, p. 230) There is only one claim left over -- the adverse possessor's assertion, because the Imperial and Royal House deserted or threw away their claim by officially denying that they owned or possessed it creating a powerful legal bar against recanting it by estoppel in both English and international law. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family") After 12 years, in such a situation as this, the new title of the claimant, to all the rights, distinctions and privileges thereof, becomes permanently final and complete by the legal impact of the Limitations Act 1980.

 (c) How it Works

          [There is] a parity [a state or position of being equal before the law] between the position of the adverse possessor (as holder of a right to possess good against the whole world except someone with a superior right to possess) and the position of the owner (as holder of a right to possess that is good against the whole world including the possessor). (Larissa Katz, "The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law," McGill Law Journal, vol. 55, no. 1, March 2010, para. 15; 2019: https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/mlj/2010-v55-n1-mlj3862/039836ar) (emphasis added)    

          Legally both the adverse possessor and the paper owner hold a legal right to the property. But, the only way the paper owner can lawfully get his property back is by taking legal action. If he or she does not do so, according to English law, after 12 years for unregistered land, the property becomes the supreme right of the adverse possessor. At that point, the original owner loses all ownership and has no claim or right to what is now permanently lost. "In the case of unregistered land [as in the case of Halberstadt], the squatter [claimant] acquire[s] title [or ownership] automatically [without any legal involvement] at the end of the 12 year period." (Lexology, Adverse possession - human rights; 2016: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=58274cb4-a42f-4f3a-a898-64fe2c7056fa) (emphasis added) That is:

            Where land [of the intangible/tangible type as in the case of the Principality] is unregistered [as is the principality is an unregistered land right], a squatter [the possessor or claimant] can acquire title by their adverse possession [of it] over a period of time. This is through a combination of the positive effect of the adverse possession giving them [good] title and the negative effect of the LA 1980 [the Limitation Act 1980], which extinguishes the documentary or paper title [of the former owner]. (Practice Guide 5 -- Adverse Possession of (1) Unregistered Land (2) Registered Land where a Right to be Registered was Acquired before 13 October 2013, 2013: http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/professional/guides/practice-guide-5)

             The principles of [adverse possession] embody the most basic [fundamental] concept of property and ownership, which can be summarized by the adage "possession is nine-tenths of the law," meaning the person who uses the property [whether corporeal or intangible] effectively owns it. Likewise, the adage, "use it or lose it," applies. The principles . . . predate formal property laws; to a large degree, modern property law formalizes and expands these simple [universally respected and legally practiced] ideas. (Adverse Possession, 2013: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adverse_possession)

          The time limitation is central to or a core doctrine of adverse possession and how it operates. "The aim of the statutes of limitation is to prevent citizens from being oppressed by stale [antiquated] claims, to protect settled interests from being disturbed, to bring certainty and finality to disputes and so on." (1 Natwest v Ashe [2008] EWCA Civ 55; 2014: http://www.radcliffechambers.com/media/Misc_Articles/Out_of_Time__Recent_Developments_in_Limitation_-_2013.pdf)

 (d) Requirements

          Adverse possession is a global principle practiced in almost all countries. It rests upon a "wrong," the wrong that the owner abandoned his property, instead of using it productively and knowingly allowing another to possess it without a fight. Adverse possession also rests upon a "right," that is, long possession creates lawful proprietary rights ethically and morally, and the statute of limitations defines when that right becomes final or legally complete.

            For unregistered land [an unregistered hereditary property, such as, the rights of Halberstadt], the Limitation Act of 1980 states that a squatter [the legally undisputed possessor] must remain in adverse possession for 12 years, at which point the paper owner's title to the land is extinguished. (Adverse Possession, 2013: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adverse_possession and 2013: http://quizlet.com/18352594/land-law-11-adverse-possession-flash-cards)

            ". . . (Where title is registered, the land law is now different), [but with unregistered land as in the cases of Halberstadt] all one really has to do is to prove that one has been in possession of the land for longer than the limitation period: the last twelve years" -- along with the intent to possess. (Elizabeth Cooke, Land Law, 2nd ed., 2012, p. 245) The minimum requirements are as follows:

You must show that:
   the squatter [or claimant] has factual possession of the land
   the squatter [or claimant] has the necessary intention to possess the land
   the squatter’s [or claimant's] possession is without the owner’s consent
all of the above have been true of the squatter and any predecessors through whom the squatter claims for at least 12 years. . . . (Practice guide 5: adverse possession of (1) unregistered and (2) registered land where a right to be registered was acquired before 13 October 2003; 2015: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/adverse-possession-of-1-unregistered-land-and-2-registered-land/practice-guide-5-adverse-possession-of-1-unregistered-and-2-registered-land-where-a-right-to-be-registered-was-acquired-before-13-october-2003#appendix-statement-of-truth)

          In addition, ". . . in cases in which the true owner has, to the knowledge of the adverse possessor, abandoned the land," not as much proof is required to complete and establish the transfer of all rights of ownership to the possessor. (Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law, 8th ed., 2012, p. 447) Thus, the following nine requirements represent a much more stringent set of rules than actually exists on the books for such. In other words, not only were the minimum fundamentals fulfilled in the transfer of Halberstadt, but, to ensure that the law was fully and completely complied with, the maximum number were satisfied to the fullest extent possible, so there could be no valid dispute.

 All Nine Requirements were Fulfilled to the Utmost:

 (1)  Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession

Flexibility

Possession that is factual must be ". . . in the same manner that a reasonable owner would [possess something], given [the type of property and its] nature, character, and location." (Adverse Possession, 2013: http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/outlines/html/prop/prop28.htm) It is a flexible legal term that can incorporate a "constructive" possession, which is a "possession that exists by virtue of a right . . . rather than direct occupancy or control." (Merriam-Webster, Inc., Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law, 1996, p. 369)          
So the question is, how does one possess an intangible, because the possession of the Principality is an intangible right? One cannot physically put a fence around it. An incorporeal is simply not capable of physical detention. However, its actual use and enjoyment is a physical exercise. (Shoprite Checkers supra, Zulu v Minister of Works, KwaZulu and Others, 1992 (1) SA 181 (T) Therefore, an intangible can be physically controlled and thus, by definition, it can be factually possessed. In other words, what amounts to possession depends on the circumstances of each case. "What constitutes factual possession will differ depending on the nature of the land." (Lord Advocate v Lord Lovat (1880) 5 App Cas 273) The land of the principality is de jure corporeal in International Law -- it is different from regular tangible land -- it is legally corporeal, but actually incorporeal or an intangible legal right. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law")
In a deposed monarchy, sovereignty, or the right to rule, is an intangible proprietary right that can be preserved and perpetuated indefinitely through protest and/or continually and actively maintaining the claim by the use and enjoyment of the titles. The point is:

            . . . Possession is freely applied . . . to many kinds of incorporeal things, provided they be capable of exclusive enjoyment [which is true of the Principality which is both incorporeal and corporeal]. (Frederick Pollock, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law, 1888, p. 39)

            . . . A person is "in" possession . . . if he or she [is] . . . substantially enjoying the benefit of it; that is, taking the benefit of the estate, rather than the physical land itself. (Ibid., p. 161

            Again, possession is ". . . shown by its actual exercise . . . use or the enjoyment . . . , since the property itself is a mere intangible right, not [actually] capable of visible and tangible possession." (Raleigh Colston Minor and John Wurts, The Law of Real Property, 1909, p. 126) Use and control are the "fences," as it were, to show possession, which is what has taken place from the very beginning with the Principality. In fact, ". . . All legal interests are incorporeal [if you think about it]. . . ." (Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning," Yale Law Journal, vol. 23, no. 16, November 1913, p. 5) That is, no one can put his land in his pocket. Yet, factual possession is the first and most important proof required in all valid adverse possession situations. Factual possession must be determined as a verifiable and unequivocal fact in each case. So what is it?
The House of Lords approved the following statement of the law in J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2002] UKHL 30, which was originally stated in Powell v McFarlane:

Factual possession [a factum possessionis] signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single and [exclusive] possession. . . . The question [of] what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed. [That is, in this case, the use of title and arms in international law for maintaining deposed sovereignty.] Everything must depend on the particular circumstances, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no one else has done so. (Practical Guide 5 -- Adverse Possession (1) unregistered land; 2014: http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/professional/guides/practice-guide-5)

         The above flexible definition makes it clear that the narrow view of actual possession is unacceptable. What constitutes a sufficient degree physical control will depend upon the nature of the land in question. In tune with the above definition, in Port of London Authority v Ashmore [2009] EWHC 954, a claim of adverse possession was made for a river bed with the tide rising and falling twice a day and his boat rested on the river bed twice a day. The Port of London Authority highly disagreed, so it went to court. The judge ruled that the claimant had been dealing with the land as an owner might be expect to according to the nature of the land and in a manner in which land of that nature would commonly be used or enjoyed. Another example of the above definition is:

            If the land was used or could only be used for shooting game and this activity was carried on by a squatter then title could be acquired in this way. See Red House Farms v Catchpole [1977] 2 EGLR 125. (Factual Possession of the Land in Claims for Adverse Possession; 2014: http://www.quinnlaw.co.uk/acts-that-constitute-factual-possession-of-the-land-in-claims-for-adverse-possession)

            Likewise, if the territory of a deposed sovereign could only be used and controlled by the physical act of using the "title and arms," and/or appropriate protest for maintaining and possessing under international law, this kind of activity would be factual possession that can be adversely possessed. The point is, "[Control and possession] depends on the type of use and occupation of which the property is capable." (Jonathan Hill, "The Proprietary Character of Possession," Modern Studies in Property Law, vol. 3, Elizabeth Cooke, editor, 2001, p. 25) This flexibility creates a situation where, "There is no requirement that adverse possession should be apparent to anybody inspecting the land." (Emma Harwood, Adverse Possession of Land; 2014: http://www.legalcentre.co.uk/property/guide/adverse-possession-of-land) The reason for this is because "possession" does not require actual occupation in certain situations as shown in Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P & CR 452, Ch D; Wong Kar Sue & Ors v Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd & Anor [2006] 2 HKC 600 and Seddon v Smith [1877] 36 LT 168.

