Three more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality: (The 2nd, 3rd & 4th modes)
(This is probably one of the most profoundly certain claims on earth, and it is elaborated, verified and confirmed in great detail throughout the website.)
There are five major or leading reasons for this website:
(1) The first is to teach correct principles as there are serious falsehoods taught in the field of nobility and chivalry. (See "Problems and Solutions: The Future of Nobility and Chivalry" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id108.htm) Pope Felix III wrote, "Not to oppose error is to approve it, and not to defend the truth is to suppress it." In other words, silence implies consent and promotes error and distortions.
(4) The fourth reason is this website is a well-written and documented doctoral project on international and domestic law. A university doctoral degree requires that one make a "significant original contribution to knowledge." In our case, this dissertation, which is, in fact, this website, provides proof far "beyond a reasonable doubt" that our claim is absolutely true, and the important laws that determine when a case is authentic, valid and genuine. Thus fulfilling an international law requirement. (See "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and False Claim")
(5) And fifth, because my good name (Donald E. Goff, Ph.D., DBA, D.Litt. (eq.) and our claim have been unfairly attacked on the internet, the true facts needs to be published and made known. It is, as Edmund Burke emphatically declared, "All that is needed for the forces of evil to win, is for good men to do nothing." It is hoped that the real truth will prevail, not error or inaccuracies. Hence, a good reason for this website. (See "Problem -- Misinformation" and starting with http://www.nobility-royalty.com/beware_of_false_claims_of_sovereignty.htm on the website of The International Commission on Nobility and Royalty)
To fulfill all these important purposes:
George Washington declared, "Truth will ultimately prevail [but only] where there [is a concerted effort] to bring it to light." Every single relevant point will be examined in great detail, so that the reader can easily see that all the legal facts are more than adequately substantiated, verified and confirmed.
This website is about the lawful transfer of all the international land rights, distinctions and honors of the principality of Halberstadt, which claim has been vetted and recognized by scholars as being legally valid and legitimate. (See "The First of Seven Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and/or "Documents") In other words, this case is not based on hunches, speculation, guesswork, or suspicion. Nor it is based on foolish myths, legends, fabrication, or make believe. It is based on many cold, hard, verified facts -- the law itself. Including the fact that, not just one, but eight legitimate and lawful conveyance or acquisition laws transferred the title and rights thereof to our family. Thus, our claim is not only compelling, but it is truly beyond any reasonable doubt. This is because no other logical explanation can be derived from the facts, and expert legal witnesses have validated the claim as genuine and accurate. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim" and "Documents: Testaments and Witnesses to the Truth")
In other words, this case is not questionable or problematic. The proof is not imaginary. It is as close to being flawless that is possible in this life.
Contents: (Every section and subsection in one way or another provides verified evidence of the truth)
The Following is the Conclusion to Important Basics:
We not only obtained corporeal international land, we obtained an internationally legally intact sovereign principality and all the rights and privileges that pertain to it. Adverse possession in one of the modes that provided the legal apparatus or mechanism that transferred all the rights of ownership. All the laws were activated or set in motion automatically by the power of English private international law that is applied when there is a foreign element involved in a situation such as ours. (See "English Private International Law activates English Domestic Adverse Possession") All these rights were established in our family through eight legitimate legally binding means.
1st Legally Binding Transfer of Rights: Universal, Incontestable and Final in and of Itself -- Adverse Possession Law -- a most Powerful Witness
This website has emphasized the reality of how the laws of adverse possession and abandonment though English private international law created a permanent legal transfer of all the rights, privileges, and distinctions of the principality of Halberstadt to our family in 2013. Practically all the website has focused on this valid and legally binding acquisition mode. This fact is explain in the following quote:
Once the statutory time passes and [the original owner] loses the right to displace [the adverse possessor], [the adverse possessor's] rights become superior to those of everyone. When no one has greater rights, the [adverse claimant clearly] is the new owner. (Jeffery E. Stake, "The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession," The Georgetown Law Journal, vol. 89, 2001, p. 2422)
It is recognized worldwide that ". . . if the statutory requirements are met [for adverse possession], title passes as though there had been a conveyance through the traditional methods of deed transfer." (Marianne Jennings, Real Estate Law, 10th ed., 2014, p. 372) ". . . A person who has acquired title by adverse possession has as good a title as someone who acquires it by a formal conveyance. . . ." (John L. McCormack, "Title to Property, Title to Marriage: the Social Foundation of Adverse Possession and Common Law Marriage," Valpariso University Law Review, vol. 42., no. 2, Winter 2008, p. 462) In other words, it is as conclusive and final as a settled and established conveyance.
Good Against the Whole World
The principle organizing adverse possession . . . is that if a . . . claim is uncontested for long enough, it stands. [That is, it is established, verified and confirmed as such by law]. . . . Adverse possession concerns claims in rem [which means they are real ownership rights that are valid and recognized throughout the earth]. (Arthur Ripstein, "The Rule of Law and Times Arrow," Private Law and the Rule of Law, Lisa M. Austin and Dennis Kimchuk, eds., 2014, p. 323)
Adverse possession results in ownership and "ownership is an absolute right in rem." Ram Gopal Chaturvedi and M. L. Chandak, Law of Adverse Possession, 1979, p. 6) In fact, it is universally recognized that: "The most absolute right in rem is the right of ownership."
A right in rem follows the property wherever it goes [or wherever it is]; it is good against the whole world [that is, it applies universally to everyone on earth], and not merely against a determinate individual. (Charles Phineas Sherman, Roman Law in the Modern World, vol. 2, 1917, p. 146) (emphasis added)
Rights in rem are characterized as those rights which bind "all the world," that is, rights which must be respected by all . . . [in other words] everyone [legally] must refrain from trespassing [or violating such a right]. (James E. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, 1997, p. 23) (emphasis added)
Our claim is an international one -- an international ownership land right, and is universally binding all people or in rem. It means the right to be left alone, unchallenged, unmolested in the enjoyment of one's property and possessions. “The property [ownership] rights are . . . erga omnes; [that is] everyone [on earth] is bound to observe these [important] rights." (Andreas Rahmatian, "Indirect Sovereignty through Property Rights," Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 7. Issue 2, art. 4, p. 59)
The point is, "rights in rem are meant to resolve the question of authority over property once and for all. . . ." (James Y. Stern, "Property's Construction," William and Mary Law School, Faculty Publications, 1527, vol. 101, no. 277, 2013, p. 298) That is, it bears legal witness that such a case is final and conclusive.
In summary adverse possession creates ". . . a sufficient title against all the world [against everyone]; and cannot be impeached by any dormant [original, obsolete or stale] claim [from the past]." (Thomas Edlyne Tomlins, The Law Dictionary: Explaining the Rise, Progress and Present State of the British Law, vol. 2, 3rd ed., 1820, "Writ of Right") "[It] operates to convey a complete title . . . not only an interest in land . . . but complete dominion over it." (William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 2, 1759, p. 418) However, an adverse possessor ". . . is not a 'purchaser' of land, she [he] is, like someone who simply inherits land. . . ." Nevertheless, he or she receives everything that ". . . a buyer would [legally] expect to receive in any traditional conveyance." It is as though he or she received it as if it were ". . . a conveyance by warrantee deed [or a legally protected and guaranteed title]." (Mark Davys, Land Law, 8th ed., 2013, p. 217, Will Saxe, ""When 'Comprehensive' Prescriptive Easements Overlap Adverse Possession: Shifting Theories of 'Use' and 'Possession,'" Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, vol. 33 Issue 1, article 5, 2006, p. 185, and Ibid. respectively)
English land law, by definition, accommodates not only the corporeal land rights, but every ". . . right, privilege, and benefit over, or derived from [the] land," ". . . to include . . . with the land, all . . . privileges . . . rights, and advantages whatsoever . . . enjoyed with, or reputed or known as part or parcel of or appurtenant [belonging] to the land or any part thereof." (See "Adverse Possession transfers all the rights of an Estate which includes Regal and Sovereign Rights" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") That is, the law permits the transfer of the highest secular rights on earth, which are "reputed or known as part or parcel of or [belong] to the land or any part thereof." The land belongs to the deposed intact proprietary principality and the principality belongs to the proprietary international land. They are inseparable. To transfer it is to transfer all of it -- every "right, privilege, and benefit over, or derived from [the] land."
But this is not all, there are six other equally valid ways, which are just as powerful and final in terms of transferring all the rights of ownership to us. These six additional modes of acquisition took place in 2002. Each of these methods accomplished the same thing in completely transferring all the entitlements and distinctions of the sovereign proprietary principality.
Together they more than adequately fulfill the legal requirement that, "In the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word be established [verified or confirmed]," or ". . . shall the matter be established [and settled or finalized]." (2 Corinthians 13:1 and Deuteronomy 19:15) The second mechanism or process of transfer is through international abandonment and occupation. The third is the highest legal right to the principality created immediately after the Imperial Family abandoned ownership through the power of English private international law and adverse possession. (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction" and "Adverse Possession Applies" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") The fourth is by proprietary estoppel. The fifth is through non-violent conquest and the sixth is by international prescription. All six witness the same thing. We received all the rights, privileges and honors of Halberstadt as a deposed, but still intact proprietary principality and territory in international law.
For the second mode of transfer, note that abandonment and occupation are two of the important modes for acquiring and losing sovereign territory:
These are discovery, occupation, accretion, conquest, erosion, avulsion, cession [which can be by gift or conveyance], prescription, abandonment, revolution, succession, and annexation. (Daniel K. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic, 1998, p. 31) (emphasis added)
Abandonment and occupation will be addressed, because these two binding international laws also transferred every right of the principality of Halberstadt. After discussing occupation law as it relates to de jure corporeal international land, we will introduce the third method in which all rights and all privileges were transferred, which also succeeded in the year 2002. Last of all, we will introduce the fourth about equity and estoppel. But first, we need to lay a foundation so that this transfer of rights can be clearly understood. One of the most significant laws in the transfer is English "private international law," which follows after the next subsection on English law.
Automatic Nature of Adverse Possession in English Law
In most states and many countries, the combination of "color of title" and possession automatically creates a situation where adverse possession can take place. "Color of title" is where there is "a document which purports to convey title but fails in this respect either because the grantor lacks title or because the conveyance was ineffective." (Christine Rossni, English as a Legal Language, 1998, p. 58) That is, "Some states require the adverse possessor to have a mistaken claim to the land, like a defective title, or some other document that purports to convey the land to them." (Find Law, New York Adverse Possession Laws; 2018: http://statelaws.findlaw.com/new-york-law/new-york-adverse-possession-laws.html) England does not require this, but that is what happened. Our defective, but legal title, automatically, by English law, lead from a conveyance claim to an adverse possession claim that eventually completed the transfer. "[Color of title] is a paper writing (usually a deed) which professes and appears to pass title, but fails to do so." (The Southern Reporter, vols. 81-82, 1914, p. 952) The deed was defective in that it could not provide "good title," but it was a valid deed. The highly expensive investigation by the Solicitors Disciplinary Authority (SRA) established the deed to be legal, but the deed only supplied "color of title." However, because we continued to claim ownership and legally did what was required by law to qualify for factual possession, we obtained constructive rights to the principality through adverse possession law. That is:
. . . If it [the original contract] proves to be defective [as in our case], that [fact] does not affect the adverse character of the possession; and the fact of possession, and the quo animo [that is, the solid intent behind it] . . . are the only tests [needed to create an adverse possession transfer of all rights and privileges]. (Edwin Burritt Smith and Ernest Hitchcock, Reports of Cases Adjudged and Determined in the Supreme Court of Judicature, vol. 9, 1884, p. 612)
"Thus a defective title can be effectively cured by mere possession [though adverse possession] even though the vendor remained ignorant of the defect until disillusioned by the purchaser." (The Solicitors' Journal, vol. 108, April 3, 1964, p. 271) That is, "If these conditions [the legal requirements for adverse possession] are fulfilled, a defective title [one that cannot provide "good title," such as ours] grows into an absolute title. . . ." (M. K. Nawaz, The Indian Journal of International Law: Official Organ of the Indian Society of International Law, vol. 9, 1962, p. 162) "It is the very purpose of the doctrine of adverse possession to cure technical defects in the evidence of title [so ownership can be lawfully transferred]." (Henry W. Ballantine, "Title by Adverse Possession," Harvard Law Review, vol. 32, no. 2, December 1918), p. 151)
In other words, in most nations on earth and in England, ". . . possession under a conveyance which is void [can't provide good title such as ours] . . . is one example of a case where there may be adverse possession." (Stephen Jourdan and Oliver Radley-Gardner, Adverse Possession, section 20-08, 2011, p. 393) The point is, ". . . the passage of time cured [or can cure through adverse possession] the defect in the conveyance," so that a valid transfer is effected. (Ibid., section 6-34, p. 100)
In full support to the automatic principle of a faulty conveyance turning into an adverse possession case, note that, "adverse possession . . . may occur through ignorance or mistake, without any knowledge or awareness on the part of either the paper [or original] owner or the adverse possessor (see e.g. Wilson v Martin’s Executors (1993)." (Kevin J. Gray and Susan Francis Gray, Land Law, 5th ed., 2007, p. 136) That is, if the rules of adverse possession are obeyed, adverse possession automatically exists. (See "Adverse Possession Cures Defects in Conveyances" and "The Adverse Possessor does not need to know that he is Adversely Possessing the Rights to the Property he has taken control of or Factually Occupied" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
In England and Wales, court involvement in the process of transferring through adverse possession all rights and privileges of ownership is unnecessary. In fact, it is automatic. Note the following professional legal advice about the nature of how the law works:
It works differently for registered and unregistered titles. . . . [Our property was international and therefore unregistered]. What constitutes adverse possession in relation to unregistered titles? The adverse possessor needs to stay there for 12 years, at which point all other claims to possession - even by the paper owner of the legal estate - are automatically time-barred. (Quizlet, Adverse Possession as per Snape’s Notes; 2018: https://quizlet.com/129603242/adverse-possession-as-per-snapes-notes-1-flash-cards) (emphasis added)
The title to the real estate that is claimed by adverse possession automatically changes hands the moment that all the statutory requirements are fulfilled. (Richard C. Gunter, Where Is Your Property?: A Guide to Real Estate Principles, Land Surveying, and Legal Decisions, 2010, p. 30) (emphasis added)
. . . The title of the landowner will be automatically extinguished once the relevant limitation period has passed. This process now applies only to unregistered land [to which the feudal property of the Principality belongs]. (Adverse Possession, 2013: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adverse_possession) (emphasis added)
The title to the real estate that is claimed by adverse possession automatically changes hands the moment that all the statutory requirements are fulfilled. (Richard C. Gunter, Where Is Your Property?: A Guide to Real Estate Principles, 2010, p. 30) (emphasis added)
As a result, ". . . The adverse possessor [in England] gains the full rights of ownership because the owner's rights are extinguished [forfeited or terminated] after a time [the 12 limitation years]. . . ." (Larissa Katz, "Adverse Possession and Sovereignty," Property and Sovereignty: Legal and Cultural Perspectives, James Charles Smith, editor, 2016, p. 1 of chapter 10) (emphasis added) This provides, ". . . the most extensive interest in [the] real property that an individual can possess. . . . It is limited completely to [him] and his heirs, assigns forever, and is not subject to any limitations or conditions." (Property Law, The Free Dictionary by Falex, 2014: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Property+(law)
In review and summary, this is how it worked:
In English [adverse possession] law, the basis of title to land is possession. [We took possession of the rights in the year 2000 through a legal deed of transfer, which turned into an adverse possession case in 2001.] Possession of land [or the constructive possession in our case] by itself gives a title [ownership rights] to the land [or rights that is] good against the whole world except a person with a better right to possession. If X [our case in this situation] takes possession of A’s land [as we did by constructive possession], X [that is, us] ha[ve] a title which will avail [hold strong] against all save A's [or the Imperial family's title]. . . . X [in other words, we] ha[ve] a fee simple [ownership], and so ha[ve] A [the Imperial family], but . . . although X’s fee [ownership rights] is good [as] A’s [the Imperial family's] is better. If, however, A [the Imperial family] fails to take steps to recover the [factual possession] in due time, [their] claim will be barred by [the English statute of] limitation[s], and X’s [our] fee [or secondary ownership right], freed from the superior claims of A’s [the Imperial family's fee], will be good against all the world [that is greater than anyone else's]. (Rainey P. Megarry, Megarry’s Manual of the Law of Real Property, 9th ed., 2014, pp. 482-483)
It is universally acknowledged that where adverse possession is completed (12 years in England -- completed in 2013 in our case), the possessor obtains a title of ownership that is ". . . good against everyone [good against the whole world], including the original owner," who no longer owns any particle of it. (David Mellinkoff, Mellinkoff's Dictionary of American Legal Usage, 1992, p. 491) That is, at that point, no one held a more perfect title to the property than we did in 2013. By another adverse possession method in 2002, after the Imperial family officially renounced ownership, we gain the highest or greater right as no one held a higher right at that time. Later in 2013, as stated, this was confirmed and further established by virtue of English statute of limitations enabled by private international law. Thus, two transfer modes involving adverse possession transferred all the regal ownership rights of the principality.
English Private International Law activates English Domestic Adverse Possession
Before we start a long elaboration on private international law, it is important to note that:
. . . private law and private international law . . . now provide the basis for a great many [legal and lawful] interactions [especially] between . . .
 the public and private law realm, and . . . .
 national [that is, the domestic domain], [the] supranational -- [having power or influence that transcends national boundaries or governments], and public international law [the field which can legally transfer the rights of sovereignty]. (Jhon Anderson, “International Law and the Public/Private Law Distinction,” Master’s Thesis, McGill University, 2000, p. 56)
In other words, private international law, as it is used today, is practically all encompassing and has provided the legal right to transfer the case under adverse possession. It is very powerful, flexible, far-reaching and profound impacting public and private law, transcending national boundaries or governments, and the full right to transfer sovereignty. The legal mechanism for the acquisition of the principality existed in English private international law.
Three important truths to remember in this regard:
(1) It is obvious to anyone who knows the law that a private transaction can exist between an individual and a government, an individual and a another person, or a legal juridical entity; such as, a corporation or a legitimate deposed sovereign entity still intact under international law -- that is, the House of Hohenzollern in our case. The fact is, private contracts between private individuals and states or de jure sovereign entities come under private rather than public international law. The required international or foreign element necessary that activated international private law is that the principality of Halberstadt, like the Imperial House, is a legitimate deposed sovereign entity still intact under international law. Thus, international private law had full jurisdiction and governed the outcome. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "Public and Private Law as it relates to the Transfer of the Principality of Halberstadt" in "The Public and Non-Public Use of Titles in International Law") Note:
[Private international law] serves largely to promote unregulated emancipation of private transnational actors [such as a deposed sovereign entity still legally intact under international law], with little accountability in return. The activities of multinational [or international] corporations, [or the private dealings of deposed sovereignty], rating agencies, or arbitrators, all yield . . . considerable power outside a domestic, public law framework. . . . [but function under private law]. ("Abstract," Private International Law and Global Governance, Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P. Fernández Arroyo, eds., 2014, iii)
[It is a mistake to think] that private law never applies to the State or other public bodies [such as a deposed sovereign entity like the Imperal family]. For bodies subject to public law can make use of private law, methods and institutions; there is sufficient unity in the law to confer on all persons, including the State, in both public and private law capacities. . . . Private law governs all acts done in a private law capacity, whether by public bodies or by private persons. (G. Miele, G. Cotzi, and D. Falconi, "Italian Administrative Law," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 3, no. 3, July 1954, p. 421)
Thus "Private international law [can have] transnational [that is, international] force." (Donald Earl Childress III, "Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict of Laws," University of California, Davis Law Review, vol. 44, no. 11, p. 22)
(2) English private international law is the private law right that enables English domestic law; such as, English adverse possession to govern private international transactions as long as they have an international or foreign component. That is, international private law established the statutory authority for English adverse possession to transfer all the international rights to the principality of Halberstadt to the Goff/Harradine family. Private international law is central to a number of legal principles that legally conveyed the international corporeal property. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
(3) Because the "Deed of Transfer" in this case, which was created in the year 2000 to lawfully convey the principality, was a valid legal contract and an extensive investigation by the English Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) could not prove it was fraudulent, nor could it be proven to validly provide "good title;" therefore, the Deed became a legal, but flawed contract. As such, according to law, the defective, but legal conveyance, qualified to become an adverse possession case, because all the requirements were met. This is just how the law works and it legally worked to our advantage giving us full ownership. (See "Automatic Nature of Adverse Possession in English Law" on this page and both "Adverse Possession Cures Defects in Conveyances" and "The Adverse Possessor does not need to know that he is Adversely Possessing the Rights to the Property he has taken control of or Factually Occupied" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
Private International Law:
". . . A king [or sovereign prince] can transfer his right over such a kingdom [a patrimonial kingdom or principality] to whomsoever he pleases." (Andreas Rahmatian, "Indirect Sovereignty through Property Rights," Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 7, issue 2, article 4, May 3, 2017, p. 77) In other words, ". . . sovereignty is as alienable as a property right." (Andreas Rahmatian, "Indirect Sovereignty through Property Rights," Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 7, issue 2, article 4, May 3, 2017, p. 74) Proprietary sovereignty can be bought and sold especially by a patrimonial monarch who owns the land. Transfers of sovereign territories were common in the past up to and including the 20th century. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred")
Both reigning and deposed sovereignty have legal personality or international legal rights. (See "Deposed Monarchs and their Lawful Successors have International Personality as Public Persons under International Law") But legal, deposed sovereignty is privately, rather than publicly, owned. That is the meaning of proprietary or patrimonial sovereignty. The rights are privately owned by the monarchy. That is, "[In a] patrimonial state . . . a kingdom and everything in it was regarded as being to the king very much what a landed estate was to its owner. For the acquisition of [sovereign territory, private property] . . . rules are still used as the foundation of the law on the subject. " (Andrew Clapham, Brierly's Law of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law, 7th ed., 2012, pp. 168-169) As such, it can be privately conveyed or sold by contract law in any nation whose laws will allow it. Our legally valid "Deed of Transfer" is an example of this. (See "Documents") Whatever is privately owned can be privately sold, conveyed or transferred as desired. As a generally recognized principle:
A government [or a patrimonial, non-reigning, de jure monarch], when acting in its proprietary capacity [for example -- as the private owner of a sovereign territory] would normally be bound by ordinary commercial [law, not public law, but through private law or contract] law unless otherwise provided by statute or regulation. (American Bar Association, Government Contract Law: The Deskbook for Procurement Professionals, 3rd ed., p. 3)
Such a transaction, if done in a foreign land whose laws would allow it, as in England, would immediately be under the rules of "private international law," which law ". . . exists to fulfil foreign [or international] rights, not to destroy them. . . ." (Geoffrey Chevalier Cheshire and Peter Machin North, Private International Law, 10th ed., 1979, p. 692) The rights involved in the conveyance in our case was a deposed sovereign entity still legally intact under the authority of international law.
The scope of private international law is not just between individuals, but ". . . between individuals and states . . . ," that is, in our case, a deposed state -- the Imperial House of Hohenzolern, that still held the legal status of a non-territorial sovereign entity in international law before they abandoned the principality in 2002. (Paras and Peeyaski Divan, Private International Law: Indian and English, 1993, p. 47) "The central issue in . . . private international law . . . [is] which state will be allocated the legal power to regulate the matter?" (Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution and the Right to Regulate, 2006, p. 21) In our case, it was laws of England that governed and had dominion.
Private international law enabled and authorized the transfer of ownership to occur -- first as a legal and substantiated English conveyance in the year 2000, then as an English adverse possession right created in 2001, and afterwards, in addition, as a proprietary estoppel case under equity laws.
It is a well-known and obvious fact that adverse possession is one of many domestic laws for which private international law has full authority. It holds the legal power to validate and establish what laws will be binding for foreign or international concerns of a private nature. Thus, it set in motion the power of English adverse possession and other important laws to provide us with all the rights to the Principality. English private international law rules lawfully established the certainty of the fact that English adverse possession could rightfully governed our claim. As a result of obeying all the requirements mandated by adverse possession, this legally gave us all the rights and regal privileges of ownership. Seven other valid methods of legal transfer also applied to the case, on their own merits, making the transfer of ownership extremely solid. (See "Eight Legal and Lawful Methods Transferred all the Rights")
Law involving Private Concerns with International Components:
"Public and private international law are viewed . . . as two separate [and distinct] intellectual streams running parallel." (Alex Mills, The Confluence of Public and Private International Law, 2009, p. 2) However, they interlap and influence each other. That is, in many cases, there is no ". . . clear separation in their effects, their social products, or their practice." (Ibid., p. 2) Both can impact sovereignty in their own particular way. In fact, "The [sometimes artificial] distinction between public and private international law obscures the important ‘public’ role of private international law, both actual and potential, in ordering the regulation of private international transactions [worldwide]. . . ." (Ibid.) In other words, private International law also embodies ". . . public principles of global ordering [and regulating]. . . ." (Ibid., p. 3) The point is, ". . . private international law is international in character because it forms part of a single, broadly defined, international system of law." (Ibid. p. 14)
In other words, ". . . Although private international law had taken up its place in the shadow of public international law, the two spheres nevertheless remained connected." (Horatia Muir Watt, Private International Law: Beyond the Schism, from Closet to Planet, p. 26; 2018: http://blogs.sciences-po.fr/pilagg/files/2011/11/PILAGG-Launching-Paper-HMW1.pdf) ". . . Private international law has always served as an interface between the local and the global allowing national cultures . . . governance of situations beyond their own territorial boundaries." (Ibid., pp. 52-53) In other words, ". . . Private international law has global governance implications. . . ." (Ibid., p. 3) In fact, it is so powerful that ". . . [It] has allowed private economic [legal] power to acquire an informal sovereign status. . . ." (Ibid., p. 25) Therefore, ". . . [It has a] planetary [a full and complete] function [that is] . . . private international law . . . [has] power beyond the state [into foreign and international situations]." (Ibid., p. 43) In other words, "It is the myth that private international law is not actually international, as it is essentially and necessarily a part of . . . [the law of all the nations and] States." (Alex Mills, "The Private History of International Law," International & Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 55. Issue 1, January 2006, p. 1)
"Private International Law is the body of law that governs private relationships [or dealings] that cross national borders." (Private International Law -- Conflict of Laws -- Library Guides at Catholic University of America -- Law Library; 2018: https://libguides.law.cua.edu/c.php?g=625517&p=4361616) "Private international law . . . deals with international transactions between private parties [which was precisely what our case was about]. . . ." (U. S,. Department of State definition at Brooklyn Law School negotiations in 2002;2018: https://www.state.gov/s/l/38725.htm) It can be ". . . between persons, companies, corporations and other legal entities [such as a deposed sovereign entity in international law which provides its] international context." (Tulp/Abogadox, Private International Law; 2018: http://tulpabogados.com/en/our-services/international-law)
Included in the modes of derivative acquisition [generally transfer of ownership by gift or sale] are transactions at the international private law level [that is, a domestic conveyance of an international item or entity] and also at the public international law level [a conveyance of an international item or entity under international law]. (Cestmir Cepelka and Jamie H.C. Gilmour, "The Application of General International Law in Outer Space," Journal of Air Law and Commerce, vol. 36, no. 1, article 3, 1970, p. 40)
In other words, conveyances of sovereignty can be done by either private international law or public international law. But the point is, private international law has the power that ". . . the rights of sovereignty can be ceded to [private] individuals. . . ." (Egide Arntz, "Argument of Egide Arntz," in Henry Wellington Wack, The Story of the Congo Free State, 1905, p. 524) (See "Private Individuals can become Royal Sovereigns" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") In other words, private international law regulates and governs private legal situations with an international component, such as the principality.
