In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality: (the 5th & 6th modes)   

(This is probably one of the most profoundly certain claims on earth, and it is elaborated, verified and confirmed in great detail throughout the website.)

Table of Contents after the Short Foreword

 Foreword:

          There are five major reasons for this website:

(1) The first is to teach correct principles as there are serious falsehoods taught in the field of nobility and chivalry. (See "Problems and Solutions: The Future of Nobility and Chivalry" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id108.htm) Pope Felix III wrote, "Not to oppose error is to approve it, and not to defend the truth is to suppress it." In other words, silence implies consent and promotes error and distortions.
(2) The second reason is that international law obligates a person with a valid regal claim to assert what is rightfully owned, or face the severe penalty of permanently losing all legal entitlement to it. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "Deposed Sovereignty and Royalty: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost").
(3) The third is that international law requires that a person who claims legal, non-territorial sovereignty is obligated to conclusively prove that the claim is valid and legitimate to the point that it is "beyond a reasonable doubt," and not just "more likely than not." (See "Proof is Necessary and Required" in "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and False Claim" and "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")
(4) The fourth reason is this website is a well-written and documented doctoral project on international and domestic law. A university doctoral degree requires that one make a "significant original contribution to knowledge." In our case, this dissertation, which is, in fact, this website, provides proof far "beyond a reasonable doubt" that our claim is absolutely true, and the important laws that determine when a case is authentic, valid and genuine. Thus fulfilling an international law requirement. (See "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and False Claim")
(5) And fifth, because my good name (Donald E. Goff, Ph.D., DBA, D.Litt. (eq.) and our claim have been unfairly attacked on the internet, the true facts needs to be published and made known. It is, as Edmund Burke emphatically declared, "All that is needed for the forces of evil to win, is for good men to do nothing." It is hoped that the real truth will prevail, not error or inaccuracies. Hence, a good reason for this website. (See "Problem -- Misinformation" and starting with http://www.nobility-royalty.com/beware_of_false_claims_of_sovereignty.htm on the website of The International Commission on Nobility and Royalty)

          To fulfill all these important purposes:

Microsoft Word Document

George Washington declared, "Truth will ultimately prevail [but only] where there [is a concerted effort] to bring it to light." Every single relevant point will be examined in great detail, so that the reader can easily see that all the legal facts are more than adequately substantiated, verified and confirmed.     

          This website is about the lawful transfer of all the international land rights, distinctions and honors of the principality of Halberstadt, which claim has been vetted and recognized by scholars as being legally valid and legitimate. (See "The First of Seven Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and/or "Documents") In other words, this case is not based on hunches, speculation, guesswork, or suspicion. Nor it is based on foolish myths, legends, fabrication, or make believe. It is based on many cold, hard, verified facts -- the law itself. Including the fact that, not just one, but eight legitimate and lawful conveyance or acquisition laws transferred the title and rights thereof to our family. Thus, our claim is not only compelling, but it is truly beyond any reasonable doubt. This is because no other logical explanation can be derived from the facts, and expert legal witnesses have validated the claim as genuine and accurate. (See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim" and "Documents: Testaments and Witnesses to the Truth")

In other words, this case is not questionable or problematic. The proof is not imaginary. It is as close to being flawless that is possible in this life.

          There are six additional binding methods of transfer. (See "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges, "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" and "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges."

          To remove unreasonable or irrational doubt in any kind of important claim, ". . . it behooves us to place the foundations of knowledge [or a case such as ours] in[to] mathematics." (Roger Bacon as quoted in Stuart Shanker, Wittgenstein and the Turning Point in the Philosophy of Mathematics, 1987 p. 269) Mathematics is one of the surest paths to truth, because the principles of mathematics are the principles of almost all things. Not every thing lends itself to math, but the precise exactness of the laws in this case and the facts thereof, do. For that reason, probability is particular is well-suited to our case. This project was done with the help of two prominent members of the Math Department of Dixie State University. The exacting science of probability shows the claim is not merely a "preponderance of evidence" level situation, making it "more likely than not," or even just a "clear and convincing" case, meaning it is exceptionally compelling. But it is nothing less than the highest confidence level available, which is far "beyond reasonable doubt," because it has achieved mathematical certainty.
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Table of Contents: (Every section and subsection in one way or another provides verified evidence of the truth)

Preface
Introduction
Again, Court Involvement is not Required for International Acquisition Laws to Transfer Sovereign Rights
The Fifth Legal Transfer of Rights: Non-Violent Conquest
Abandonment--The Grand Master Key
The Sixth Legal Transfer of Rights: International Prescriptive Law
          a. "Ordinary" International Prescription transferred all Rights
         b. International Prescription is Legally Powerful and Completed the Transfer
Uti possidetis juris and Uti possidetis defacto
Non-Belligerent Occupation, International Prescription, Non-violent Conquests and Peaceful Annexation have much in Common as Sovereign Acquisition and Loss Modes
Underlying Purpose

 Preface

In preparation to understand the following, a few important concepts are helpful to remember:

(1) Sovereignty is the highest secular right on earth. It is the supreme legal authority about all others. (See "The Vital Importance of Sovereignty" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(2) Whether de jure, deposed or non-reigning, on the one hand, or de facto, reigning or regnant, both hold this greatest of all legal governmental rights. (See "Deposed Royal Houses can Maintain Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty Forever" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(3) The laws that transfer the supreme right to rule apply to both reigning and deposed entities. (See "Non-Reigning Royal Rights can be Transferred to Others Under International Law" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(4) Recognition does not create sovereignty or non-recognition destroy it. If an entity is sovereign, it is. Recognition does not change realty or what is real. (See "Recognition is Immaterial or Irrelevant to the Situation" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" and "Recognition Unessential to being Legitimate and Valid" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
(5) Legal intervention or court decrees are not part of the legal formulate for the accusations/loss laws that can transfer sovereignty in England and for the international laws that can do the same. They are binding on their own without any other intervention. (See "Automatic Nature of Adverse Possession in English Law" and "Court Involvement is not Required for Occupation to Effect Changes in Sovereignty" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

 Introduction

          There are seven modes -- each of which lawfully transferred all the rights and entitlements to our family. This kind of thing is legal and has been accomplished over and over again. Emerich de Vattel, one of the fathers of international law, declared that a whole kingdom or principality may be obtained by one ". . . who has purchased it, or received it in exchange, or acquired it by any title whatever." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book III, chapter 13, no. 198) (emphasis added)  

          It must be admitted that there is no a priori [self-evident] reason why the categories of methods of acquiring territorial sovereignty should be considered closed. International law is not so rigid as to exclude new developments. It may well be, therefore that there exists a sixth [or seventh or eight] method of acquiring territorial sovereignty. . . . (F. A. Mann, "The Present Legal Status of Germany," The International Law Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 3, Autumn, 1947, p. 326)

          In fact, other methods are now widely recognized; such as, international proprietary estoppel, novation, consolidation of title and historic title. That is, any truly legal and valid mechanism that can pass on a sovereign regal entity can be acquired, according to Vattel "by any title whatever." And ". . . It is this [kind of legal transfer] which gives the receiver . . . regal [kingly and/or princely] right." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, [1680], vol. 2, John Pawley Bate, trans., chapter 9, no. 19, 1916)

          Our case is about one of many historical instances. The only difference is this is a fairly recent event, but just as valid as those of earlier days. (See the "Sovereign Honors and Rights can be Transferred" and "Private Individuals can become Royal Sovereigns" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" for numerous examples of such in history) That is:

          [Sovereign] territories were transferred back and forth and thus boundaries were [quite fluid] drawn and redrawn as a result of war, conquest [including non-violent conquests], treaties, dynastic marriage, purchase and other transactions . . . . (Robert H. Jackson, "Boundaries and International Society," International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, Barbara Allen Roberson, ed., 1998, p. 161) (emphasis added)

          Transfers of sovereignty can be "acquired . . . by any title whatever." "Other [possible] transactions" includes any other legal or lawful mechanism that can be employed.  For example, English private international law can activate the rightful and lawful transfer of a sovereign entity under English domestic law. That is a fact. (See "English Private International Law activates English Domestic Adverse Possession" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

          Much of this website definitively substantiates this and every one of the eight methods of territorial acquisition. The following are a few of the briefs on some of the various laws involved. (See "1st Legally Binding Transfer of Rights and the Two Additional Transfer Modes," "The Importance of English Private International Law," and "Automatic Nature of Adverse Possession in English Law" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") (See also "Abandonment" in "Letters from the Imperial Family" and "Adverse Possession," and "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges," as well as "Adverse Possession Applies" and "All Nine Requirements were Fulfilled to the Utmost" also in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")