No Need to be in Physical Possession of the Land

            . . . A squatter [claimant] himself has no need to be in physical possession of the land; . . . [because a] tenant or licensee possesses the land on his behalf. (The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong: Adverse Possession Sub-Committee, December 2012, p. 11; 2014: http://www.hkreform.gov.hk)

          "What is required [according to factual possession in such a cases as ours] is evidence that the possessor has dealt with the estate in the same way as an owner [in such circumstances as ours] might have been expected to deal with it." (Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land, 2006, p. 132) In our case, the possession question is, "How does one legally possess a de jure corporeal a corporeal international land right?" (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law" at http://www.sra-lso-misconduct.com/id24.htm)
          The answer is, obey the laws which maintain and perpetuate the rights of proprietary sovereignty in international law, which is to continue to use the "title and arms" of the realm in question. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 145) "For a person retains possession of an estate only for so long as he or she is actually enjoying at least some of the fruits of it." (Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land, 2006, p. 129) Since one cannot, under domestic law, enjoy the de facto occupation of the land, which is held by the reigning government. He or she can possess, own and claim the dignities and honors of the land -- the "title and arms" thereof. (Op.cit., Vattel) If he or she uses them in the established way, he remains in possession of the full rights of the former principality or kingdom according to international prescriptive law, which governs such. To use the dignities of the international land is to ". . . enjoying at least some of the fruits of it" -- the only thing he is allowed to do under the domestic law of most nations. This is, in fact, the only way international law provides for a deposed sovereign house to maintain corporeal possession through the legal tenants of his de jure land, that is, to claim and possess it as any other deposed house can and must to preserve, protect and safeguard their possession rights through prescriptive law. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law")
More common law or case law examples:

          Physical occupation of land is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for possession in law because a person may in law be in "possession" of land without asserting his physical presence on it. "Possession" and "occupation" are distinct concepts. The common law is replete with examples. (See, eg, Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1 at [518]; and Nicholson v Samuel Property Management Ltd (2002) 217 DLR (4th) 292 at [14])). In Singapore, the Court of Appeal held in Soon Peng Yam & Anor (trustees of the Chinese Swimming Club) v Maimon bte Ahmad [1995] 1 SLR(R) 279 (“Soon Peng Yam”), that "a possessor need not personally be in occupation of the land to be in factual possession or to have the requisite animus possidendi." (Number 12: Chua June Ching Michelle v Chai Hoi Tong and others [2011] SGHC 180 High Court Suit No 377 of 2009) (emphasis added)

Proprietary Sovereignty and the Landlord/Tenant Relationship

          The point is, the Landlord/Tenant relationship ". . . [fulfills] the requirement for factual possession." (Ibid., number 19) In other words, "A landlord or freeholder of land is . . . 'in [factual] possession' [even if he is never on the land and does not live there]." (Claiming Adverse Possession of Land, land-registry-documents.co.uk; 2016: http://www.land-registry-documents.co.uk/news-blog/claiming-adverse-possession-of-land/#sthash.ZUn0RI6J.dpuf)
          "If a person, X, exercises effective control of land on behalf of another, Y, it is Y who is in possession and not X." (Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 7-103, 2011, p. 150) Again, if ". . . X is the landlord and the land is in the physical possession of the tenant Z," then ". . . the land is treated as being in X’s possession. . . ." (Robert Megarry, Charles Harpum, William Wade, Stuart Bridge and Martin J. Dixon, The Law of Real Property, 8th ed., 2012, p. 171) ". . . [Landlords] will . . . be treated as being in [factual] possession where [a tenant] is in physical possession. . . ." (Ibid.)
          A tenant legally only possesses the property on behalf of the owner. That is, it is universally understood that, ". . . Claimants [can] . . . assert adverse possession though the land has been occupied by their tenants." (Faculty of Law, The Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, vol. 54, 2003, p. 283) Therefore, landlords, through their tenants, hold ". . . factual possession for the purposes of adverse possession." (Ibid.) In summary, ". . . The possession of the tenant shall be deemed the possession of the landlord. . . ." ("Adverse Possession," The American and English Encyclopedia of Law and Practice, William Mark McKinney and David Shephard Garland, eds., vol. 2, 1909, p. 473) This holds true for the subjects of a reigning or deposed proprietary monarch as well, because legally, they are his lawful tenants. They are the possessors of the property, but the king or sovereign prince is the "factual," or constructive possessor and owner.

          . . . Ownership resided in the sovereign [the proprietary] monarch. . . . All private owners are therefore either its tenants or sub-tenants." (Lai Oshitokumbo Oshisanya, An Almanac of Contemporary and Comparative Judicial Restatements: Annotated with Treatises, Treaties, Statutes Rules and Commentaries, 2016, p. 611) That is:

          . . . [If the monarch was a proprietary sovereign] nobody owned land but the king. The expressions dominion directum and dominion utile are often used to describe the relative ownership of king and lords; the former as landlord the latter as tenant. (Duhaime.org, History of Real Estate Law; 2016: http://www.duhaime.org/LawMuseum/LawArticle-62/History-of-Real-Estate-Law.aspx)

Again:

          The monarch, king, chief, lord, or other sovereign of any particular district or country was generally the owner of all landed property within his empire or domain; and the people who cultivated it were his villeins, serfs, or tenants. A sovereign who owned all the land of a country [a proprietary monarch] . . . could at his will take any portion of the labor product of the people who cultivated or occupied it. . . . (Estcourt Rowland Metzner, The Conflict of Tax Laws, 1918, p. 172 and David Wells, “Principles of Taxation,” Popular Science, vol. 48, no. 31, February 1896, p. 443)

          In other words, “. . . The original title is in the king or emperor, and that everybody who has an interest in land [in that realm] is a tenant.” (Ibid.)
          As explained earlier, once adverse possession began in 2001-2002, by law, I held "fee simple in absolute" title of the land and all its rights. This came about because the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern threw away or abdicated all ownership, and I was already making a legal possessive claim for it since 2000. This made me the legal or de jure lord of that land, and thus, the landlord of this proprietary sovereign entity under international law through English domestic law, which had temporary legal jurisdiction over the case. The point being, "The adverse possessor [as a landlord] need not himself be in physical possession of the land." (Robert McGarry, William Wade, Charles Harpum, Stuart Bridge and Martin Dixon, The Law of Real Property, 8th ed., 2012, p. 1467) He must merely be in factual possession of it as a landlord would be.

          . . . In kingdoms, though the people may own private property, they live on the Land and hold their property as tenants on the Land subject to the King/Sovereign/Feudal Lord. (Team Law, Sovereignty 101: 2015: http://teamlaw.net/Sovereignty.htm)

          [In a] patrimonial state . . . a kingdom and everything in it was regarded as being to the king very much what a landed estate was to its owner. ( Andrew Clapham, Brierly's Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law, 7th ed., 2012, pp. 168-169)

          Thus, "The monarch was lord, ultimately, of all the tenants in the realm, and, therefore, was supreme landlord over all lands occupied. . . ." (Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World, 2006, p. 31)

In International Law, Deposed Sovereigns are still the Rightful and Lawful Landlords of their Former Territories in International Law    

          Grotius declared that the landlord/tenant relationship was:

            . . . not destroyed by grants of rights from the Sovereign [like creating a constitution or delegating authority].
            The truth of this appears [in international law] from the analogy of the master of a family, who, though he should have promised to do something which pertains to the government of the family, does not thereby cease to have the supreme power in the family, so far as family matters are concerned. Nor does a husband lose his marital power, by making certain promises to his wife. (Hugo Grotius, Grotius on the Rights of War and Peace: An Abridged Translation, William Whewell, ed., Book 1, chapter 3, no. 16, #1, 1853)

          He wrote that even though there is a constitution limiting the exercise of the monarch's powers. "Sovereignty does not cease to be [what it is] even if he who is [sovereign] . . . exercise[s] it [and] makes promises . . . I am speaking of . . . constitutions. . . ." (Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book 1, chapter 3, no. 16) This is even true, if the people depose the rightful owner and ruler of the land, the tenants still legally possess or occupy their lands in behalf of the dispossessed king, sovereign prince, or their lawful successors, as they are still the lawful rulers in international law. In other words, the same legal relationship continues to exist. Legally, this relationship is maintained in international law by the consistent use of the "title and arms" of the respective kingdom or principality and/or by a proper protest. This can last indefinitely as long as the rules of preservation are obeyed by the deposed House. As Dr. Kerr states:

            Under the doctrines of public international law a ruler who is deprived of the government of his country by either an invader or revolutionaries remains the legitimate de jure Sovereign of that Country while the de facto regime set up by the revolutionaries or the invader is considered an "usurper", both constitutionally and internationally. (Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, libri Tres, Book I, Chapter 4, Nos. 15-19) (Dynastic Law; 2014: http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id70.htm)

 This sovereign power is the highest and most important legal secular right on earth, as Dr. Kerr explained:

            Under public international law a Government-in-Exile, monarchical or republican, is deemed to have the implied constitutional power to perform all normal acts of state including those acts which by its own constitution would require the consent of an organ of government, such as a parliament, which are at present suspended due to the conditions arising from a usurpation of sovereignty. (F. E. Oppenheim, "Governments and Authorities in Exile," 36 American Journal of International Law,1942, pp. 568, 581-582) (Ibid.)