If there is a dispute between parties in international private law, then a court, arbitrator, mediation expert, attorney or even self study can determine or help with the situation, but the law is always the deciding factor, not opinion except where this is permitted. That is, although there is some flexibility built into it, private international law is obligatory and binding. (Vanderbilt University, Topic One: Introduction to Conflict of Laws; 2018: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/wp.../Lehmann-author-changes-ARJ-final-supra-check.pdf) When no dispute exists, as in our case, it is still the law that prevails and is compulsory.
As such, it governs what domestic laws apply or can cover a situation with an international or foreign aspect. The point is, private international law is powerful, broad, flexible and extensive. It is "all-pervading" or all pervasive. (J. J. Faucett and J. M. Carruthers, Private International Law, 14th ed., 2008, p. 7) It covers all situations with a foreign or international aspect. The purpose of private international law is to determine what law applies. In our situation, it is English law in general and adverse possession in particular. For example, "According to English [private international] law . . . if the contract was concluded in the United Kingdom [under English law as was ours], [it] is governed by English law. . . ." (Jean G. Robert, LexisNexis Emerging Issues Analysis, Private International Law, 2014 Emerging Issues 7232; 2018: http://www.lette.ca/docs/default-source/articles/private-international-law.pdf?sfvrsn=0) But it can also uphold and support the use of English proprietary estoppel and the international laws of prescription, non-belligerent occupation, cession and peaceful or non-violent conquest. In our case, it works well for each one of them. But our international case started as a private transaction under English law.
. . . Jurisdiction in international cases of a private nature [like the private transfer of international rights] is not governed by international law, but by the domestic law of each state [because of the solid and binding rules of international private law]. (Chilenye Nwap, "Litigating Extraterritorial Corporate Crimes in Canadian Courts," Doctoral Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 2012, p. 142) (emphasis added)
". . . Private international law is designed to enforce private and not public claims," that are international in nature. (Hessel E. Yntema, Book Reviews, Private International Law, The University of Chicago Law Review, p. 341; 2019: http://paperity.org/p/81622835/review-of-private-international-law-by-g-c-cheshire) "Flexibility is particularly en vogue [accepted] in the context of private international law." (Lutz-Christian Wolff, "Flexible Choice-of-Law: Panacea or Oxymoron?," Journal of Private International Law, vol. 10, issue 3, 2014, p. 431) In other words, the law can not only use domestic laws, or adverse possession, in particular, but can apply, uphold and support the use of all pertinent laws to a case; such as, the international laws of prescription, non-belligerent occupation, cession and peaceful or non-violent conquest. In our case, each of these acquisition laws are material. The point is, private international law applies all relevant laws to a private case whether domestic, international or foreign. Laws are binding that best bring about what is legal and rightful, or best suited to agree with the principles of equity and justice. Hence, private international law supports all eight transfer modes, because each is valid and lawfully binding in our situation. (See "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges," "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality," and "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges")
In conclusion, private international law changes the focus from national to global concerns. Hence, it governs cases having international jurisdiction between private parties. In our case, it was between a deposed, legally sovereign entity and us. The power of private international law is so great internationally that legal experts are increasingly introducing it "into conversations about global governance." (Karen Knop, "Lorimer's Private Citizens of the World," European Journal of International Law, vol. 27, issue 2, May 2016, p. 459) That is, "Private international law. . . is best comprehended from an international perspective . . . as a regulatory system of global governance." (Alex Mills, “Variable Geometry, Peer Governance, and the Public International Perspective on Private International Law,” Private International Law and Global Governance, Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P. Fernández, eds., 2014, pp. 261-262) In other words:
[The] standard distinctions . . . between state law and international law . . . between public and private law; between monism and dualism . . . [is not what is valued, rather] whatever arrangement is most likely to work [is what is considered], paying no heed to these distinctions [between domestic and international law and private and public international law]. (Brian Z. Tamanaha, "What Is International Law?," Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-07-01, October 7, 2016, p. 61)
Private International Law makes Domestic Law binding and powerful for Private International Concerns:
Because of this law:
. . . Extraterritorial [beyond national borders] jurisdiction [is lawful] in private law cases . . . [and are] commonplace [because of this law is for private transfers]. (Jennifer A. Zerk, Extraterritorial Jurisdictions: Lessons for the Business and Human Rights sphere from Six Regulating Areas, report 59, June 2010, pp. 144-145)
". . . Aside treaties, private international law is domestic law [--] only its object is international. . . ." (Gerhard Kegel, Introduction, International Encyclopedia Of Comparative Law, vol. 3, Kurt Lipstein, ed., 1986, p. 6) However, since, "its philosophy is international. . . ," it deals with international concerns, but they are of a private nature. (Kurt Lipstein, Principles of the Conflict of Laws: National and International, 1981, p. 2) In other words, it is specifically designed to impact ". . . international transactions and private issues with an international element" through domestic law. (University of Aberdeen, Private International Law LLM; 2017: https://www.thecompleteuniversityguide.co.uk/courses/details/4420712) In fact, "There is no clear line of demarcation between it [private international law] and public international law. Both are integral parts of the law of nations." (Phillip Marshall Brown, "Private versus Public International Law," American Journal of International Law, vol. 36, 1942, pp. 448-450)
The primary questions addressed by public international law are:
Jurisdiction - What nation should have jurisdiction . . . and
Choice of Law - What nation's laws should be applied. . . . (Expert law, Aaron Larson, What is International Law: 2017:
English private international law activated or set in motion the power of English jurisdiction law which makes English adverse possession and all the related domestic rules active, so that the principality would be transferred in England. German domestic law did not, and still does not, apply to the case, because the Federal Republic of Germany, or any subsequent de facto government, has any legal jurisdiction or governance rights over the international legal rights of a former de jure kingdom, principality or empire that once ruled the land they now rule over. The 2008 London Tribunal agreed that German domestic law ". . . did not apply to the transaction and was [therefore] not relevant [or material to the case]." (Tribunal Findings number 110) In other words, the two solicitors and two Queen's barristers and judges concluded that ". . . English law applied to the transactions. . . ," not German law. (Tribunal Findings number 181) The Deed of Transfer contract was about an international private land right, not a German domestic right, placed under English jurisdiction through the power and rights of private international law.
It [private international law] does not offer any immediate solution for a particular dispute but operates indirectly. [That is, it does not solve the issue at hand, rather] it only indicates the legal system which is to provide the rule to be applied in determining the particular issue. (Kurt Lipstein, Principles of the Conflict of Laws: National and International, 1981, p. 2)
PIL [private international law] does not give a final decision. It is comparable with a railway inquiry room. By approaching the inquiry room you can only a ascertain the platform from which a particular train leaves. It is the train [the domestic, foreign or international laws that it activates] that reaches you [or delivers you] to your destination not the enquiry room [where the rules of private international law are displayed in this analogy]. (Salauddin Saimum, Private International Law; 2017: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/private-international-law-salauddin-saimum-5989072056078135296)
In our case, the inquiry clearly and unequivocally demonstrated that it was English jurisdiction and English law that established the legal transfer of all rights. In other words, independent of a jury, court or judge, ". . . the rules [themselves] tells us which county's law apply." (Gerhard Dannemann, "Common law-based contracts under German law," Boiler Plate Causes, International Commercial Contracts and the Applicable Law, Ciditta Cordero-Moss, ed., 2011, p. 4) That is:
[Private international law governs] all [private law] actions and transactions [of an international or transnational nature either] in a Court of Justice or out of Court [that is, either way -- in or out of court] . . . [they] are valid [and binding]. . . . (Jan Helenus Ferguson, Manual of International Law: For the Use of Navies, Colonies and Consulates, vol. 1, 1884, p. 146) (emphasis added)
Outside of court, private international law opened up the door that English law that the domestic law of adverse possession would have full power to determine the outcome. Private international law provides the guidance and the authority for domestic law to govern.
"Legal interpretation is a rational activity that gives meaning to a legal text." (Abaron Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, 2005, p. 3) It should be the activity of all people to know the law that affects them personally. But who can interpret the law? The answer is anyone! That fact, of course, does not make an individual's personal interpretation binding on others. It is the law itself that is binding. But if one does not understand the law, that law can administer a cruel and terrible blow with teeth enough to maim or ruin a person’s whole life. It is important to keep in mind that ignorance of the law is no excuse; therefore, ". . . ‘the Law of Interpretation’ has a claim to guide the actions of judges, officials, and private interpreters [private citizens]. . . ." (William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs, "The Law of Interpretation," Harvard Law Review, vol. 130, no. 4, February 2017, p. 1082) That is, individuals who are not lawyers often need to be interpreters of the law in everyday life circumstances to ensure they are legally safe and well-grounded in their decisions, because of the ". . . legal principle holding that a person who is unaware of a law may not escape liability [or the consequences thereof. . . ." (Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979, pp. 672-673 and UIA, The Encyclopedia of World Problems & Human Potential; 2018: http://encyclopedia.uia.org/en/problem/158218) When laws are obscure or full of holes, one may need to have legal help, but when the law is straight-forward, upfront and obvious, any reasonable person can perceive what the law is really saying. That is, if the law is self-evident and it is being enforced "as is," then it is clear and unequivocal -- leaving no doubt about how it is to be interpreted.
"There are no special courts of Private International Law. . . ." Its use can take place inside or outside of court ". . . in the midst of any process [such as ours]. . . ." (Frederic Harrison, "The Historical Side of the Conflict of Laws," The Fortnightly Review, vol. 26, 1879, p. 561) In other words, it operates to the benefit of any legal issue in or outside of court to determine what laws apply whether foreign or domestic to a particular situation or a dispute.
Juridical Entities and Private Individuals:
Substantive law defines the rights and responsibilities expressed in civil or domestic law; such as, in the entitlement to use adverse possession, which is central to our claim. Substantive law in private international law ". . . is concerned with what people do outside of court [not in court only, but outside of it as in our case]. . . ." (Kermit Roosevelt, Conflict of Laws, 2nd ed., 2015, p. 19-20) In other words, private international law is not merely for court, arbitration or mediation or any kind of dispute, but it is a way to determine which laws rightfully govern a situation that has an international or foreign aspect to it. In all cases of private international law, "the mere presence of . . . a foreign element in a legal matter raises a number of questions and it is the function of private international law to provide an answer to these questions and to ensure just solutions." (Louwrens Rienk Kiestra, The Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Private International Law, 2014, p. 14)
As, in our case, private international law has jurisdiction over situations involving private individuals and a sovereign entity including a deposed sovereign. For example, "A juridical person . . . is a legal entity having a distinct identity and legal rights and obligations under the law." (JHU Democ Elec 2; 2018: https://quizlet.com/176811836/jhu-democ-elec-2-flash-cards) A deposed sovereign house "is a legal entity" and is a subject of international law having legal personality provided, of course, that the supreme right to rule was preserved as required in prescriptive law. (See "Deposed Monarchs and their Lawful Successors have International Personality as Public Persons under International Law") They have, as defined, "a distinct identity [as a royal house] and [has] legal rights and obligations under the law [as legal sovereigns]." In other words, a dispossessed de jure or non-reigning king or sovereign prince is a juridical person by legal definition.
With that in mind, "Private international law concerns . . . natural and juridical persons. . . ." (Michael Bogdan, Private International Law of the Forum, 2012, p. 285) (emphasis added) Since deposed sovereigns are juridical persons, then it is obvious that such a person or his legitimate successors, the head of a dispossessed royal house can be governed by or subject to domestic private international law. ". . . In the case of private international law [situations are usually] of a private character, though . . . one . . . may be a sovereign state [or a deposed royal house that maintained rightfully and lawfully sovereignty]." (S. S. Gulshan, Business Law, 4th ed., 2012, p. 16) (emphasis added) In other words, ". . .Private international law [can be] between individuals or between individuals and states." (Paras Diwan and Peeyushi Diwan, Private International Law: Indian and English, 1993, p. 47) Again, ". . . Transactional situations [in private International law]. . . may involve individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other groups." (Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law, vol. 1, 1956, pp. 2-3) ". . . A sovereign State [can] voluntarily assume a purely private law obligation. . . ." by making a private law contract. (Adam J. Mambi, Rule of Law vs. Rulers of Law, 2011, p. 54) However, because of the immense power of a sovereign, care must be taken to ensure fairness. The recommendation is that:
A private party dealing with a sovereign counterpart can further optimise its legal position by insisting that the law of a jurisdiction, which is known to be favourable to private parties and to arbitration generally, govern the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract. (Lexology, McDermont and Emery, Drafting Tips for Contracting with Sovereign Parties; 2013: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a22bf2dd-cd0b-441f-a0f4-638d35b8572d)
England was such a place with benevolent and just laws to protect both the sovereign and the individual. For ". . . when a sovereign contracts with persons who are not subjects of the State [as in our case], whether it be with a private individual, or with a Nation, or with a sovereign, the rights of [both] parties are [or should be] the same in each case." (Emerich de Vatel, The Classics of International Law, vol. 3 issue 4, no. 214, James Brown Scott, ed., 1916, p. 186)
The point is, a state can contract with a private individual, which means a proprietary monarch, being the personification or embodiment of his kingdom or principality, can contract with a private individual. Such a contract can be for the sale of a sovereign entity. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred") This is a recognized right in international law. ". . . States [or sovereigns truly can] enter into commercial, or other private law, transactions with individuals." (Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity, 3rd ed., 2013, p. 36) And a proprietary deposed monarch can transfer his territorial sovereignty rights to another person through private law, or in our case by contract law. In other words, English law had the legal mechanism to do this, because the conveyance of corporeal land includes all the incorporeal rights that belong to it. (See "Adverse Possession transfers all the rights of an Estate which includes Regal and Sovereign Rights" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
In our case, the foreign or international component that activated "private international law" was that the principality was an intact legal, non-territorial sovereign entity under international law. There was also a legitimate English Deed of Transfer that was defective in that it could not provide "good title," but was a bonefide and valid legal document. In such a situation, adverse possession could and did take over the case, because private international law has the legal right to govern such situations and it unequivocally provided that domestic law (adverse possession in particular) would have full jurisdiction to cover what had happened. That is, by judge made law, or legal precedence in England, a flawed, but valid conveyance contract, can, by adverse possession, transfer the full and complete ownership designated in a faulty document, if the requirements thereof are satisfied. This is what happened in our case. (See "Adverse Possession cures defects in Conveyances" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
English Jurisdiction and Adverse Possession:
Where there is no dispute between two or more parties, no court, tribunal or mediation is required for private international law matters. This kind of law can be used to solve a legal jurisdiction problem outside of court or a dispute. That is, private international law is usually thought of as being invoked only when there is a dispute to be involved. However, it can merely be an individual personally determining what law is binding on him and his personal international situation. Or, in a court, arbitration or mediation situation, the law can provide binding guidance about what law dominates and governs. The point is, when the answer is so extremely clear and obvious, as in our case, there no need for anything else. The law speaks for itself. And the London Tribunal confirmed that the case was under English law, not German. We also have had legal experts and prominent scholars declare that we have interpreted the law as it really is. (See "Expert Opinions and Recognitions" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and "Documents: Testaments and Witnesses to the Truth") In other words, private international law irrefutably and unequivocally supports, sustains and establishes that English law governed our case. That is, ". . . If there is no dispute [no court involvement] . . . [you simply] apply the private international law [rules] . . . to identify the law governing the contract [situation or issue]." (Camilla Dalbak, "Ship Management Agreements and Third Party Claim," 2006, p. 37; 2017: https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/22827/ShipxManagementxAgreements.pdf?sequence=1)
This is especially true where the laws operate automatically outside of court as in adverse possession, which is based upon a statute of limitations and case law. In mediation and arbitration, like a non-dispute case such as ours, with an "international dimension," rules are more flexible than in a normal or regular court setting to solve the ". . . issue in the eyes of law." (Business Law, Legal Status: 2017: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/legal-status.html; Horst Eidenmüller and Helge Großerichter, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Private International Law, 2015, p. 4; 2017: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2638471 and Filip De Ly, "The Place of Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of International Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning," Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, vol. 12, issue 1, Spring 1991, p. 63)
That is, in these circumstances (arbitration, mediation or in a non-dispute case, "The law [or legal jurisdiction] applicable [to a situation] . . . will . . . be determined [or identified] in accordance with the existing rules of private international law. . . ." (Carlos Esplugues Mota and Louis Marquis, New Developments in Civil and Commercial Mediation: Global Comparative, 2015, pp. 74-75, 77)
There four main rules in private international law relevant to our case for making a determination of what laws will be binding are as follows:
(1) lex loci contactus -- apply the law of the place where the contract was made, which was in England,
(2) lexl loci solutions -- apply the law where the contract is performed, which again was in England,
(3) choice of law -- apply the law specified in the contract, which was once again English,
(4) lex situs -- if land, apply the law where the land is locate, except in a case of constructive ownership in international law, which is a legal abstract that is as authoritative as any English domestic land. This means it is a moveable land right and can be applied in any country on earth whose laws like that of England can accommodate it.
All four of these rules make English law the proper law in governing our claim to Halberstadt. They enabled English adverse possession to operate. The point is, "Private international law rules . . . [include a] . . . domestic legal system’s concepts of time bars [statutes of limitation] and adverse possession. . . ." (Christa Roodt, State Courts or ADR in Nazi-Era Art Disputes: A Choice "More Apparent than Real?," p. 432; 2016: http://cardozojcr.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CAC205.pdf) (emphasis added) In other words, adverse possession is one of the rules that private international law supports and legally established for international concerns.
What follows hereafter are some basic principles important to understanding how the laws apply and how they uphold the transfer of all the international sovereign rights of the principality. First, the rights sovereignty are indispensable or essential to everything that is royal, grand and true.
The Vital Importance of Sovereignty
Sovereignty is so tremendously important that it has been called "the defining doctrine," "the primary cause" from which flows all effective government, "the defining feature of statehood," "the glue or cement that holds all society together," "the one and only true stabilizing principle," "bedrock," "the foundation stone," "the most sacred of international law principles," "an indispensable concept," "of cardinal importance," "the central organizing principle," "the soul" of civilized society, "the reference point," "the central concept for the preservation of world peace," "the most basic principle in international affairs," "the dominant world order framework," doubtlessly "the most precious" of all governmental rights, "the cornerstone," "the guiding principle," "the key constitutional safeguard," "the final and ultimate matrix of a stable society," the "pinnacle," the "ark of the covenant," the "holy grail," the "Alpha and Omega," the "first principle," "the sine qua non of international law," that is, the indispensable condition that cannot be done without, for it is "the building block," "the principle of solidarity" --- "safeguarding humanity." Emerich de Vattel, the father of international law, wrote:
It is an evident consequence of the liberty and independence of nations, that all have a right to be governed as they think proper, and ‘that no state has the smallest right to interfere in the government of another. Of all the rights that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious, and that which other nations ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they would not do her [the gift of sovereignty] an injury. (The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 4, section 54)
Sovereignty is the highest secular right on earth. Royalty is merely an appendage or lessor part of this great attribute. A house without sovereignty is a house without royalty and grandeur. Royalty is inseparably connected to sovereignty, such that, the loss of it is a loss of all that represents the high regal status. A house without sovereignty is a house of commoners. If that house was once royal, they no longer hold that exalted status. This is where international prescriptive law comes into the picture, which can destroy or preserve the right of sovereignty for dispossessed or deposed monarchies. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "Depose Sovereignty and Royalty: How it can be Preserved and How it can be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm)
Deposed Royal Houses can Maintain Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty Forever
There are two kinds of legally valid sovereignty. Illegally deposed, dispossessed or de jure non-territorial sovereignty, and reigning or de facto sovereignty that actually is governing the territory. De jure sovereignty is defined as the legal, rightful supreme right to rule. De facto sovereignty is actually ruling the land and its people. Such a government reigns or is regnant, but not necessarily de jure or lawful. The illegally deposed monarchy may be the rightful rulers in international law, in spite of the fact that they are exiled and without power. De jure means "by virtue of law." De facto means "In fact. Used to distinguish something that actually exists from what may exist only in law." (Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary, 2005, p. xix)
Sometimes a forcible displacement of the legal sovereign of a state may occur and its place may be usurped by another authority not recognized by law; but the legal sovereign may still continue its claims of sovereignty over the territory of the state concerned. Under such circumstances, the sovereignty held by the displaced legal sovereign is known as De Jure Sovereignty. When [Nazi] Germany occupied the territories of many of the European states during the Second World War, leaders of many of these stated formed governments-in-exile in London and continued their De Jure [or legal] Sovereignty over their respective territories. (Durga Kanta Samah, Political Science, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 2004, p. 70)
An officer, king, or government de facto is one who is in actual possession of the office or supreme power, but by usurpation, or without lawful title; while an officer, king, or governor de jure is one who has just claim and rightful title to the office or power, but has [either] never had plenary [or unlimited] possession of it, or is not in actual possession. (4 Bl.Comm. 77,78. MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 33 S.Ct. 955, 57 L.Ed. 1260; Wheatley v. Consolidation Lumber Co., 167 Cal. 441, 139. p. 1057, 1059)
Phillip Marshall Brown, a distinguished international lawyer, wrote on the sovereignty of kings and princes in exile, living in England, who had been robbed of the right to rule their own territories during World War II, he stated that:
A nation is much more than an outward form of territory and government. . . . So long as they [those who hold sovereignty] cherish sovereignty in their hearts their nation [kingdom or principality] is not dead. It may be prostate and helpless. . . . [It] may be suspended, in exile, a mere figment even of reality, derided and discouraged, and yet entitled to every respect. [Why? Because we are] not dealing with fictions, [these] valiant standard bearers of sovereignty . . . in faith and confidence [have, and this is the point] . . . inalienable, immutable rights. ("Sovereignty in Exile," American Journal of International Law, vol. 35, 1941, pp. 666-668)
This jurist went on to say, "The general conclusion we are warranted in reaching is that . . . their sovereignty, even though flaunted, restricted, and sent into exile, still persists. . . . There is no automatic extinction of nations." (Ibid.)