          There are two kinds of legally valid sovereignty. Illegally deposed, dispossessed or de jure non-territorial sovereignty, and reigning or de facto sovereignty that actually is governing the territory. De jure sovereignty is defined as the legal, rightful supreme right to rule. De facto sovereignty is actually ruling the land and its people. Such a government reigns or is regnant, but not necessarily de jure or lawful. The illegally deposed monarchy may be the rightful rulers in international law, in spite of the fact that they are exiled and without power. De jure means "by virtue of law." De facto means "In fact. Used to distinguish something that actually exists from what may exist only in law." (Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary, 2005, p. xix) Simply stated:

          According to international law, sovereignty i.e. the legitimate exercise of power by a state: de jure sovereignty is the legal right to do so; de facto sovereignty is the ability in fact to do so. Ideally, de jure and de facto circumstance coexist, though . . . that is not always the case. (Joan Johnson-Freeze, Heavenly Ambitions: America's Quest to Dominate Space, 2009, p. 34)

          For example, there is the de jure or illegally deposed monarchy or exiled government and the de facto usurper or new republic that is in power. Both hold sovereignty of a different kind. The former is de jure or legal and rightful, and the latter is de facto -- the one in control or in power. The de jure sovereignty can remain as such as long as the exiled government or deposed royal house preserves and continues to maintain its rights.

          Two kinds of government are known to international law — governments "de jure," and governments "de facto." Governments "de jure," or legalized governments, are those which are in general recognized as having all the attributes of sovereign power, whether able to enforce their sovereignty over the territory they claim or not [such as, a deposed monarchy that maintain their right to rule]. Governments "de facto" are those which, without . . . the legal [right or] attributes of sovereignty, nevertheless actually exercise the powers of sovereignty [or rulership]. . . . ("First Year of the Philippine Subjection," February 3, 1900, p. 6, The Public, Louis Freeland Post, Alice Thatcher Post and Stoughton Cooley, eds., 1903, no. 96)

          De jure sovereignty . . . has its foundation in law, not in physical power. . . . This is the sovereignty that the law recognizes and to which it attributes the right to govern. . . . As a matter of fact, it [the head of the royal house] may not be the actual sovereign, for [he] may be expelled, as has been said, from [his] rightful place or may have temporarily disappeared through disorganization or disintegration; but, however this may be, [the de jure or deposed sovereign] has legal right on its side and is lawfully entitled [even though he is dispossessed]. (James Wilford Garner, Introduction to Political Science: A Treatise on the Origin, Nature, Functions, and Organization of the State, 2015, p. 247)

          Deposed sovereignty is not necessarily lost but can remain intact forever. That is, ". . . where there is an adverse claimant [the head of a deposed royal house], who has been de jure sovereign; who has been unjustly and sinfully deposed; and who has not yet lost its right." ("Art. II – Reply to two criticisms – Civil sovereignty, and necessary Truth," The Dublin Review, vol. 77, July – October 1875, p. 44) In fact, he may never lose his right, because the de jure or rightful entitlement to rule can go on endlessly or never end provided the preservation laws are consistently and publicly observed. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "Deposed Sovereignty and Royalty: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost"

          In domestic law, especially English domestic law, deposed sovereignty can be sold, adversely possessed and conveyed through proprietary estoppel. This is because of the immense power that private international law has to govern private foreign and international situations. In public, rather than private, international law, deposed sovereignty can also be sold, conquered, occupied, abandoned, accrued or prescripted. Either way sovereignty can be transferred. In our case, several methods of transfer took place through domestic and international legal procedures. Each transfer method is binding, permanent and conclusive.

 Court Involvement is not Required for International Acquisition Laws to Transfer Sovereign Rights

          In international law, all . . . court involvement is voluntary, so either party can stop the meddling or interference of a court or tribunal simply by refusing to be involved.  Hence, the statement is true that "[international . . . ] disputes are subject to no judge [no trial, no court or legal action]. . . ." (Stephen P. Kerr, The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law, 2016, p. 129 and Freiiherr von Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum: The translation, Joseph Horace Drake, trans., 1964, p. 188)

          In international law, none of the modes of acquiring sovereign rights and ownership require any kind of court or judicial involvement. They are automatically and legally binding in and of themselves.

          . . . Each "mode" [abandonment and occupation being two of them] affords . . . a factual or juridical process which international law . . . acknowledges to be capable of creating a "title" to -- or basis of – [a transfer of] territorial sovereignty. (Linda J. Pike, Encyclopedia of Disputes Installment, vol. 10, "Territory, Acquisition," 2014, p. 496)

          ". . . Juridical acts or further legally relevant facts can operate as titles by which territorial sovereignty [the internal right to rule] can be acquired [or] lost. . . ." (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 347)  In other words, by juridical means, "Legal rights can expire without the intervention of a court." (Noel Cox, Anglicans/Dynastic Law; 2015: http://en.allexperts.com/q/Anglicans-943/2010/12/Dynastic-Law.htm) Royal status can and has been created and terminated by appropriate non-judicial juridical acts. Binding juridical acts are most often completed outside of court -- contract law being a good example.

          In summary of all of the above, ". . . There is no requirement [in international law] to refer a dispute to international tribunals or other settlement mechanisms." (Jessup worldwide Competition for International Law, "Bench Memorandum 2010," p. 12) No court or legal involvement is required for abandonment or occupation to effect a change in ownership of a territory and the de jure regal princely right to rule a land on either a regnant or dispossessed level.

  The Fifth Legal Transfer of Rights: Non-Violent Conquest

          Non-violent or peaceful conquest, in international law, is one of the methods that can legally transfers all the rights and entitlements of sovereignty. And, as in "all" the other international laws of acquisition, such applies to both reigning and non-reigning sovereignties. (See "Non-Reigning Royal Rights can be Transferred to Others under International Law" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

          Conquest was in the past considered to be a legitimate and lawful way to obtain territory. "Treatises [that is, commentaries] of international law have often enumerated discovery, occupation, conquest, cession, prescription and accretion as the major titles to territory. They are also characterized as 'modes of acquiring territories.'" (Onuma Yasuaki, International Law in a Transcivilizational World, p. 306 and Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1, 1905, pp. 263-296) In the past:

          Conquest is associated with the traditional principle that sovereign states may resort to war at their discretion and that territorial and other gains achieved by military victory will be recognized as legally valid. (Conquest International Law; 2018: https://www.britannica.com/topic/conquest-international-law)

          However, now-a-days belligerent occupation or conquest of another sovereign territory cannot legally yield so much as ". . . an atom of sovereignty in the authority of the occupant." (Lassa Oppenheim, "The Legal Relations Between an Occupying Power and the Inhabitants," Law Quarterly Review, vol. 33, 1917, pp. 363-364) This is merely a confirmation of the jus cogens (compelling law) principle of international law, which bars the acquisition of territory through the use of threat or force. The rejection of violent conquest began in 1928 and in a progressive manner finally culminated in 1970. In that year, the United Nations General Assembly declared as a body that it was a general principle of international law that "no acquisition of territory resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal." (Peter Malanczuk and Michael Barton Akehurst, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th revised ed., 1997, p. 152) Earlier in 1945 in the United Nations Charter, proclaimed the same seminar principal: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." (Chapter 1, article 2(4)

          [However] even in post-1945 international law, the invalidity of [violent or forced conquest] has been in very few instances . . . transforming the illegal effective situation into a lawful territorial situation. (Enrico Milano, Unlawful Territorial Situations in International Law: Reconciling Effectiveness, Legality and Legitimacy, 2006, p. 89)

          That is:

          Although [violent conquest] has been officially disallowed by the United Nations Charter, the examples of Palestine (1948-1949) and Goa (1961) suggest that a limited form of conquest is still possible. (Andrew F. Burghardt, "The Basis of Territorial Claims," Geographical Review, vol. 63, no. 2,  1973, p. 229)

          Not only is conquest still possible, but when it is not violent or accomplished by threat, it is completely legitimate. This is because, ". . . Title by conquest remains a valid title . . . when [it] is not in the particular case, unlawful." (Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1, 1955, p. 574) That is, if it was peaceful, non-violent nor achieved by force or intimidation, then the conquest is legally and lawfully valid. The point is, there is nothing illegal for non-violent conquest to take place, especially over a depose, legal, sovereign entity in international law. That is, there is no law against peaceful conquest, only violent conquest or a conquest involving "threat" or the "use of force." The prohibition on violent coercive territorial conquest has become a cornerstone of the international legal law, and yet even in this kind of situation, there are exceptions. But there is no rule against non-violent conquest. Hence, the following remark:

          [Violent] conquest cannot be regarded as a legal method of acquiring territory, nor can peaceful conquest under the form of expansion or colonial protectorate, in violation of the principles of "common" law, be regarded as legitimate. (Pasquale Fiore, International Law Codified and its Legal Sanction or the Legal Organization of the Society of States, 1918, p. 421)

          In our case, there is no violation of common or nature law, no protectorate. Only domestic and international acquisition laws were legally used to create enable a non-military, non-violent or peaceful conquest to take place. Hence, no laws were broken. Various lawful forms of non-violent conquest for the sovereign right to rule can include inheritance or wills in a proprietary monarchy, purchase, gifting, cession, prescription, annexation, occupation and domestic transfer methods; such as, adverse possession or proprietary estoppel authorize under the power of private international law. All of these modes are peaceful and honorable. Additional means include to acquire:

           . . . by peaceful means [non-violent or peaceful conquest] . . . lie in "discovery," "effective occupation," "control," "contiguity" and/or "prescription." Any or all of these may form a claim to possession. But in the final analysis, the strength of any title lies in the determination of the claimant to preserve it. . . . (Peter Kikkert and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Legal Appraisals of Canada’s Artic Sovereignty, Key Documents 1905-1956, 2014, p. 113)

          That is, perseverance is a must. Claims lawfully obtained must be maintained or they are eventually legally forfeited and lost forever.

          Non-violent or peaceful conquest is the same as a non-violent, non-threatening victory that results in the obtaining of either regnant or deposed sovereignty over a nation, country or people. This can be accomplished in any truly lawful mechanism supported by law. (See "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and a Fraudulent Claim")

          "The only requirement of fact to be fulfilled before the title by conquest can be established is that the territory must be in the effective possession of the conqueror." (Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest, 2003, p. 8 and Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, part 4, chapter 2, section 246, no. 169) (emphasis added) That is, ". . . title by conquest is formally complete when the conquering state [whether regnant or non-reigning] unilaterally [or single-handedly] annexes the conquered territory. . . ." (Ibid., p. 9) This legal obligation applies to both types of international conquest -- violent and non-violent, but only peaceful conquest is still permissible. "[Annexation] is used within and outside the context of armed conflicts [that is, in both violent and non-violent conquest], to designate a unilateral [one-sided] decision . . . to extend [ones] sovereignty over a given territory." (Marcelo G Kohen "Conquest" in Frauke Lachenmann and Rüdiger Wolfrum, The Law of Armed Conflict and the Use of Force: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2017, p. 289) However, ". . . it is doubtful whether an annexation proclaimed while war is still in progress would have operated to pass a good title to territory." (Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 7th ed., 2014, p. 362) Hence, our public decree on May 11, 2006 --  our "Declaration of Ownership" came long after we had already legally won the rights to the principality through the first, second, third, fourth and sixth acquisition or transfer methods. (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" and the "The Sixth Legal Transfer of Rights--International Prescriptive Law" on this page)

          It is important to realize that "The formalities accompanying annexation are not prescribed by International Law." (Przemyslaw Saganek, Unilateral Acts of States in Public International Law, 2016, p. 222 and Thomas Joseph Lawrence, The Principles of International Law, 1925, p. 149) The important thing is that the proclamation declares unequivocal ownership as our "Declaration of Ownership" unmistakably did. It was announced years after taking possession of the sovereign entity and we legally maintaining it as mandated by the law. (Ibid.)

          Our conquest was non-violent as required because the Imperial family had already abandoned or discarded all the rights to the principality in 2002. We held non-hostile constructive possession of the principality since 2001 and made our annexation proclamation first in 2005 and then publicly in 2006. (See "What was Transferred")

          In 2000, starting with a conveyance claim, we first proclaimed our right to the Principality of Halberstadt. This continued unabated to the present time and will continue into the future. That is, our public proclamation of the fact that we annexed, possessed and owned it was consistent and only increased with time. The first public act was to have our claim printed on our checks, which we used in most of our purchases at the time. Our checks still maintain this assertion. (See "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" for how possession was undeniably achieved, maintained and improved along the way, all of which were international acts in full harmony with non-violent conquest -- the capstone being in 2002 with the abandonment of the Imperial Family and our prior constructive or legal adverse possession, which put us into the position of holding the highest rights on earth to the de jure international property. In other words, we had "effectively possessed" and publicly "annexed" the corporeal rights and privileges of the principality through English private international law and by English adverse possession and by continuing to maintaining that right. Hence, we fulfilled "the only requirement" mandatory in the international law for the principle of non-violent conquest to transfer all rights to our family.  

          Just as a conquest using coercion, military or threat manifest itself in many different forms, when lawfully practiced, so to, in historical and legal practice, "peaceful conquest" has varied in how it has been accomplished. In our case, the non-violent victory was mainly by six different legal modes described in:

(1) the 1st Legally Binding Transfer of Rights: English private international law, abandonment and English adverse possession,
(2) the 2nd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights: legal abandonment and non-belligerent occupation,
(3) the 3rd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights: owning the highest right on earth to the property, and
(4) the 4th Legally Binding Transfer of Rights: proprietary estoppel or equitable rights.
(5) the 6th Legally Binding Transfer of Rights: international prescription
(6) the 7th Legally Binding Transfer of Rights: cession

          All six methods of acquisition amounted to a peaceful conquest, because the Imperial and Royal House, being under no threat of violence, merely gave the principality away without any kind of resistance or protest. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family") Whether by violent or peaceful means, conquest literally means to have a victory. In our case, it was winning some precious legal rights – the treasure of a deposed sovereign entity still valid or having legal standing in international law. That is, it resulted in the transfer of all sovereign rights giving our family ownership of the right to rule and all the other entitlements attached to it. This derivative title of ownership, by law, provided us with all the privileges and distinctions of the original regal titles of the historically prominent little principality of Halberstadt, which is about 600 square miles in size.

 Abandonment: The Grand Master Key

          "A state [a reigning or legitimate non-reigning sovereign entity in international law] may readily relinquish territory [by an act of] deny[ing] . . . sovereignty or ownership over it." (Gbenga Oduntan, International Law and Boundary Disputed in Africa, 2015, p. 46) A renunciation of ownership is a denial of ownership, which is by definition an abandonment. In other words, ". . . denial of ownership would mean renouncing [or abandoning] its sovereignty. . . ." (Jon Harald Sande Lie, Developmentality: An Ethnography of the World Bank-Uganda Partnership, 2015, p. 225) To formally deny ownership, as the Imperial family did, is a legally binding form of abandonment -- a renunciation of all rights and royal privileges. By definition, this act of denial is "to [disclaim or] renounce all claim to; to deny ownership of or responsibility for; to disown; to disavow; to reject [it]." (WikiDiff; 2018: https://wikidiff.com/abandon/disclaim)             

           A sovereign authority ". . . relinquishes its rights of [reigning or deposed] sovereignty over territory whenever, by any means, it gives them up [by a denial of ownership like the Imperial family did] or [by] renounc[ing] its claim to them . . . [or any act of] abandonment. . . ." (Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, vol. 1, 1922, p. 191) Legal definitions support that what the Imperial Family did was really – a lawful abandonment. For example, ". . . abandonment requires the intent to relinquish, surrender, and unreservedly give up all claims to the land in question." (State of Oregon v. Thomas Captain, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 12-345, p. 22) This is what the Imperial family did. They gave "up all claims" by denying ownership of what they owned. They manifested "intent" by saying they would not fight it or take legal action to prevent its loss. The following is another example of a legal definition of abandonment showing the same thing, "In law, abandonment is the relinquishment, giving up or renunciation of an interest, claim, civil proceedings, appeal, privilege, possession, or right, especially with the intent of never again resuming or reasserting it." (Big Home Buyer, Abandonment-Definition; 2018: http://bighomebuyer.com/real-estate-terms/abandonment-definition) ". . . [The abandonment] need not be expressed [but] may be gathered from the circumstances. . . ." (Charles Henry Huberich, The Political and Legislative History of Liberia: a Documentary History of Liberia, 1947, p. 251)

          Again, by officially denying or disclaiming ownership, the Imperial Family, in spite of actually owning all the legal rights to the principality in international law, gave up or disowned the "claim," the "right," the "interest," the "privilege" and the "possession," and in addition, they added that they would not fight against the loss of their principality. They legally let it go, washed their hands of it or left it in the hands of others to deal with it according to law. Thus, they demonstrated their absolute "renunciation" with "the intent of never again resuming or reasserting it" as required by law. It was permanent disavowal.