          He continued, "Such de jure possession of sovereignty continues so long as the de jure ruler or government does not surrender his sovereignty to the usurper." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis Juris Gentium, Chapter 10, Nos. 9-11) (Ibid.) "[In other words] the loss of its territory in no way diminishes its sovereign powers, [in the least] because these are inherent in the person of the sovereign, transmitting it, perpetually to their descendants." (Baroni W. Santos, Treaty of Heraldry, vol. I, 5th ed., 1978, p. 197-198) This means, it can last forever if the rightful heirs continue to obey the rules that maintain that possession. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")

The Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern were Proprietary Monarchs and owned their Territory

            The ruling princes of Halberstadt were the kings of Prussia and they were ". . . the owners of the entire realm. . . . In him [that is in these kings] lay the final legal title to all land. All other persons had 'tenures' rather than rights of ownership." (W. W. Willoughby, "The Prussian Theory of Monarchy," The American Political Science Review, vol. 11, no. 4, November 1917, p. 621)
            To further illustrate this, note in the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, which was after the final defeat of Napoleon, all land and ownership rights of the various territories that were patrimonial were restored in most cases to their proper owners. This was done by treaty. Not only was sovereignty conveyed back, but "full property" rights or ownership because they were proprietary monarchies. For example, part of the Kingdom of Saxony was ceded to Prussia in these words, ". . . and his Majesty the King of Prussia shall possess these countries in full sovereignty and property, and shall unite them to his monarchy." (Edward Baines, History of the Wars of the French Revolution, viol. 2, 1818, cp. 538) (emphasis added) In other words, "Those kings possess[ed] the crown in full property. . . ." (Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principle of Natural and Politic Law, vol. 2, chapter 7, no. 5(52) There is an ". . . inseparable connection between land tenure and . . . genuine [patrimonial] sovereignty. . . ." (Morris R. Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty" Rights and Duties, vol. 6, Carl Wellman, ed., 2002, p. 9) The fact is, "The House of Hohenzollern [the Imperial and Royal House of Prussia] was a patrimonial monarchy. . . ." (Reginald James White, Europe in the Eighteenth Century, 1966, p. 50) In this type of monarchy, the sovereign literally owned the territories given to him or that he inherited. Years later, the united Imperial German Constitution of 1871 did not change the landlord-owner/tenant relationship, because ". . . The German State [was not taken] out of the category of patrimonial monarchies" by the Imperial government and constitution. Prussia continued to be a "Patrimonial State" as demonstrated in the following quote. (Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution, 1815, pp. 79-80)

            This has been the keynote of the Emperor's entire reign. The army, that was [the king of Prussia's] first thought, for it was that which had created his imperial heritage, it was that which could enable him to read into the Imperial Constitution the full meaning of the Hohenzollern traditions, and make the whole realm what his ancestors had made Prussia, a patrimonial estate to be transmitted by him to future generations of his House. (David Jayne Hill, Impressions of the Kaiser, 1918, p. 9) (emphasis added)

          Feudal Monarchy [was] characterized by "absolute power," "divine authority," "hereditary right," and "private, exclusive, proprietary ownership" in the right to govern. The Kaiser still holds to this doctrine. (Michigan State Bar Association, Proceedings: Annual Meeting, 1915, p. 81)

            In fact, "Family and proprietary considerations . . . loomed so large that the Kaiser [the king of Prussia] could in 1891 give orders for a mobilization to be carried out if his mother was insulted in Paris. . . ." (J. M. Roberts, Europe 1880-1945, 2000, p. 49) (emphasis added) Again, "Sovereignty [of a patrimonial kingdom or principality] was considered to include, not only the right of . . . [ownership of the] absolute property of the sovereign or state, but all private lands [of the kingdom or principality as well]. . . ." (Henry Wager Halleck, Elements of International Law and Laws of War, 1874, p. 76)

          In "Parliamentary Questions: Absolute owner of land," it shows that England operates on this same principle. That is, "The Crown is the ultimate owner of all land in England and Wales. . . . Most land is held of the Crown as freehold or leasehold [in other words, as landlords over tenants]. . . . The basis of UK land law is the presumption that all land belongs to the Crown. Everybody else is a tenant of the Crown [i.e. the government]. . . ." (Parliamentary Questions: Absolute owner of land; 2017: http://www.duchyofcornwall.eu/latest/?page_id=130)

By law, Proprietary Ownership begins Immediately

          As the ruler's lawful tenants, the people had actual possession of the land in the monarch's behalf, who is the lord of the land. This legal binding landlord-owner/tenant relationship, which exists in a patrimonial monarchy, continues even for a deposed house provided they remained in full compliance with the rules that determine its legal continuance and survival. If the sovereign rights of a deposed patrimonial principality were transferred, the lawful recipient would be the monarch or landlord of all the land on a de jure basis. This is the situation, the Principality of Halberstadt was in under adverse possession from the onset of the claim, because:  

            A squatter [disseiser] who commences adverse possession has, from the very beginning, a fee simple absolute in possession, albeit one that is defensible [only] by a person with a better right to possess. (Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land, footnote 31, 2006, p. 45) (emphasis added)

          . . . Even before the [limitations] period is completed, the squatter [claimant] has the rights and powers of an owner, against everyone except the person he has dispossessed. (Judith-Anne MacKenzie and Mary Phillips, Textbook on Land Law, 2013, p. 146)  

Again:

          . . . The successful adverse possessor does not merely become the owner at the end of the [limitation] period, but also becomes the owner for the period during which she [or he is] adversely possessing. (Jeffrey E. Stake, "The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession" Articles by Maurer Faculty, Paper 221, 2001, p. 2452)

            In other words, such a person in England ". . . immediately obtain[s] a free hold title."  (Ben McFarlane, Nicholas Hopkins and Sarah Nield, Land Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 2012, p. 281) That is, ". . . the right of action [this right] accrues at the date at which the claimant [legitimately] commences possession." (Ibid., p. 253) This is because in adverse possession, "The mere act of taking possession . . .  bestows the right of exclusive possession, a title good against the whole world save a person with a better title." (William Swadling, "Property," English Private Law, 2nd ed., Andrew Burrows, editor,  2007, p. 276) However, after the limitations period has elapse, ". . . there is no longer anyone with a better title to the land" -- no one else on earth. (Op.cit., Textbook on Land Law)
          But in the case of the Principality, the House of Hohenzollern did not have a superior title to Halberstadt years ago, because of their official statements through their attorney in 2001 and 2002 that they would not fight or protest the legal transfer in England about the Principality being conveyed under English law. (See "Letters") Hence, by estoppel -- not being able to retract it official statements that are relied upon, our title as claimants became the highest and strongest title claim on earth to said Principality. The right of the Hohenzollerns being terminated by abandonment (denying ownership) and estoppel (meaning their official word being legally binding). Thus, as stated, we had "no need to be in physical possession of the land," for factual possession to exist, because the "tenant or licensee possesses [that is, the people living today in the ancient territory possess] the land on [our] behalf [because we had and have a fee simple absolute in possession right concerning the territorial principality]." (Op.cit., The Law Reform Commission; Tower Hamlets LBC v Barrett [2006]; and Neutral Citation no. [2003] NICA 5(1). ". . . A non-adverse possessor [a tenant or licensee] occupies the land on behalf of the titleholder [which is myself in this case by virtue of well-established law]. . . ." (Michael H. Lubetsky, "Adding Epicycles: The Inconsistent Use Test in Adverse Possession Law," Osgoode Hall Law Journal, vol. 47, no. 3, article 3, Fall 2009,  p. 511) This is called vicarious possession:

          Vicarious possession refers to the fact that in some circumstances a person, A, who allows another, B, to have control of land on A's behalf is treated by the law as being entitled to the same rights as if A were in actual possession, while B is not entitled to those rights. (Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Raykey-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 6-34, 2011, p. 100)

Summary

          In summary, we qualified as a family for factual possession, when the claim began more than 12 years ago through a combination of domestic and international law.

          . . . Possession . . . is a question of fact depending on all the circumstances of the case [such as possessing the principality through lordship] . . . [through] the appropriate and natural uses it can be put [that is] conduct reasonably expected of an owner of that type of property. . . . Consequently, acts of possession which may amount to possession in one case may be wholly insufficient to constitute possession in another. (Sampson Owusu as quoted in Recreational Holdings 1 (Jamaca) Ltd v Carl Lazarus [2012] JMSC Civ 165 14; 2014: http://www.supremecourt.gov.jm/sites/default/files/judgments/Recreational%20Holdings%20I%20(Jamaica)%20Limited%20v
%20Lazarus,%20Carl%20and%20The%20Registrar%20of%20Titles%20Consolidated%20with%20Lazarus,%20Carl%20v%20Recreational%20Holdings%20I%20(Jamaica)%20Limited.pdf

           ". . . Everything in what constitutes factual possession as a matter of law, is relative [situational and circumstantial]. . . ." (Ibid., no. 15) In fact, ". . . There is ‘perhaps no legal conception more open to a variety of meanings than ‘possession.’"  (Stephen Jourdan, Adverse Possession, 2003, p. 107) Factual possession has broad applicability. To ". . . ’take possession,’ i.e. [is basically merely to] behave like an owner." "The idea of ‘taking’ possession means behaving as though you have this set of rights,” that is, all the rights of an owner and act them out. (Simon Gardner and Emily MacKenzie, An Introduction to Land Law, 2015, sections 7.2.1, 7.2.3)
          All that is needed for factual possession for a deposed proprietary monarchy is the ability to control, use or enjoy the property in the only way for which it is capable of being possessed, as an international corporeal lord/tenant land right, according to its nature and legal situation in international law.