The displaced sovereign loses possession of the occupied territory de facto but it retains title de jure. For its part, the Occupying Power [the usurper] acquires possession – with jurisdictional rights – but not title. Undeniably, divested of possession, "at least temporarily, the title of the territorial sovereign is considerably weakened and reduced to a naked title [because he has no power or control]." Nevertheless, the sovereignty of the displaced sovereign over the occupied territory is not terminated. Indeed, it is not even suspended. . . . In the words of L. Oppenheim, "[t]here is not an atom of sovereignty in the authority of the Occupying Power." (Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 2009, p. 49)
. . . The king [or sovereign prince] does not forfeit the character of royalty merely by the loss of his kingdom. If he is unjustly despoiled of it by an usurper, or by rebels, he still preserves his rights. . . . (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter XII, no. 196)
"A deposed monarch remained, in law, a monarch [a legal and rightful sovereign]." (Charlotte Catherine Wells, Law and Citizenship in Early Modern France, Issue 1, 1995, p. 4) "Such de jure possession of sovereignty continues so long as the de jure ruler or government does not surrender his sovereignty to the usurper." See Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, Chapter 10, Nos. 11. (Stephen P. Kerr, Dynastic Law; 2017: http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id70.htm) So how long can it last? ". . . The de jure legal rights to the succession of that monarchy may be kept alive indefinitely. . . ." See Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book II, Chapter II, Nos. 145-146. (Ibid.) That is, it can last forever provided this precious right -- the sovereign right to rule is maintained according to the law. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De Jure Ownership")
The point is, "Once a king is anointed [in a hereditary monarchy], he and his descendants are granted the monarchy forever. . . ." (Moses Maimonides quoted by Chaim Miller, The Gutnick Edition Chumash -- Book of Deuteronomy, 2005, p. 132) This gave ". . . the king . . . supreme power which was natural and inalienable, inalienable to such a degree that dethroned [or deposed] kings and their descendants kept this right forever. . . ." (Ibid. & Jacques Maritain, Man and the State, 1998, p. 37) Being deposed does not destroy this right -- ". . . mere seizure of territory [by a usurper or rebellious factions] does not extinguish the legal [and rightful] existence of a government [or a monarchy]. . . ." (Cordell Hull in George V. Kacewicz, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Polish Government in Exile (1939-1945), 1979, p. 35) Both the deposed regal house and exiled governments hold true sovereignty as deposed sovereign entities. However, keeping sovereignty only lasts as long as those rights are preserved as required by law. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De Jure Ownership") (See also Dr. Kerr's monumental two volume book, The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com)
The legal situation of legitimate exiled governments demonstrates or exemplified the power of prescriptive law that also maintains the right of sovereignty for illegally deposed monarchs and their rightful successors. Governments-in-exile are "sovereign bodies." (Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law, 1954, p. 90) They ". . . belong to the same category as sovereign States. . . ." (Ibid., p. 88) They hold the ". . . rank of an independent subject of international law." (Ibid., p. 89) ". . . Exiled governments carried out acts of State sovereignty on foreign soil in every sphere, -- legislative, administrative and judicial." (Ibid., p. 99) "[A] government in exile is the representative organ of the international legal person of the state and the depository of its sovereignty." (Stefan Talmon, "Who is a Legitimate Government in Exile? Towards Normative Criteria for Governmental Legitimacy in International Law," The Reality of International Law: Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie, 1999, abstract) With this in mind, it should be remembered that the head of a deposed proprietary monarchy or royal house, as the personification and embodiment of the nation, ". . . are de jure Sovereigns and, as such, [are the] Head of the Government-in-Exile of their usurped country." (Stephen P. Kerr, Dynastic Law; 2018: http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id70.htm) They hold all the rightful executive, legislative and judicial rights, whether living in situ or in exile, because they are the legal sovereigns of their nations even though they hold no actual power or control domestically. Nevertheless, they ". . . remain the sovereign governments of their countries even in exile." (Marjorie Millace Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 2., 1963, p. 474) Their ". . . de jure legal rights to the succession of that monarchy [or government-in-exile] may be kept alive indefinitely . . ." merely by obeying the prescriptive laws that preserve them. (Opcit., Stephen P. Kerr)
The legal binding right of sovereignty and ownership remains with the deposed monarch and his successors and legitimate governments-in-exile as long as they maintain that right. And these rights can last forever being passed down intact to later generations without end. It is the international law of prescription that creates this right and governs the regal rights of deposed monarchies as sovereign provided they obey the rules that preserve these important and grand rights. There are many ways this right can be permanently lost, and only one way to maintain them in perpetuity, endlessly or forever. (Please see "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "DEPOSED SOVEREIGNTY AND ROYALTY: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm
All Sovereign Houses are Legally Equal whether Reigning or Non-Reigning
"The doctrines of the equality of sovereign states is one of the central postulates in the theory and practice of international law and international relations. . . ." (Hidemi Suganami, "Grotius and International Equality," Hugo Grotius and International Relations, Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts, eds., 1992, p. 221) That is, the idea of sovereign equality is deeply embedded in world affairs. The UN charter ". . . is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members."
In terms of monarchy, both reigning and non-reigning, ". . . all Princes, including the Emperor and the Pope, are on an equal footing, as is expressed by the maxim par in parem non habet imperium [a Latin term that means an equal has no power over another equal]." (Gérard Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty And Effectiveness, 2004, p. 32) "At an international level all sovereigns [or monarchs, kings and sovereign princes] were considered equal and independent." (Tim Hillier, Sourcebook on Public International Law, 1998, p. 288) No one is legally any greater or less than any other.
All sovereign houses, who have properly maintained their rights, are equal under the law no matter whether they are reigning, deposed, popular, unknown, large or small. As Emerich de Vattel (1714-1767), one of the founders of international law, explained in his book The Law of Nations that:
. . . A sovereign prince, tho’ weak, is a sovereign independent, and equal to the greatest monarch, as a dwarf is not less a man than a giant, tho’ indeed the political giant makes a greater figure in the general society than the dwarf. . . . (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 4, chapter 6, no. 78)
. . . International law recognizes all monarchs as equally sovereign, although the difference between the constitutional position of monarchs is enormous. . . . Thus, the Emperor of Russia, whose powers are very wide, and the King of England . . . whose powers are . . . very much restricted [constitutionally], are indifferently sovereign [equally sovereign] according to international law [though their power, resources and territories are unequal]. (Amos Shartle Hershey, Diplomatic Agents and Immunities, 1919, p. 91)
Every sovereign . . . [can] freely exercise its sovereign rights in any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of other states. The very fact of its sovereignty implies independence of the control of any other state. It may, therefore, exercise all rights and contract all obligations incident to its sovereignty as a separate, distinct, and independent . . . organization. (Ibid., p. 63)
All are equal under the law in regard to the one great principle -- sovereignty -- whether one is an emperor or a lowly sovereign count. Those who are deposed, who have maintained their right to rule, and those who currently reign over their territories are legally equal. Even a "mediatized" deposed sovereign has the same rights as those who were never "mediatized." That is:
The houses of the mediatised princes and counts are nevertheless to rank equally with the high nobility of Germany [the royal houses], and are to retain the same privileges of birthright with the sovereign houses (Ebenbütrtigkeit,) as they have hitherto enjoyed. (Michael Hurst, Key Treaties for the Great Powers, 1814-1914, vol. 1, 1972, p. 36)
A wrongfully deposed monarch and his house, whether absolute or limited as rulers, remain de jure or rightful even though another government has taken control of their land and have ruled on that territory de facto (in reality) for decades. The rightful ruler is the de jure monarch or his successor as he lawfully holds in international law what is called "legal, non-territorial sovereignty." (See "Sovereign Equality: Royal Status and Monarchy" in the book "The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law" at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com/id44.htm) Both deposed and reigning sovereigns hold all of the following in their complete fullness, but some like legislative or enforcement powers are inoperative, inactive or in abeyance:
1. Ius Imperrii is the right to command and legislate,
2. Ius Gladii is the right to enforce ones commands,
3. Ius Majestatis is the right to be honored, respected and protected as a sovereign person or monarch,
4. Ius Honorum is the right to honor and reward others.
One either has all the above rights or none of them.
. . . Sovereignty does not cease to be such even if he who is going to exercise it makes promises – even promises touching matters of government [i.e., a constitution limiting his powers]. . . .
That what I say is true becomes clear from the similarity . . . to that of the head of a household. If the head of the household promises that he will do for it something which affects the government of it, he will not on that account cease to have full authority over his household, so far as matters of the household are concerned. A husband, furthermore, is not deprived of the power conferred on him by marriage because he has promised something to his wife. (Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book I, chapter 3, no. 16.)
Constitution or not, the sovereign still holds the supreme right. "The fact that a monarch has agreed to restrict the exercise of his Sovereign Power by swearing to a constitution in no way derogates from the unalienable Sovereignty residing in his person." (Stephen P. Kerr, "King and Constitution in International Law," The Augustan, vol. 18, no. 4, issue 80, 1977, p. 130) That is, "As a monarch is the source of the Sovereign Power of the state and the grantor of any constitution, he is not deprived of the power conferred upon him by his kingship merely because he has promised to exercise it in a certain way. . . ." (Ibid.)
The point is, sovereignty is fully an "all or nothing" proposition by construct. It reigns supreme as the highest principle of governmental power on earth. Such ". . . absolutes don't exist in degrees. You can't be partially pregnant, sort of dead, kind of human, or almost sovereign. These are not absolute conditions." One either has all the rights or none of them. To hold sovereignty in international law even if one is deposed is to actually hold the real and authentic right to rule in its fullest degree. Nevertheless, neither the de jure or deposed monarch or the reigning constitutional ruler can command and legislate or enforce their commands in their present state without either permission or opportunity. These specific traits are dormant or inactive in their exercise, but still legally exist as full sovereign rights in their royal persons. In other words, a King or monarch retains full sovereignty -- all four rights (ius imperrii, isu gladii, ius majectatis and isu honorum) even though there is a constitution limiting the exercise of his or her sovereign powers. Or, he or she is deposed and holds only the rights thereof without any control of the territory. In other words, the difference between reigning and non-reigning sovereignty is one has control and the other does not. Otherwise, legally, they are the same.
All sovereigns, large or small, reigning or non-reigning, limited or unrestricted, de jure or de facto, they all hold the legal right to be equal because they all equally hold right of sovereignty in one form or another. Thus:
Just as the mouse is as much numbered among animals as is the elephant, so the [the small county or principality] is just as much a commonwealth [or sovereign entity] as a great empire. The principality of Ragusa, which is one of the smallest in Europe [at that time in history], is no less a commonwealth [or sovereign entity] than the empires of the Turks and the Tartars, which are among the greatest [or largest] in the world. (Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, M. J. Tooley, abridger and trans., Book 1, 1955, p. 8)
In conclusion, ". . . Legal rights of the greatest and smallest states [even deposed ones] are identical." (Hannis Taylor, International Public Law, section 69, 1901, p. 98) In other words, ". . . The smallest and least powerful nation [such as, a dispossessed, but rightful government], in its capacity [as] a nation [as its true sovereign right holders], is the equal of the strongest. Whatever rights belong to one belong to all. . . ." (John Stewart Mill, "Treaty Obligations," Dissertations and Discussions, vol. 5, 1875, p. 137)
Some rights are obviously inoperative, limited or restricted, but they still exist as binding legal and lawful entitlements under the law. No legal monarch, reigning or deposed, is half sovereign. He either holds it all or he do not hold any of it. A proprietary deposed royal sovereign house that has maintained their rights through prescriptive law are equally sovereign with reigning houses even though they are not in control of their former lands. Both are restricted in some way, but both hold the full and complete right to rule.
Sovereignty and Royalty are Inseparable
". . . Sovereignty is not of like character with other things, rather, in its exalted rank it far exceeds other things." (Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 12, no. I) It is something truly magnificent -- there is something supreme and wonderful about it, which is above most things in life. ". . . The ruler or sovereign of a State [reigning or deposed] is, in international law, . . . considered as representing, in his person, [all] its sovereign dignity [honor and glory] . . . ." (William Teulon Swan Stallybrass, A Society of States, Sovereignty, 1919, p. 32) The point is, "All the majesty of the nation resides in the person of the prince. . . ." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, chapter 15, no. 188) He is nothing less than the personification and embodiment of all that is grand in his nation.
Contrary to most people's assumptions,". . . Royalty is not equivalent to monarchy or sovereignty." ("Royalty," The Penny Cyclopaedia of the Society for the Diffussion of Useful Knowledge, vol. 20, 1841, p. 211) Sovereignty and royalty are connected, but not identical. These special regal entitlements ". . . are annexed to the sovereignty [rights of the regal house]. . . ." (Prussian Kingdom, The Frederician Code: or, A Body of Law for the Dominions of the King of Prussia, vol. 2, 1761, p. 60) That is, they are a subordinate, less important, secondary or a part of sovereignty. In other words, these words are not the interchangeable. Royalty and sovereignty are not one and the same. Royalty is inferior to the highest secular right on earth -- the right of sovereignty.
Nevertheless, the existence of ". . . royal prerogatives [are] inseparable from sovereignty." (James Arthur Ballentine, "Regalia Majora," A Law Dictionary, 1916, p. 429) Royalty cannot and does not exist without it.". . .The rights defined as regal . . . are adjuncts [an accessory or supplemental part] of the power of making law [or sovereignty]. . . ." (John Locke, Locke: Political Essays, Michael Goldie, ed., pp. 56-57) In other words, ". . . Majora regalia [royal or dynastic rights]. . . [are an] attribute [lesser or inferior segment] of sovereignty." (Hippolyte A. Taine, The Modern Regime, vol. 1, Svend Rom, annotator, John Durant, trans., 1880, Note: 14, 2006, p. 123) If a reigning or non-reigning monarchy lawfully and rightfully loses sovereignty, that house is empty of any royal or grand right, prerogative or entitlement. It is lost. On the other hand, if sovereignty is preserved and maintained by, for example, a deposed house, they are still royal in spite of being unlawfully dispossessed and/or exiled. (See "Introduction: Dynastic Rights, Sovereignty and Prescription" in Dr. Kerr's book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law volume 2 chapter 1 at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com/id38.htm)
In other words, without the right to rule – the highest right on earth, a house is not royal or grand in any way. Eliminate the entitlement of sovereignty and house members become mere commoners like everyone else. To call them royal, without the right of supremacy and grandeur, is to promote a legal falsehood.
Abraham Lincoln was fond of asking, "If you call a dog’s tail a leg, how many legs does a dog have?" "Five," his audience would invariably answer. "No," he would politely respond, "the correct answer is four. Calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg." Calling a house "royal" when they are not, does not, and cannot, make them true royals. You can't change reality by the words that are used.
Deposed Monarchs and their Lawful Successors have International Personality as Public Persons under International Law
In a proprietary kingdom or principality, the sovereign prince is the embodiment of his nation. He is the government. He owns it. If illegally deposed he then becomes the personification of a rightful government-in-exile with all its sovereign rights. In other words, "They are true governments. . . . They exercise sovereign power [and entitlements in international law]. . . ." (Moraitis v. Delany, Annual Digest, 1941-1942, case no. 96)
That they cannot be full, perfect, and normal subjects of international law there is no doubt [because their external sovereignty and de facto control is limited]. [But] it is inaccurate to maintain that they have no international position whatever. Once it is appreciated that it is not so much the possession of [de facto] sovereignty which determined the possession of international personality but rather the possession of rights, duties and powers in international law, it is apparent that a [deposed] State [or deposed royal house] which possesses some, but not all, of those rights, duties and powers, is nevertheless, an international person. (Lassa Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International Law, Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, ed., 9th ed., 1992, p. 123)
"The view that exiled governments [and monarchs] were organs [and sovereigns] of the occupied States, acting on their behalf and on the basis of their own legal order, was forcefully and uniformly upheld by all judicial decision on the subject." (Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in Public International Law, 1968, p. 95) (emphasis added) ". . . In the legal literature a ‘government in exile’ is . . . the ‘representative organ’ of the international legal person ‘State’ and, as such, the depository of its sovereignty." (Stefan Talmon, "Who is a legitimate government in exile? Towards normative criteria for governmental legitimacy in international law," The Reality of International Law, Guy Goodwin-Gill and Stefan Talmon, eds., 1999, p. 500) Thus, they were acknowledged as having international personality and non-territorial sovereign rights although dormant or inactive as they are dispossessed. Note the following example of one:
The most important of these [examples demonstrating that a deposed sovereignty can be subjects of public international law] is the Papal Church, which, even after the loss of the Papal States, through the Italian Law of Guarantees of the 13th May 1871 is recognised as sovereign. . . . To this category of subjects of international law belong also dethroned sovereign princely Houses . . . as long as the princely House has not given up its claims, the question of its rights is left open [still intact or unforfeited], even when the actual head of state, who has come in its place, is recognised as the actual representative of the state in question. (Carl A. Reuterskiöld, Folkrätt, Särskildt såsom svensk Publik Internationell Rätt, 1928, p. 47) (emphasis added)
It is true that ". . . Statehood has been regarded as the paramount type of international personality." (James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 1979, p. viii) But it is not the only type of international personality that exists. For example, the United Nations is an international person, but it is not a state. The same with the Sovereign Military Order of Malta (SMOM):
[This] Order supports the idea of territory not being a requirement for statehood because it has maintained international personality despite periods where it did not exercise sovereignty over territory. [Yet] the Order is an international person. It has the power to conclude treaties and its Grand Master is entitled to sovereign immunity." (Nanni v Pace and the Sovereign Order of Malta (1935) 8 ILR 2, 4 (Italian Court of Cassation) and Noel Cox, "The Continuing Question of Sovereignty and the Sovereign Military Order of Jerusalem, of Rhodes and of Malta," Australian International Law Journal, vol. 13, 2006, pp. 223-224)
". . . The Holy See is an international person and has maintained such status even during the period (1870-1929) during which it was deprived of territory and population." (Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, On the Nature of the International Personality of the Holy See, p. 6; 2017: http://www.gaetanoarangioruiz.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/on-the-nature-of-the-international-personality-of-the-holy-see.pdf) The reason is that it was a deposed legal, non-territorial entity just like any other dispossessed royal house that maintained their sovereign rights through the law of prescription, which is the only international law that preserves the entitlement to rule necessary for deposed royalty to continue to exist. The point is, "International practice shows that persons and bodies other than states are often made subjects of international rights and duties. . . ." (Hersch Lauterpachet, International Law: The Law of Peace, E. Lauterpacht, ed., 1974, p. 494) An international person:
. . . means a person who is subject to international law. S/he has the powers established in international law, enjoys rights, duties, and powers established in international law, and has the ability to act on the international plane. (US Legal, International Person Law and Legal Definition; 2017: https://definitions.uslegal.com/i/international-person)
Exiled monarchs or their successors as the heads of royal houses and as the personification and embodiment of sovereign rights, have all the authority of a legitimate government-in-exile. Therefore, they have "the ability to act on the international plane" using their "powers established in international law."
Under public international law a Government-in-Exile, monarchical or republican, is deemed to have the implied constitutional power to perform all normal acts of state . . . including those acts which by its own constitution would require the consent of an organ of government, such as a parliament, which are at present suspended due to the conditions arising from a usurpation of sovereignty. (See Felix E. Oppenheim, "Governments and Authorities in Exile," vol. 36, American Journal of International Law, 1942, p. 568)
1. Becoming a party to a bilateral or international treaty;
2. Amending or revising the constitution of the territory over which the sovereign reigned;
3. Maintaining military forces;
4. Retaining diplomatic recognition by sovereign states;
5. Issuing identity cards;
6. Allowing the formation of new political parties;
7. Instituting democratic reforms;
Functions that governments have continued to perform in exile include treaty-making, maintaining diplomatic relations, and conferring immunities, privileges and jurisdiction over nationals. (Jane McAdam, Disappearing States, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law, p. 11: 2018: https://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup13/Disapearing%20States,%20Jane%20McAdam.pdf; and Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law: With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile, 1998, p. 15)
. . . It is this government [the government-in-exile] – and not the government of the occupying state – which is competent under competent international law to exercise, as organ of the occupied state, all the functions of a state in relation to other states, such as sending and receiving diplomatic envoys, concluding treaties, especially a peace treaty with the occupying state, directing the armed forces at its deposal in war against the occupying state. It may even exercise legislative, administrative and judicial functions. . . . All this in spite of the fact that the government in exile has lost control of the territory. . . . (Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 1959. p. 289)
"The displaced [or deposed] sovereign loses possession of the occupied territory de facto [that is, in fact or in reality] but [he or she] retains title [ownership of the ruling right] de jure [that is, by law]." (Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 2009, p. 46) "A government de jure [that is, the rightful government] but not de facto [meaning they have no control of the territory] is one deemed lawful, which has been supplemented [usurped or overthrown]." (Duhaime's Law Dictionary, De jure Definition; 2018: http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/D/DeJure.aspx) "Such de jure [or legal] possession of sovereignty continues so long as the de jure ruler [or his legitimate successors] or [a] government [in exile] does not surrender his [her or its] sovereignty to the usurper." (Stephen P. Kerr, Dynastic Law; 2018: https://www.nobility-royalty.com/id70.htm) That is, if it is legally maintained, it can last forever as a legal fact that is established, supported and upheld by international law or the law of all nations.
A true proprietary sovereign or monarch does not just represent the state. He or she is the state. That is, "the person of the prince is necessarily identified with the State itself. [So much so that] . . . the terms sovereign and State [are used] as synonymous." (Henry Wheaton, Wheaton's Elements of International Law, Coleman Phillipson, ed., 5th ed., 1916, p. 34) "Sovereign princes [which would of course include legal, non-territorial sovereigns are] subjects of international law [especially in relation] . . . with [other] sovereigns or citizens of these foreign States." (Ibid.) Thus, it is a legal fact that:
The qualities which render a deposed sovereign a subject of international law are undeniable and in fact constitute an absolute personal right of which the subject may never divest himself and which needs no ratification or recognition on the part of any other authority whatsoever. (Emilio Furno, "The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders,” Rivista Penale, No. 1, January 1961, pp. 46-70) (emphasis added)
". . . A prince [holding true ancient sovereignty as we do] is more than a private citizen whose relations are governed by the municipal law of his domicile." That is, such a person, is obviously subject to the ordinary laws of the country he lives in, but is above all foreign domestic courts in terms of his rights to ancient "de jure" non-territorial sovereignty. (Stephen Kerr, Dynastic Law, 2012: http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id70.htm) It all boils down to the fact that "Deposed Princes of sovereign houses are 'international public persons," whether dispossessed or presently reigning. (Ibid.)
The point is, de jure or legal sovereignty is sovereignty just as much as de facto sovereignty is sovereignty. They both, in their own way, hold the highest secular right on earth. One holds it legally and the latter holds it actually. Thus, deposed "territorial States, kingdoms and principalities, as well as regnant [reigning] princes . . . are subjects of public international law." (Stephen P. Kerr, Dynastic Law, 2017: http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id70.htm) See "International Personality Rights of Non-Territorial Sovereigns," in the book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law volume 2 chapter 4 at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com/id44.htm) The de jure are equal to reigning monarchs in the international legal system. That is, international acquisition laws apply to them as well as they do to reigning monarchies only some of the rules apply differently. The point is, "de jure states are those that are fulfilling some of the conditions of statehood but not all three. As an example . . . a government [or monarchy] in exile . . . ." (Aneta Stojanovska-Stefanova and Drasko Atanasoski, "State as a Subject of International Law," US-China Law Review, vol. 13, no. 25, 2015, p. 28) Such are legally states and they are legally sovereign.
Once international personality has been acquired by a state [such as an ancient sovereign principality or kingdom that is later deposed], it is lost only by the [actual] extinction of the state [not by it being illegally deposed]. Mere non-recognition of its [de jure and rightful] government does not put an end to its legal rights, although they may be unenforceable. . . . (Charles G. Fenwick, International Law, 3rd ed., Frederic A. Ogg, ed.,1952, p. 149)
When a foreign invader or local insurgents have occupied a state, its government may flee abroad and, provided the state of refuge agrees, operate as a government in exile [or monarchy in exile] with the same legal status as it [or he] had before. (Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law, 2005, p. 25-26) (emphasis added)
It has been shown that for an authority in exile to qualify as a ‘government’ [rather than merely a non-sovereign organization] in international law the following four criteria must be fulfilled:
(2) representative character,
(4) internationally illegality of the government in situ. (Stefan Talmon, "Who is a legitimate government in exile? Towards normative criteria for governmental legitimacy in international law," The Reality of International Law. Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie, Guy Goodwin-Gill and Stefan Talmon, eds.,1999, p. 34)
That is, it must be composed of government officials of the former deposed government to be regarded as de jure states or actual valid exiled governments holding legal, non-territorial sovereignty. Second, the representative official or officials could be the deposed monarch or a legitimate descendant who is a lawful heir. Or, it could be composed of recognized high members of the executive branch of either a dispossessed monarchical or republican government. Third, the so-called government-in-exile would have to be independent, not controlled.
For an authority (irrespective of whether in exile or in situ) to qualify under international law as the government of a State and not just as the subsidiary organ or subordinate body of another State`s government it must have a certain independence. (Ibid., p. 17)
Fourth, the de facto government or usurpers (foreign beligerant power or insurgents) would have to have illegally dispossessed the rightful government whether republic or monarchy. If all four criteria exist, then, whether recognized or not, the exiled authorities hold the rights over a rightful state, albeit a deposed state, with legal and rightful personality. (See "Recognition is Immaterial or Irrelevant to Authentic Sovereignty") They legally hold the highest of all secular rights on earth. In summary, they have international personality and are subject to international law according to their unique situations. Whether regnant or deposed, sovereignty is sovereighty -- the highest right to govern on earth.
Non-Reigning or Deposed Royal Rights can be Transferred to Others
Deposed sovereignty is legally equal to reigning sovereignty because the same basic rules apply to both. This is because in international law, deposed sovereign houses hold real or authentic sovereignty that is just as legal and rightful as the sovereignty held by a reigning government. As a direct result, all the relevant rules that transfer regnant sovereignty also transfers de jure or deposed sovereignty. Likewise, all the laws that destroy sovereignty for a reigning monarchy can terminate this supreme entitlement for an illegally dethroned monarchy or exiled government. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De Jure Ownership") The point is, "The rules of International Law [govern] the various modes of monarchical succession as well as the . . . position and status of unlawfully dethroned Sovereign Houses." (Stephen P. Kerr, "Resolution of Monarchical Successions Under International Law," The Augustan, vol. 17, no. 4, 1975, p. 979) That is, the rules apply to both. In history, ". . .sovereignty and jurisdiction [whether reigning or non-reigning] could be transferred [sold, willed, ceded, gifted, mortgaged, etc.] in any form it might please the giver and the receiver to adopt." (Jefferson Davis, The Papers of Jefferson Davis: July 1846--December 1848, vol. 3, James T. Macintosh, ed., 1981, p. 349)
As an example, "Andreas (Andrew) . . . was the only legitimate representative of the dynasty of the Palaeologi, who possessed the rights to the lost [or deposed] Byzantine throne." (A. A. Vasiliev, History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453, vol. 2, 1952, p. 590) It was a well-known facts that, "The title [or ownership] of Eastern Roman Emperor was the sole inheritance of Andrew Palaeologus. He [as a legal, non-territorial sovereign] sold his claim to Charles VIII of France." (Isabel MacBeath Calder, Activities of the Puritan Faction of the Church of England, 1625-33, 1957, p. 59) This man was the only de jure or rightful successor to the Empire according succession rules created in the last century of its existence. And in this position, owning all the privileges of the Empire, he legitimately sold all his de jure royal and imperial rights, titles and prerogatives, "which were genuine," to Charles VIII, the King of France, in 1494. (James J. Algrant, The Fons Honorum; 2017: http://web.archive.org/web/20030404070252/www.kwtelecom.com/chivalry/fons.html) Again:
[Andreas] Paleologus, the nephew of Constantine, the last Christian emperor, [sold] his right to the whole empire of Constantinople. The act of sale being drawn up by two notaries, and ratified, Charles [VIII of France then] assumed the robes and ornaments of the imperial dignity, and made no scruples in claiming the imperial rights vested in him by virtue of this purchase. (Ward, Law of Nations, vol. 2, pp. 260-262 ; Garnicr, Hist, de France, liv. 1, pp. 429, 461, 494; Russell, Hist Modern Europe, vol. 1, pp. 185, 472; White, Hist. of France, p. 208.) (Henry Wager Halleck, International Law: Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, 1861, pp. 128-130)
Two kings later, under Francis I, the Imperial Crown of the Byzantine Emperor was still being claimed. That is, these kings claimed that the kings of France were the rightful emperors of Constantinople. Not until Charles IX in 1566 did the claim come to an end as a result of disinterest. This king wrote that the imperial title ". . . is not more eminent than that of king, which sounds better and sweeter." (David Potter, A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State, 1995, p. 33) This disinterest was the equivalent of an abandonment, because both he and his successors failed to maintain the claim.