          Sovereign territory [such as a principality] may not only be acquired [by conveyance among other acquisition modes], it may also be lost. . . . Lost by express declaration [like through the Imperial family’s juridically binding letters] or conduct such as a treaty of cession [the Imperial family’s official letters also qualified, by legal definition, as binding treaties]. . . [or] by acquiescence [negligence, silence or absence of diplomatic protest] through prescription. Further, territory may be abandoned [which also means a total loss of ownership as the Imperial family officially repudiated and renounced owning what they owned]. . . . (Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., 2003, pp. 442-443)

          Those Princes do likewise forfeit this Sacredness [their royalty], who have either laid down their Dignity [their sovereignty], or have utterly deserted and abandon’d the Kingdom [or principality as in our case]. . . . (Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book 7, chapter 8, no. 8)

          Corresponding [to] the modes of acquiring territory, there are modes of losing it. Territory may be lost by express declaration or conduct such as a treaty of cession or acceptance of cession, by conquest, by erosion or natural geographic activities, by prescription or by abandonment. (Walid Abdulrahim, State Territory and Territorial Sovereignty; 2018: https://sites.google.com/site/walidabdulrahim/home/my-studies-in-english/6-state-territory-and-territorial-sovereignty) (emphasis added)

          Abandonment has powerful legal implications. It is central to the seven transfer methods. For example, abandoned tangible property, or discarded intangible property rights, are ". . . deemed to have been returned, so to speak, to the common mass and to belong to the one who first assumes possession, . . . and the former owner can assert no [further] claims thereto." (Aigler, Rights of Finders, 21 Mich. L.Rev. 664 in William T. Fryer, Readings in Personal Property, 368) Also, ". . . The first person who takes possession of abandoned property acquires title that is valid against the world, including the prior owner."  (§ 4.04 Rights of Finder Against Original Owner, 2013: http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/study/outlines/html/prop/index_Full.asp)

          All mankind have an equal right to things that have not yet fallen into possession of any one [or where they have been abandoned]; and those things belong to the person who first takes possession of them. (John Norton Pomeroy, Lectures on International Law in Time of Peace, 1886, p. 98)

          In other words, "Abandoned property belongs to the finder." (D. Barlow Burke and Joseph A. Snoe, Property: Examples & Explanations, 3rd ed., 2008, p. 35) However, real property doesn't become the immediate property of a possessor, except through international non-belligerent occupation, non-violent conquest and/or international prescription. The last mode of transference will be discussed next. In addition, adverse possession laws, on an English domestic level, through English private international law can be a vehicle of new ownership of private international rights, but it takes twelve years. But with the advent of  abandonment, an adverse possessor can immediately, totally and exclusively hold the highest right on earth to the de jure territory. (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

Dereliction is another method of loss, however, it is by definition the same thing as abandonment with the addition of intent.

          Dereliction as a mode of losing corresponds to occupation [or possession] as a mode of acquiring territory. Dereliction frees a territory from the sovereignty of the present owner State. Dereliction is effected through the owner State’s complete abandonment of the territory with the intention of withdrawing from it for ever, thus relinquishing sovereignty over it. (Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1, 1905, p. 298)

          The abandonment of the Imperial and Royal House of Hohenzollern of the Principality of Halberstadt was official through the general secretary and attorney of the House at the request of the Head of the Royal House, HIRH Prince George Friedrich von Preußen. They denied owning what they owned. A denial is to disclaim, disavowal all connection to the rights thereof. It is a complete repudiation. These official letters were binding or juridical legal documents on several levels including estoppel on a domestic and international level – legally preventing retraction, and under private international treaty law also making it legally permanent. There could hardly be a more powerful and absolute renunciation. In addition, as required by dereliction, "the intention to withdrawing for it for ever" was added, "thus relinquishing sovereignty over it." (See "Abandonment" in "Letters from the Imperial Family")

Abandonment in international law is juridical. It is a conclusive and legally binding act which stands independent of any kind of outside judicial or legal involvement. Vattel explains:

          . . . the law of nature ordained that all men should respect the right of private property in him who makes use of it? For the same reason, therefore, the same law requires that every proprietor who for a long time and without any just reason neglects his right, should be presumed to have entirely renounced and abandoned it. This is what forms the absolute presumption (juris et de jure) of its abandonment, -- a presumption, upon which another person [the subsequent government or the holder of the second highest right to it] is legally entitled to appropriate to himself the thing so abandoned. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 141)

           The important thing to remember is that abandonment is final and conclusive. "An abandonment of property, or a right, divests the title and ownership of the [former] owner as fully and completely as would a conveyance," or, as fully and completely as though it were sold and he or she, the former owner, no longer owns it or has any claim or future connection to it. (1 Corpus Juris Secundum §12, n. 71) That is, ". . . that very Moment, in which [a sovereign house or polity] renounce their Right, [they] have no longer any thing to do with the Sovereignty [they abandoned]." (Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book 7, chapter 3, no. 8, 1729 ed.) Adverse possession in our case is built around abandonment, which is literally what took place. And once it does, it is permanent, that is, "A title [to sovereignty] once abandoned whether tacitly [by implication] or expressly, cannot be resumed [continued, started over or reconstituted]." (T. Twiss, The Oregon Question Examined, 1840, p. 24) It is final.  

            "The consequence of abandonment [in international law] is either that the territory becomes res nullius [having no owner] once again, or that it falls under another State’s sovereignty [that is, it is transferred]." (Marcelo G Kohen, Territory, Abandonment, Oxford Public International law: 2108: http://opil.ouplaw.com/oxlaw/entryview/viewoxlawoxchap/10.1093$002flaw:epil$002f9780199231690$002flaw-9780199231690-e1117) In other words, abandonment is the key that opens the door for non-belligerent occupation, non-violent conquest and international prescriptive law to immediately transfer international ownership rights to whoever holds either the secondary reigning or non-reigning de jure right to govern the respective territories involved. Alienation or abandonment is so important in transferring international rights and entitlements that it is mentioned as part of "The modes of acquiring Kingdoms [or a principality in this case] under the Law of Nations are: Election, Succession, Conquest, Alienation and Prescription." (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 1680, p. 77) (emphasis added) Abandonment enables changes in the right to rule and/or who rightfully owns the deposed or de jure territory involved. Abandonment is involved in all the transfer methods in one way or another.

 The Sixth Legal Transfer of Rights: International Prescriptive Law

First of all: "The dominion of nations [sovereignty] is acquired and lost by prescription." (Antonio Riquelme, Derecho Publico Internacional, 1875, p. 29) In other words, prescription is the one single law that enables deposed sovereignty to exist or be ruined or destroyed.
(See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and a Fraudulent Claim") Prescriptive law established the transfer of Halberstadt as a legal fact. In international law, there is "ordinary" and "immemorial" prescription.

 "Ordinary" International Prescription transferred all Rights:

          "Waiver [or abandonment], acquiescence and extinctive prescription are legal concepts entailing the same effect – they lead to the loss of a right or claim." (Christian J. Tams, "Waiver, Acquiescence and Extinctive Prescription," University of Glasgow, 2009, p. 1, 2013: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1414188) "Once the conditions for any of them are met, the claimant State’s [regal and sovereign] right . . . ceases to exist." (Ibid., p. 2) All is lost. In other words, abandonment can cause a prompt and immediate forfeiture of all rights for a claim to some territory, kingdom, or principality. (See "Abandonment" in "Letters from the Imperial Family")

          There is in international law two types of prescription according to Emerich de Vattel. One is "ordinary" and the other is "immemorial." The difference is that "ordinary" prescription take less than 100 years before it become binding and irrefutable. Immemorial prescription requires 100 years or more and is juris et de jure or final.   

          Juris et de jure [Latin] -- "Of law and of right." A presumption juris et de jure, or an irrebuttable presumption, is one which the law will not suffer to be rebutted by any counter-evidence, but establishes as conclusive. . . . (Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary, 1st. ed., 1891, p. 633)

          In other words, "Where [there] is juris et de jure, the law . . . forbids the admission of counter-evidence. The inference (for it is absurd to call it a presumption) is conclusive.  That is to say, proof to the contrary is inadmissible." (John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, vol. 1, no. 698, 2009, p. 347) "Immemorial possession [of 100 years or more] . . . is an irrefragable [that is, an indisputable] title, and immemorial prescription admits of no exception: both are founded on a presumption which the law of nature directs us to receive as an incontestable [or undeniable] truth." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 143)

          In cases of ordinary prescription [that is, prescription of less than 100 years – not immemorial] the same argument [of indefeasibility] can not be used against a claimant who alleges just reasons for his silence, as the impossibility of speaking, or a well-founded fear, etc., because there is then no longer any room for a presumption that he has abandoned his right.  It is not his fault if people have thought themselves authorized to form such a presumption, nor ought he to suffer in consequence.  He cannot, therefore, be debarred the liberty of clearly proving his property [that is, if the case is less than 100 years old]. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 144) (emphasis added)

          Ordinary Prescription is therefore based on three things to be binding:

1.  . . . that the proprietor cannot allege an invincible ignorance [that is, the former sovereign cannot supply an invincible defense because of ignorance] . . . either on his own part, or on that of the persons from whom he derives his right;
2.  that he cannot justify his silence by lawful and substantial reasons; [and]
3.  that he has neglected his right, or kept silence during a considerable number of years. . . . (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 142)

          Using the above criteria:

1. Since the Imperial House could not supply an "invincible" defense of ignorance about the conveyance of the Principality, because we informed them of what was going on, and they acknowledge this understanding to us officially through their attorneys, and
2. Since the Imperial House were not under mortal danger not to protest, take legal action, etc., this also left them without a valid reason to rebuttal the case, and
3. Since such a long period of time, passed in silence, ordinary prescription rightfully barred them from any future or lawful claim.