          Summary of the situation on the Factual Possession of the all that pertains to the Principality, which is the direct outcome of both domestic and international law:

1.   Legally in English law, "factual" possession is not the same as the highly restrictive term of "actual" possession. Factual possession is a broad, highly inclusive and flexible term used in English law for the purposes of adverse possession,
2.    Domestic case law consistently gives to non-inhabiting landlords legal "factual" possession of their land through the actual possession of their land by and through their tenants,
3.    Proprietary sovereigns, such as, the princes of Halberstadt and kings of Prussia owned all the territorial lands and properties of their sovereign estates or nations as royal patrimony, and therefore, the people who lived in their territories were their legal tenants. Thus, the monarchs held "factual" possession through the tenancy of the people, whether these sovereigns were in actual possession of their lands or not,
4.    Illegally deposed monarchs, who have maintained and preserved their rights -- the right to rule and own their territories, under international law, still hold "factual" possession even though dispossessed, because the people continue to be their legal tenants, even though, they remain unrecognized by the de facto governments that took over their land,
5.    Under English domestic adverse possession, as soon as the Principality was properly claimed in the year 2001, the claimant, myself, immediately held all the territorial rights, honors, distinctions and privileges by a fee simple absolute title. This title was, however, defensible at first, but shortly thereafter in 2002, I held the highest right to it on earth, because of estoppel and treaty law. The House of Hohenzollern (Prussia), officially through their attorneys denied ownership of the Principality. They literally abandoned it and knowingly sanctioned or sustained the transference or Deed, which was under English jurisdiction. This was done in writing through their attorneys in the year 2001 and 2002. (See "Letters") As a direct consequence of these things, Dr. Goff held:

          . . . the most extensive interest in [the] real property that an individual can possess. . . . It is limited completely to [him] and his heirs, assigns forever, and is not subject to any limitations or conditions. (Property Law, The Free Dictionary by Farlex, 2014: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Property+(law)

6.    As a direct result of the above, I held "factual" possession and thereby became fully eligible to adversely possess the Principality and completely own it after 12 statutory years.
          According to factual possession:

          The use [the possession] must be consistent with the nature of the land and in a manner similar to the use a true owner [dispossessed monarch or successor] might make of the land [or claim in question]." (Adverse Possession; 2015: http://novascotia.ca/natr/land/policyadversepossession.asp)

          . . . Factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land [the principality in this case] as an occupying [non-territorial sovereign] owner might have been expected to deal with it.” (Slade J in Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P & CR 452, Ch D and Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 8-02, 2011, p. 167)

Again:

"Possession" did not require actual occupation. So in Powell v McFarlane, it was held to be "possession" when Mr Powell, from age 14, let his cows roam into Mr McFarlane's land. (Wikipedia, Adverse possession; 2017: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adverse_possession and Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P&CR 352)

          Constructive possession or occupation depends on the kind of land and the legal situation involved. Corporeal land ownership, in international law, is through de jure, non-territorial sovereignty law. It is just as valid, binding and everlasting as natural law is eternal, over all people, all nations, cultures and all time.

Our Case and Factual Possession

          Factual possession was fulfilled, according to what would be "expected" or in total compliance with the "nature" or way possession "is commonly used or enjoyed" in international law for a deposed, non-territorial sovereign entity. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership") In other words, the Principality was fully possessed according to its "nature" and how it is "capable" by law of being occupied. It was "used," defended, "benefited from," "enjoyed," claimed and "controlled" as such as follows:
            From the very beginning in the year 2000, more and more acts of possession, control, and use have been made throughout the years making intention glaringly obvious. All the rights and privileges of the Principality were claimed continually and its possession was publicly advertised or proclaimed since March of 2000. In fact, the first thing we did was to put our claim on our personal checks.
            I had to fight a long, hard, difficult and convoluted battle for 11 years for said feudal property, which involved strenuously accusing the broker and his London solicitor of fraud unless they provided me with the obligatory and promised evidence of good title. This was a major theme throughout all this time, as what I had taken full possession of what appeared to have a faulty title to it, which I wanted to resolve. These actions were in full harmony with possession, that is, as quoted above, it was "conduct reasonably expected of an owner of that type of property." (Ltd v Carl Lazarus [2012] JMSC Civ 165 14)
            In all of this, I never, at any time, declared that the supposed vendors (the Imperial Hohenzollerns) held the real entitlements rather than myself. That is, I never surrendered or conceded to the idea that the Imperial family were the true owners, except, as a matter of historical fact, before the conveyance took place. I continually declared my possession. I started by obtaining regalia appropriate to the status in early 2000 for my family, never for outsiders, and continued this process for many years to come little by little. I created 19 medals, two different stars, two different sashes (royal blue and green) along with neck decorations and special medal for the sashes and other regalia (including a sovereign orb and special sword) designed to benefit my family only -- no one else. None of which was to involve others -- they are not made to sell or give to outsiders or non-family members. (See "Underlying Purpose") In addition, later through formal ceremonies, family members have and are being given noble and regal titles and knighthoods showing the claim is being maintained according to the mandates of international prescriptive law. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership") All of these things provide proof that the claim was, in fact, factually seized or possessed with the intention to own them from generation to generation into an unending family legacy.
            My possession efforts included letters to the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern (See "Letters"), hiring two private investigators (2001-2002), one of which put a report of the internet on this case since 2001 only with changed names. It is still on the internet. A U. S. Federal Bankruptcy Court was involved with the title in (2004), wherein I fought it and effectively maintained title and arms, House Rules consisting of over 70 pages were drawn up in 2003 and amended from 2004 to the present, a six-day Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal was held that involved the title, which I worked long and hard to make sure it took place (2007-2008), four websites, three directly related in proclaiming sole ownership and possession (one from 2001 to 2010, one from 2002 to 2009, one from 2010 to the present) and one that was indirectly related (2005-present). Two "Declarations of Ownership" (one in 2005 and a detailed one in 2006) were created, notarized and updated, a non-monetary dynastic fully public trust in Belize was created to protect and safeguard this family patrimony as a dynastic proprietary right (2006-present). I consulted with a number of solicitors and attorneys through the years, and although I never knighted anyone, showing ownership, I took upon myself the princely royal arms of Halberstadt, and created two orders of chivalry (2000) again for my family, not outsiders. I made the claim of the right to the Principality to the English Law Society and then the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) (2001-2011) again trying to use legal leverage to push the broker’s solicitor to produce the proof for which his law firm had created a binding promise to do -- that is, a legal "undertaking." I also complained to the Legal Services Ombudsman (LSO) (2009-2011), because the SRA refused to act on the obvious and glaring act of professional misconduct committed by the solicitor involved. This was an attempt to get the SRA to use their leverage to obtain inside information denied to me from the London solicitor. Again, as quoted before, all of these behaviors were acts "dealing with the land [the property rights] in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it [according to its uniqueness]." (Practice Guide 5)       
            During all the 12 year period, I wrote numerous letters, correspondence and research reports to various legal agencies and interested parties amounting to thousands of pages to over 70 people. Much of my work was in the hope of forcing the broker and his solicitor to defend themselves in such a way as to prove the conveyance was authentic and genuine. An obvious act of possession would be to do whatever is necessary, or has the potential, to make a faulty, unproven title into a good and marketable title. As a result of all these and other closely related efforts, I became aquatinted and ended up as the senior editor of the book, The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law by Dr. Stephen Baca y Kerr (2011-2015), and an editor of a professional journal article for the German Administrative Court for a potential half a billion dollar tort case being developed for and in behalf of the former Imperial and Royal House of Habsburg (2011-2016). These last two important efforts are indirectly related, but of some significance in my general efforts to maintain a fence to demonstrating solid ownership by expanding the understanding of related international and domestic law as it related to deposed, but legally valid, non-territorial sovereignty.
            The point is, the feudal property was fully and completely defended, owned, fought for and intangibly occupied, spending thousands of dollars and working at least 5 hours a week, rarely missing a single day, for 12 years. I truly did more than most would do to possess and occupy any property. Yet all that was really required is that I possess the property "in the same manner that a reasonable owner would, given its nature, character, and location." (Adverse Possession, 2013: http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/outlines/html/prop/prop28.htm) I am, therefore, in the position of being more than qualified in demonstrating adverse possession being a claimant for the 12 year period for the statute of limitations to take full effect. Yet all that is required is that, ". . . A person retains possession of an estate . . . for so long as he or she is actually enjoying at least some of the fruits of it." (Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land, 2006, p. 129)
          As to the royal and noble titles thereof, these:

            Dignities are [by law] real property [under the law of real property]: All dignities or titles of honor having been originally annexed to lands, were considered as tenements or incorporeal hereditaments, wherein a person might have a real estate. And although dignities are now become little more than personal honors, and rights, yet they are still classed under the head of real property [or real estate]. (William Cruise, A Treatise on the Origin and Nature of Dignities, or Titles of Honor, 2nd ed., 1823, p. 98)