Powerfully demonstrating that deposed or dispossessed royal and imperial rights can be bought and sold just like reigning rights, Andreas Palaiologos later conveyed the same non-reigning ruling rights to Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile. Of course, selling something that one has already sold to someone else is fraud, but the point is, it was a well-known legal fact that deposed rights could be lawfully purchased just like reigning rights. (John Julius Norwich, Byzantium -- The Decline and Fall, vol. 3, 1995, p. 446) The latter sale, of course, was fraudulent as the rights were already owned by France. But this shows that the transferring of dispossessed sovereign rights, not just reigning rights, was known as a legally acceptable practice, such that, both France and Spain recognized it was a valid procedure.
For a more modern example, the United States bought all sovereignty rights to the Philippines from the Kingdom of Spain. But Spain at the time of this purchase had been deposed in the Philippines and had no control over the territory. "Spain [or any other sovereign entity] cannot give any better title than she has; and the only title she has is to the right to carry on the civil war with the new republic for the recovery of her lost [reigning] sovereignty. That right [the legal, non-territorial sovereign right to rule] she may convey [that is, sell]. ("Further Legal Aspects of the Philippine Question," The Public, no. 49, Louia F. Post, ed., March 11, 1899, p. 5) The United States bought this right, which was de jure, not regnant. That is, it was a deposed right instead of a regnant or reigning one. The point is, sovereignty, whether reigning or non-reigning, is legal, rightful, and legitimate sovereignty by law; and the ". . . International Code specifically provides . . . that sovereignty may be bought and sold. . . ." (Oscar William Coursey, The Philippines and Filipinos, 1914, p. 101) That is, "Such transactions are fully sanctioned under the current [as well as in the past] international order [as exemplified by the above]." (Stephen Clowney, "Should Qw Buy Selling Sovereignty?" Duke Law Journal, vol. 66, January 2017; 2018: https://dlj.law.duke.edu/2017/01/should-we-buy-selling-sovereignty) A few examples of further de jure territory being bought are the Louisiana Purchase, then Alaska, Florida, Texas, California, New Mexico and finally Utah -- all conveyed for money in the 19th century. These territories for the most part were de jure rather than reigning territories as they were not generally settled and governed, but were mostly merely legal rights. The conclusion is obvious that non-reigning rights can and have been transferred under international law.
Jean J. Burlamaqui (1694–1748), one of the founders of international law, explained that:
There is no reason to hinder the sovereign power [reigning or nonreigning], as well as every other right, from being alienated or transferred. . . . They [deposed as well as reigning patrimonial kings and princes] are permitted to share, transfer, or alienate [their sovereignty] . . . [In other words, a] prince shall have full right [and prerogative] to dispose of the crown [his kingdom or principality], as he shall think proper. (The Principles of Natural and Politic Law, vol. 2, chapter 7, section 5, no. 53(1)
In proprietary sovereignty, the monarch, and his royal house and lawful successors, holds the highest secular right on earth over the territory. In other words, full ownership:
The sovereign owns the sovereignty [and the territory] in the precise sense that he can control it, use it, lend its use or exercise to others, and even sell or transfer it as he sees fit. The people . . . can do no such a thing. (Arash Abizadeh, "Sovereign Jurisdiction, Territorial Rights, and Membership in Hobbes," The Oxford Handbook of Hobbs, A. P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra, eds., 2016, p. 410)
Selling reigning sovereign land also took place just:
Within the last century [the 20th century], Mexico, Japan, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Oman, Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Seychelles, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Chile and Peru have taken or given money in exchange for the transfer of [sovereign] jurisdiction over certain inhabitants in a given territory. Often these territories are overseas bases, but they need not be. In 2011, China agreed to increased investment in Tajikistan in exchange for sovereignty over 1,000 square km of territory in the Pamir Mountains, including some 5,000 inhabitants. (Steven Press, Sovereignty can be Bought and Sold like a Commodity; 2017: https://aeon.co/ideas/sovereignty-can-be-bought-and-sold-like-a-commodity)
Sovereignty may be held either with full property right (jure pleno proprietas), or with usufact only (jure usufructarion). Where the sovereignty is a full property right, it includes ownership of the land and the people, and the right to dispose of all at pleasure. Hence, either the land or the people may be bought and sold like property. (Charles Edward Merriam, History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau, 1900, p. 23)
In the Andreas Paleologus case cited earlier, it was non-territorial or deposed sovereignty (legal under international law) that was sold. Another example of non-reigning sovereignty being legally transferred under international law came after World War I, where Germany transferred ". . . all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions" in June 28, 1919, even though the territories involved were only "de jure," holding the legal right to rule, rather than actually reigning over them as de facto or actual rulers. (Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, vol. 1, 1922, p. 179)
Three other examples again show that non-territorial sovereignty or de jure sovereignty are subjects of international law:
(1) ". . . Both Russia and Georgia had . . . de jure territory, [they had no de facto or actual control over them. However, during the time of the Soviet breakup, they] ceded [these various lands to] Chechnya, Abkhazia, and South Ossertia." (J. George, The Politics of Ethnic Separation in Russia and Georgia, 2009, p. 146) That is, de jure sovereign land rights have legal standing in international law and can be ceded, sold, prescribed, abandoned and can also be occupied and therefore legally acquired.
(2) Another example, ". . . The de jure territory of the Republic of Ireland encompassed the entire island of Ireland. More than half a century later, the Republic changed the Constitution and renounced its irredentist [restoration] claim." (Markus Kornprobst , Irredentism in European Politics: Argumentation, Compromise and Norms, 2008, p. 52) In other words, dispossessed or deposed rights can be renounced.
(3) De jure transfer claims like the principality of Halberstadt are legal and valid in international law. They exist where the sovereignty involved no longer governs the territories in question. The new norm or practice for reigning governments in Europe that do not have control over some of their de jure lands, is explained in the following observational statement. That is, "Almost all irredentist [restoration] disputes have been resolved by the peaceful de jure recognition of the de facto existing borders rather than by peaceful territorial change." (Ibid., p. 237) This is a new European norm, not an international law as there are still 29 unsettled rightful land claims worldwide among reigning nations. (Ibid. p. 15) But the European countries mentioned above could have, by legal right, pushed and asserted their rights, but instead they used the legal mechanism of recognition to renounce their claims. Thereby transferring dispossessed rights to others. The point is, dispossessed, deposed or constructive claims can be legally transferred just as much as reigning ones. (See "Sovereign Rights and Honor can be Transferred" and "By Law, Adverse Possession can create or establish Constructive Possession") This fact is important to our case, because it is an example of the rightful transfer of legal, non-territorial or deposed sovereignty in international law.
International prescriptive law always involves "dispossessed sovereignty," not merely de facto or reigning sovereignty. (Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 8th ed., 2017, p. 375; John O'Brien, International Law, 2001, p. 210; and Surya Prakash Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes, and International Law, 1997, p. 118) The same is true of non-belligerent occupation. De jure territory can be abandoned and occupied on a legal (constructive) level instead of on an actual level to obtain the legal rights to rule over it, which rights are de jure and not de facto. As long as the de jure, non-territorial right is maintained, it can last forever. And it can be occupied as well as bought and sold under international law. The point is, ". . . In every international State [reigning or non-reigning] is the power to transfer territorial jurisdiction." (United States Congress, The Congressional Globe, part 1, 1866, p. 696)
In conclusion, non-belligerent occupation, non-violent conquest and international prescription of de jure rights can take place even though the territory in question is currently ruled on a de facto or actual basis by a current republic that ousted the rightful monarchy ages ago. Occupation of this kind can only work, if the deposed royal house actually maintained the right to rule the land. This must be the legal status of the regal territory before they abandon it to the individual or group that had concurrent constructive or factual possession of the deposed territory. In other words, deposed or de jure sovereignty stripped of actual control is recognized and rightfully acknowledged as legitimate subjects of international acquisition law. As such, the rights thereof can be transferred by any one of the customary modes.". . . The classic list of modes of acquisition describes five methods of acquiring territorial sovereignty: occupation, cession, accretion, prescription and conquest [which is no longer valid]." (Abraham Bell, "Economic Analysis of Territorial Sovereignty," Economic Analysis of International Law, Eugene Kontorovich and Francesco Parisi, eds., 2016, p. 78)
Subjects of international law include persons and entities capable of possessing international rights [like the de jure sovereign entitlements of a deposed royal house] and duties [or obligations] under international law and endowed with the capacity to take certain types of action on the international plane [as in the case of an exiled government or monarchy -- a legal and valid deposed monarch is the personification and embodiment of a government-in-exile]. (Lori Fisler Damrosch, International Law: Cases and Materials, 2001, p. 249)
In other words, the heads of deposed proprietary monarchies ". . . are de jure Sovereigns and, as such, [are the] Head of the Government-in-Exile of their usurped country." (Stephen P. Kerr, Dynastic Law; 2018: http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id70.htm) And again "governments-in-Exile are subjects of public international law. . . ." (See Marjorie M. Whitman, Digest of International Law, vol. I, pp. 921-930; F. E. Oppenheim, "Governments and Authorities in Exile," vol. 36, American Journal of International Law, 1942, pp. 568-595; L. Oppenheim and H. Lauterpacht, International Law, vol. I, no. 144.) The fact is, ". . . a deposed sovereign [and his rightful and lawful successors are] subject[s] of international law. . . ." (Emilio Furno, "The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders," Rivista Penale, no.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70) Thus, international law applies to the dethroned as well as the reigning. The de jure heads of the sovereign dispossessed houses hold all the rightful executive, legislative and judicial rights, whether living in situ or in exile, because they are the legal sovereigns of their nations even though they hold no actual power or control domestically. But they continue to own the legal right of supreme authority over their ancient lands, even though they have been dispossessed of it by rebels or a foreign invader. Holding this supremacy in international law, they are, as discussed, subjects of international law and, therefore, are subject to that law. Any kind of valid and legitimate ". . . sovereignty [is itself] the status of an entity subject to international law." (Marek St. Korowicz, Introduction to International Law: Present Conceptions of International Law, 1959, p. 65) This includes the international laws of acquisition and loss, such as, non-belligerent occupation, non-violent conquest, abandonment and international prescription as well as the domestic laws governed by private international law; such as, proprietary estoppel, adverse possession, the highest entitlement on earth created by abandonment. All of which can transfer sovereignty from one entity or person to another. Each one of these laws gave us all the rights and privileges of the principality. (See the three transfer methods detailed on this page and "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality" and "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges")
Here is how it works in a nutshell: if a non-territorial, non-reigning or deposed sovereign legally abandons his or her rights, they are abandoned, forfeited and lost. That is the law. It is final. If no one exists, who holds legitimate secondary rights to the deposed territory, then after an abandonment, the actual reigning government of the land would, by law, automatically become the full and complete owner of all the true de jure or legal rights to that land. However, if another person, family or legal entity held "constructive possession" of these de jure territorial rights, then that person, our family in this case, would hold the second highest right to the sovereign entity. Once the original owner abandons the right, as the Imperial House did in 2002, the family owning the "constructive possession," as our family did, moves from being the second highest right holder to the position of holding the greatest right to it on earth. No one else would have a higher legal ownership entitlement. (See "3rd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth") "Constructive possession," which will be discussed in detail later, is, the key to who the rights would vest in after a legitimate abandonment of de jure sovereignty. (See "Constructive Possession" and "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
Speaking "of sovereignty in exile" that is, deposed sovereignty, Phillip Marshal Brown, (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philip_Marshall_Brown), declared that in international law, "There is no automatic extinction of nations . . . A nation is much more than an outward form of territory and government. . . . [If they maintain their rights, they are] not to be denied the symbols and forms of sovereignty on foreign soil or diplomatic relations with other nations." (Phillip Marshal Brown, "Sovereignty in Exile," American Journal of International Law, vol. 35, 1941, pp. 666-668) He continued: "This sovereignty may be suspended, and in exile, a mere figment even of reality, derided and discouraged, and yet entitled to every respect." In law, they hold "inalienable, immutable" rights -- the right of a genuine non-reigning State in exile. (Ibid.)
It is important to understand that depose states are acknowledged to have international rights in international law and are subject to that law. Note that a dispossessed State still has valid treaty rights over their lost territory:
Prima facie [accepted as correct until proved otherwise], since the dispossessed State typically maintains its claim to title over the annexed territory, its treaties should continue to apply in the territory [according to international law]. The result . . . certain treaties of both the annexing and the dispossessed State could apply with respect to the same territory at the same time, even if acts on the territory are not likely to be attributable to the dispossessed State. (Daniel Costelloe, "Status of the ‘Dispossessed’ State's Treaties in Annexed Territory" in the article: "Treaty Succession in Annexed Territory," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 65, issue 2, April 2016, pp. 343-378)
Treaty rights are a matter of the exclusive right of sovereignty. The fact that a dispossessed kingdom’s or nation's treaties are still held to be valid is because, by law, they maintaining their claim. Therefore, deposed states are sovereign in international law and that same law -- sovereignty law -- applies to both regnant and non-reigning sovereign states.
In other words, deposed sovereign states exist as legal and authentic facts in international law. This is undeniable. They are just as absolute and authentic or just as sure as a recognized reigning or de facto State. Both reigning and non-reigning states are under the rule of law. The law allows for the transfer of such entities either on a private or public international law basis depending on the situation.
Private Individuals can become Royal Sovereigns
It is simply an historical and legal fact that private individuals can become royal sovereigns. That is, "it is plain, all the present royal families in the world came from beginnings that were not of royal blood." (William Hazlitt, The Works of Daniel De Foe: With a Memoir of His Life and Writings, vol. 3, footnote 2, 1843, p. 59) There had to be a beginning and commoners -- regular people -- became kings or sovereign princes.
Most of the states of antiquity, according to legends and traditions, or positive historical information, have been created in no other way [than by commoners or private individuals forming sovereign states].
The states of the Middle Ages had the same origin. The Franks, the Visigoths, the Ostrogoths, the Burgundians, and others were only nomadic people, composed of chiefs who, in the eyes of international law, were only individuals, but who founded states.
The Italian republics of the Middle Ages were only municipalities without international sovereignty, and they have become sovereign states. . . . (Professor Egide Arntz in Sir Travers Twiss, "The Free Navigation of the Congo," Compilation of Reports Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, vol. 6, Charles G. Bennett, ed., 1901, p. 256)
For a modern example of this, on September 1, 1928, the President of Albania, who had practically unlimited powers, became the King of the Albanians, and thus established a royal house that continues to this day. (King Zog of Albania, Richard Cavendish charts the events leading up to King Zog I's coronation on September 1st, 1928; 2017: http://www.historytoday.com/richard-cavendish/king-zog-i-albania)
Two modern statements imply that an individual cannot occupy and obtain sovereignty over a land that has no sovereign authority over it. (William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law, 8th ed., 1924, p. 128 and Lassa Oppeneheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. I, 5th ed., 1958, p. 555) The reason for this is that:
. . . those who discover new territories are almost always navigators, traveling in a public ship, often public officers or individuals commissioned by their governments – agents of the government – and they can not occupy in their own name. (Ob. cit., Professor Egide Arntz, p. 257)
But the idea that a commoner cannot become a king is contradicted by the fact that ". . . all the history of humanity, from the earliest down to modern times, denies it. [That is, private] individuals can become sovereigns, and exercise the rights of sovereigns. . . ." (Ob. cit., Professor Egide Arntz, p. 256) The point is:
. . . Neither practice, nor the literature on international law confirms the absolute value . . . to which individuals acting in their own name did not have legal capacity [or the legal right] to occupy a territory without a master. (Bela Vitànyi, Legal Opinion about the International Status of the Principality of Sealand, 1978, p. 20; 2017: http://www.principality-of-sealand.eu/pdf/e_vitanyi_legal_opinion.doc)
Although this is not too likely to occur in modern times, still history and practice confirms that an individual "in his own name," if he is not a representative of a reigning government, can occupy and obtain all the rights of sovereignty for himself and his posterity afterwards. Hence, it has been rejected in international law ". . . that only states can acquire territorial sovereignty. . . ." (Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 3rd ed., 1977. p. 210) Vattel, one of the founding fathers of international law, explains that a private individual can in truth acquire the supreme right to rule and all the regal privileges pertaining to the high honor. He wrote:
An independent individual . . . may . . . possess [occupy] an independent domain. . . . [and own and create] both the domain and the empire [that is, all the full sovereign entitlements of it as a nation]. . . . [Whoever] would afterwards make himself master of the entire country, could not do it with justice without respecting the rights and independence of this person. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, vol. 2, section 96-97, 1834, as quoted in L. A. Horn, "To Be or Not to Be or Not to Be: The Republic of Minerva: Nation Founding by Individuals," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 12, no. 3,1973, p. 520) (sentence sequence altered)
[If] simple individuals should establish themselves on a deserted island, or on territory unoccupied by another state, they can establish a new state, with all the rights of sovereignty. . . . (Op cit., Professor Egide Arntz, p. 256)
Thus, a private person could by occupying a res nullius (that is, one with no owner) ". . . create a sovereignty of his own and to establish a new State under his rule, after the fashion of King Leopold II of the Belgians in the Congo or of Sir James Brooke in Sarawak." (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 349) "An individual can [also] become sovereign by succeeding another sovereign. . . . [In other words] from a private individual he becomes a sovereign. . . ." (Ob cit., Professor Egide Arntz) Thus, a person ". . . may be a legal [rightful] King [by will or designation] who is not the next rightful heir [genealogically]. . . ." ("An Inquiry into the Nature and Obligation of Legal Rights," A Collection of State Tracts, publish'd during the Reign of King William III, vol. 2, 1705, p. 398)
It is even possible that an individual may remain a subject of the state to which he belongs, and may be the sovereign of another country. The sovereign, therefore, can have a double personality [that is, have dual citizenship]. Thus, Ernest Augustus, and George V, Dukes of Cumberland, were subjects of Queen Victoria and peers of England at the same time Kings of Hanover. In 1787 the sovereign bishop of the principality of Osnabruck, the Duke of York, sat as a peer of England in the House of Lords. (Op.cit., Professor egide Arntz, p. 257)
Legally hundreds of patrimonial territories (sovereign principalities and counties) were bought, sold, mortgaged or transferred on a regular basis in Germany and throughout Europe. This created completely new legal and lawful dynasties, who had no blood connection to the prior ruling families who by sale lost their rights and former honors. This process ennobled commoners who had the financial ability to purchase such distinctions. The rights and titles in the Holy Roman Empire, and most of Europe, went with the purchase of the land, not with the family that sold them, who lost their honors. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred")
This is because:
Princes can cede, concede, or contract away all or any part of their patrimonial power, as every proprietor can give, grant, or make contracts with respect to all or any part of his property. Sovereignty is property of the prince. Such is the patrimonial conception of the State in the fullest sense of those words. (Harold J. Laski, "The Law and the State, " Harvard Law Review, vol. 31, no. 1, 1918, p. 146)
A treaty giving away sovereignty over a territory can be made to a private person or whoever a proprietary prince decides as the following quote makes clear. That is:
The agreements and contracts which the sovereign makes with private individuals, in his character as sovereign and in the name of the [reigning or deposed] State, follow the rule which we have given for public treaties. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, nos. 214-215) (emphasis added)
[A proprietary] Prince may transfer his Right of governing such a Realm on any Person, whom he shall choose; and consequently may appoint any Method of Succession that shall be agreeable to his Judgment or Inclination. (Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book 7, chapter 6, no. 16., Barbeyrac, notes., Basil Kennett, trans., .
A recent event furnishes a powerful support to the theory that rights of sovereignty can be ceded to individuals, namely, the treaty between the Sultans of Bornea and Sulu and Mr. Dent and Baron Overbeck, who is their turn, have ceded their rights to a private British company, the “British North Borneo Company.” This fact [has] . . . been inferentially or explicitly, by several governments, by juris-consultants, and by eminent statesmen whose opinions can be invoked. . . . (Ob cit., Professor Egide Arntz, p. 257)
Patrimonial kingdoms . . . could be sold or given away at the will of their rulers -- like private property. . . . (Anna Stilz, "Why do states have territorial rights," International Theory, vol. 1, no. 2, 2009, p. 189)
International law not only sustains this, but it has happened many times in the history of regal territory that non-royals became sovereign princes or sovereign counts. In fact, it has taken place so many times that it is fairly common knowledge to historians and international lawyers. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred") However, some jurists wanted to change this and only allow States the right to obtain sovereign territories. However, Lassa Oppenheim, noted to be the father of the modern discipline of international law, never said:
That cessions [transfers] to individuals are prohibited by international law or that they are unknown creatures. On the contrary, he specifically mentions cessions to private individuals and acquisitions of sovereignty by them. (Faculty of Law, University of Singapore, Malaya Law Review, vols. 9-10, 1967, p. 317)
What this all means is that ". . . under principles of international law . . . individuals [may] obtain title to such [sovereign] territory. . . ." (United States v. Fullard-Leo, 133.2d 743, 46 (9th Cir. 1943) That is, history shows that this ". . . is not a question of principle, but simply of fact." (Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law, 5th ed., vol. I, 1967, p. 80) It is an established historical and legal verity that private individuals can legally and lawfully buy or occupy an abandoned claim and obtain all the rights and entitlements of that sovereign entity. Occupation is merely one of several international modes mentioned above where a person or a state can acquire full sovereignty. ". . . It is this [kind of transfer among others] which gives the receiver . . . regal [that is, the full kingly and/or princely royal] right [to rule under international law]." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, , vol. 2, John Pawley Bate, trans., chapter 9, no. 19, 1916) Thus, a commoner can become a monarch or head of a de jure or deposed royal house in international law not only in the past, but in the here and now. Again, the ". . . International Code specifically provides . . . that sovereignty may be bought and sold. . . ." (Oscar William Coursey, The Philippines and Filipinos, 1914, p. 101) ". . .The idea of selling sovereignty has been deemed legitimate [and is a right in international law]. . . ." (Steven Press, an assistant professor in history at Stanford University, Sovereignty can be bought and sold like a commodity; 2018: https://aeon.co/ideas/sovereignty-can-be-bought-and-sold-like-a-commodity) For example:
Though it is not often thought of as a commodity, sovereignty resembles one in that it can be bought and sold. . . . [For example] The Louisiana purchase from France in 1803 and the Alaska purchase from Russia in 1867 are the most famous sales of sovereignty, but there are many other deals. In 1819, Spain sold sovereignty over Florida for $3 million; in 1845, $7.5 million of debt relief bought Texas; in 1848, $15 million to Mexico transferred titles to rule California, New Mexico and Utah; in 1854, Arizona came into the US fold for $10 million. The United States purchased jurisdiction over the majority of its land.
Europe and its former imperial possessions have seen some of the most creative deals in this vein, and not just outright sales. Germany leased sovereignty over Qingdao from China starting in 1898, while Britain, Russia and France did the same with various other Chinese territories. Leopold II sold Belgium and France ‘options’ to buy portions of the Congo Free State. And France made its recognition of Haitian independence dependent on debt payment over the course of the 19th century. (Ibid.)
In other words, sovereignty can be transferred to another, which would make that man, woman, or nation own all the sacred rights and privileges that belong to the supreme right to rule -- the highest secular right on earth and with it. And if it were a royal entity, it would provide the grand regal titles that go with it. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred")
The United State Senate considered this important subject and the presenting U.S. Senator declared:
[There is no] principle of international law . . . that one who is a private citizen to-day cannot become a sovereign to-morrow, and be in possession of the plenitude of sovereignty! Such a principle [denying this] does not exist. No author of international law has ever sustained it, and all the history of humanity, from the earliest down to modern times, denies it. Individuals can become sovereigns, and exercise the rights of sovereigns, in two ways:
First. By creating themselves into a state -- that is to say, by establishing themselves upon a territory which belongs to them, and forming themselves into a community with a regular government, and legal organs of public power – in a word, with all the constituent elements of a state. . . .
. . . Most of the states of antiquity, according to legends and traditions, or positive historical information, have been created in no other way.
States, to exist, have no need to be recognized by other states. Those who have founded them are the sovereigns, and therefore have the right to exercise the right of sovereignty in so far as this exercise has not been delegated. . . .
And, if to-day, simple individuals should establish themselves on a desert island, or on territory unoccupied by another state, they can establish a new state, with all the rights of sovereignty. We have seen Texas thus formed.
Second. An individual can become sovereign by succeeding to another sovereign in the exercise of the sovereignty of a state. From a private individual he becomes a sovereign. . . .
Philip, Duke of Anjou, great grandson of Louis XIV, was, from the point of view of international law, a simple individual. After the death of Charles II, by the treaty of Utrecht the states belonging to the Crown of Spain were dismembered, and Philip V was recognized as the King of Spain, and acquired part of the states of the Spanish monarchy. Other examples might be cited. When a prince was elected King of Germany he became a sovereign from a private individual that he was.