          In other words, there was no "just reasons for [their] silence," no "impossibility of speaking" nor any kind of viable or "well-founded fear" for making a legal protest; hence, ordinary prescription was fully competent to transferred all the rights to our family even without their legal abandonment or abdication.

          The time requirement of prescriptive law has become shorter and shorter through the years. In the early 17th century, it was known and stated that, ". . . Sixty years prescription [is] sufficient to deprive a lawful [deposed] King of his Princely right, and give it to a . . . usurper [or actual possessor]. . . ." (David Morrison Rogers, English Recusant Literature, 1558-1640, vol. 280, 1969, p. 158) To lose one’s deposed "Princely right" is to forfeit all hereditary rights and entitlements. Once lost, the deposed and his or her House becomes common and have no sovereign right higher than any other commoner.  No regal rights are retained once internal and external de jure sovereignty is lost. In other words, eventually the de facto ruler can:

          . . . get a lawful [full and complete] right to the kingdom, because . . . he reigned peaceably sixty years . . . [that is] either sixty years prescription, or peaceable [that is, uncontested] possession is sufficient to give . . . a true and lawful right to the kingdom. . . . (Ibid., p. 134) (emphasis added)

          The normal old requirement of a century for the transfer of sovereignty can now be completed in much less time even for "ordinary international prescription." For example, a treaty between Great Britain and Venezuela in 1897, ". . . affirmed that a fifty year prescription gave good title." (Quincy Wright, The Enforcement of International Law through Municipal Law in the United States, 1915, p. 24) (emphasis added)

          This international arbitration commission also concluded that, "A right unasserted [neglected] for over forty-three years can hardly in justice be called a [legitimate] 'claim.'" to stop a transfer. (United States and Venezuelan Claims Commission, 1889-90, Opinions, p. 79) (emphasis added) Even "thirty years has been suggested as the minimum [for sovereign prescription], while fifty years have received sanction of many writers." (Arnold Bennett Hall, International Law, 1910, p. 27) This shorter period 30 year period was also suggested by Sir Robert Phillimore, the great 19th century publicist. (Venezuela, Case of Venezuela in the Question of Boundary Between Venezuela and British Guiana, vol. 2, 1898, p. 302) (emphasis added) In modern times, the 50-year date has received relative acceptance, but even shorter time periods have been judicially endorsed:

          . . . In 1970, the Swiss Government expressed the view that a lapse of 20 to 30 years was required. . . .  [Such that] the lapse of more than 30 years [no longer] constitute[s] a bar against presenting a claim. . . .  In contrast, the arbitrators in Loretta G. Barberie held 15 years to constitute an unreasonable delay giving rise to prescription. (Christian J. Tams, "Waiver, Acquiescence and Extinctive Prescription," pp. 18-19, University of Glasgow, 2009: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1414188) (emphasis added)

          Vattel concluded that the short time for "ordinary" prescription:

              . . . is impossible to determine by the law of nature the number of years required to found a prescription: this depends on the nature of the property disputed, and the circumstances of the case. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 142)

          In our case, the official abandonment instantly meant that there was no more waiting period. The transfer was a done deal as soon as the renunciation of ownership was made by the House attorneys. There was no required or mandatory wait for 15, 20, 30, 50, 60 or 100 years. The transfer was immediate and final. This is because no one held a higher or superior right to the principality than we did since the years 2000 by a valid deed, and in 2001 by adverse possession rules. (See "3rd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") Therefore, once all entitlement was cast off, thrown away, and legally abandoned or disowned, we instantaneously held the highest of all rights to it on earth. In case of abandonment, there is no pause or delay. The transfer was immediate and conclusive.

 International Prescription is Legally Powerful and Completed the Transfer:

          Prescription not only transfers sovereign rights, it preserves and perpetuate depose sovereignty. In fact it is the only law on earth that enables deposed sovereignty to continue to be valid on an international level even though the monarchs or governments-in-exile have no control over their former lands. This situation is called legal, non-territorial sovereignty. It is de jure or rightful, but dispossessed having no control over their own lands and people. This happens because prescriptive law has the power to preserve and maintain the right of sovereignty forever as long as the requirements of the law are obeyed. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De ure Ownership") Prescription can also irretrievably destroy all sovereign and royal rights so that they are forfeited and completely and conclusively terminated. (See "Deposed Sovereignty and Royalty: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm) (See also the book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com)

          Vattel explained how deposed royal houses can keep their rights alive indefinitely by a certain type of protest required by prescription. He declared, "Protests answer this purpose. With sovereigns it is usual to retain the title and arms of a sovereignty or a province, as an evidence that they do not relinquish their claims to it." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 145) In other words, ". . . keeping up the Titles and Arms of Kingdoms, implies in it a Kind of continual Protestation, to prevent the Prescription [or loss] of the Rights which are . . . [authentically and rightfully claimed for] these Kingdoms or Dominions." (Larry May, Aggression and Crimes against Peace, 2008, p. 144) However, "if he has neglected it [failed to assert his titles or made the required protests] for such a length of time [50 to 100 years] . . . the law of nature will no longer allow him to revive and assert his claims. . . ." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 141)  He loses them altogether. (See "Fifty to One Hundred Years are Required for the Transfer of the Internal Legal Right to Rule" in volume 2 of chapter 2 in the book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com)

          Prescription is a powerful natural law, part of the necessary or core rules of international law, not a transitory part of the law of nations. That is, ". . . One part of international law [is] stable and eternally the same . . . another part as shifting and changeable with the changing manners, fashions, creeds, and customs [of man]. . . ." (Sheldon Amos, The Science of Law, 1874, p. 341) Vattel explained:

           . . . As this law [natural law of which prescription is a part] is immutable, and the obligations that arise from it necessary and indispensable, nations can neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense with it in their own conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of it. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, "Preliminaries," nos. 8-9)

          Sir William Blackstone declared the following on natural law:

          It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original." (Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1, 4th ed., 1770, p. 41)

          When abandonment is combined with prescription, the law creates new requirements. Abandonment, another natural law right, is a very serious and far-reaching act. (See "Abandonment" in "Letters from the Imperial Family")

          Those Princes . . . forfeit this Sacredness [their sovereign ownership], who have either laid down their Dignity [their sovereignty], or have utterly deserted and abandon’d the Kingdom [or principality]. . . . (Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book 7, chapter 8, no. 8)

          Normally, "Prescription, in international law, is sovereignty transfer of a territory by the open encroachment by the new sovereign upon the territory for a prolonged period of time, acting as the sovereign, without protest or other contest by the original sovereign." (Newspapers Library, Prescription (sovereignty transfer); 2018: http://newspaperslibrary.org/articles/eng/Prescription_(sovereignty_transfer) However, when the "original sovereign" officially abandons the territory, then the "prolonged period of time" requirement ceases to exist. At this point the transfer becomes immediate. That is, in situations where there is an abandonment, ". . . there’s no need of waiting for the Term of Prescription [normally 50 to 100 years], since the Right is immediately transferred on [to] the other Party." (Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book 4, chapter 12, no. 8, 1710 (emphasis added) That is:

          . . . Occupation [or possession as in prescription] of terra nullius [no man’s land either by the fact that it is empty of inhabitants or because of abandonment] results in an immediate title [of ownership] opposable to the whole world. (R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, pp. 38-39)

          Good against the whole world means it is a valid against any attacks upon its legitimacy and integrity worldwide. Prescription gives all sovereign ownership rights instantaneously to the person or state that has the next legally highest right to it. In our case, we had constructive or factual possession and therefore the superior or next highest right to it.