            In other words, possessing deposed de jure feudal property means one possesses an "interest" in both incorporeal and corporeal rights in full harmony the law of nations and thus also with the definition of land in the Limitation Act 1980, other Parliamentary statutes, and case law being factually possessed. The territory of the Principality was usurped in the 1918 Weimar Republic along with all other principalities, dukedoms, and counties owned by the Royal Monarchy of Prussia and other kingdoms and principalities. However, the sovereignty rights of these monarchial territories remained intact according to public international law. That is, as long as the rights were lawfully maintained and perpetuated, they remained undamaged by time and circumstance. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and the two volume book, The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law by Stephen Baca y Kerr, 2015 at http//:www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com)
            My possession of the feudal Principality of Halberstadt was perpetually claimed since the year 2000 to be in full harmony with the Deed of Transfer and Statutory Declarations, that is, as one of being:

            . . . seised [possessed or claimed] in Fee Simple Absolute in Possession free from encumbrances . . . [with] all the Right, Title and Interest [in it] . . . [and] all Rights, Privileges, Honours, and Emoluments (if any) appertaining thereto. . . . (Deed of Transfer, January 2000) (emphasis added)

           "As in the case of a corporeal hereditament, so in the case of an incorporeal hereditament, the highest estate is a fee simple." ("Art. IV: The Elements of Conveyancing," Law Magazine: or Quarterly Review of Jurisprudence, vol. 40-41, 1848, p. 287) It included all the honours and dignities of ". . . the same fief by whatever other name it may have been known in history EXCLUDING [only] the Demesne Lands, the corporeal estate of the feudal Barony and any Advowson." (Ibid.) That is, rightful deposed ownership of the "corporeal estate" of the entire principality, except that of the barony of Schauen, was still claimed and possessed in the only way international law allows or as quote above, "in the same manner that a reasonable owner would, given [the type of property and its] nature, character, and location." (Adverse Possession, 2013: http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/outlines/html/prop/prop28.htm)
            In addition to the Declaration and Addendum, my Last Will and Testament also publicly recognizes the full right to the bear the titles and arms of the feudal Principality of Halberstadt. This is, in effect, also a legal act of possession as required by law. An excerpt of that Will follows:

            I bequeath the titles, orders, websites, books and organizations of the Principality to the heirs to the throne and their spouses and children throughout all their generations in full accord with the Goff/Harradine Family Constitution (the House Rules and Statutes) and in full harmony with the Goff/Harradine Trust for both the direct and collateral lines. All copyrights, as property, including the Trust are also to be passed on by the same methods of lawful succession as specified in said documents. All major properties that may or may not exist at the time of my death are bequeathed in the same fashion and for the same purposes as delineated, which include Susan Joan Brown Goff as first heir to everything. If she is deceased, then everything should follow the procedures specified above in the family documents, which documents were designed to ensure that all hereditary dynastic sovereignty rights are maintained according to the ancient and modern rules of international prescriptive law. The executor of this last will and testament is to be the heir to the throne of Halberstadt at the time of my death, or shortly thereafter, according to succession rules.

          The coat of arms and the main title were registered officially and publicly as service (trade) marks in 2014 and renewed in 2018, so there would be a public record of the claim. To also make a public record, we file a copyright claim and submitted this website as proof. Signet rings were made and the coat of arms was place on our vehicle. My emails also carry the title with my name. We do not flaunt these honors. But we must make it eminently clear that we use our arms and titles as mandated in international law so that the entitlements may be maintained as a perpetual regal and sovereign right. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership") Conferring knighthood onto others is an act of sovereignty. Only family member are to receive such and have. My family, through our coat of arms, was officially registered in Germany as a "royal princely house" through State heraldic law and the Westphalian Heraldic Society. (See "Documents") Three professors of international law have stated unequivocally that the transfer of rights to the Principality was legitimate and valid according to both domestic and international law. (See "Documents") A Doctor of Laws dissertation/project was approved and registered in the world archives. This project was, in fact, this website, which consisted of almost 1,000 pages proving that our claim to Halberstadt is valid, conclusive and undeniable.
          In conclusion, an illegally deposed monarch, who once ruled a proprietary kingdom or principality and who legally preserves his or her sovereign ownership rights under international law, never loses his right as lord of all the land. The people, who dwell in his legal or de jure domain are still his tenants even though he is no-longer in de facto control of the nation and its people.  This kind of depose king or sovereign prince is, therefore, in "factual possession," rather than "actual possession" of the land through his tenants or the people who dwell within the boundaries of his former kingdom or principality. In other words, "A landlord . . . is . . . 'in [legal or factual] possession' [of the land even though he does not live on the land or the territory in question]."  (Land-Registry-Documents.co.uk, Claiming Adverse Possession of Land; 2015: http://www.land-registry-documents.co.uk/news-blog/claiming-adverse-possession-of-land) I fulfilled all the requirements, because, ". . . possession that will ripen into title by adverse possession is use of the property in the manner that an average true owner would use it under the circumstances." (Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, Property, 4th ed., 1998, p. 131) This I have more than adequately done. This results in a perpetual and never-ending land right under, domestic and international law, that is capable of being preserved and maintained forever. (See Dr. Kerr's book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Nonterritorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com)

 (2) Exclusive Possession

            ". . . There cannot be a person with a rival claim who is also in possession of it [or an active claimant to the right at the same time]." (Mark Monaco, Possession of Land, 2006, cp. 12) Neither the broker or the Imperial House presented rival claims. For example, the attorney’s for and in behalf of the former Imperial and Royal House of Prussia made it clear and unmistakable that they did not claim to possess the rights to the principality. ("Letters" in Personal Possession) In other words, the claim was not shared. The June 2000 Statutory Declaration specified that I was ". . . the sole [or exclusive] owner of the said Principality of Halberstadt." (emphasis added)  And my 2006 "Declaration of Ownership" states:

            . . . that no other person or group of people anywhere on earth has the right or is entitled to use the above titles of Halberstadt without the express written authorization of said owner . . . [and] that any violation or infraction of the above statement on the use of the titles of Halberstadt constitutes a legal offense or tort -- a wrongful act, whether intentional or otherwise, in violation of law and is therefore subject to legal action for the same.

 (3) Open and Notorious Possession

In Lambeth LBC v Blackburn, L. J. Clarke wrote that a situation:

. . . can only be adverse if the adverse possession is apparent to owner: that is if it is manifest to the owner that the trespasser intends to maintain possession against the whole world including the owner. That does not mean that it must in fact be known to the owner, but that it must be manifest to him so that, if he were present . . . he would be aware that the trespasser had taken possession of it and intended to keep others out. (Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Ragley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 8-24, 2011, pp. 175-176)

That is, it would be reasonably obvious to anyone, especially the owner, who looks into it. As stated in number (1), the possession was known to the attorneys and head of the Imperial family and acknowledged by them several times from 2001 to 2003. The claim was made obvious to them. However, before this time for several years, the potential to obtain rights over former Imperial titled feudal property were advertised by British Feudal Investments, Ltd. continually since 1999 all the way up to 2003. There was nothing sneaky or hidden about the situation. Not only was this presence of the conveyance personally communicated to Imperial house four or five times, but the claim was posted on the worldwide web by the possessor, since 2002 and 2003 and is still on the internet as this website testifies. In other words, the case was open and notorious. (See comments on how the claim was notoriously and clearly claimed and possessed under "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession")
Nevertheless, "In Topplan Estates Ltd v Townley (2004) it was held that the squatter is under no obligation to tell the paper owner that time is running against him." (April Stroud, Making Sense of Land Law, 4th ed., 2013, p. 91) That is, even though, "there is no requirement for a squatter [or claimant] to bring his actions to the attention of the owner," we did so. (Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 8-25, p. 176) We have done more than was required to fulfill this obligation.
 In one response to one of the letters, the attorney for the Imperial House declared that ". . . The Prince does not wish to take action. . . ." (October 2, 2002 Letter in personal possession -- see "Letters from the Imperial Family") That is, they knew about what was going on (we told them), but they declared that no court or legal action was going to be taken to protect the intangible property claim. Thus they willfully and knowingly ignored the situation and also legally abandoned it to English jurisdiction rather than disputed the English documents of conveyance. This important action transferred the legal international claim to English domestic law and therefore effectively opened the door, after 12 years, for the possession to become permanent or impervious to overthrow by the rule of law.

 (4) Unchallenged

            "During the statutory period of 12 years, the usage must be unchallenged by the owner or their heirs." (Legally Claim Unregistered Land and Property in the UK, 2013: http://www.profitdata.co.uk/adversepossession_248959.html) This is why the owner needs to be known. It is also why most Lord of the Manor titles, with no known owner, fail to meet the requirements of adverse possession. (All genuine manorial titles are owned, whether the owner knows it or not, either through a will, an intestate decree or it reverts back to the Crown.)
            An important legal fact in adverse possession is that the paper owner must be able to protest or ignore the unauthorized use of his property. He must be able to choose to neglect the situation by silence, acquiescence or a failure to legally protest or evict the person who has, without his authorization, taken over either his tangible or incorporeal property. In other words, adverse possession cannot be wrought in a clandestine or stealthy manner. The paper owner must be able to know what is going on and do little or nothing about it, as in this case.