Or, again, when a chief of an African tribe, forming a sovereign state, cedes to an individual in full sovereignty a part of his state, does he do other than to call another person to the exercise of rights of sovereignty over one part of his state, erected into a new state! What difference is there between the case of a European prince who is called as sovereign to a state, or part of a state, and that where an African chief calls upon an individual to exercise sovereign powers over part of his state? (Mr. Morgan, "Report 393" of March 26, 1884, United States Senate, Reports of Committees: 48th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 3, 1884, pp. 33-34)
The senator then concluded, after quoting from a number of prominent international jurists and authors, ". . . that independent chiefs of savage tribes can validly cede to a private individual the whole or part of their state, with the sovereign rights which belong to them. . . . (Ibid., p. 36) And again, if the small state is a regal entity, then that right is transferred to the new ruler or owner of the sovereign territory.
For a few brief examples, King Leopold II privately held all the sovereign rights to the Congo, which he later sold to his own country of Belgium in 1908. The British East Indian Company, as a private corporation, privately owned the governing and ruling rights to most of India until it was legally transferred to Great Britain. The Deutshe Kolonialgesellschaft, another private company, held the supreme rights in the Namib Desert over the diamond fields in Africa until willingly and voluntarily turning everything over to the German Empire or their Fatherland. "Over time, [other] private German sovereigns proved unwilling or incapable with regard to governing" in such places ". . . not just in Southwest Africa, but in Cameroon, Togo, New Guinea, and East Africa." (Steven Press, "Sovereignty and Diamonds in Southern Africa, 1908-1920," Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, vol. 28, no. 473, 2018, p. 477) They too conveyed their rights away. There are other examples, but suffice it to say that private individuals or private organizations can hold the supreme right to rule and can transfer all their rights to others as they choose.
Two Modern Examples of Private Citizens becoming Sovereign Monarchs, and that Deposed Sovereignty is governed or subject to International Law
It is the natural law of "prescription," which is an ancient and modern international law, that fully enables deposed sovereignty to preserve the supreme right to rule even though they have no control over their former realm. The subsequent government rules de facto. Nevertheless, the highest right to rule and govern can continue forever for the deposed as long the royal house continues to maintain it. (See "Deposed Sovereignty and Royalty: How to Preserve it and How it may be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm)
The following is an example of a private person becoming a king or sovereign prince and establishing a dynasty. Sir James Brooke, a British subject, achieved a great victory for a reigning Sultan and was ceded full sovereignty of part of his kingdom, (the land of Sarawak), after saving the local sultan’s life in 1942. He thus became the rightful ruler thereof with the title of "Rajah" or king. Later, his heir, Vyner Brooke succeeded him as the king of Sarawak. However, sometime after World War II, he lost all interest in it and ceded or sold the sovereign territory of the Kingdom of Sarawak to the British Empire for a large retirement pension. His actions were objected to by His Royal Highness Anthony Brooke, the Raja Muda, or Crown Prince, whose objection meant that he legally retained all the non-territorial sovereign and royal rights to reign over the kingdom. The legal principle is that:
When a king forfeits his authority [for whatever reason], his heir ought naturally to remain in the same situation, as if the king were remov'd by death; unless by mixing himself in the tyranny, he forfeits it for himself. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Lewis Amherst Selby-Bigge, ed., 1846, p. 565)
In other words, if the heirs to a throne do not acquiesce, consent or gave up without protest to the forced loss of their rights, they would, by law, still hold all the sovereign and royal rights. This principle is true in situations where there is a ceding of the kingdom or principality without the approval and acquiescence of the heir or heirs to the throne. That is:
. . . [No] abdication, renunciation, or surrender [can] be valid [or impact the whole royal household] without the free [will acceptance and] consent of the prince royal and the other princes of his family both in the direct and collateral branches. (George L. Craik & Charles MacFarlane,The Pictorial History of England During the Reign of George the Third, vol. 4, 1864, p. 522)
Hence, the Crown Prince, Anthony Brooke, though now, in effect, a deposed king was still the rightful, but non-reigning king. After years of fighting the British, he finally gave up and renounced his de jure rights in 1951 and thus lost all his regal entitlements and royal prerogatives and rights. Sarawak being fully conveyed, then, became a lawful British Colony. (The Telegraph, Anthony Brooke; 2018: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/8365045/Anthony-Brooke.html)
Renunciations of a deposed monarch such as Sarawak are legally honored, even though they are not a reigning entity, because deposed sovereignty is, by law, the supreme right or highest secular right on earth. International law governs reigning and non-reigning sovereignty when it comes to the loss and the acquisition of rights. The Raha Muda, or Crown Prince, having no heirs, so his binding waiver giving up the right to rule could not be prevented by an heir. The loss became permanent and final.
Gustavus Baron von Overbeck in a cession treaty with the Sultan of Sulu on January 22, 1877 was appointed "Datu Brandara and Rajah [king] of Sandakan." And later "Maharajah" or great king over Sabah (North Borneo). It was to last "forever and until the end of time," [that is to be endless or never ending] and included "all the rights and powers over the lands tributary" to the sultan in the area defined. The baron was made "supreme and independent ruler" with "absolute power over life and death of the inhabitants of the country with all the absolute rights of property . . . together with all other power and rights usually exercised by and belonging to sovereign rulers. . . ." This again demonstrates the fact that a private citizen can become a royal and hold grand office of a monarch. Overbeck was succeed by the British North Borneo Company.
By the above actions, Sulu had sold its sovereignty to North Borneo, and later sold all their rights to rule their land in the Philippines to Spain by treaty and later to the United States. Obviously, it would be an act of fraud to sell something twice, but when large amounts of money is available honesty often ceases to be the major concern.
The Republic of the Philippines had some major concerns about North Borneo becoming part of Malaysia, so they contrived to create a falsehood in international law, by saying that Sulu still held the deposed or de jure right to rule North Borneo. They then had them transfer all those rights (rights they did not possess) to the Republic, so they could contest Malaysia’s entitlements to govern. Everyone signed the deed of transfer of all Sulu’s so-called rights. This was done in the hope of preventing Malaysia’s claim. However, their 1962 scheme amounted to little or nothing, but it did show that the transfer of deposed or non-reigning rights can take place under international law as well as in reigning acquisitions. (Lela Garner Noble, Philippine Policy Toward Sabah with the "The Association of Asian Studies," University of Arizona, Monograph no. 33)
Court Involvement is not Required for any International or Domestic Law to Effect Changes in Sovereignty
In international law, all . . . court involvement is voluntary, so either party can stop the meddling or interference of a court or tribunal simply by refusing to be involved. Hence, the statement is true that "[international . . . ] disputes are subject to no judge [no trial, no court or legal action]. . . . (Stephen P. Kerr, The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law, 2016, p. 129 and Freiiherr von Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum: The translation, Joseph Horace Drake, trans., 1964, p. 188
International courts (barring certain criminal complaints) can only ". . . make binding rulings between states [or participants] that agree, or have previously agreed, to submit to the ruling of the court. . . . The Court only has jurisdiction on the basis of consent." (Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice; 2018: https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/Jurisdiction_of_the_International_Court_of_Justice.html) The point is, neither purchase, cession, occupation, conquest, abandonment, prescription, annexation, adverse possession or proprietary estoppel need court or any other kind of legal involvement to create a conclusive title to either territorial or non-territorial or dispossessed sovereignty. ". . . [Most sovereign] titles rest [were acquired] on an instantaneous act having an immediate effect. . . ." (Yehuda Zvi Blum, Historic Titles in international Law, 1965, p. 335) In other words, the legal system is not involved. The laws are effective without delay in most cases. In fact, very few permanent changes in the supreme right to rule, throughout the ages, have come about by a court or arbitration decree. The laws are automatically and legally binding in and of themselves. This is because loss and acquisition laws operate by "juridical" law -- not judicial or court law. By definition:
A juridical act is any statement or agreement, whether express or implied from conduct, which is intended to have legal effect as such. It may be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral. (Study and Research Groups on European Civil and Private Law, Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, Christian von Bar, Eric Clive, and Hans Schulte-Nölke, eds., 2009, p. 183) (See "Juridical Acts" in "Letters from the Imperial Family")
In international law:
. . . Each [transfer of sovereignty] "mode" affords . . . a factual or juridical process which international law . . . acknowledges to be capable of creating a "title" to -- or basis of – [a transfer of] territorial sovereignty. (Linda J. Pike, Encyclopedia of Disputes Installment, vol. 10, "Territory, Acquisition," 2014, p. 496)
". . . Juridical acts or further legally relevant facts can operate as titles by which territorial sovereignty [the internal right to rule] can be acquired [or] lost. . . ." (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 347) In other words, by juridical means, "Legal rights can expire without the intervention of a court." (Noel Cox, Anglicans/Dynastic Law; 2015: http://en.allexperts.com/q/Anglicans-943/2010/12/Dynastic-Law.htm) Royal status can be created or terminated by an appropriate (non-judicial) juridical act by private or public international law. Binding juridical acts are most often completed outside of court -- contract law being a good example. They are automatically effective when signed or agreed upon. (See also "Automatic Nature of Adverse Possession in English Law" as an example in domestic law)
Question: When are these acquisition laws (cession, conquest, prescription, annexation, conveyance, etc.) completed, made binding, and final; such that, the new ownership of the sovereign right to rule is finally-completely settled and resolved?
Answer: Finality only takes place when all the rules attached to the particular transfer mode are fulfilled. This is what completes the transfer. It is not perfected by the action of a court, nor it is established by the recognition of other nations. It is only after all the rules are fully complied with that the transfer automatically becomes an accomplished fact. However:
If a dispute arises as to the sovereignty over a certain portion of territory, it is customary to examine which of the States claiming sovereignty possesses a title . . . superior to that which the other States might possibly bring forward against it. (Elihu Lauterpacht, Stephen Schwebel, Shabtai Rosenne and Francisco Orrego Vicuña, Legal Opinion on Guatemala’s Territorial Claim to Belize, 2001, p. 30)
In our case, after the legal and final abandonment of the principality, by the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern -- the former absolute owners, we, holding the second highest right to the principality on earth, became the highest right holders -- superior to all others, which makes our case for all practical purposes final and complete especially considering the fact that not just one, but eight international and domestic acquisition modes, each individually and collectively, gave us all the rights. (See "3rd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth") No one has a higher or superior claim than we do.
In summary of all of the above, even if there is a dispute, ". . . There is no requirement [in international law] to refer a dispute to international tribunals or other settlement mechanisms." (Jessup worldwide Competition for International Law, "Bench Memorandum 2010," p. 12) Even on a domestic level:
[Private international law governs] all [private law] actions and transactions [of an international or transnational nature is done either] in a Court of Justice or out of Court [that is, either way -- in or out of court], when [it is] regularly done or executed according to the laws and formalities of a Civilized State, [they] are valid [and binding as such]. . . . (Jan Helenus Ferguson, Manual of International Law: For the Use of Navies, Colonies and Consulates, vol. 1, 1884, p. 146) (emphasis added)
The superior claim triumphs in international law as long as it is maintained. No court or legal involvement is required for an inter vivos transfer to effect a change in ownership of a territory, which is also true of a de jure regal princely right to rule a land on either a reigning or non-reigning level. Neither recognition or nor a court hearing is necessary or determines what is legitimate.
Recognition is Immaterial or Irrelevant to Authentic Sovereignty
Recognition of a claim of sovereignty is nice, but actually unnecessary. Although some highly honored legal scholars have vetted our claim as true, accurate and legally rightful, neither legal involvement or recognition is decisive or essential. (See "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and "Documents") The fact is, ". . . Sovereignty is neither created by recognition nor destroyed by nonrecognition." (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edition, part 3, vol. 17, 1981, p. 312) ". . . Sovereignty is not something that is decided by other countries [lawyers or people]. They can only recognize it or not." (Frank Muyard, Director, Taipei Office, French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC), April 1-2, 2005) ". . . Recognition and questions of acquiescence are strictly irrelevant to title by occupation." (Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 39) In other words, it is not external recognition that counts; it is the possession of a true and valid claim or title that can be conclusively proven such as ours.
New sovereignties, at the head of which are individuals or associations . . . exist of themselves, of their own right and their own strength, without having need of the recognition of other states. (See Kluber, par. 23; Heffer, par. 23, p. 42, and par. 51, p. 104; Bluntschli, par. 28 and 38; and all the authors.) . . . . The want of recognition does not give them [other nations] the right to act as if these sovereignties did not exist. . . . (Professor Egide Arntz in Sir Travers Twiss, "The Free Navigation of the Congo," Compilation of Reports Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, vol. 6, Charles G. Bennett, ed., 1901, p. 256)
If an usurping or de facto government has ages ago unlawfully dethroned the royal house and become a republic, even if it has obtained both de jure and de facto acceptance by a number of other nations, it is important to understand that:
. . . The recognition of a usurper by foreign powers does not destroy the [de jure legal] rights of the legitimate sovereign of the country. Such a recognition is nothing more than saying as the usurper is peaceable master of the country he governs, we may venture to treat him as a neighbour; but this is far from guaranteeing his right to the throne he [the usurping republic] possesses [on a de facto basis]. (General View of the Political State of France, and of the Government of Louis XVIII, 1815, p. 9) (See "Recognition Unessential to being Legitimate and Valid" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
The point is, "No recognition of this fact [the deposed monarchs sovereign rights] by foreign powers . . . is necessary." (Ernest Wolff, "The International Possession of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England," Modern Law Review, December 1943, p. 208) The 3 article of the 1933 Montevideo Convention made it clear that, "The political existence [or reality] of the state [or non-territorial sovereignty] is independent of recognition by the other states." (International Law: Cases and Materials with Australian Perspectives, 2nd ed., 2014, p. 301) And, "Courts agree that sovereignty can exist in the absence of recognition by any state. . . ." (Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law: a Concise Introduction, 1979, p. 120) So it is not necessary. In fact, it is suggested that recognition actually ". . . causes more problems than it solves and therefore must be rejected." (Louis Henkin, International Law: Cases and Materials, 1987, p. 248) Simply stated, ". . . Sovereignty is not something that is decided by other countries. They can only recognize it or not." (Frank Muyard, Director, Taipei Office, French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC), April 1-2, 2005) Other countries do not legally determine anything for other sovereign entities. Samuel Pufendorf, one of the founders of the law of nations, explains that, . . . Just as a king owes his sovereignty and majesty to no one outside his realm, so he need not obtain the consent and the approval of other kings or states, before he may carry himself like a king and be regarded as such. . . . [I]t would be an injury to the sovereignty of such a king to be called into question by a foreigner. (Samuel Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and of Nations, Book 7, chapter 3, no. 690) (See "Recognition Unessential to being Legitimate and Valid" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
In 1933, Declarative theory has been acknowledged as an international law. It states that the existence of the sovereign right to rule is independent of recognition by others. In other words, "The [Montevideo] Convention codifies [that is, establishes] the declarative theory of statehood as accepted as part of customary international law." (Encyclopedia Westarctica, Montevideo Convention; 2018: http://www.westarctica.wiki/index.php/Montevideo_Convention) Since this time, ". . . The declaratory approach has remained predominant in mainstrean theorizing on recognition throughout the post-1945 period." (From a selection of widely used textbooks in English, French, and Russian, see A. Cassese, International Law, 2nd ed., 2005 pp. 73-74; P. Daillier and A. Pellet, Droit International Public Law, 7th ed., 2002, pp. 556–557; V. P. Panov, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo, 2009, p. 113) It is not recognition that is most important in the final analysis. (See "Recognition Unessential to being Legitimate and Valid" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and "Again, Recognition is Unessential to being Totally and Completely Legitimate and Valid" and "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges")
Sovereignty is the ultimate legal power and authority of each individual nation or sovereign entity whether reigning or deposed. No other person, group, tribe or state can tell a sovereign entity what to do with its rights and prerogatives or if it holds such or not. "No recognition of this fact [the possession of valid sovereignty] by foreign powers in general and by the power in the territory of which the exiled government [or monarchy] has found asylum in particular is necessary." (Ernest Wolff, “The International Possession of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England,” Modern Law Review, December 1943, p. 208) Once sovereignty is obtained, as in our case, the title is supreme or literally the highest on earth -- above all others for the territory it represents. One simply ". . . cannot be deprived of it by another nation." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 18, no. 207) Only, by one of the lawful methods of international or valid domestic acquisition or loss, can a regnant or depose sovereignty entity be forfeited. We hold this great authority legally and lawfully. It is a family treasure, which we hold as precious and will do all that is necessary to keep and maintain it. (See chapter 2 of volume 2 of Dr. Kerr’s book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://the-entitlement-to-rule.com, "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and the article "Deposed Sovereignty and Royalty: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm)
The Following is the Conclusion to Important Basics:
Sovereign Rights can be Transferred through either International or Domestic Law
Besides the usual modes of acquisition and loss of sovereignty in international law, "A few novel methods have emerged." (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective: State Territory, 1970, p. 297) This would include three domestic ones governed by private international law as well as public international modes. ". . . It is this [kind of legal transfer] which gives the receiver . . . regal [kingly and/or princely] right." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, , vol. 2, John Pawley Bate, trans., chapter 9, no. 19, 1916)
Some [transfers of sovereignty] bore a highly public character and could be considered genuine treaties under international law, whereas other [transfers or conveyances] had more of the characteristics of private law contracts [under private law]. . . . (Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, The Acquisition of Africa (1870-1914): the Nature of Nineteenth-Century International Law; 2019: http://www.mpil.de/en/pub/research/areas/public-international-law/aquisition-of-africa.cfm)
Private law mechanisms through private international law can transfer sovereignty that is privately held; such as, by a deposed sovereign house. In addition to private law transfers, international law allows for the sale or transfer of sovereign rights. That is:
In accordance with . . . State territory being the patrimonium of the head of the State, it was not uncommon to sell the territory of one State to another, to transfer it as a marriage gift, or to dispose of it in the will of the reigning monarch. (Yehuda Z. Blum, Historical Titles in International Law, 1965, p. 1) (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred")
The entire claim rests on legal verities, legal facts and certainties. In other words, the law is the law. It is just the way it is. It is black and white, but unknown to those who have not studied the subject. (See "Public and Private Law as it relates to the Transfer of the Principality of Halberstadt" in "The Public and Non-Public Use of Titles in International Law" )
2nd Transfer of Rights 2002: Abandonment and Occupation
Textbooks commonly list four or five modes of acquisition of territory: occupation . . . prescription, cession and accretion (and sometimes conquest). (Martin Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, 2005, p. 283) (emphasis added) Yet there are others, for example:
[Sovereign] territories were transferred back and forth and thus boundaries were [quite fluid] drawn and redrawn as a result of war, conquest, treaties, dynastic marriage, purchase and other transactions. . . . (Robert H. Jackson, "Boundaries and International Society," International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, Barbara Allen Roberson, ed., 1998, p. 161) (emphasis added)
A whole kingdom or principality may be obtained by one ". . . who has purchased it, or received it in exchange, or acquired it by any title whatever." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book III, chapter 13, no. 198) (emphasis added) Occupation is one of these along with "other transactions." In fact, a sovereign entity can be "acquired . . . by any [legal] title whatever," which, in our case came legally through private international law, adverse possession law and abandonment. In this section, it will be made obvious that non-belligerent occupation and abandonment also transferred all the rights, honors, and privileges of Halberstadt.
Just as international law applies to both deposed and reigning sovereignty in terms of the buying and selling of sovereignty, the ceding of deposed or regnant sovereign territories, and the fact that the law of prescription governs both reigning and non-reigning sovereign entities, so to does abandonment and occupation apply to both. The point is, on a legally level, there is little difference between de jure (non-reigning or deposed sovereignty) and de facto (regnant or reigning sovereignty) in international law. Each holds the rights to all four major qualities and powers:
1. Ius Imperrii is the right to command and legislate,
2. Ius Gladii is the right to enforce ones commands,
3. Ius Majestatis is the right to be honored, respected and protected as a sovereign person or monarch,
The only difference is that some of those qualities are active and some are inactive depending on the situation. That is, part of the above rights are inoperative and part are fully functional and useable, but both the illegally deposed and the regnant and reigning monarchs possess all four sovereign qualities as the right.
The international law of occupation applies to any legal territory de jure or de facto in international law as long as it is either vacant (terra nulius) or abandoned (res nullius -- without an owner). It does not matter if the territory in question is in a de jure or de facto state of being. Both are equally legal under the law of nations. All of this is explained in the following:
Briefly, "de jure [or illegally deposed] sovereignty is the legal [or rightful] sovereignty [of any nation] and it has its foundation in law." (A. C. Kapur, Principles of Political Science, 1997, p. 197) Law is its center or core. It is the heart and soul of it. That is, sovereignty, whether reigning or non-reigning, is based and founded on law and depends on the natural and international law of prescription for its legal existence and survival. International law applies to deposed sovereignty just as much as it does for reigning sovereignty. This is because a dispossessed claim in international law can ". . . create an underlying entitlement to territory, regardless of whether a state has actual [reigning] or constructive [deposed] possession of the land at the time of the claim." (Brian Taylor Sumner, "Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice," Duke Law Journal, vol. 53, 2004, p. 1789; 2017: http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=dlj) That is, and this is important, the acquisition laws of sales, prescription, occupation, etc. apply to both reigning and non-reigning sovereignty or to both corporeal and constructive territorial land. In other words, occupation can, in reality, transfer an abandoned principality, which happened in our case.
For occupation to work, the de jure abandoned land rights of a deposed principality must be res nullius (which means it is without an owner). ". . . Res nullius [in international law represents] things that are open to [sovereign] occupation. . . ." (Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500-2000, 2014, p. 270) In other words, "Res nullius . . . refers to the principle by which a nation may assert [sovereign] control of an unclaimed [or abandoned] territory." (U. S. Legal, Res nullius Law and Legal Definition; 2017: https://definitions.uslegal.com/r/res-nullius)
RES NULLIUS [means] a thing which has no owner. A thing which has been abandoned by its owner is as much res nullius as if it had never belonged to any one. The first possessor of such a thing becomes the owner, res nullius fit primi occupantis. (The Free Dictionary by Farlex, Res Nullius; 2017: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Res+nullius)
The property of "no one" naturally becomes that of the first occupant, which is the natural law foundation for the law of occupation.
Occupation is the act of appropriation of territory [taking it over] which [actual land or the de jure deposed territory that is intact under international law] is not at the time under the sovereignty of another state. Two conditions or requirements must be met for a country to acquire sovereignty by occupation. The territory in question must be res nullius, that is, must belong to no one [which took place when the principality was officially abandoned]; [and two] the occupation must also be "effective." (Ob cit., Daniel K. Gibran, p. 32)
In other words:
In a territory [or a deposed legal land entity that is intact or has legal standing under international law], where there is no sovereign [sovereignty was officially abandoned by the Imperial House] then a territory can be occupied [possessed or taken over] by exercising power. However there must be [an] absence of [a] proper sovereign [which is true in our case because of the abdication of all rights by the former owner]. (Acquisition of Territory: International law, Law Note; 2017: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qR6KZa3wG20)
Note that the kind of transfer of entitlements we are discussing -- that of abandoned territory and the acquiring of sovereignty by occupation is not "belligerent or military occupation" where de jure sovereignty belongs to someone else. The criteria for legal abandonment and the kind of occupation we are describing in international law is as follows:
Dereliction [or abandonment in international law] as a mode of losing territory corresponds to occupation as a mode of acquiring it.
Dereliction frees a territory from the sovereignty of the present owner-State. It is effected through the owner-State completely abandoning territory with the intention of withdrawing from it forever, thus relinquishing sovereignty over it.
Just as occupation requires, first, the actual taking into possession (corpus) of territory [or a deposed intact legal land entity under international law], and, secondly, the intention (animus) of acquiring sovereignty over it, so dereliction [abandonment] requires, first, actual abandonment of a territory, and, secondly, the intention of giving up sovereignty over it. (Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1, Ronald Roxburgh, ed., 2005, p. 405)
Additionally, ". . . The mere passage of time has no place in [occupation law]." (Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 23) That is, "If a State effectively occupies a territory which is res nullius [no sovereign exists over it], it acquires an immediate title opposable to the whole world." (Robert Yewdall Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 38) That is, once completed, occupation is final. It must merely be maintained and preserved. It provides legal and rightful sovereignty, the highest of all secular rights, capable of being defended against any other on earth.
". . . From that moment [the moment of actually] taking of possession [of the rights, it] must be considered as accomplished [or final], and the occupation is thereby completed. . . ." (Revue générale de Droit international public, 1968, p. 1063) Unlike international prescriptive law, which generally takes 50-100 years to obtain the de jure or legal sovereign right to rule, title or ownership is obtained immediately and without delay upon possession where there is an official abandonment, or no one holds the right to rule over the land. Sovereignty, thus gained, is legally maintained and perpetuated by the ongoing and continued control and possession of the claim.
The Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern officially abandoned the principality in 2002 by letters through their attorneys or official representatives, and expressed the intention of having nothing to do with any potential legal actions concerning it in the future. As it turned out, they fulfilled their word in that they did not get involved and made no protest about the loss of their former international land right. In addition, their letters qualified as juridical acts, which activated the laws of laches and estoppel preventing a retraction, repudiation or denial. As a capstone, the official letters were legally competent as treaties. (See "Juridical Acts," "Treaty Law" and "Abandonment" in "Letters from the Imperial Family") As a result, the abandonment of the rights to the principality were conclusive and final. And a transfer of sovereignty took place, as a result of this, because:
Occupation, according to modern law, is after all, the acquisition of territorial sovereignty rather than [merely] the appropriation of property [land] or soil." (Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, 1997, pp. 97-98)
In other words:
When a nation takes possession of a country to which no prior owner can lay claim [because of abandonment or no inhabitants dwell there], it is considered as acquiring the empire or sovereignty over it at the same time with the dominion. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 18, no. 205)
". . . Effective occupation is a time-honoured mode of establishing exclusive title [or the right to rule a] territory." (Surya P. Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law, 1997, p. 63) However, the meaning of "effective occupation" has changed. ". . . The old theory (demanding actual settlement and use of territory) has been decisively rejected by arbitral and judicial decisions of the present [that is the 20th] century." (Ibid., p. 65) (emphasis added) That is:
The emphasis has shifted from the taking of physical possession of the land and the exclusion of others to the manifestation and exercise of functions of government over the territory. (Sir Humphrey Waldock, The Law of Nations, 1967, p. 317)
What is needed and necessary for occupation to be legally valid and have legal standing is that "’. . . state activity, and especially acts of administration [must exist],’ noting that occupation does not necessarily signify actual settlement." (Donald Rothwell, The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law, 1996, p. 60) That is, like adverse possession, "[factual or constructive occupation] may be satisfactorily established in the absence of habitation [actual possession] of any sort." (James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., 2012, p. 138 and Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts, International Law, 9th ed., 2008, p. 688) In other words, ". . . very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights [is necessary]. . . ." (Quoting from the Eastern Greenland Case in the Permanent Court of International Justice from the book Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 2nd ed., 2013, p. 163) This is because occupation is flexible and varies according to the circumstances of the individual situation.