          The reason why "there's no need of waiting for the Term of Prescription" is the original owner is no longer the owner. He is out of the picture --  the rightful owner is, at this point, the person or organization that holds the second highest right to the property. That person or organization immediately and automatically holds the pinnacle, the uppermost, the highest right on earth to the territory and all its rights, honor, distinctions and privileges. No one else has a valid claim as high as this person or group of people.

          Pufendorf gave an example of such an immediate loss and the transfer thereof through prescription. It was again immediate. In such a situation, the right to the supreme power has been transferred or conclusively conferred in the eyes of the law without the normal "prolonged period of time:"

          . . . If a City or Country hath on any occasion whatsoever discarded the Sovereignty it once stood under, and set itself up for a free independent State, upon Supposition that it hath transacted the Affair in a friendly manner with its former Lord, and hath by him been acknowledg’d for a free Commonwealth, it immediately commandeth such, with the full Right of Liberty, and need not wait for the tedious Confirmation of Prescription and Use. (Ibid., Book 7, chapter 7, no. 5) (emphasis added)

          Immediate transfers of sovereignty occurs in international occupation, conquest and in certain cases with prescription. They also take place when abandonment occurs and constructive or factual possession has already been established domestically. However, it is still common sense and legally required that responsible possession continue. (See "Constructive Possession" and "The Keystone without which Deposed Occupation becomes Impossible for De jure or Deposed Territories" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") (See also "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")

          In our case, the abandonment or abdication of rights in 2002 permanently terminated the Imperial Hohenzollern's claim to Halberstadt, which reduced the waiting period for prescription from 50 to 100 years to zero. That is, it transferred all rights instantaneously. No waiting period was required, because sovereign possession was already in operation in 2001. This is because we were the only one's legally and exclusively in factual possession or ownership of the principality at the time. There were no competitors. In other words, we not only had the highest right on earth to it in English law, but the only legal right to it on earth. No other claimants existed. No one else had a valid legal and lawful bonafide and rightful constructive right to it.

          All other requirements for international prescription were also achieved, such as, the intention to hold the sovereign rights and achieve peaceful possession, which means that the original owners did not legally protest either the sale or adverse possession of Halberstadt. The Imperial family did not fight the conveyance of their property nor did they interfere with it in any way. The point is, every single requirement of prescription was fulfilled just like every adverse possession mandate was completed. (See "All nine requirements were fulfilled to the utmost" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges") The result is all rights were transferred through prescription as well as the other acquisition modes.

          The last and most important requirement is a display of sovereignty. "This requirement is, perhaps, at the heart of acquisition [transfers] of sovereignty in international law," whether for occupation or for prescription. (Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 7th ed., 2013, p. 162) However, "It is also clear that the extent or degree of display of state power required may vary according to the type of territory in question." (Ibid., p. 163) Dispossessed or de jure international land rights differ markedly from de facto or actual corporeal territory. The former would ". . . require very little by way of sovereign acts to establish title. . . ." (Ibid.) Again, the practice of international law ". . . has been satisfied with very little in the way of the actual exercise of sovereign rights, provided that the other state could not make out a superior claim." (Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed., 2003, p. 433) Sovereign acts (the exercise of sovereignty) for dispossessed international land rights, as shown earlier, are the consistent use of the sovereign titles and national arms of the former kingdom or principality and other obvious and appropriate ways to show that the claim was never abandoned, neglected or discarded. If it was not, then there is proof that the sovereignty is intact for a deposed entity. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")

          As with English adverse possession for unregistered land, when the requirements are met, the transfer is automatic. (See "Automatic Nature of Adverse Possession in English Law" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") The same is true for international prescription. ". . . There is no requirement to refer a [prescriptive] dispute to international tribunals or other settlement mechanism." (Jessup Worldwide Competition for International Law, "Bench Memorandum 2010," p. 12) That is, "[international prescriptive] disputes are subject to no judge [no trial, no court or legal action]. . . ." (Freiherr von Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum, issue 13, vol. 1, no. 364, p. 187) The law stands on its own without any court or other intervention. It is a matter of fact and historical accuracy. In addition, once sovereignty is obtained, the title is supreme or literally the highest on earth or above all others for the territory it represents. One ". . . cannot be deprived of it by another nation." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, chapter 18, no. 207) It is good against the whole world. And recognition is not necessary or needed. The point is, ". . . Sovereignty is neither created by recognition nor destroyed by nonrecognition." (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th edition, part 3, vol. 17, 1981, p. 312) ". . . Sovereignty is not something that is decided by other countries [lawyers or people]. They can only recognize it or not." (Frank Muyard, Director, Taipei Office, French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC), April 1-2, 2005) What this means is recognition is not essential especially for a deposed sovereign entity valid only in international law.

          Prescription works as follows: if a de jure sovereign entity, like the Imperial and Royal house of Hohenzollern, abandons its rights or title, which they did in 2002, ". . . a dispossessed state [a valid deposed claim such as ours holding the second highest possessory right on earth] will be able to establish . . . its [full and complete] right to the territory. . . ." (Seokwoo Lee, "Territorial Disputes Among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands," Boundary & Territory Briefing, vol. 3, no. 7, Shelagh and Clive Schofield, eds., 2002, p. 24) In other words:

          If . . . a state [regnant or deposed] abandons its sovereign title to territory, but the territory does not become terra nullius [empty or have no owner], because other states [reigning or dispossessed] that have valid claims to title in such territory [and] have not abandoned their claims, title must vest in the state [again whether reigning or deposed] that has the best relative claim to the territory. (Ibid.) (emphasis added)

          In summary, since we had "the best relative claim to the territory" and no one else did, therefore, after the official abandonment, the rights vested in us. ". . . The right of [international] prescription is founded on . . . res derelicta primi capientis (that which is abandoned belongs to the first who takes possession thereof)." (José Luis Mendoza, Britain and Her Treaties on Belize (British Honduras): Guatemala Has the Right to Reinstate the Entire Territory of Belize, 1959, p. 83) We had already taken possession of it in the year 2000 in the way that international law requires or mandates for a deposed legally sovereignty entity. So we had taken possession as obligated and adverse possession gave us immediate ownership. ". . . Possession of land is itself a fee simple [absolute ownership]. Thus when I take possession of your land, I have an [immediate] estate in it, readily defeasible by you but not by anyone else. ‘Possession is good title against all but the true owner.’" (Elizabeth Cooke, The New Land Registration, 2003, p. 133) (emphasis added)

          [As a result of this immediate fee simple ownership that is good against the whole world] . . . I can sue in trespass or nuisance, and my estate is [obviously] a fee simple because I can leave it by will to whomsoever I please or allow it to pass on by the rules of intestacy. My fee simple [ownership] co-exists with yours [that is, it co-exists with the paper owner]. . . . [This dual ownership right continues as long as the paper owner does not take legal action, then eventually the paper owner is legally] . . . barred after 12 years and the dispossessed proprietor’s title is extinguished. . . . (Ibid.)

In other words:

          In the case of unregistered land [as in our case] the adverse possessor is regarded as having an estate in fee simple from the moment when he first takes possession (Leach v Jay (1878) 9 ChD 42 at p.45) although until the limitation period has been completed, his title is always liable to be defeated by the owner. Thus even before the period is completed, the squatter [or claimant] has the right and powers of an owner, against everyone except the person he has disposed. (InBrief, Acquisition of an Estate by Adverse Possession; 2019: https://www.inbrief.co.uk/land-law/estate-acquisition-by-adverse-possession)

          In 2001, because adverse possession was activated by the governing law of English private international law, we obtained full and complete constructive or factual possession of the principality we had claimed since 2000 on the basis of a legally valid English Deed of Transfer that was a legitimate legal document. This gave us the second highest right on earth to owning the principality. The abandonment immediately transformed our subordinate or lessor ownership right, that was legally good against the whole world into the highest possession possible. (See "3rd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") This is what the abandoment did. Instantly or immediately thereafter, we held the highest right to it on earth, and prescription with abandonment confirmed it in public international law as well as a valid and lawful transfer.

          Note that all, not some, but all international rights are transferred by international prescriptive law when a transfer takes place and this includes what is both corporeal and incorporeal:

          When we say, that things [sovereignty] may be acquired by prescription [in international law], we must be understood to mean, not only corporeal [the de jure territory or land of a nation], but likewise incorporeal things [the de jure sovereign and royal rights that are connected to it]. (Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius De jure Belli Pacis 1832, p. 65)

          That is, everything regal, grand and sovereign were part of the deal. The new owner of a sovereign principality, being the personification and embodiment of its regal grandeur, owns all its rights, which includes all royal honors and distinctions attached thereunto.