            The fact [is] uncontested long possession eventually confers an impregnable title upon the actual occupier [by a statute of limitations]. . . . If unchallenged for the duration of the legally stipulated limitation period, [the law] conclusively bars all prior rights of recovery. (Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, "The Idea of Property in Land," Land Law: Themes and Perspectives, Susan Bright and John K. Dewar, eds., 1998, p. 8) (emphasis added)

            However, it must be noted that a verbal or even written protest is not enough. In English unregistered property rights law, "a demand for possession from the [paper or original] owner [to the adverse possessor] does not stop [the limitation] time [period from] running [against the original owner]." (Practice Guide 05 Practice Guide 5 – Adverse possession of (1) unregistered land 4.3 . . . ; 2014: http://www.landregistry.gov.uk/professional/guides/practice-guide-5 and Mount Carmel Investments Ltd v Peter Thurlow Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1078) (emphasis added) In other words, ". . . The mere fact that the true owner asks the squatter to leave does not terminate the squatter's possession." (Charles Harpum (ed), Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, 6th ed., Charles Harpum, ed., 2000, p. 21-018) Nor can ". . . a letter sent by the paper [the original] owner asserting title [or ownership be] sufficient. . ." to overrule the adverse possession.  (UK Law, Adverse Possession; 2014: http://lawnotesh1.blogspot.com/2012/06/adverse-possession.html) In other words, even a written protest is inadequate to stop the limitation period from transferring all rights.
            The are only three known ways to stop adverse possession: (1) legal action through a court of law, (2) officially giving the adverse possessor licensure, permission or authority to use the tangible or intangible property. However, if the possessor officially rejects the licensure, permission or authority, then the claim remains adverse, and (3) if the adverse possessor acknowledges or implies that the paper or original owner holds the true legal right to the property, then the limitation period starts all over again. Because, (1) No court action took place, (2) permission was never given, and (3) the original owner was never acknowledged to have any ownership from the day the Deed of Transfer was officially legalized specified in the year 2000 to this very day, all the incorporeal and tangible rights were transferred from the former owner to the actual possessor. This not only provided me with "good title," but ". . . a title superior to all others." (Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land, note 9, 2006, p. 128)

 (5) Continuous Possession

            ". . . The claimant's acts of possession possession must be as continuous as those of a reasonable owner, given the nature, location, and character [type or situation] of the land." (Op. cit, lexisnexis) This was likewise demonstrated in number (1) above as the possession was uninterrupted from the beginning, and further acts of actual legal possession were added through the years demonstrating a continuous reiteration of custody, claim and rights of all that the principality held in international law.
          Notwithstanding a continuous possession on our part, it should be noted that in Bligh v Martin, Pennycuick J. wrote:

          Possession is a matter of fact depending on all the particular circumstances of a case. In very many cases possession cannot, in the nature of things, be continuous from day to day, and it is well established that possession may continue to subsist notwithstanding that there are intervals, and sometimes long intervals, between the acts of use. . . . (Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 8-12, 20011, pp. 171-172)

 (6) Defined

            The claim must be distinct and well-defined. The claim to Halberstadt was based on what was clearly specified in the Deed of Transfer and Statutory Declarations, and these documents plus the Declaration of Ownership and Addendum provide a clear and concise legally definitive description of what was continually possessed and/or consistently claimed through the years. (See "What was Transferred" and "Documents")

 (7) Adverse or Hostile Possession

            "There is no requirement that the squatter [or claimant]  intends to exercise the physical possession over the land wrongfully." (Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 9-18, 2001, p. 196) The hostile possession requirement ". . . is met if the claimant merely uses the [intangible] land [right] as a reasonable owner would -- without permission from the true owner." (Ibid.) (emphasis added) This is the reason why, "neither a licensee nor a tenant . . . can be in APOS [adverse possession] since they are in POS [possession] with the owner's consent. . . ." (Land law 11: adverse possession, 2013: http://quizlet.com/18352594/land-law-11-adverse-possession-flash-cards) (emphasis added) "[Adverse possession] is possession inconsistent with the title of the true owner." (Ram Gopal Chaturvedi and M.L. Chandak, The Law of Adverse Possession, 1979, p. 125)
          I did not have license or permission to use the titles or possess the rights. One of the core concepts in adverse possession is that the possession must be without the authorization of the owner. This is explained in the well-known Pye adverse possession case. The word "adverse" really means:

            . . . that the possession is adverse to the interests of the paper owner or, in the case of registered land, of the registered proprietor. . . . In that sense, and for that purpose, the other person's possession is adverse to his. (JA Pye (Oxford) Holdings Ltd v Graham [2000] Ch 676, at para 69.)

Before the decision in Graham [J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419 (HL, Lords Bingham pf Cornhill, Mackay of Clashfern, Browne-Wilkinson, Hope of Craighead and Hutton], much academic and judicial ink had been split in trying to determine in what circumstances possession be deemed . . . ‘adverse’ to the paper owner. . . . (Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law, 8th ed., 2012, p. 447)

The court decided that:

"The question is simply whether the [possessor] has dispossessed the paper owner . . . for the requisite period without the consent of the owner." In other words, we should not seek to over-conceptualize what is ‘adverse’ and what is not, but ask ourselves the simple ordinary question: is the claimant in possession of the land without the permission of the landowner? (Ibid.)

"Adverse simply means that the possession must occur without the consent of the paper owner." (April Stroud, Making Sense of Land Law, 4th ed., 2013, p. 87) In other words, the only real essential is that the possession must ". . . not be by the consent of the true owner. . . . " (Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, 6th ed., Charles Harpum, Stuart Bridge & Martin Dixon, eds., 2000 at para 21-018)
So much of the work done through the years in regard to the Principality was done because it was discovered that there was little or no proof that the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern were actually party to the Deed of Transfer or Statutory Declarations that declared it was conveyed. This effort was to discover the real truth about the purchase, which the vendor and his solicitor were privy to. It was to possess what was thought to be valid, which was against the interest of the Hohenzollerns. The Imperial family never admitted that they conveyed the rights to the Principality to me. But I had some circumstantial evidence that they might have actually done so. For this reason, I persisted in my claims and efforts -- even though they denied in their letters that the conveyance ever took place. By this act, they proved that my possession of their rights was contrary or without to their consent and permission as required. That is, never at any time did they gave me consent or authorization to occupy or use the titles in their official responses to the letters I sent to them. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family and Adverse Possession")
Now, at this point, it is immaterial whether the legal Deed of Transfer was valid in conveying the rights or not, as all the entitlements were transferred through the rules of the Limitation Act 1980, their lack of legal action to stop it, their abandonment of the situation to whatever England would do with it, and adverse possession laws.

 (8) Intention to Possess

The actions of the squatter in seeking to assert physical possession of the land also may give a strong indication as to whether the necessary intention exists. (UK Law, Adverse Possession, 2013: http://lawnotesh1.blogspot.com/2012/06/adverse-possession.html)

            The obvious and consistent actions taken by myself, for the entire length time, act as powerful witness of my unwavering intention to continue to possess the rights to the Principality as seen in number (1). Everything I did revolved around the core belief that I was in possession of the incorporeal hereditament of a deposed, but legally intact, sovereign entity. I used negative evidence for the most part through any means I could to gain leverage or power in order to try to force others (broker, solicitor, etc.) to prove it was genuine and authentic. That is, my intentions, which permeates throughout my personal journals, and, by all the actions I have taken, irrefutably show a consistent and determined effort to keep and improve the actual ownership and retention of the intangible feudal property. As a further evidence, I was offered $20.000 in 2002 for the special rights of Halberstadt during a time when I was in a financial crisis, but I turned it down, because of a clear and unmistakable intention never to part with it. Nevertheless, ". . . in cases in which the true owner has, to the knowledge of the adverse possessor, abandoned the land," as in our case, not as much proof of this is required. (Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law, 8th ed., 2012, p. 447) (See "Letter from the Imperial Family and Adverse Possession") In fact:

          The decision of the House of Lords in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. Graham [(2002) 3 WLR 221] has not only reaffirmed the importance of possession in the common law tradition as had been understood historically, but it has also explained that it is long-sustained possession that is the root of a successful claim to adverse possession. It does not matter that the adverse possessor does not have an actual subjective belief that he is acting as the owner. Neither does it matter that the possessor is willing to pay for the occupation of the land. . . ." (S. Panesar, "The Importance of Possession in the Common Law Tradition," Coventry Law Journal, vol. 8, no. 1. p. 6)

          In other words, common law, or case law, has softened this once mandated requirement, "In so far as a need to have an intention to own, his Lordship referred to the words of Slade LJ in Buckingham County Council v. Moran [(1990) Ch 643], where he stated that what was required was ‘not an intention to own or even an intention to acquire ownership, but an intention to possess.’" (Ibid. and April Stroud, Making Sense of Land Law, 4th ed., 2013, p. 92) (emphasis added) This we have amply done.
          As usual, we have wittingly and unwittingly gone far beyond what is needed and required to create a perfect adverse possession transfer of all the regal rights to Halberstadt.

 (9) Possession must be for the Whole Statutory Period

As quoted before:

For unregistered land, the Limitation Act of 1980 states that a squatter [or a possessor] must remain in adverse possession for 12 years, at which point the paper owner's title to the land is extinguished [or terminated]. (Adverse Possession, 2013: (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adverse_possession#cite_note-10)

            It has been over 12 years of adverse possession from January 2001 to the present. The result, "Successful adverse possession automatically extinguishes the former owner's title and creates a new title in the adverse possessor by operation of law." (Op.cit., lexisnexis) (emphasis added) Automatic means it operates independent of any human intervention. It is merely a matter of law and works completely outside of court. This is not true in all countries, but in England, for unregistered property, no action is required to activate the statute of limitations and bar the former owner from bringing any complaint or defense against the fact that all his former rights, honors, dignities and titles now belong to the new possessor. That is, no court action can be taken in an unregistered land case that completed the 12 years according to the law. In this case, the conditions have been discharged far beyond what is mandatory or required in every single area of the law. These clear and unequivocal facts make the claim conclusive, indisputable and final.