The definition of effective control remains necessarily variable [flexible depending on the circumstances according to] the nature of the territory [in our case, a deposed sovereign territory still legally intact -- all of this] affects the [type and] degree of sovereign activity needed [or required by law]. . . . (Andrew F. Burghardt, "The Basis of Territorial Claims," Geographical Review, vol. 63, no. 2, 1973, p. 228)
Nevertheless, ". . . taking of possession is a necessary condition of occupation. This taking of possession consists in the act, or series of acts . . . to exercise exclusive authority there." ("Arbitral Award on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the Sovereignty over Clipperton Island," American Journal of International Law, vol. 26, no. 2, April 1932, pp. 393-394) The minimum requirement is an ". . . intention to occupy coupled with some display of authority, which should be continuous and uncontested. . . ." (Ob cit., Surya P. Sharma, p. 66) The fact of our "intention" and our "continuous and uncontested" factual possession over the years can be readily seen in the section on "Adverse Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges." The last requirement is a "display of authority [or acts of sovereignty]." However, this obligation or requirement is unique to each case. That is, "much depends on the facts of each case." (D. P. O'Connell, International Law, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1970, p. 420) For example:
In many cases international jurisprudence has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other State could not make out a superior claim. (Minquiers and Ecrehos islands (France/United Kingdom), ICJ 1953, p. 46) (emphasis added)
When abandonment is involved, there is no superior or better claim involved. That is, "in the case of abandonment, there is no usurpation [no theft, no robbery] of sovereignty [or property rights] since there are no contemporaneous [or competing] claims." (James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., 2008, p. 230) There is only one claim -- the occupier's or possessor's legal right to rule. In such a situation, again, there is "very little" required as far as showing an "exercise of sovereign rights," because again there is only one claimant left.
Normally, "Two persons cannot have . . . possession of the same thing at the same time; such possession of one excludes the possession of another." (John Adams,The Doctrine of Equity: Being a Commentary on the Law as Administered by the Court of Chancery, 1850, p. 104) However, in English adverse possession, before the statute of limitations expired, the adverse claimant holds the second highest right on earth to its ownership except for the paper owner, who has the superior title. Thus two can legally hold "constructive possession" of the same territorial right at the same time.
In the case of unregistered land the adverse possessor is regarded as having an estate in fee simple from the moment when he first takes possession (Leach v Jay (1878) 9 ChD 42 at p.45) although until the limitation period has been completed, his title is always liable to be defeated by the owner. Thus even before the period is completed, the squatter has the right and powers of an owner, against everyone except the person he has disposed. (InBrief, Acquisition of an Estate by Adverse Possession; 2019: https://www.inbrief.co.uk/land-law/estate-acquisition-by-adverse-possession)
"[When] two States have concurrent legal claims to the same region, the superior claim will be the one recognized as legitimate." (Boston College International and Comparative Law Journal, vol. 2, no. 1, 1978, p. 118) After the abdication and abandonment in 2002, only one "constructive possession" continued – ours. At that time, we became the only legal and lawful claimants on earth -- holding the highest right and entitlement. This transferred full sovereign and royal rights and the full de jure ownership of the territory by the laws of non-belligerent, non-military occupation. (See "3rd Legal Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth")
The point is, in international law in regard to occupation in particular, the law declares that:
All mankind have an equal right to things that have not yet fallen into possession of any one [particular person or nation or are factually abandoned]; and those things belong to [or are owned by] the person who first takes possession of them. When therefore a nation [or person] finds a country uninhabited [or abandoned] and without a master [such as a ruling king or sovereign prince], [he] may lawfully take possession of it. . . . (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 18, no. 207)
In other words, it ". . . is a natural right . . ." -- rightful and true to what is wholesome and fair for all. It is a law common to all people. The legal Maxim is ". . . res derelicta primi capientis (that which is abandoned belongs to the first who takes possession thereof)." (José Luis Mendoza, Britain and Her Treaties on Belize (British Honduras): Guatemala Has the Right to Reinstate the Entire Territory of Belize, 1959, p. 83) ". . . Taking possession of property which has no owner . . . [as it was abandoned, creates a situation where] . . . any individual has an equal right to anything that has not fallen in the possession of another." (Jan Helenus Ferguson, Manual of International Law for the Use of Navies, Colonies and Consulates, vol. 1, 1884, p. 99) This is a just and true principle. The power of non-belligerent occupation, in international law, creates or transfers the supreme or regal right to rule. It is the law -- one of a number of ways sovereignty is transferred. And once completed ". . . it cannot be [rightfully] deprived . . . by another." (Ob.cit., Vattel) If properly maintained, it is a permanent possession.
However, the important legal status of "constructive possession" absolutely must be obtained in order to transfer a deposed or dispossessed sovereign entity, which is to be elaborated below.
By Law, Adverse Possession can create or establish Constructive Possession
In England, if I take possession of someone's unregistered land, I have, by law, a legal estate in that land and my estate is fee simple -- the highest level of ownership. As such, it can create constructive possession if the adverse possessor leases the property and becomes a landlord, where the tenant holds actual possession and the adverse claimant holds constructive possession. Adverse possession establishes a level of ownership is so strong that only a person with a better title or right to the land could take legal action and take it away. In other words, "Possession is good against all [in the world] but the true owners." (Mellor J in Asher v Whitlock (1865) I LR QB and Elizabeth Cooke, The New Law of Land Registration, chapter 7 2003, first page) Adverse possession of this kind creates a legal situation often entitled "constructive possession."
In domestic law, "A person who exercises dominion or control over property not in his or her physical possession is said to have that property in his or her 'constructive possession.'" (Physical and Constructive Possession; 2017: https://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Possession_Physical_Constructive.pdf) This is called "possession in law." It is not physical possession by law, but it is the equivalent or legally has the same status as physical possession. "Constructive occupation and constructive possession are generally recognized in the legal systems of civilized nations [all over the world]." (United States Congress, House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, 1976, p. 206) Constructive possession can be over "chattels or real property" which means over things or actual land, including on an international land right level. (Property Law (Adverse Possession; 2018: https://quizlet.com/5341690/property-law-adverse-possession-flash-cards)
It is important to understand that, ". . . one cannot be in 'constructive possession' and another in 'actual possession' of the same piece of land at the same time. . . .” (Judicial and Statutory Definitions of Words and Phrases, vol. 1, "Constructive Possession," 1914, p. 936) Either one or the other has it. This is important because generally worldwide, in all adverse possession cases, it must be either "actual or constructive possession of the land for the statutory period" to work and actually transfer the property. (William E. Burby, Handbook of the Law of Real Property, 2nd ed., 1954, section 220) The absent rightful owner holds ". . . constructive possession [of his own land] until an actual adverse possession commences. . . ." (Reports of Cases adjudicated in the Superior Courts of Law and Equity of the State of North Carolina, 2nd ed, 1832, p. 16) If the owner lives on his land, he has actual possession. The way an adverse possessor holds constructive possession is through a landlord/tenant relationship. However, merely the ". . . right to possess is described as a form of constructive possession." (Unit 10: Types of Property, p. 23; 2018: http://studyres.com/doc/8966625/types-of-property)
"If the [constructive] claimant’s period of adverse possession is [legally] interrupted [or ended], constructive possession is [in this case] restored to the owner." (Mullis, 237 S. C. at 496 118 S. E. 2d at 65) (Do I as Homeowner Qualify for "Adverse Possession?," 2018: http://poaplantationestates.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Law-of-Adverse-Possession-.pdf) In other words, a terminated adverse landlord possession before it matures into ownership means constructive possession would return to the original owner. On the other hand, if adverse landlord possession ripens into ownership, possession of the territory becomes the permanent right of the claimant. Constructive possession -- legal possession, without actual possession, is an important legal reality needed for most, if not all, the acquisition modes described in this case -- all six of them. Hence, all the methods of transfer have this in common. In many countries and states:
Without actual possession . . . , there can be no constructive possession . . . . [Except] one having a . . . color of title under a deed [such as we had and that] . . . [creates constructive possession, nevertheless this kind of possession still] makes an inferior title. (Tennis Coal Company v. Backett, 172 Ky. 729; 190 S.W. 130 , Annotated Cases: American and English, William M. McKinney and H. Noyes Greene, eds., 1917, p. 630)
The idea of an inferior title needs to be explained. Although the owner no longer holds constructive possession, as the adverse (landlord or color of title) possessor legal holds this legal right, even without actual possession, still, and this is important, the owner holds a higher right to the territory. The adverse possessor, as the legal constructive possessor, holds the second best right, not the greater right. This lawful situation lasts until the owner either take legal action and terminates the adverse possession, abandons his right (which for us took place in 2002) or the statute of limitations runs out and the owner's right is legally terminated (which for us took place in 2013). In other words, because of an abandonment or the limitations period matures 12 years later, the adverse possessor then at this point holds the highest right and entitlement on earth to the land or territory and all the rights and distinctions that go with it. (See "3rd Legal Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth")
The transfer of all rights provides exclusive ownership which is good against the whole earth. No one holds a higher or greater right on earth to the claim. It is so powerful that, ". . . constructive possession is [greater or] superior to that which results merely from the ownership of the legal titles. . . . [Hence the adverse possessor legally holds ownership before the limitations period completes]. (Lawyer’s Report Annotated, book 69, 1915, p. 742) (emphasis added) That is, "Legal [or constructive] possession [of this kind] . . . is such possession which is recognised by law and enforceable in rem, that is, against the world at large." (Unit 10: Types of Property, p. 23; 2018: http://studyres.com/doc/8966625/types-of-property) Good against all the world means that one's rights are exclusive and enforceable above all others.
In England, and many other countries, this important legal right takes place immediately when the benchmarks of adverse landlord possession law are satisfied. Either actual or constructive possession is necessary. In our case, it was constructive possession, which is legally equal to or greater or superior to actual possession. (See "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") Constructive possession, one way or another, is critical to all six transfer modes. The fact that adverse possession actually took place in 2001 and an abandonment took place in 2002, then the keys was turned for all six transfer modes to established that we held all the rights, all the privileges and all the distinctions of an important little sovereignty entity.
Constructive Possession is Created by a Sovereign (Landlord)/Tenant Relationship
By way of review and explanation:
(2) A defective legal Deed of Transfer is one of the ways in which adverse possession law is automatically activated. (See both "Adverse Possession cures defects in Conveyances" and
A person has constructive possession (or possession in law) (1) when some one representing him has actual possession. . . . Thus, if A, the owner of the land, leases it to B., A. has constructive possession by B., and if A. dies interstate, leaving C. his heir, C. is immediately in constructive possession of the land by B., although he has never had actual possession. (Stewart Rapalje and Robert Linn Lawrence, A Dictionary of American and English Law, vol. 2, "Constructive, or in Law," 1883, p. 980)
As a general principle of law, "[a landlord] continues to retain the legal [and rightful] possession although actual possession, user and control of that property is with the tenant. . . ." (Tarun Jain, Law-in-Perspective, 2010; 2017: http://legalperspectives.blogspot.com/2010/03/landlord-can-seek-possession-on-behalf.html) In fact, "Constructive occupation and constructive possession are generally recognized in the legal systems of [practically all] civilized nations." (United States Congress: House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, 1976, p. 206) That is, it is a well-known general concept that:
That is, ". . . The possession of the tenant shall be deemed the possession of the landlord. . . ." ("Adverse Possession," The American and English Encyclopedia of Law and Practice, William Mark McKinney and David Shephard Garland, eds., vol. 2, 1909, p. 473) This is because, ". . . in the eye of the law though they [the landlords] were not in actual possession, they had constructive possession through their tenants.” (Evidence, 1940, p. 17; 2017: https://books.google.com/books?id=gN0kAQAAMAAJ) (emphasis added) Constructive possession is accomplished or created through the principle of tenants holding possession for and in behalf of the landlord, who may be a deposed or reigning monarch or their lawful heirs or legitimate successors.
Since a deposed proprietary monarchy, such as Halberstadt, constructively occupies their territories factually and legally through the tenants or the people of the land, such a monarchy ". . . has no need to be in physical possession of the land . . . [because his] tenant[s] . . . [legally] possess [or occupy] the land on his behalf." (The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Report: Adverse Possession, October 2014, p. 11; 2017: http://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/radversepossession_e.pdf and Wong Kar Sue & Ors v Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd & Anor  2 HKC 600) And an illegally deposed sovereign who has maintained his or her sovereign rights is still legally in international law the lord of the land of the de jure or former territory.
The deposed Kingdom of Prussia and the Principality of Halberstadt are proprietary entities in international law. As such, the head of the royal house and his lawful successors own all the land or whole territory of their kingdom or principality. As such, the people are still his tenants giving the king or sovereign prince constructive possession in international law of the all the land both public and private. This situation is also true today in England even though this is a reigning country. That is, "To put the matter in terms of modern constitutional law, the position of the Crown as ultimate overlord is . . . a matter of public law. . . ." (Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land, 2006, p. 38) In other words, it is still legally true that ". . . the king is sovereign lord, or lord paramount, either mediate or immediate, of all and every parcel of land within the realm." (Ibid.) However, ". . . the practical consequences of tenure for land owners have been abrogated [by statute]." (Ibid., p. 39) Nevertheless, "English [constitutional] law does not recognise any form of land ownership, except tenure mediately or immediately of the Crown." (Ibid.) Hence, whoever is the lawful ruler of England is the rightful landlord of the kingdom and the people are legally tenants. This means the royal house and parliament hold "constructive possession" over both public and private owned lands in the whole nation.
". . . Dominium eminens means the absolute property [right], by an exercise of which a nation can at any time displace the individual right. . . . Dominium eminens is vested in the sovereign power alone, in the Government; and it is that sovereign right of property which . . . embraces the full property right in the territory over which it extends." (James C. Carter, Proceedings of the Tribunal of Arbitration convened at Paris between the United States and Great Britain, 1892, United States Congressional Serial Set, vol. 12, issue 3166, 1895, p. 100) That is, a proprietary sovereign holds ownership and the people are his lawful tenants as he has the "full property right."
In other words, ". . . In kingdoms [or principalities], though the people may own private property, they live on the Land and hold their property as tenants on the Land subject to the King/Sovereign/Feudal Lord." (Team Law, Sovereignty 101: 2015: http://teamlaw.net/Sovereignty.htm) Thus, "The monarch was lord, ultimately, of all the tenants in the realm, and, therefore, was supreme landlord over all lands occupied. . . ." (Ken MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession in the English New World, 2006, p. 31) ". . . Ownership resided in the sovereign [the proprietary] monarch [reigning or nonreigning]. . . . All private owners [all subjects who own land] are therefore either its [the monarchy's] tenants or sub-tenants." (Lai Oshitokumbo Oshisanya, An Almanac of Contemporary and Comparative Judicial Restatements: Annotated with Treatises, Treaties, Statutes Rules and Commentaries, 2016, p. 611) This is true in England even now, ". . . English land law still retains its original basis, that all land in England is owned by the Crown. [Those who hold fee simple absolute property are mere] tenants either directly or indirectly from the Crown." (R. E. Megarry and H. W. Wade, The Law of Real Property, 5th ed., 1984, p. 12)
The following demonstrates how sovereign constructive rights and the landlord/tenant relationship are perpetuated and continued for a deposed monarchy:
Upon the fall, dispossession, or usurpation of a monarchy, the de jure legal rights to the succession of that monarchy may be kept alive indefinitely through the legal vehicle of making diplomatic protests against the usurpation. (See "Dynastic Law" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id70.htm from Emerich Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 145-146)
"Such de jure [or contructive] possession of sovereignty legally continues so long as the de jure ruler or government does not surrender his sovereignty to the usurper." (Stephen P. Kerr, Dynastic Law; 2017: http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id70.htm from the teachings of Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis Juris Gentium, Chapter 10, Nos. 9-11) In other words, deposed royal houses can keep their rights continually alive in an unending manner by a certain special type of continual protest, "With sovereigns it is usual to retain the title and arms of a sovereignty or a province, as an evidence that they do not relinquish their claims to it." (Op cit., Vattel, no. 145)
. . . International law states that the heads of the Houses of sovereign descent . . . retain forever the exercise of the powers attaching to them, absolutely irrespective of any territorial possession. They are protected [by law] by the continued use of their rights and titles of nobility. . . . (Monarchist World Magazine # 2, August 1955)
Using one's title and arms in international law outwardly and publicly proves that the legal claim is still legally valid. That is, it is a perpetual sovereign claim that can last forever as long as it is legally continued and perpetuated. This must be done properly in full accord with sovereignty law as it applies to the deposed. Otherwise, there is a forfeiture or loss that cannot be reconstituted. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership") But as long as one maintains these rights, constructive possession and sovereignty is preserved. For:
There is no distinction between constructive possession . . . and actual possession. [Constructive possession does] not [have actual] physical possession, [but has] the right -- [the full entitlement of physical possession]. . . ." (The Law Reports. Queen's Bench Division, vol. 2, 1971, p. 481) (emphasis added)
It is a legal fact that, in the law of nations, monarchs still hold legal sovereignty, de jure ownership and thus have constructive possession. "Constructive possession" or "possession by law" is just as legally binding as actual possession. So much so, that "actual possession includes [both] actual and constructive occupation." ("Byrne v. Earl of Meath," The Irish Law Times and Solicitor’s Journal, vol. 42, 1908, p. 45) It is legally, as though the head and chief of the deposed royal house, is in actual possession, not merely by legal occupation. In other words:
. . . The right to possess, though distinct from possession, is treated as equivalent to possession itself. . . . [Legally there are only] somewhat minute distinctions arising from this extension of the rights of a possessor to one who is not an actual possessor. . . . (Frederick Pollock, An Essay on Possession in Common Law, 1888, p. 13)
In other words, ". . . a constructive possession is equivalent to an actual one." (John Louis Taylor, North Carolina Reports, vol. 4, Walter Clark, ed., 1921, p. 284)
. . . There are such things as . . . constructive occupation [which means legal occupation -- a lawful abstraction -- or an intangible possession in law without actual occupation of the territory]. Those are allowed by all the international law-writers. . . . Constructive limits [intangible legal boundaries] are just as real limits as the [actual] fenced limits of a colony [or a regnant and reigning nation]." (Arbitration between the Governments of Her Britannic Majesty and the United States of Venezuela, vol. 11, 1899, p. 3215)
The only possession required [for occupation] is such as is reasonable under all the circumstances [what is reasonable for deposed sovereign ownership is different than reigning occupation, that is, what is reasonable] in view of the extent of territory claimed, its nature [for example being deposed sovereignty instead of reigning sovereignty], and the uses to which it is adapted and is put [which are different but just as valid and binding]. . . . (Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, vol. 1, footnote 1, 1922, p. 169) (emphasis added)
This kind of constructive occupation is different, but "at law, a person with constructive possession stands in the same legal position as a person with actual possession." (Humphrey Humberto Pachecker, NAFA's Blue Book: Legal Terminology, Commentaries, Tables and Useful Legal Information, 2010, p. 59) Constructive possession is "possession in law," not possession in actual fact. However, it ". . . is treated as equivalent to possession itself. . . ," which is legally true for deposed monarchs in international law. (Michael D. Bools, The Bill of Lading: A Document of Title to Goods : an Anglo-American Comparison, 1997, p. 180) In other words, both situations are binding and legally equal or equivalent.
The point is, non-territorial sovereignty or possession is just as valid, authentic and genuine as any other type of occupation or possession on an international level. It is basically that a deposed proprietary sovereign house, holding legal, non-territorial sovereignty, lawfully owns, in international law, all the land, even though in domestic law, it owns nothing or is unrecognized. As such, legally, according to the law of nations, all citizens are still lawfully tenants of the deposed or non-reigning royal house as they live on the rightful and de jure corporeal territory on the non-territorial sovereign's legally rightful land. (See "De Jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") In other words, the deposed proprietary monarch is legally still in constructive possession or legal occupation of his former lands as a sovereign by this legal means. Because ". . . Juridical [or constructive] possession [is] a possession through the occupancy of others. . . ," such as through a de jure landlord -- a monarch/tenant relationship, as in our case and the case of many other dispossessed royal houses. (The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia, vol. 6, 1903, p. 4367)
Our case stands on solid ground by the legal constructs that pertain to deposed sovereignty -- that constructive or legal possession through tenants is a universal, worldwide, legal fact. The sub-section "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" explains this important concept in greater detail.
De jure Sovereignty and Occupation
Constructive possession operates in both international and domestic law. It is exemplified or obvious in the legal concept of uti possidetis among other areas pertaining to the right to govern and rule. For example:
In the Colombia-Venezuela Arbitral award, the Federal Council of Switzerland observed that the principle of uti possidetis meant that although territories were not occupied in fact, they were deemed to be occupied in law by the new states at the very moment of independence. By [the legal principle of] constructive possession [all the lands of the old colonies became the new territory even though they were not in actual possession], in the words of the Federal Council, "no territory of old Spanish America was without an owner" and the principle of uti possidetis served to "put an end to the designs of the colonizing states of Europe against lands which otherwise they could have sought to proclaim [such] as res nullius [that is, without an owner and available for occupation]. (Colombia-Venezuela Arbitral Award, Reports of International Arbital Awards, vol. 1, 1922, pp. 223-305)
"In effect the principle of uti possidetis declared that no territory in [any of the] former [colonies] was without an owner and thus no territory was open to further European colonisation on the basis of territory being terra nullius." (Peter Radan, "The Borders of a Future Independent Quebec does the Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Apply?," Australian International Law Journal, 1997, p. 205) "Uti possidetis is based on constructive possession. . . ." (International Court of Justice, Lybia vs. Chad, International Law Reports, vol. 100, E. Lauterpacht, C. J. Greenwood and A. G. Oppenheimer, eds., 1995, p. 82) That is, legal or constructive possession, which is legally the same as actual corporeal possession, operates in cases of uti possidetis. It obviously operates in a sovereign relationships as shown in the above subsection.