          In summary:

          Prescription, analogous to the common-law property doctrine of adverse possession, generally requires the same conditions. The adverse possession has to be open, conspicuous, notorious, and uninterrupted for a reasonable period of time. [That is] the possession must not be contested or challenged by the original possessor. (Thomas Donovan, "Surinam-Guyana Maritime and Territorial Disputes: a Legal and Historical Analysis," Intervention, Border and Maritime Issues in CARICOM, Kenneth Hall, Kenneth O. Hall, and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang, eds., 2006, p. 154)

          All of these things were fulfilled in our case. And because of the renunciation or abandonment of ownership, ". . . the Right is immediately transferred on [to] the other Party," that is, unto us as the second highest owners or earth. (Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book 4, chapter 12, no. 8, 1710) (See "3rd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

 Uti possidetis juris and Uti possidetis defacto

           We have discussed six ways in which the Principality of Halberstadt was transferred so far. A seventh and eight mode will be discussed in the next chapter. This sub-section describes another international principle that is worth mentioning, because it adds more weight and credibility to the facts that establish ownership of the whole complete territory. This principle does not transfer rights, it is not an acquisition law, but it supports that the fact that the old recognized borders of the principality are the same as they were as recognized in history.

          Uti possidetis juris (UPJ) is a principle of customary international law . . . originally applied to establish the boundaries of decolonized territories. . . . [However, it] has become a rule of wider application [now]. . . . (Cornnel University Law School, uti possidetis juris; 2017: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/uti_possidetis_juris)

          "[Uti possidetis juris (Latin for ‘as you possess under law’) is a] general principle, which is logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence [or a transfer of sovereignty], wherever it occurs." (Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), International Court of Justice, 22 December 1986, p. 20) That is, it applies ". . . in all situations where there was a [sovereignty] movement [or transfer of rights] from one sovereign authority to another [as in our case]." (Fernanda Fernandez Jankov, "The Legality of Uti Possidetis in the definition of Kovoso’s legal Status," p. 4; 2017: http://www.esil-sedi.eu/fichiers/fr/Agora_Fernandez_879.pdf and M. N. Shaw, "Peoples, Territorialism and Boundaries," European Journal of International Law, vol. 8, 1997, p. 497)

          It, like all other international legal principles, can be applied to deposed or non-territorial sovereignty, because it involves "constructive possession" or "possession by law," which is just as legally binding as actual possession. Once we became "independent" in 2002 by virtue of the abandonment of Halberstadt by the House of Hohenzollern, this principle became fully relevant and effective in our case.

          There are ". . . two different forms of uti possidetis, namely, uti possidetis iuris (de jure, legal possession) and uti possidetis de facto (effective possession)." (Fozia Lone, Uti Possidetis Iuris; 2017: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0065.xml) However:

          The principle of uti possidetis iuris favors actual possession [and/or constructive possession, which is legally the same as actual possession] regardless of how it was reached and does not distinguish between de facto and de jure [or deposed] possession [as in our case]. (Oxford Bibliographies; Fozia Lone, Uti Possidetis Iuris; 2019: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0065.xml)

          "The essence of the principle lies in its primary aim of securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when independence [or the transfer was or] is achieved." (Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 International Court of Justice Rep. 554, 20,23 (2); Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute case, El Salvador v. Honduras, 1992, International Court of Justice 351; Opinions N. 2 and No. 3, European Council Conference on Yugoslavia, 1992, 92 I.R.L. 167,170) Halberstadt being a proprietary sovereign entity in international law preserves its old boundaries by law. Nevertheless, those boundaries, according to this international principle, were further validated and legally confirmed by this law. That is, ". . . The effect of the uti possidetis principle is to freeze the territorial title [the old established sovereign boundary] . . . without modification [as it was]. . . ." (International Court of Justice, "Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger)," Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders, 2005, p. 109)

          Hence, there is a second legal witness to the rightful and lawful territorial perimeter for the sovereign rights of the principality. The first being its preservation by prescription and sovereignty law, and the second by uti possidetic iuris as elaborated above. In other words, more than one legal principle established the territorial boundaries and made them legally final and complete. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "Maps of the Noble and Regal Territories belonging to Halberstadt")

 fNon-Belligerent Occupation, International Prescription, Non-violent Conquest and Peaceful Annexation have much in Common as Sovereign Acquisition and Loss Modes

          This subsection is about all four international modes that transferred all the rights, titles, privileges and distinctions of the Principality of Halberstadt. The last two that were discovered are addressed on the next page: cession and annexation.          

          All eight of the international acquisition modes that apply to our case have many similarities. For example:

          [The abandonment or relinquishment of ownership] of transferring sovereignty is sometimes referred to as "acquiescence," "estoppel," and even "prescription." The distinction between renunciation [or abandonment] and prescription is sometimes rather blurred. One difference is the need for occupation [possession] in order to establish prescription. None of these terms has been clearly defined or distinguished in International Law. (William R. Slowmanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 6th ed., 2011, p. 300) (emphasis added)

          To a great degree, these different modes support and compliment each other. In fact, because of the many commonalities and similarities in the four transfer laws, it has been proposed in the past that they could be consolidated into one law, but this was never carried out. (Alexander George Roche, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case: An Analysis of the Decision of the International Court of Justice, 1959, pp. 21, 23) But this reflects the facts about the basic resemblances that exist between them. "[The transfer modes are so similar that] in practice it is unlikely that any single mode would be evident in isolation. The modes are interrelated and in complex cases may be used in conjunction with each other to the extent that no one mode appears dominant." (Alina Kacziriwska-Ireland, Public International Law, 4th ed., 2010, p. 276) For example:

          Annexation . . . has [much] in common with occupation [in] that it is a unilateral international act, but it is distinguished from occupation by the fact that it concerns not no man’s land, but a territory which is placed under the sovereignty of another State. (Ibid., p. 356) (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 347)

          Annexation is involved in nearly all of the modes of transfer in one way or another. ". . . Ceded territory [one transfer mode] becomes part of the nation to which it is annexed [another method of acquisition]." (American Insurance Co. v Canter, I Peters 511, 542) Thus both modes exist together and support one another. For another example, "many of the cases which textbooks classify as an occupation could equally well be regarded as cases on prescription, and vice versa." (Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th 1997, p. 150) Why? – ". . . because often one of the very points in dispute is whether the territory was [actually] terra nullius [empty of population or having no owner] or was subject to the sovereignty of the ‘first’ state before the ‘second’ state arrived on the scene." (Ibid.) Proof of what really happened can be obscured by time, and lacking clear evidence and reliable facts, it can be confusing and misinterpreted. In other words, "The difference between prescription and effective occupation is not easy to establish." (James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 2016, p. 217) Hence, "although occupation and prescription can be distinguished from one another in theory, the difference is usually blurred in real life. . . ." (Ibid.) "The precise mode by which sovereignty is acquired is not always entirely clear." (John McHugo, "How to Prove Title to Territory: A Brief, Practical Introduction to the Law and Evidence," Boundary and Territory Briefing, vol. 2, no. 4, Clive Schofield, ed., 1998, p. 7) "[The renunciation] method of transferring sovereignty is sometimes referred to as acquiescence, estoppel, and even prescription." (William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 6th ed., 2011, p. 300) This is because the various methods are so similar and evidence is sometimes lost as time goes on. The result is, "There is a close affinity between prescription, preclusion, recognition, acquiescence and absence of protest." (Percy Spender, "Temple Case," International Court of Justice Reports, 1962, p. 131) All of these have weight and bearing on each other. The point is, "In practice these modes overlap and sovereignty over territory is sometimes acquired by a combination of them." (Stephen Windsor, "An Exploration and Critique of the Sovereignty Assumed by the United Kingdom over New Zealand," Auckland University Law Review, 1991, p. 173)

          However, for a "non-reigning entity," such as ours, with a current history, the evidence and facts are easy to discern -- nothing is missing -- everything is available for examination. Therefore, the facts of the case can be verified and confirmed without doubt or question. There is little or no mystery involved in any of it. One need only understand the law and what happened. Such is the situation with the claim of Halberstadt. Legally and historically, it is a matter of legal certainty instead of conjecture or guesswork.

          On the similarities of law, ours is a good example. That is, if one has achieved actual constructive (non-reigning) possession of a sovereign land, then one can obtain full ownership either by occupation, prescription or non-violent conquest, peace annexation -- any one of the three or each and everyone of them. That is, the common denominator that makes all three laws active is prior possession before, (not after), an abandonment of the territory takes place. Then all four laws can to take full effect activating a lawful transfer of all the ownership rights and all the entitlements thereof.