          Brief Summary Statement: All the mandated conditions for English adverse possession were carried out to the fullest extent possible. No defect or flaw exists. All the conditions were more than adequately complied with. Therefore, as specified by law, the rights, honors, and regal privileges of the Principality were automatically terminated for the original owners and, as a matter of British law, reassigned to the Goff/Harradine family, who adversely claimed the rights for the required 12 years or statute of limitations.

 Registration is Unnecessary

          A [claimant] who commences adverse possession has, from the very beginning, a fee simple absolute in possession [the highest form of legal estate], albeit one that is defensibly [open to revision or forfeiture] by a person with a better right to possess. (The Law Commission as quoted in Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land, footnote no. 33, 2006, p. 45)

          However, if the one with the "better right" does nothing, then after twelve years for unregistered property, the former owner automatically loses, that is, completely forfeits his right to the property on a permanent basis. The possessor then holds the "better right" -- superior to all others on earth. At this point, in our case, we now hold the exclusive right to all the regal privileges, honors, and sovereign rights to the Principality.

          All during the transition period, our claim was under both public international law and English private international law at the same time, because the ownerships rights were international in nature. It is now an international right in Rem "good against the whole world" -- no one holds a higher right to it. (See "1st Legally Binding Transfer of Rights -- Universal, Incontestable and Final in and of Itself -- Adverse Possession Law" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

          All the legal protections of English law, making the case final, unimpeachable and an unalterable fact, are still binding because of the fact that private international law is still in full force. (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction")

          Nevertheless, registration is not required, because the land is legally international and is not owned by any nation on earth. If the land was not legally and exclusively international, but was a domestic territory, it obviously would have required registration in England as English land. International territory cannot be registered in any nation on earth, because it is not under the sovereign rights of any nation-state, but is an international land right. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law")

          Brief Summary Statement: Registration is not legally required as genuine English land would be.

 Adverse Possession & Human Rights

It is clear that the rules of adverse possession can result in the destruction of the title of a duly certified "owner." This might be thought to contradict a person's right to peaceful enjoyment of their property under Art 1, Protocol 1 European Convention on Human Rights, as enacted in to English law by the Human Rights Act 1998.  (UK Law, Adverse Possession, 2013: http://lawnotesh1.blogspot.com/2012/06/adverse-possession.html)

Judicial judgments went back and forth on this for years, until finally in Pye (JA)(Oxford) Ltd v UK (2008), it was settled by:

. . . the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights [from which there is no higher appeal] by a majority of ten votes to seven overturned the earlier finding, holding that the law on adverse possession in the United Kingdom under both the Land Registration Act 2002 and the Land Registration Act 1925 [were] compatible with human rights. . . .

The decision in Pye Ltd v UK effectively prevents any landowner from pleading violation of their human rights as a defense to a claim. . . . (Judith Bray, Key Facts Land Law, 4th ed., 2013, p. 120)

As a result ". . . [it is] impossible to claim breach of human rights when land is adversely possessed." (April Stroud, Making Sense of Land Law, 4th ed., 2013, p. 126)

          Brief Summary Statement: It has been legally determined that neither the European Convention on Human Rights, nor the Human Rights Act interfere, bar, contradict or clash in any way with the adverse possession laws of England.

 Legal Consequences and Ramifications of Completing an Adverse Possession Claim

        1. Once adverse possession has started, the adverse possessor can defend their possession against all but the original owner.
           2. Once adverse possession has continued for twelve years, the adverse possessor can defend their possession against all including the original owner. (Roger Sexton and Barbara Bogusz, Land Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 2nd ed., 2009, p. 488)

That is:

           . . . Under [unregistered adverse possession] an owner [is] deprived of his title automatically by operation of law without any judicial or quasi-judicial enquiry. . . . ("Is adverse possession a dead duck? Pye v Graham; 2014: http://www.gardenlaw.co.uk/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=2404) (emphasis added)

           Again:

The title to the real estate that is claimed by adverse possession automatically changes hands the moment that all the statutory requirements are fulfilled. (Richard C. Gunter, Where Is Your Property?: A Guide to Real Estate Principles, Land Surveying, and Legal Decisions, 2010, p. 30) (emphasis added)

          This change has already taken place. In other words, the positive legal impact of adverse possession gives good title to the adverse possessor and the negative effect of the Law Act of 1980 extinguishes all the former owners rights to the property. In addition, "No action shall be brought by any person to recover any land after the expiration of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued. . . ." (Limitation Act 1980 s.15(1) (emphasis added) Since, ". . . any action for the recovery of unregistered land must be brought before the expiration of the limitation period," which has already passed, the rights to the property are legally protected and secure. (Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Land Law, 2011, p. 490) Again, "If the [legal] action is not brought within the period of limitations, then the cause of action expires and it can never be brought. This means, the former owner cannot overturn the loss." (National Paralegal College, Acquisition by Adverse Possession; 2015: http://nationalparalegal.edu/public_documents/courseware_asp_files/realProperty/Acquisition
/AcquisitionbyAdversePossession.asp) (emphasis added) They are, at this point, legally precluded from doing so. In other words:

            . . . The title of the landowner will be automatically extinguished once the relevant limitation period has passed. This process now applies only to unregistered land [to which classification the Principality belongs]. (Adverse Possession, 2013: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adverse_possession) (emphasis added)

            With unregistered rights, as in Halberstadt, after 12 years of continual possession, "no steps need to be taken by the squatter [the adverse possessor]" as the transfer is then automatically complete and final. It is a done deal. (Judith Bray, Unlocking Land Law, 2010, p. 214)  No court ruling is necessary to effect this automatic operation of the law. In fact, after this point, court action is barred -- the high ground or certainty belongs to the adverse possessor of the property rights, especially where unregistered land rights are concerned. In other words, under the jurisdiction of English law, the principality of Halberstadt and all its rights, honors and titles were made final, and the former owner, or vendor, at this point, is effectively precluded and cannot recover the rights of the sovereign feudal property. The result is a permanent transfer of ownership.

          Brief Summary Statement: All the rights, honors, dignities, and distinctions of the Principality of Halberstadt were by law terminated automatically for the former owners and were transferred to the new ones. As a legal certainty, this transfer has rightful legal standing as a completed, settled and legally establish fact.

 Recognition Unessential to being Legitimate and Valid

            Sovereignty is the highest secular right on earth, hence, this transfer of rights is a most valuable possession and entitlement. Recognition of this fact, however, is nice, but totally unnecessary. Both common sense and international law tells us that,  ". . . Sovereignty is neither created by recognition nor destroyed by nonrecognition." (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, edition 15, part 3, vol. 17, 1981, p. 312) International law denies that diplomatic or political recognition confers sovereignty, nor can nonrecogntion destroy it. In other words, recognition cannot make something utterly false into something utterly true, nor can it make something genuine and authentic into a counterfeit or false claim. Recognition is not, and never has been, the determining factor. Countries and individuals may have their opinions, but reality is reality.
           The point is, "Courts agree that sovereignty can exist in the absence of recognition by any state. . . ."  (Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law: a Concise Introduction, 1979, p. 120) In other words, "No recognition of . . . the exiled government [or any deposed monarchy] . . . is necessary." (Ernst Wolff, "The International Position of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England," The Modern Law Review, vol. 6, no. 4, December 1943, p. 208) ". . . Sovereignty is not something that is decided by other countries. They can only recognize it or not." (Frank Muyard, Director, Taipei Office, French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC), April 1-2, 2005) The point is in the words of Emilio Furno an advocate in the Italian Supreme Court of Appeal:

          The qualities which render a deposed Sovereign a subject of international law are undeniable and in fact constitute an absolute personal right of which the subject may never divest himself [without his consent] and which needs no ratification or recognition on the part of any other authority whatsoever. ("The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders", Rivista Penale, No.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70)

          States [reigning or deposed], to [rightfully] exist, have no need to be recognized by other states. [They] . . . are sovereigns, and therefore have the right to exercise the right of sovereignty. . . ." (Senator Morgan, “Report 393” of March 26, 1884, United States Senate, Reports of Committees: 48th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 3, 1884, pp. 33-34)
This is the highest secular right on earth. Recognition does not change this all important legal reality.

          The 1933 International Convention on the Rights and Duties of States concluded that "The political existence [or government] of the state is [unconstrainted or] independent of recognition by the other states." (University of Oslo, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, enacted 1933, Article III; 2018: https://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/01/1-02/rights-duties-states.xml) That is:

          Even before [that is, without] recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence. . . . The exercise of these rights has no other limitation than the exercise of the rights of other states [both reigning and non-reigning] according to international law. (Ibid.)

          Thus, "declarative theory" has been acknowledged as an international law. It states that the existence of the sovereign right to rule is independent of recognition by others. In other words, "The [Montevideo] Convention codifies [that is, establishes] the declarative theory of statehood as accepted as part of customary international law." (Encyclopedia Westarctica, Montevideo Convention; 2018: http://www.westarctica.wiki/index.php/Montevideo_Convention) As such, recognition is not what is most important. (See "Again, Recognition is Unessential to being Totally and Completely Legitimate and Valid" and "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges" and "Recognition is Immaterial or Irrelevant to the Authentic Sovereignty" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

          By law, this ruling would include deposed governments such as a valid government-in-exile or wrongfully dispossessed monarchy. "These rights [the rights of internal de jure sovereignty] are all absolute, and quite independent of any recognition of the external sovereignty by other States. . . ." (Charles St. Julian, The International Status of Fiji, 1872, p. 3) Again, "In international public law, the act of recognition does not have the effect of conferring rights, but it is merely declarative in character." (Carsten Thomas Ebenroth and Matthew James Kemner, “The Enduring Political Nature of Questions of State Succession and Secession and the Quest for Objective Standards,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 17, no. 3, Fall 1996, p. 761) Recognition is nice but not legally relevant to the legal status of a sovereign entity. It is not external recognition that counts; it is the possession of real and authentic internal sovereignty, whether it is de facto, in actual possession of its territory, or a de jure deposed legal right to rule.