However, ". . . in contemplation of international law [constructive possession] is not enough to establish the right of a nation to exclusive territorial sovereignty." (John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law: As Embodied in Diplomatic Discussions, vol. 1, 1906, p. 266) More is required – "acts of sovereignty." ". . . What acts will be sufficient to found sovereignty is a matter of fact and degree, and . . . depend[s] on the character of the territory. . . ." (James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., 2008, p. 222) All that is expected depends on what the legal entity ". . . is practically capable [of]. . . ." (Stephen D. Mau, Hong Kong Legal Principles: Important Topics for Students and Professionals, 2nd ed., footnote 11, 2013, p. 374) If it exists in a legal abstraction, it is a "constructive possession," not an actual possession. Hence, "in many cases [especially an international de jure constructive possession case] . . . very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights [is required]. . . ." (Minquiers and Ecrehos islands (France/United Kingdom), ICJ 1953, p. 46) (emphasis added) Again, the Permanent Court of International Justice ". . . observed that in the absence of a superior claim, ‘very little in the way of actual exercise of sovereign rights’ is necessary to establish sovereignty. . . ." (Gary Jay Levy, "Case Comment: Advisory Opinion on the Western Shahara," Brooklyn Journal of International Law, vol. 2, issue 2, art. 5, 1976, p. 297) (emphasis added) The point is:
Nations recognize that inflexibility is not a desirable attribute in international law any more than it is in municipal law; therefore "effective occupation" does not bear the same absolute interpretation [as under normal circumstances]. . . . The standard is constant but its application is relative according to the circumstances. (Ivan L. Head, "Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic," McGraw Law Journal, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 225-226; 2019: lawjournal.mcgill.ca/userfiles/other/131472-head.pdf)
Dispossessed sovereignty is legally legitimate and valid sovereignty in international law just as much as reigning sovereignty. For the deposed, "very little" is needed, because "displays of authority" for deposed sovereignty is not by actual, but it is transferred on the basis of constructive possession -- possession by law. This is the only way they can legally hold onto and maintain their the supreme right, and own the territory on a legal basis internationally. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "De Jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") That is:
. . . One who, being unwilling to give up the sovereignty, [must] claim the title and royal insignia. . . . It is undoubtedly wise that the one who wishes to preserve his right, and does not wish to give it up, should give plain indications of his desire, so far as is in his power. (Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo, Scientifica Pertractatum, vol. 2, John H. Drake, trans., chapter 3, no. 364, 1934, pp. 187-188) (emphasis added)
In other words:
[Deposed] Princes, by keeping the Titles or Arms of a Kingdom, of which they have not been in Possession of a considerable Time, [do so] . . . to preserve their Right. . . . (Professor Johann Werlhof (1660-1711) quoted in Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, vol. 2, Jean Barbeyrac trans., ed. and writer of the notes, Richard Tuck, ed., book 2, chapter 4, no. 1, note 5, , 2005)
When a monarch does this, the result in international law is that "the territory remains the legal [constructive] possession of the ousted sovereign [and his lawful successors]." (Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., 2003, p. 422) (emphasis added) In other words, "No territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognised as legal." (Caleb Wan, "Security Flashpoint: International Law and the Islands Dispute in the Far East," New Zealand Postgraduate Law e-Journal, Issue 2, 2005, p. 9; 2017: https://cdn.auckland.ac.nz/assets/nzpglejournal/Subscribe/Documents/2005-2/1%20Caleb's%20Final.pdf) Again from another article in slightly different words, "The territory remains the legal [constructive] possession of the absent sovereign and the latter remains the de jure government of the country." (Pasadena - International Law in Austria; 2017: http://ilac.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/project_ilac/Vienna_Training_Session/Draft_Headnotes/834_CY2007_H.doc) (emphasis added) This right of legal occupancy or legal or constructive possession can be permanently maintained and last indefinitely without end. (See "DEPOSED SOVEREIGNTY AND ROYALTY: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm)
The internationally required "acts of sovereignty" or "displays of authority" for any of the transfer modes to be valid specifically for a deposed sovereign entity include, various ways to prove that the claim is still alive and well and that no abandonment has occurred. This is done not only through the consistent use of "title and arms," but in other ways as well. In our situation through the years, we notarized a public declaration of ownership and posted it, created house rules or an indepth constitution, consistent use of the sovereign title and national arms, a resume, an email, checks and return address labels, and business card declaring such, a public website, a will, setting up medals, conferring knighthoods and titles on family members only (not to the general public), a protective legal dynastic trust to safeguard ownership, protective trade marks, public displays of one's coat of arms, and titles, the wearing of signet rings, notarized statements of the legal reality, etc. Such acts make the claim notorious, obvious, solid and sure as required by law, not to flaunt, but to legally maintain the rights. This is a must if one wants to safeguard and protect them as valued possessions, because they can be irretrievably lost -- lost on a permanent or eternal basis with no option for a return or restoration. The important point here is, once lost, such a claim cannot be resurrected or renewed. (See the informative article "DEPOSED SOVEREIGNTY AND ROYALTY: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm)
In conclusion, both the requirements for abandonment and occupation in international law, as well as in English domestic law, as described throughout this website, were completely and entirely fulfilled to the utmost level or degree. Both methods establishing a permanent transfer of all rights, distinctions, honors and privileges to us. This created a claim that is legally just as valid and authentic as any other legitimate royal claim on earth. (See "The Law makes all the Difference between a Solid and a Questionable Claim")
Putting it all Together in a Nut Shell
(To understand this very brief review, please read this whole article, which will provide the background and all the supporting legal facts and details needed to comprehend it)
". . . A de facto government [such as a republic that illegally deposed a monarchy] does not have the same legal basis as a de jure [or lawful] government." (Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th ed., 1997, p. 88) The deposed sovereign is the rightful sovereign and holds the higher right to rule -- the right that is lawful and legally in the right. That is, "[The usurping government's] acts affecting public rights . . . are void, since they are necessarily in derogation [in opposition] of the rightful, the de jure, sovereignty." ("Kenedy Pasture Co. et all, v. State et all. (No, 3043)," The Southwestern Reporter, vol. 231, 1921, p. 691) "A government de jure is a rightful government supplanted or displaced, a de facto government one which has established itself but is not rightful." (William Loutit Morison, John Austin [1790-1859, prominent legal theorist], 1982, p. 90) "A de jure government is the legal, legitimate government of a state. . . ." (The Free Dictionary by Farlex, De jure; 2017: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/de+jure) In other words, the de jure monarch has the superior entitlement.
Both the reigning and the non-reigning sovereigns hold the highest secular right on earth, but deposed sovereignty is senior in status because it is "rightful" even though it is relatively ignored, marginalizes or overlooked, whereas the subsequent government that illegally dispossessed the ruling family is honored, recognized and acknowledged.
Sovereignty, by definition, is "supreme in power; possessing supreme dominion." In other words, de jure sovereignty is legally and lawfully supreme, but, in a dispossessed state, has no actual control over the territory that the sovereign once ruled as much as centuries ago. A de facto government, on the other hand, also holds sovereignty. It is in full power and control, and may have governed for centuries over the land and its people. Nevertheless, the head of the dispossessed royal house is still the rightful ruler. That is, legally "the absent [or deposed] sovereign remains the de jure [legal and rightful] government of the country [even though they are never officially, or even unofficially recognized as such]." (F. E. Oppenheimer, "Governments and Authorities in Exile," American Journal of International Law, 1942, p. 571)
The question of how long a "de jure" king may continue in this status is answered in Textor’s "Synopsis Juris Gentuim," which says that "de jure" sovereigns in exile retain their status [as the rightful and lawful rulers] as long as they do not surrender their sovereignty to the "de facto" government. . . . (David Hughes , The British Chronicles, vol. 1, 2007, p. 358)
International law recognizes the place of both reigning and non-reigning sovereignties. However, as stated, legally, the highest lawful entitlement to rule belongs to the wrongfully deposed monarchy or government that has continued to maintain their rights. It is the law of prescription that governs the preservation and maintenance of wrongfully dispossessed royal houses and/or exiled governments. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De Jure Ownership")
The whole point is, international law not only impacts reigning governments, but it has jurisdiction and is binding for non-reigning sovereign entities as well. Any true sovereign is an international public person, and "it matters not . . . whether he is the de facto or de jure head of a nation [or deposed government]. . . ." (Henry Wager Halleck, Halleck's International Law, Or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, vol. 1, 3rd ed., 1893, p. 119) (emphasis added) (See "Deposed Monarchs and their Lawful Successors are International Public Persons and come under International Law") What matter is that he holds the supreme right of sovereignty. If deposed, he is equal with reigning rulers and the law reigns over both. (See "All Sovereign Houses are Legally Equal whether Reigning or Non-Reigning")
One example of the law having dominion for both reigning and non-reigning sovereignty is the legal fact that sovereignty can be bought and sold. (See "Non-Reigning Royal Rights can be Transferred to Others Under International Law") In fact, all the laws that govern the transfer of sovereignty can be applied to both non-territorial sovereigns and reigning ones. ". . . Acquisition of territory [or the sovereign right to that territory] may be accomplished by various means, including discovery and occupation, conquest, cession, or prescription." (Corpus Juris Secundum: A Complete Restatement of the Entire American Law as Developed by All Reported Cases, vol. 24, 2004, p. 23)
"To the five modes of acquiring sovereignty over territory correspond five modes of losing it – namely, cession, dereliction, operations of nature, subjugation [conquest is no longer allowed and], prescription." (Parry & Grant Encyclopaedic Dictionary of International Law, 3rd ed., John P. Grant and J. Craig Barker, ed., 2009, p. 599) "Dereliction (abandonment or relinquishment) as a mode of losing territory corresponds to occupation as a mode of acquiring it." (Tim Hillier, Sourcebook on Public International Law, 1998, p. 247)
Just as the law of prescription impacts both the reigning and the dispossessed, so too, can the international law of occupation be applied to de jure deposed sovereign territories. Besides occupation, prescription, the right to buy and sell non-reigning sovereign lands, there is in international law the following rights for deposed sovereignties:
(1) the right to be honored, respected, protected,
(2) the right and privilege of honoring others with offices and distinctions,
(3) the sovereign entitlement to legislate and enforce laws (these rights are in abeyance, inactive or dormant while in the deposed state, but they are still binding entitlements under sovereignty law),
(4) the right to be restored to one's lawful possessions and territories (although this may never happen, the legal. moral and ethical right legally exists) (See "The Right to be Restored in International Public Law" in volume 2 chapter 4 in the book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com/id28.htm),
As such, the major laws which govern the reigning also governs the non-reigning. The point being that occupation laws, among others, apply and can give to a legitimate occupier sovereign rights to a deposed territory that is legally abandoned or vacated. However, as shall be shown, there is a critical element that must be satisfied in order for the law of non-belligerent occupation to provide sovereign rights to non-reigning sovereignty. This necessary ingredient is "constructive possession." It is the grand master key to activating occupational rights to non-territorial sovereignty.
The Keystone without which Deposed Occupation becomes Impossible for De jure or Deposed Territories
Why couldn't anyone merely make a claim to an ancient principality that no one is asserting and thus become an authentic and genuine sovereign royal?
The answer is that it is highly or extremely unlikely:
1. First of all, the territory of interest must be an authentic sovereign entity that has been legally maintained as such by the requirements of international law. Otherwise, the law of non-belligerent occupation would not apply. No law would be capable of creating a valid transfer of sovereignty, the highest secular right on earth, if sovereignty did not exist as a legal reality. That is, it is impossible to transfer something that has no legal standing. (See both "Who Rightfully Owned the Rights of Halberstadt in the Past?" and "The Principality of Halberstadt was a Sovereign Entity" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
2. "Constructive possession" is the legal equivalent of "actual possession," which is a necessary requirement for the type of constructive occupation that fits with a legal, non-territorial sovereign entity in international law. Constructive possession is created both by adverse possession and a landlord -- proprietary monarch/tenant relationship. Both types of constructive possession exist and are important to this case. In fact, without constructive possession deposed sovereignty does not exist. If sovereignty does not exist on either a reigning or non-reigning level, there is no royal right and therefore, no rightful claim. (See "Proprietary and Non-Proprietary" in chapter 4 of the second volume of Dr. Stephen P. Kerr's book, The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com/id44.htm and "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
3. There would have to be an abdication or abandonment of all rights to the sovereign entity that must already exist in international law, or occupation law would have no lawful impact or effectiveness in establishing any transfer of regal rights or distinctions. This is because non-military occupation requires that the area occupied is either legally abandoned or has no sovereign authority over it (res nullius (no owner -- no sovereign) and/or is terra nullius (being no man's land) (See "Abandonment" in "Letters from the Imperial Family")
4. Constructive possession must exist for a transfer of rights, because universally, ". . . Actual or constructive possession [one or the other] is necessary, at common law, to the transmission of a right to lands is incontrovertible [that is, it cannot be changed – it is set in cement or established by law]." (Richard Peters, Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 5, 1831, p. 402) Thus constructive possession is necessary in more than one way.
5. One would have to have "constructive possession" or constructive adverse possession before, not after, an official abandonment takes place. Otherwise, the abandonment would automatically transfer all the rights to the current de facto government or reigning republic. That is how international prescriptive law works. Whoever holds lawful "constructive possession" of the de jure sovereign rights whether reigning or non-reigning, has the highest right to the territory if it is abandoned. Adverse possession provided this type of possession along with a landlord/tenant relationship, which occurred in 2001.
6. Not any type of claim qualifies for "constructive possession," which has the power to activate international occupation and other international laws that are legally competent in conveying sovereign rights and privileges. Deed poll, trade marks, and copyrights laws cannot do this. Only one law basically provides the legal mechanism necessary. In our case, it is chiefly through English adverse possession, which is legally capable of creating legal possession; and in combination with English private international law, international ownership rights can and were legally established as lawful facts. (See "All nine requirements were fulfilled to the utmost" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
7. Obviously, English jurisdiction and standing over our case had to be a legal reality for English adverse possession to be applicable. (See "Adverse Possession Applies" and "English Jurisdiction and Authority" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") This is where "private international law" comes in. Under English legal authority, it allows or enables English law to have full dominion so that English adverse possession laws can apply to a de jure corporeal international land right. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law" and "Private International Law and Adverse Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") The London Tribunal agreed that all the cases they were considering had legal standing or were under English law, not German law or any other domestic or foreign jurisdiction.
8. Our claim came from a legally valid English conveyance contract in the year 2000. Because the Deed of Transfer, though a legal document, was incapable providing "good title," by English common law, the conveyance automatically turned into an English adverse possession claim in 2001, because all the required conditions were met to the fullest degree possible -- even more than was legally required. This established, constructive possession -- both from adverse possession and a proprietary monarchical/tenant relationship.
In addition to adverse possession transferring all rights to us in and of itself, it created a situation where the international laws of occupation and two other international acquisition laws became active and simultaneously create the transfer of all the same rights and privileges earlier than the adverse possession laws would mature on a domestic level. In other words, ultimately six major modes of law legally transferred full ownership of the principality and its sovereign territory. Adverse possession took 12 years or until 2013. The others took place in 2002.
However, all the six methods of acquisition are dependant on the first as "constructive [legal] possession" had to be created. In considering all the binding transfer methods fit with the importance of what Emerich de Vattel declared. That is, that a whole kingdom or principality can be ". . . acquired it by any title whatever." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book III, chapter 13, no. 198) This was achieved through a combination of various compatible laws by two major legal methods culminating in giving us the highest rights of possession on earth.
Changes in dynasties or ownership described on this website, under international and domestic law, were not only fairly common in practice in the past, but are still lawful today. (See "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred") The rigorous rules of probability have been applied to this case. They show the claim to be nothing less than a mathematical certainty. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim") In other words, the claim for Halberstadt is not merely "more likely than not" or on a "preponderance of evidence" level, but is composed of the highest confidence level reasonably attainable on earth in proving anything. That is, it is "beyond any reasonable doubt." Hence, the claim becomes just as legally competent and solid as any other royal claim anywhere on earth.
3rd Legal Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth
Domestic Level- Highest Entitlement
Because the third acquisition method has the same beginning as the others, all the substantial evidence and legal facts presented on this website are applicable in one way or another to the point that it is not merely "more likely than not," but "beyond all reasonable doubt." Probability makes it nothing less than a mathematically certain and sure claim. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")
The highest level of English ownership took place immediately when adverse possession legally began in 2001. That is, "As soon as a [claim] goes into adverse possession over unregistered land [as in our case], he [the claimant] acquires a fee simple absolute in possession." (InBrief, Squatters and Adverse Possession; 2015: http://www.inbrief.co.uk/property-law/squatters-and-adverse-possession.htm#, Leach v Jay (1878) 9 ChD 42 at 45, and Judith-Anne MacKenzie and Mary Phillips, Textbook on Land Law, 14th ed., 2012, p. 146) That is, "The adverse possessor is recognized as owner from day one. . . ." (Larissa Katz, "The Moral Paradox of Adverse Possession: Sovereignty and Revolution in Property Law," McGill Law Journal, vol. 55, no. 1, March 2010, p. 47) ". . .The only person with a stronger link to the land would be the true owner as long as it is within the limitation period" -- before the 12 year statute of limitations is completed. (Ibid., InBrief) "Thus even before the [12 year] period is complete, the squatter [or claimant] has the rights and powers of an owner, against everyone except the person he has dispossessed." (Op.cit., MacKenzie) In other words:
A squatter [disseiser or adverse claimant] who commences adverse possession has, from the very beginning, a fee simple absolute in possession, albeit one that is defeasible [only] by a person with a better right to possess. (Mark Wonnacott, Possession of Land, footnote 31, 2006, p. 45)
Again: ". . . In the case of unregistered land [as in our case] the adverse possessor is regarded as having an estate in fee simple from the moment when he first takes possession." (Leach v Jay 91878) 9 ChD 42 at 45) From the onset of adverse possession, the adverse possessor legally gains a "fee simple absolute in possession" right. This is the highest form of possession on earth. "[The] sine qua non [that is, the essential and fundamental defining quality] of all rights in land [is] the fee simple absolute in possession." (Leslie Turano-Taylor, "Misplaced Trust: First Principles and the Conveyance of Legal Leases to Minors," Modern Studies in Property, vol. 7, Nicholas Hopkins, ed., 2013, p. 115) In fact, "The fee simple absolute is the greatest estate that can exist in land, the highest and most complete form of ownership. It is of potentially infinite duration and represents the whole [not part of the] . . . rights." (Real Estate Principles, 2006, p. 51) (emphasis added)
Fee Simple Absolute:
1. "Invests the owner with all possible rights,"
2. "Is of perpetual and infinite duration (lasts forever)," and
This highest of all ownership by definition includes everything belonging to the land, every land right, every attached royal privilege, all entitlements "reputed or known as part or parcel" of the property, is conveyed. (Law of Property Act 1925 section 62(1) The definition of land is also highly inclusive. That is, not only is it tangible land, but the "right, privilege, and benefit in, over, or derived from [the] land" of Halberstadt, in this case, is also included its regal titles or the "incorporeal hereditaments" that derive from owning all its land rights. (Law of Property Act 1925 section 205(1)9) In essence, "‘land’ is both the physical asset and the rights that the owner or others may enjoy in or over it." (Martin Dixon, Modern Land Law, 6th ed., 2009, p. 2) (emphasis added) The point is:
[A fee simple in English law] confers, and since the beginning of legal history it always has conferred, the lawful right to exercise over, upon, and in respect to, the land, every act of ownership which can enter into the imagination . . . and, for all practical purposes [the full right] of ownership. (Henry William Challis, Challis’s Law of Real Property: Chiefly in Relation to Conveyancing, 3rd ed., Charles Sweet ed., 1911, p. 218)
The point is:
. . . The successful adverse possessor does not merely become the owner at the end of the [limitation] period, but also becomes the owner for the period during which she [or he is] adversely possessing. (Jeffrey E. Stake, "The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession" Articles by Maurer Faculty, Paper 221, 2001, p. 2452)
[In fact] the adverse possessor is recognized as owner from day one [and for us that took place in 2001]. . . ." (Larissa Katz, "Adverse Possession and Sovereignty," Property and Sovereignty: Legal and Cultural Perspectives, James Charles Smith, ed., Part II: Revolution and Rehabilitation, 2013) In other words, from the very beginning, unregistered English adverse possession law immediately provides the adverse possessor with the highest title on earth to the claim -- though subject to a higher right which the true owner would have. In other words:
[Before the statute of limitations takes effect 12 years later, he] has a right to possess [that is] good against the whole world [higher and greater than anyone else's on earth] except someone with a superior right to possess [the original owner]. . . . (Ibid., Part I: Three Models of Adverse Possession: A Proceduralist Model)
It works like this: "in English law, the basis of title to land is possession. Possession of land by itself gives a title to the land good against the whole world except a person with a better right to possession." (Robert Megarry, Megarry’s Manual of the Law of Real Property, 8th ed., 2002, p. 548) When the Imperial family surrendered or abandoned their rights of ownership, we then held the exclusive right "good against the whole world."
When we say that property rights are "good against the world" or "in rem" this means that the flip side of the owner’s right [to the exclusive use of what he owns], is the duty [or legal obligation] of the other members of society to keep off, to respect the right. . . . (Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, The Oxford Introductions to U.S. Law: Property, 2010, p. 9) (emphasis added)
A right in rem [such as ownership] is a right that holds against everyone. The classic example is the right not to be assaulted. Everyone has a duty [a legal obligation] to refrain from assaulting you. (George W. Rainbolt, The Concept of Rights, 2006, p. 22) (emphasis added)
"In rem rights are not against specific nameable persons, but against the world at large [good against people everywhere on earth]." (B. Bandman as quoted in Joerg Chet Tremme, A Theory of Intergenerational Justice, 2001, p. 55) In other words, ". . . Rights in rem are universally claimable and held against persons universally [worldwide or everywhere]." (Christian Erk, Health, Rights and Dignity: Philosophical Reflections on an Alleged Human Right, 2011, p. 181) International rights are not merely English, but extend over the whole earth. That is, "In rem rights are property rights enforceable against the entire world [or everyone on earth]." (Duhaime's Law Dictionary; 2017: http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/I/InPersonam.aspx)
In our case, the legally valid abandonment of the territory by the original owners (the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern) took place in the year 2002 meant that there was no superior legal title to the principality on earth higher or greater than ours. This meant we legally and lawfully occupied a deposed sovereign entity under international law and had the highest right to it on earth including all it honors, rights, privileges and distinctions.
That's it, in a nutshell. We obtained ownership or legal constructive possession, in 2001 and the supreme or highest right in 2002, because no one on earth held a superior legal claim to the Principality than we did after the Imperial Family abandoned their ownership in light of being informed that there was a legal conveyance of it in England. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family") This was the 3rd absolute transmission.
International Level-Best Title/Best Claim on Earth
The highest entitlement on earth to Halberstadt is established under international law as well as English domestic law. It comes under "best title" or "best claim" doctrine. That is, whoever ". . . can establish the best title [to the right of sovereignty] thereto [is] a rule well recognized by the International Court of Justice. . . ." (Paul Eidelberg, An American Political Scientist in Israel: From Athens to Jerusalem, 2010, p. 160) This is the way courts generally determine who is the rightful holder of all sovereign rights. ". . . The claimant with the best title, as a matter of international law [holds the highest sovereign entitlement on earth]." (Lea Brilmayer , "International Boundary Disputes in the 21st Century: Victims, Villains, and Third State Responsibility," Wisconsin International Law Journal, vol. 33, no. 3, p. 414) What is looked for is ". . . not strictly (original] roots of title when considering which of the claimants has the better claim to sovereignty." (Gillian Triggs, "Maritime Boundary Disputes in the South China Sea: International Legal Issues," University of Sydney Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09/37, May 2009, p. 6) In other words, not matter what the past was ". . . inevitably, the debate shifts to who has the better or best claim [right now]." (Lowell Bautista, "Thinking Outside the Box," Philippine Law School Journal, vol. 81, no. 4, 2007, p. 701) The process is always to find who ". . . has the stronger or better title, the practical effect of which is to confer title and then erga omnes, that is, against the whole world." (Ibid., p. 5)
"Erga omnes" are "obligations" that ". . .do not require ratification or integration into national law to be enforceable in all countries [of the earth]." (Duhaime's Law Dictionary; 2019: http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/E/ErgaOmnes.aspx) All people are expected to honor them. This is why best title is good "against the whole earth." They are, in fact, both valid and legitimate everywhere on earth.
In 2000, we began a claim to the principality of Halberstadt based on the conveyance. In 2001, when the Deed of Transfer (although a valid legal English document) was shown to be incapable of providing "good title," the claim was automatically, according to English statute and legal precedence, became an adverse possession case. It also became an international prescriptive claim, a non-violent conquest, an English and international proprietary estoppel began and a legal annexation took place. Then when the abandonment or relinquishment came about in 2002, the ownership became final and complete through prescription, occupation, and annexation. (See "Abandonment" in "Letters from the Imperial Family") The other acquisition modes kicked in later, but no later than 2014.
Holding the highest, best claim, best title and ownership on earth was finalized by eight binding legal transfer methods. We own this unique and rare family treasure by law. However, even though everything is final, international law mandates public acts of sovereignty to maintain it. The Law of Nations ". . . looks . . . not only to a good root of title [or ownership] but also requires an actual vigorous [living, breathing] plant," because there must be a ". . . continued display of sovereignty . . ." in order to perpetuate the supreme sovereign right to rule. (Robert Yendal Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, p. 35) It is ". . . use and occupation [or constructive possession that] constitute [or maintaines] the best titles by which a state [or sovereign entity] can lay claim to [the] rights of sovereignty." (Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000, 2014, p. 205) We do this by continually obeying that law as it relates to deposed sovereignty. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")
4th Legally Binding Transfer of Rights: Proprietary Estoppel
"Proprietary estoppel is a means of creating a proprietary interest in land in the absence of following the correct formalities." "The doctrine of proprietary estoppel can be used to create freehold ownership. . . ." (e-lawresources.co.uk, Proprietary Estoppel; 2017: http://e-lawresources.co.uk/Land/Proprietary-estoppel.php) A freehold estate by definition "lasts for an indeterminable length of time, such as for a lifetime or forever." (Shared Flashcard Machine, Real Estate; 2017: http://www.flashcardmachine.com/chapter-4602.html) In this case, de jure ownership rights in international land was created and can last forever. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") "In the context of land law, proprietary estoppel is now a well-established doctrine." (John Cartwright, "Protecting Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel in English Law," Report to the XVIIth International Congress of Comparative Law, July 2006; 2018: https://www.ejcl.org/103/art103-6.doc) Its impact is to bring about fairness, justice and equity in cases governed by English law.
When the Imperial House, who owned all the legal rights to the Principality of Halberstadt, were informed that a "Deed of Transfer” was created in England selling their property, they officially denied knowing the vendor, then formally denied even owning their own property – legally abandoning it, and then declared they would not fight it or take legal action against the vendor to stop the sale from taking place. This was, in effect, an abdication of all responsibility or any obligation toward it. The principality’s fate in England was surrendered or deserted as well as legally abandoned. They did not care about the outcome of the sale enough to get involved one way or another. Their indifference to the conveyance of Halberstadt legally creates the potential, groundwork or foundation for "proprietary estoppel."
Their actions acted as a promise, an assurance, that the principality could be legally transferred or conveyed to us and they would ignore it since they had already washed their hands of it or relinquished all rights to it. English private international law could then empower adverse possession to legally give us the highest right on earth to the principality. Higher than anyone or any other family on earth. Their silence in this legal context is legally binding as approval. The legal maxim is qui tacet consentire videtur, which means, "He who is silent is understood to consent or is taken to agree." In other words, silence in a situation like this has profound legal consequences. It stands as a witness of implied approval, permission and assent to the outcome. It is, in effect, a promise of success essential to make proprietary estoppel work. (See "Failure to Protest" under "Pertinent Binding Laws" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges.")
Proprietary estoppel is one of four principal mechanisms to acquire rights over property, seen particularly in the case of land (the others being a contract, an implied trust, and adverse possession). (Wikipedia, Proprietary Estoppel; 2107: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proprietary_estoppel)
Proprietary estoppel in England is used in courts, tribunals, arbitration and private mediation proceedings to solve land disputes. Some decisions are enforced by law and others merely by agreement. Where there is no dispute, proprietary estoppel on its own standing supports in principle whatever is equitable, just and fair. Therefore it operates to uphold whatever the overt proprietary promise, or what the implied assurance makes plain and obvious.
In our case, it was the fact that the Imperial House knew there was a legalized English conveyance selling their property, but their apathy or disinterest in protecting it, and their formal denial of ownership, in spite of the fact that they owned it, suggests what is called "implied consent" for it to be conveyed. "Implied consent [evidenced by silence or neglect] . . . raises a presumption that the consent [or approval] has been given [to abandon and forsake all rights]." (Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, The Cyclopedic Dictionary of Law, "Consent," 1901, p. 191) IThat is, with proprietary estoppel ". . . the promise of some right – can in all cases be express or implied." (Proprietary Estoppel and Formalities in Land Law and the Land Registration Act 2002: A Theory of Unconscionably, p. 21: 2017: http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/mjd1001/estoppel.pdf) With no dispute, proprietary estoppel vindicates and affirms the transfer of all ownership rights provided the rest of its provisions are fully complied with.
If there is no dispute, obviously, the requirements are seem to be meaningless -- the claimant wins hands down. No one is opposing it. But the law of equity, should it be ever challenged, must comply to what the common law requires. Since we claim proprietary estoppel as one of the four binding legal transfer methods, we are obligated to substantiate the fact that the following legal requirements were completely and totally satisfied:
1. An assurance giving rise to an expectation that the claimant would have an interest in land,
2. The claimant must demonstrate reliance on the assurance, and
3. The claimant must have acted to their detriment as a result of the assurance. . . . (Proprietary Estoppel and Formalities in Land Law and the Land Registration Act 2002: A Theory of Unconscionable, p. 21: 2017: http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/mjd1001/estoppel.pdf) (Also: Oliver J restated the broad approach in Taylors Fashion Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees  QB 133. This was approved by the Court of Appeal in Habib Bank v Habib Bank AG Zurich  1 WLR 1265 and was applied by the Privy Council in Lim Teng Huan v Ang Swee Chuan  1 WLR 1306)
Note that "unconscionability" is not included. It used to be an integral part of proprietary estoppel, but is no longer normally used. That is, ". . . the concept of unconscionability receives so little judicial attention [anymore]. . . . It might be that . . . the focus will be on the solid elements of estoppel because their existence is easier to attack or defend." (Martin Dixon, "Confining and defining proprietary estoppel: the role of unconscionability," Legal Studies, vol. 30, no. 3, September 2010, p. 412) "There is . . . no academic consensus as to the precise role played by the concept of unconscionability in a proprietary estoppel claim." (Ben McFarlane, Nicholas Hopkins and Sarah Nield, Land Law: Text, Cases, and Materials, 3rd ed., 2012, p. 341) Unconscionability as a legal term is too elusive, too vague and undefined. There is an ". . . absence of a structured framework for understanding unconsionability. . . ." (Ob cit., Mason Dixon, p. 413) ". . . We [simply] cannot define with . . . clarity the concept. . . ." (Ibid.) No wonder, ". . . there are many cases . . . where it [is] never feature[d]." (Ibid., p. 412)
Few judges share their understanding of it as few have a concise definition of it. However, one English judge declared that, "Unconscionability has no independent existence for it is defined purely in terms of the three factual requirements [assurance, reliance and detriment]." (Ob cit., Martin Dixon) Therefore:
Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe explained, the doctrine [of proprietary estoppel] is based on three elements: a representation or assurance made [directly or by implication] to the claimant; reliance on it by the claimant; and detriment to the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable) reliance. (Ibid., note 26, p. 412) (emphasis added)
First: the Assurance:
(Pascoe v Turner  1 WLR 431; Griffiths v Williams (1977) 248 EG 947; Re Basham  1 WLR 498; Gillet v Holt  2 All ER 289; Inwards v Baker  2 QB 29; Scottish and Newcastle Plc v Lancashire Mortgage Corp Ltd  EWCA Civ 684; Shaw v Applegate  1 WLR 970; Yeoman's Row Management v Cobbe  EWHC 2810; Thorner v Major  UKHL 18; Clarke v Corless  EWCA Civ 338; Gill v Woodall  EWCA Civ 1430; Layton v Martin  2 FLR 227; Murphy v Rayner  EWHC 1; Qayyum v Hameed  EWCA Civ 352)
An assurance [the promise] may be active or passive [that is, implied]. An active assurance can be by words or [by] conduct of the owner that leads the claimant to believe that they will have an interest in [or rights pertaining to the principality as in our case] (e-lawresources.co.uk, Proprietary Estoppel; 2017: http://e-lawresources.co.uk/Land/Proprietary-estoppel.php)
As described above, the implication is that everything was knowingly setup for the transfer of ownership to take place. It could have been stopped, but no effort was made to prevent the legal transfer, even though they were well aware of it. Instead, they not only let it happen, but they even stated they would not interfere or contest it. On top of that, they legally and officially abdicated all connection to their internationally de jure property by denying that they owned it. All of this, more than complies with "implied consent" or "passive" assurance, which is, in fact, as equally binding as an overt or outright promise. Hence, there was an assurance lawfully made without specifying it. It was legally indicated and practically self-evident or assured. Passive means an assurance that is based on inactivity -- knowingly allowing something legally binding to take place and instead of stopping it, they, in effect, promoted it. Their "tacit" support was blatantly obvious. The combination of all these things activated the law of proprietary estoppel, which is a law that transfers property under equity laws. (See "Failure to Protest" under "Pertinent Binding Laws" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges." and "Abandonment" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and "Letters from the Imperial Family")
Second, the Reliance:
(Attorney General of Hong Kong v Humphrey's Estate  AC 114; Evans v HSBC Trust  WTLR 1289; Greasley v Cooke  1 WLR 113; Lim Teng Huan v Ang Swee Chuan  1 WLR 1306 and Evans v HSBC Trust  WTLR 1289)
Interestingly, the "reliance" supports the "assurance" and the "detriment." They are all connected and consistently support one another. The main identifier of reliance is a "change in behavior" as a result of the overt or implied assurance:
(1) I originally relied on the idea that the Deed of Transfer might be a valid and legitimate conveyance: If the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern were so unconcerned, after hearing about the fact that one of their small sovereign entities was conveyed in England, that they would not care enough to legally protest it and preserve it, then there is a reasonable foundation for the belief that it might have been an authentic transfer of rights, which for strong social and reputation reasons, they would not want to admit. There were other indirect evidences of validity as well. For one: a friend called His Royal Highness Prince Georg Friedrich, the head of the Imperial House on the phone, and asked him directly about the English conveyances of their legal property in international law, and his response was that he would not confirm or deny that they took place, which is a well-known secrecy response. If it were false, he could have easily denied it, but he did not. Therefore, I relied on the possibility that it might actually be true and continued to claim the rights to be mine, while I investigated it and pushed others to force the broker and/or solicitor to reveal the full and complete truth about it. They claimed they could not do so, because they had legally bound themselves up by contract to keep the full truth undisclosed,
As a sidelight: even if Prince Georg had denied any validity, or that there was any truth, to the transfer of Halberstadt, this could not have stopped the transfer by adverse possession, which would have required legal action in an English court of law to stop. (See "Ways to Stop Adverse Possession" in "Letters from the Imperial Family.") In 2002, Prince Georg officially declared, through his attorney's, that he would not get involved in what was going on in England concerning the ownership of the principality. This activated the law of estoppel, which would have legally prevented any attempt to change things. In addition, Prince Georg's official abandonment, or completely denied of ownership, of Halberstadt in 2002. This meant that the Imperial House no longer had any legal connection or legal authority to oppose, interfere with, or take legal action against the transfer or ownership of property they no longer owned. In other words, the transfer was powerfully protected legally from any interruption or hindrance. Of course, now that it is a "done-deal," the 1980 limitations law guarantees that the outcome cannot be overturned, but is impenetrable. It is legally set in cement. But it is also a moral and ethical principle:
. . . when a man hath in either manner [renunciation or transfer] abandoned or granted away his right, then is he said to be OBLIGED, or BOUND, not to hinder those, to whom such right is granted or abandoned . . . such hindrance is INJUSTICE, and INJURY, as being sine jure [without right because it is wrong], the right being before renounced, or transferred. (Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or, The Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil, 4th ed., 1894, p. 67)
(2) In addition, I relied on the contents of the letters from the House of Hohenzollern: The statement of the Prince through his attorney and general secretary that they would not contest the transfer and their disavowal of ownership allowed me the freedom to focus on English law, which was now a binding and established fact due to their legal acquiescence, surrender or abdication to English jurisdiction and authority. I, therefore, focused on pressuring the Law Society of England and Wales and the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), then the Legal Service Ombudsman (LSO) as well to help verify and confirm the legitimacy of the conveyance through the solicitor's misconduct in regard to an "undertaking" -- a binding professional promise, which he failed to fulfill. This is why the this website's address is http://www.sra-lso-misconduct.com, because it was originally used to as a public complaint. This effort never worked out, because I could not get them (the SRA and LSO) to act on it and force the solicitor to make good on his binding promise. This was the chief focus of much of my efforts. I relied on the idea of the Hohenzollern or Preussen's non-involvement to continue to push others for the truth and continued to claim the rights to Halberstadt, and
(3) I then relied on their word in a different way: As a result of not getting anywhere, being blocked in all my efforts to get the full truth about the conveyance, it dawned on me about twelve years later that the rights were already transferred through adverse possession, and because the House of Hohenzollern abandoned the rights to the Principality, therefore I relied on their statements in a very different way. Since they made the declaration that they would not to contest it, and I acted in good faith according to their word all these years in claiming the rights, all the legal entitlements to the principality were legally and lawfully transferred through another equally powerful and legally upheld route -- a legal mechanism that is just as binding and legitimate, or even more so, than a conveyance, and that is through English adverse possession. If they had taken legal action to contest this, adverse possession would have been completely thwarted or made legally impossible. However, true to their word, they did not contest it or protest it, but let it happen, even though they were made aware that of the conveyance.
Third, the Detriment:
(ER Ives Investment v High  2 QB 379 Case summary; Re Basham  1 WLR 498; Gillet v Holt  2 All ER 289; Case summary; Suggitt v Suggitt  EWCA Civ 1140; Voyce v Voyce (1991) 62 P & CR 290; Inwards v Baker  2 QB 29; Inwards v Baker  2 QB 29; Rochdale Canal Co v King (1853) 16 Beav 630; Gillet v Holt  2 All ER 289; Re Basham  1 WLR 498; Jones v Jones  1 WLR 438; Greasley v Cooke  1 WLR 113; Campbell v Griffin  EWCA Civ 990)
Detriment is either where a significant loss of some kind takes place, because the assurance was, and is still, in default and the person was wronged. Or, that a person believed a certain property was his, or would be his, and he relied on it by expending money and/or labor to maintain or improve the rights to the property, but he was cheated out of it by a broken promise.
Both reliance and detriment are substantiated by "change of behavior." For example, in our case, there is obvious proof confirming that I claimed the rights and honors of Halberstadt consistently, by my actions, throughout the years. There is a long list in the article "Factual or Legal Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") "Change in conduct" our part includes a dynastic trust, a will, websites, family knighthoods, stars, sashes, medals and titles for family members only, two formal notarized declarations of ownership, recognitions by prominent royal and legal experts, a coat of arms registering us as a "royal princely house" with the Federal Republic of Germany, State patents to create another public record of our claim, signet rings, side coat of arms on vehicle, business card, return address labels, refusing a $20,000.00 offer to sell all rights back to the vendor, fighting in a Federal Court, appealing to various investigators including the Solicitors Regulation Authority of England and Wales (SRA), dealing with two Queen's barristers and a solicitor for a London Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, and more.
Unchallenged, proprietary estoppel stands on solid ground giving us all the rights to the Principality. However, in our case, as in similar ones completed outside of court, not having the protection of a court order or decree locking in or assuring ownership in the case, it is not conclusive and final as the other three approaches are. However, there is a principle that makes it even more sure and rock solid. That is, the doctrine of Laches.
[Laches is] a defense to a claim for an equitable remedy [such as proprietary estoppel]. The person invoking laches is asserting that an opposing party [such as the Imperial family] has “slept on its rights”, and that, as a result of this delay, circumstances have changed, witnesses or evidence may have been lost or no longer available, etc., such that it is no longer a just resolution to grant the plaintiff’s claim. Laches is associated with the maxim of equity, “Equity aids the vigilant, not the sleeping ones [that is, those who sleep on their rights].” Put another way, failure to assert one’s rights in a timely manner can result in a claim being barred by laches. (Pro-Bono Legal Self-Help, Estoppel; 2019: http://probonolegal.net/estoppel)
Estoppel by is an equitable doctrine by which some courts deny relief to a claimant who has unreasonably delayed or been negligent in asserting a claim. A person invoking laches should assert that an opposing party has slept on his/her rights and that the party is no longer entitled to his/her original claim. Laches is a form of estoppel for delay. (USLegal, Estoppel by Laches Law and Legal Definition; 2019: https://definitions.uslegal.com/e/estoppel-by-laches)
It bars any attempt to legal challenge a claim.
In other words, the words of the Imperial family were legally set in cement by doctrine of estoppel. They knowingly and officially denied ownership of the principality they owned, and declared that they would not take legal action to prevent the transfer under English legal jurisdiction. Estoppel is:
A rule of law that when person A [the Imperial family in our case], by act or words, gives person B [the Goff/Harradine family] reason to believe a certain set of facts upon which person B takes action [and relies], person A [the Imperial family] cannot later, to his (or her) benefit, deny those facts or say that his (or her) earlier act was improper. (Duhaime's Law Dictionary, Estoppel Definition; 2019: http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/E/Estoppel.aspx)
Thus, by law, what they said is legally binding or rock solid.
In laches, generally, 14 years is considered a long time -- too long to question a proprietary estoppel change in ownership. (Legal News Room, Estate and Elder Law; 2019: https://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/estate-elder/b/estate-elder-blog/posts/doctrine-of-laches-means-you-are-quot-out-of-time-quot) As of 2019, it has been 19 years since we contacted the Imperial family about the conveyance that was taking place in England. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family") A legal challenge to this equity transfer mode, of legal, non-territorial sovereignty in international law under dominion of English private international law, is now effectively barred. This is because no legal challenge ever took place during that time. This is not by the 12 year statute of limitations in adverse possession, but through equity standards in English law impacting our proprietary estoppel case. The Doctrine of Laches means one is "out of time." The original claims of our ownership under proprietary estoppel now stands as an established, legal fact that is immune from challenge.
It shows that, by laws recognized as just and equitable, rightful ownership has been achieved. In short, proprietary estoppel provides ownership in and of itself with "Laches" protecting its integrity. Thus by this recognized mode, we own all the international legal and lawful rights to Halberstadt. Proprietary estoppel also supports and sustains the other methods as just and true by the laws of equity as well as by statue and common law rulings.
International Proprietary Estoppel
Although international courts and arbitration tribunals rarely, or hardly ever mention proprietary estoppel and other principles of law by name, they apply these basic principles. In the case of proprietary estoppel, which comprises of an overt or implied promise or assurance, an obvious reliance on it by the promisee, and an unjust detriment for that person if denied the realization of the promise, both English law and international law agree that proprietary estoppel creates a binding conveyance of territorial ownership.
Proprietary estoppel can be used as a cause of action or a "sword" for a plaintiff or a "shield" for a defendant who has the proof of his reliance and the justice of a solid possession. If there is no dispute, or there is an abandonment of the ownership rights, the implied promise is fulfilled. In other words, the assurance becomes an accomplished fact.
The international legal system, being altogether more rudimentary in nature [involves more basics principles of law], has no need to take account of such technicities [as "promissory" and "proprietary estoppel."]. At an international level, estoppel doctrine arises as an extension of the general principle of good faith, a principle common to all legal systems, all of which have (admittedly varying) mechanisms to ensure that parties exercise their obligations in good faith and keep their promises when a serious representation [a clear statement or actions implying such] has been made. The principle of estoppel therefore supplements pacta sunt servanda [treaties or promises shall be complied with] – "the cornerstone of international law." (Ciarán Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention, 2013, p. 230)
". . . The principles underlying estoppel, as an extension of the principle of good faith, are deeply ingrained into the architecture of international law." (Ibid.) For example:
The mere fact that [promissory and proprietary estoppel] ha[ve] been applied as the basis of a legal claim in international decisions suggests that, however unwittingly, that it has become a substantive device in international law [along with a number of other basic common law principles of equity and justice]. (Christopher Brown, "A Comparative and Critical Assessment of Estoppel in International Law," University of Miami Review, vol. 50, no. 369, January 1, 1996, p. 404)
As a result, uncontested proprietary estoppel also applies as an international acquisition mode of land or territory as well as in English law. Hence, proprietary estoppel legally transferred, by equity law, the principality on both an English domestic level and on an international level. This is an important additional witness of the truth of the transfer.
In addition, laches applies, because "some [domestic] laws are present [in international law] (i.e. laches, res judicata) [in particular are mentioned]. . . ." (Sources of International Law; 2019: http://essaydocs.org/i--sources-of-international-law.html?page=2) This is because there is precedence for its use in international courts, and the "doctrine of laches" is generally accepted as a law that is just, equitable and fair -- a natural fit for the way international law works. It is built around the core idea of estoppel that one should keep one's word. Estoppel makes one's word, or one's actions, legally important similar to the immense power of a legal contract. It is a "sword," because it can create a cause of action, if the implicit or expressed assurance is in default. Or, it can be a powerful "shield," because it can protect one against any kind of legal action if one can prove that he or she relied on the promises and the territory is already in one's possession for years. The legal maxim behind Lafches is "equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights," or wastes time in getting around to challenging it. After a period of a few years, it acts in basically the same way as a statute of limitations. Thus, in our case, we are protected against any attempt to regain the principality, because Laches will ban, bar consideration, or preclude it from ever being challenged in an domestic or international court. In other words, the transfer is a done deal or air tight. That is, it is legally protected and therefore final.
In other words:
In international law, all . . . court involvement is voluntary, so either party can stop the meddling or interference of a court or tribunal simply by refusing to be involved. (Stephen P. Kerr, The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law, 2016, p. 129 and Freiiherr von Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum: The translation, Joseph Horace Drake, trans., 1964, p. 188)
In conclusion, everything points to the fact that our transfer case is rock solid.
Summary of Important Points
According to international prescriptive law which is highly relevant to this case, if the abandonment of the deposed territory of the principality of Halberstadt, which took place in 2002, had taken place in 2001 before our constructive ownership kicked in, all the de jure, deposed, non-reigning sovereign land rights would have automatically been transferred not to us, but to the current de facto rulers of the land -- presently the Federal Republic of Germany. That's how prescriptive law works. If such had taken place, we would not have any right to it. The point being, whenever a deposed, non-reigning, legal, non-territorial sovereign entity loses its de jure right to rule, by whatever means, those rights are automatically conveyed to the next lawful heir, which in this case was us. If we did not have constructive possession, all rights would have gone to the de facto, reigning, domestic government, which, then, would become the full and complete owner of both the de jure -- the legal right to rule and the de facto or actual governance and control of the territory, which they already had. Again, constructive possession was critical to our claim, or any similar claim, without which, we would not have had a leg to stand on. This factor, in and of itself, would make it exceedingly hard for this process to work for others. The transfer of all regal rights, privileges and distinctions could only have taken place because of the following law. All four methods of transfer, although distinct and separate, are related to each other. They are all built on the same basic foundation.
(1) a valid English contractual "Deed of Transfer" was created in the year 2000, that was legal and binding, but could not convey "good title," which fact was discovered in 2001,
(2) followed by an automatic 2001 legal conversion of the "conveyance claim" to an "adverse possession claim," which could only have taken place in England where the law creates this automatic legal feature,
(3) an abandonment of ownership by the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern in 2002 came after constructive possession was an established fact because of numbers (1) and (2),
(5) 1st legal transfer of rights: covered by most of this website, was completed in 2013 as adverse possession matured into full ownership as the Imperial Family fulfilled their word and did not take any legal action to stop English law from conferring all the legal rights of the principality onto us.
(6) 2nd legal transfer of rights: because of the abandonment of the principality by the Royal House and full compliance to all the requirements of international non-belligerent occupation law, regal sovereignty was gained in 2002 by virtue of full compliance to these binding laws,
(7) 3rd legal transfer of rights: in addition, full conformity to all English domestic adverse in 2002 after the abandonment, making our claim not only the only claim, but the legally the highest lawful claim on earth.
(8) 4th legal transfer of rights: the law of equity though proprietary estoppel sustains and supports full and exclusive ownership not only on a domestic level, but on an international level as well.
The rights to the Principality were transferred in total by four different, but related methods.
What are the chances or odds that all these basic ingredients and the fine legal details would come together creating a transfer of the supreme right to rule an ancient territory in international law? Research and the law show that there is one chance in 1.1 trillion, it could be a legally wrongful claim. Or, the probability is 1.1 trillion to one that is it an established fact -- certainly "beyond any reasonable doubt" -- the highest assurance or certainty level reasonably possible in this life. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")
Now right to the point, we effectively took over the abandoned principality in the only way a legal, non-territorial sovereign possession could be possessed and occupied. (See "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") The regal sovereign territory was abandoned, so an occupation or possession could and did actually take place and change ownership of all the legal, non-territorial sovereign rights. (See "Abandonment" in "Letters from the Imperial Family")
CONCLUSION: Not only is the principality of Halberstadt ours by a combination of international and English domestic laws, but under the binding authority of international abandonment, de jure occupation, adverse possession and proprietary estoppel. Each of the methods of acquiring the supreme rights to the sovereign entity are conclusive and final in their own way as long as they are lawfully perpetuated. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")
The point is, we own the property and all its rights. "The legal ownership of property [is] the highest right to property that a person can acquire." (CPCU 530 -- chapter 7 Terms Flashcards; 2017: https://quizlet.com/2316844/cpcu-530-ch-7-terms-flash-cards) "Property" means "dominion . . . [the] exclusive right to a thing. . . ." "Property is [therefore] the highest right a man can have to anything. . . ." (Henry Campbell Black, A Law Dictionary Containing Definitions of the Terms and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and Modern, 2nd ed., 1995, p. 955) It includes the rights to about 600 square miles of de jure sovereign territory located in the Federal Republic of Germany under the law of prescription. However, international law provides no mechanism for the enforcement of those rights, even though they are lawful. Hence, we own the whole complete territory, but cannot control it or profit from it, other than to know that by law, it is rightfully ours. (See "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
Eight Legal and Lawful Methods Transferred all the Rights
Deposed de jure or legal sovereignty are both a private law rights as well as public law rights. Whereas, reigning sovereignty is exclusively under public jurisdiction, deposed sovereignty is governed by both public and private law. As a direct result, both private law transfer methods, and public law modes of conveyance, had the full legal power to transfer all the honors, privileges and distinctions of the principality of Halberstadt. (See "Public and Private Law as it relates to the Transfer of the Principality of Halberstadt" in "The Public and Non-Public Use of Titles in International Law")
It is most impressive that not just one or two, but eight different, equally binding acquisition modes, unitedly and perfectly transferred the principality and all its regal rights to the Goff/Harradine family. These laws are listed as follows along with the dates when they were achieved:
The transfer is an established fact -- each of the above perfected the change in ownership in its own unique way.
This claim is as sure as any other royal claim that ever existed on the earth. It is that profound. Our case could hardly be stronger.
In fact, we also qualified for four more valid international transfer modes, "novation," "consolidation of title," "highest entitlement on earth on an international level," and "international proprietary estoppel" as well. Since each is composed of similar principles involved in most of the other acquisition laws mentioned above, we have not listed them. Nevertheless, this means there are, in fact, four more powerful witnesses to the truth of the transfer. There is now a total of twelve valid domestic and international conveyance methods involved. Novation and consolidation of title are explained on the web page: "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges" and international proprietary estoppel and international highest right on earth is described in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
The grand and obvious conclusion is that this is one of the most profoundly certain claims on earth based on verified, confirmed and extensive evidence. (See The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")
It would be a lot more comfortable to operate below the radar, merely claim our rights privately, and not stick our necks out, but international law requires or obligates that one publicly assert his or her rights or lose them. In other words, to maintain what is considered to be of great value and worth to us personally, we must obey the law. By this means, it is possible to preserve deposed legal sovereignty from generation to generation, but such obedience ". . . imposes on him an obligation to make known his rights." (Hugo Grotius, The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter 11, no. 141) (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" on this website or "DEPOSED SOVEREIGNTY AND ROYALTY: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm and also Dr. Kerr's book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com)
The Law of Nations also requires or behooves one to provide solid proof, or a claim is considered to be no better than a family fairy tale, a phony pretense, or mere make believe. Thus, we have this website to fulfill these two important legal mandates: a public presence and solid proof, which proof was certified as valid by legal experts and the numerous citations and explanations of legally verified facts as found throughout this website. (For the requirement of proof, see "Proof is Necessary" in "The Law makes the Difference between an Authentic and a Fraudulent Claim," and "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")
Even though Halberstadt is a small sovereign regal entity, the ownership of ". . . sovereignty is not of like character with other things, rather, in its exalted rank, it far exceeds other things." (Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 12, no. I) It is something truly magnificent -- there is something supreme and wonderful about it, which is above most things in life. ". . . The ruler or sovereign of a State [reigning or deposed] is, in international law, . . . considered as representing, in his person, [all] its sovereign dignity [honor and glory] . . . ." (William Teulon Swan Stallybrass, A Society of States,Sovereignty, 1919, p. 32) The point is, "All the majesty of the nation resides in the person of the prince. . . ." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, chapter 15, no. 188) "Every thing that emanates from the throne ought to bear the character of purity, nobleness, and greatness." (Ibid.)
However, ownership of a real sovereign title does not make a man important, great, or good deep inside himself. Truly noble people are people with integrity, good works and compassion for what is right. We highly value what we have, but true nobility or inner greatness is earned, not bestowed, conveyed or transferred.
We are just ordinary people, but have some truly extra-ordinary titles that are authentic and validated. Like most other princely houses in Germany today, we are not rich, but have sufficient for our needs.
Our house rules mandate that no knighthoods will be conferred on non-family members, no titles will be given out to people outside of the family, nothing of regal importance will be sold or bartered. The claims, although public titles under international law, will not be flaunted, although they must be used as required by law. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")
For those unfamiliar with the legal concepts discussed herein, which is most of us, it is extremely easy to misunderstand what is written on this website. To avoid such, you are cordially invited to ask questions and make comments. We also welcome corrections.