          Brief Summary Statement: Recognition is unnecessary. What is true, genuine and authentic is true, genuine and authentic. Recognition cannot change reality. Outside validation or external acknowledgment is irrelevant to the questions of sovereignty and legitimacy according to international public law. Nevertheless, the confirmation of validity by Dr. Kerr, the foremost international expert on de jure sovereignty, and others is helpful, which includes the official registration of the coat of arms with the German government as a "royal princely house."

 Summary

           In summary of all that has been written above, the transfer, of all the rights and privileges, is now a legal reality and has been for years. This fact or certainty created an irrevocable new and complete entitlement to everything the said Principality represents in history, but most importantly, it includes all its regal honors and non-territorial sovereignty. By law, at this point, it cannot be annulled, voided or overturned by the former owner or by anything the broker or any other person says or does. That is, it is now set in cement as an independent legal entity.
            Whether the original conveyance document actually transferred the rights to the Principality or not, is now immaterial, because under English and International Law, the incorporeal rights and factual possession were lawfully transferred by other means, that is, by adverse possession, etc. as demonstrated by the fact of full compliance to the requirements thereof.  
           "Once the time period [the statute of limitations] is satisfied, the adverse possessor is considered [to be] the original owner. . . ." He has "full legal title," right and entitlement, and the law eliminates "any Cause of Action or liability" against him. (The Free Dictionary, Legal Dictionary, Adverse Possession; 2015: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/adverse+possession) His title is free, clear, and "unimpeachable." (Ben McFarland, Nicholas Hopkins and Sarah Nield, Land Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd. ed., 2009, p. 251) It is "good against the whole world." (William Swadling, "Property," English Private Law, 2nd ed., Andrew Burrows, editor,  2007, p. 276) No one has a greater right to it on earth. (Judith Bray, Unlocking Land Law, 4th ed., 2014, p. 440) "Thus, in unregistered land [the category of the principality], the adverse possessor simply emerges with a new and unchallengeable legal title of his own." (Kevin J. Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Land Law, 5th ed., 2007, p. 126) "The limitation period in unregistered land creates certainty, in that after a person has possessed the land for 12 years he is the legal owner." (April Stroud, Making Sense of Land Law, 4th ed., 2013, p. 118) Interestingly, ". . . in Powell v McFarlane . . . it [is] irrelevant that an owner is ignorant that he has been dispossessed." (Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 8-20, 2011, p. 167) The transfer of rights is legally concluded and cannot be rebutted.
          England and Wales is not the only jurisdiction on earth that the transfers of all rights is automatic. (See "Legal Consequences and Ramifications of Completing an Adverse Possession Claim") The following quote concerns the laws of Minnesota, ". . . There is no need to go to court in order to take someone else’s property through Adverse Possession, you simply get it automatically upon fulfillment of each of the requirements." (Gabriel Law Office, Adverse Possession; 2016: http://www.gabriellawoffice.com/?page_id=100)
           Having obtain the highest right on earth to a factual international sovereign property right, this possession can, by public international law, be maintained, preserved and perpetuated by carefully following the preservation rules and principles of international prescriptive law. These natural laws concepts were designed to protect lawful and genuine rights from loss or forfeiture as an act of justice and equity. Hence, deposed royal houses can last forever or for thousands of years as possessors of non-territorial sovereignty provided they faithfully keep their rights public and known.
          As far as the Goff/Harradine princely royal house goes, the transfer of all rights, regal regalia and privileges are legally a done deal. The law has completed its course. It is now an indefeasible and permanent possession, meaning the rights can and will remain forever in our family. However, this depends on continued obedience to international prescriptive law. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" for a brief discussion of the additional relevant laws impacting the future of all dispossessed nobility and royalty on the earth. That is, there are laws which must be followed to maintain and preserve these rights.) (See also "DEPOSED SOVEREIGNTY AND ROYALTY: how to preserve it and how to lose it" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com)

 Eight Legal and Lawful Methods Transferred all the Rights

          Ownership is now so well established and protected that it is a legal fact and certainty, because every facet of the law was fully complied with and has been fully attested to by experts. (See "Expert Opinions and Recognitions" on this page and "Documents")

          Deposed de jure or legal sovereignty are both a private law rights as well as public law rights. Whereas, reigning sovereignty is exclusively under public jurisdiction, deposed sovereignty is governed by both public and private law. As a direct result, both private law transfer methods, and public law modes of conveyance, had the full legal power to transfer all the honors, privileges and distinctions of the principality of Halberstadt. (See "Public and Private Law as it relates to the Transfer of the Principality of Halberstadt" in "The Public and Non-Public Use of Titles in International Law")

          It is most impressive that not just one or two, but eight different, equally binding acquisition modes, unitedly and perfectly transferred the principality and all its regal rights to the Goff/Harradine family. These laws are listed as follows along with the dates when they were achieved:

(1) the 1st Binding Transfer: English private international law and English adverse possession (2001 in part, 2002 in part, and fully in 2014) . (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(2) the 2nd Binding Transfer: non-belligerent occupation (2002). (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(3) the 3rd Binding Transfer: going from the second-best right on earth to the highest right on earth after the abandonment (2002). (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(4) the 4th Binding Transfer: proprietary estoppel and equitable rights, (2012). (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(5) the 5th Binding Transfer: non-violent or peaceful conquest (2001, 2002, 2006, 2012, 2014) (See "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality"), and
(6) the 6th Binding Transfer: international prescriptive law (2002). (See "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality")
(7) the 7th Binding Transfer: cession by abandonment and recognition (2012). (See "A Seventh and Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges")
(8) the 8th Binding Transfer: annexation (2000, 2001 & 2002). (See "A Seventh and Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges")

          The transfer is an established fact -- each of the above perfected the change in ownership in its own unique way.

This claim is as sure as any other royal claim that ever existed on the earth. It is that profound. Our case could hardly be stronger.

          In fact, we also qualified for four more valid international transfer modes, "novation," "consolidation of title," "highest entitlement on earth on an international level," and "international proprietary estoppel" as well. Since each is composed of similar principles involved in most of the other acquisition laws mentioned above, we have not listed them. Nevertheless, this means there are, in fact, four more powerful witnesses to the truth of the transfer. There is now a total of twelve valid domestic and international conveyance methods involved. Novation and consolidation of title are explained on the web page: "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges" and international proprietary estoppel and international highest right on earth is described in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

          Not one of the transfer methods mentioned above require court action or other legal involvement to activate them. Once completed, each of the eleven are legally an accomplish fact -- binding, eternal, and endless as long as they are maintained as the law mandates for de jure sovereignty. (See "Court Involvement is not Required for any International or Domestic Law to Effect Changes in Sovereignty" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" and "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")

The grand and obvious conclusion is that this is one of the most profoundly certain claims on earth based on verified, confirmed and extensive evidence. (See The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")

 Underlying Purpose

          It would be a lot more comfortable to operate below the radar, merely claim our rights privately, and not stick our necks out, but international law requires or obligates that one publicly assert his or her rights or lose them. In other words, to maintain what is considered to be of great value and worth to us personally, we must obey the law. By this means, it is possible to preserve deposed legal sovereignty from generation to generation, but such obedience ". . . imposes on him an obligation to make known his rights." (Hugo Grotius, The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter 11, no. 141) (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" on this website or "DEPOSED SOVEREIGNTY AND ROYALTY: How to Preserve it  and How it can be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm and also Dr. Kerr's book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com)

          The Law of Nations also requires or behooves one to provide solid proof, or a claim is considered to be no better than a family fairy tale, or mere make believe. Thus, we have this website to fulfill these two important legal mandates: a public presence and solid proof, which proof was certified as valid by legal experts and the numerous citations and explanations of legally verified facts as found throughout this website. (For the requirement of proof, see "Proof is Necessary" in "The Law makes the Difference between an Authentic and a Fraudulent Claim," and "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")

          Even though Halberstadt is a small sovereign regal entity, the ownership of ". . . sovereignty is not of like character with other things, rather, in its exalted rank, it far exceeds other things." (Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 12, no. I) It is something truly magnificent -- there is something supreme and wonderful about it, which is above most things in life. ". . . The ruler or sovereign of a State [reigning or deposed] is, in international law, . . . considered as representing, in his person, [all] its sovereign dignity [honor and glory] . . . ."  (William Teulon Swan Stallybrass, A Society of States,Sovereignty, 1919, p. 32) The point is, "All the majesty of the nation resides in the person of the prince. . . ." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, chapter 15, no. 188) "Every thing that emanates from the throne ought to bear the character of purity, nobleness, and greatness." (Ibid.)

However, ownership of a real sovereign title does not make a man important, great, or good deep inside himself. Truly noble people are people with integrity, good works and compassion for what is right. We highly value what we have, but true nobility or inner greatness is earned, not bestowed, conveyed or transferred.

Our house rules mandate that no knighthoods will be conferred on non-family members, no titles will be given out to people outside of the family, nothing of regal importance will be sold or bartered. The claims, although public titles under international law, will not be flaunted, although they must be used as required by law. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")

For those unfamiliar with the legal concepts discussed herein, which is most of us, it is extremely easy to misunderstand what is written on this website. To avoid such, you are cordially invited to ask questions and make comments. We also welcome corrections.