          If there is a prior factual or constructive possession created, as in our case in 2001, then an abandonment, which took place in 2002, would activate all four international means of transfer as well as confirming the domestic acquisition modes. This special legal possession status came through English private international law and English adverse possession. When adverse possession is involved, two legal claims exist simultaneously -- the paper or historical title holder (the Imperial family) and the constructive or factual possessor (our family). By complying with all, plus more, of the requirements mandated, we thereby legally obtained the second highest right to the principality on earth in legal or constructive possession. In other words, we possessed the territorial or took over the rights even though the Imperial family still had a higher lawful right to it. They could have easily had our rights legally annulled. But true to their word, they did not take legal action against it. Because we possessed the rights constructively to the principality, before the abandonment, we stood on solid legal ground for the next step toward full and exclusive ownership. (See "Constructive Possession" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality") That is, when the Imperial family legally and officially abandoned all their rights to the principality in 2002, instead of holding the second highest right, we then immediately held the supreme and exclusive right to it on earth. In other words, after the abandonment, no one held a higher lawful right to the territory than we did. The Imperial family no longer held any legal entitlement, ownership or connection to principality, because in a binding lawful way, they abandoned it or legally ditched it or threw it away. We were then the sole and exclusive owners not only by English adverse possession, which validly transferred the principality to us, but by literally fulfilling every single requirement for all four of the international acquisition modes. This is because:

(1) the non-territorial, de jure international land became res nullius, or without an owner, after the abandonment activating our legal right as secondary possessors to become full rightful possessors and owners by having lawfully occupied the possession on a constructive or factual legal basis. (See "2nd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights 2002: Abandonment and Occupation" and "Constructive Possession" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" and "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
(2) the abandonment of the de jure sovereign territory also made it so the time requirement for prescriptive law was automatically waived so that the land rights immediately transferred to us without the normal 50-100 year possession requirement. (See "The Sixth Legal Transfer of Rights--International Prescriptive Law"), and
(3) the rights to the principality immediately became ours by non-violent conquest, occupation and peace incorporation or annexation, when the Imperial family scrapped their ownership while we were legally claiming it. That is, because we held legal constructive possession of the principality, we won the full rights to it in a non-violent way by legally fulfilling all the legal obligations of factual or constructive possession. (See"The Fifth Legal Transfer of Rights: Non-Violent Conquest on this page," "The Eighth Legal Transfer of Rights: Annexation" in "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges" and the "2nd Transfer of Rights 2002: Abandonment and Occupation" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

          The two bottom-line domestic ingredients that gave us constructive rights in 2001, which eventually enabled us to obtain all rights, are because:

(1) the private, national English law that has binding legal power and authority over private situations that include important international or foreign legal aspects. This law is commonly called "private international law." This is very different from "public international law." (See "Private International Law and English Jurisdiction" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and "Private International Law" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality"),
(2) of our totally qualifying for adverse possession in 2001, which gave us constructive or legal possession of a legal, non-territorial sovereign territory in international law, which is important, because ". . . where  . . . the land is in actual adverse possession, the party so holding has constructive possession. . . . Such constructive possession is [greater or] superior to that which results merely from the ownership of the legal titles [by the original owner]. . . . (Lawyer’s Report Annotated, book 69, 1915, p. 742) (emphasis added), and
(3) the abandonment by the Imperial family and its far-reaching legal consequences. (See "Abandonment" in both "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and "Letters from the Imperial Family")

          When abandonment is involved, all rights are automatically conveyed to the person, family, or government who owns the second best possessory claim, which we had, because we held that second highest legal constructive right to the principality since 2001. Therefore, all rights rested upon us as holders of that right. "In the case of abandonment, there is no usurpation [no theft, no robbery] of sovereignty [or property rights] since there are no contemporaneous [or competing or contending ] claims." (James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed., 2008, p. 230) (emphasis added) There is only one claim left -- the occupier's legal right to rule. In such a situation, again, there is "very little" required as far as showing an "exercise of sovereign rights," especially because this is a legal case of non-territorial sovereignty, which is legally supported by the use of titles and arms. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")

          One more common denominator of all three international approaches is the requirement for effectiveness, because it ". . . renders the territorial acquisition lawful [and] common to both the acquisition of title to terra nullius [empty or having no owners as in occupation] and to territory already occupied [as in prescription and non-violent conquest]." (p. 188) In fact, it is so important and central to acquisition that it has become, ". . . The sole paramount question, highlighted by [modern] claimants and decision-makers, [and that core issue] is about effective occupation and use. . . ." (Surya Prakash Shama, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes, and International Law,1997, p. 188) It is critically necessary both before and after the transfer is legally completed. It is a universal and ageless principle; that is, ". . . effective occupation and use is at least as ancient as the concept of property. . . ." (Myers S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell and Evan A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space, 1963, p. 744) In others words, it is a natural law, not part of the temporary or transient laws of man, but is part of the law of all nations, all ages and all people. Prescription, which is the only law that preserves sovereignty for the illegally deposed, is also a natural law which is the highest law on earth. (See "Natural and International Law")

          Being a natural law, effective possession and use is critical to the transfer of title or ownership for all three international acquisition and loss laws -- non-belligerent occupation, international prescription and non-violent conquest.  However, ". . . effective control is a relative concept; it varies according to the nature of the territory concerned." (Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International law, 7th ed.,1997, p. 149) For example:

          ". . . [To] acquire and maintain title to a barren and remote territory, or an uninhabited or sparsely populated island, with considerably less in the way of acts of sovereignty than would be necessary in the major centers of it political power." (John McHugo, “How to Prove Title to Territory: A Brief, Practical Introduction to the Law and Evidence,” Boundary and Territorial Briefing, vol. 2, no.4, Clive Schofield, ed., 1998, p. 2) (emphasis added) In other words, "If the territory is remote, and was historically considered of small importance, surprisingly little may be adequate in order to establish and maintain title." (Ibid.) That is, the requirements of acts of sovereignty are flexible and circumstantial. In our case, the territory is de jure, meaning a rightful, deposed entitlement only recognized in international law, not in domestic law. The nature of an international law right is different from regnant possession. It is possession by law called "constructive possession." In de jure or dispossessed corporeal land ownership, the requirement for "displays of authority" or effectiveness, is by a constructive -- also called "factual possession." For more information on these concepts see "De Jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law" and "Factual or Constructive Possession is required, not Actual Possession" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges" and "By Law, Adverse Possession can create or establish Constructive Possession" and "Constructive Possession is Created by a Sovereign (Landlord)/Tenant Relationship" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

          The only [kind of] possession required [for these three different acquisition laws] is such as is reasonable under all the circumstances [the point is, what is reasonable for deposed sovereign ownership is different than reigning occupation, that is, what is reasonable] in view of the extent of territory claimed, its nature [for example being deposed sovereignty instead of reigning sovereignty], and the uses to which it is adapted and is put [which are different but just as valid and binding]. . . . (Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, vol. 1, footnote 1, 1922, p. 169) (emphasis added)

          That is, "At law, a person with constructive possession stands in the same legal position as a person with actual possession." (Humphrey Humberto Pachecker, NAFA's Blue Book: Legal Terminology, Commentaries, Tables and Useful Legal Information, 2010, p. 59) A deposed or constructive sovereign entity is as real and authentic as reigning one. They are both equally sovereign and subject to international law. However, effectiveness of possession is judged differently for the non-reigning monarchies. What is "reasonable" and "effective" for deposed sovereignty is how it is maintained and preserved. For example:

          Upon the fall, dispossession, or usurpation of a monarchy, the de jure legal rights to the succession of that monarchy may be kept alive indefinitely through the legal vehicle of making diplomatic protests against the usurpation." (Stephen P. Kerr, Dynastic Law; 2018: http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id70.htm) (See also, Emerich Vattel, Le Droit des gens, Book II, Chapter II, Nos. 145-146)

          . . . Sovereignty survives the unlawful loss of territorial authority and continues as the legitimate government of the country concerned, retaining valid title to govern [or the right to rule]. . . . (Stephen P. Kerr, "King and Constitution in International Law," The Augustan, 18:4, 1977, p. 126)

          Sovereignty does not terminate de jure due to de facto impossibility of exercising sovereign power. ("Tokyo District Court July 24 1953," The Japanese Annual of International Law, vol. 7, 1965, p. 156)

          . . . A King who has been driven form his Kingdom by force of arms, and has lost possession [or control] of his [territorial or proprietary] sovereignty, has not thereby lost his [sovereign] right [or his title to the land and its people]. . . . (Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, 1680, p. 50)

          When a king is deposed, it ". . . does not [destroy] the Dispossessed Prince of his Legal Right and Claim, nor forbid[s] him to endeavor to recover his throne. . . ." (Thomas Browne, An Answer to Dr. Sherlock's Case of Allegiance of Sovereign Powers in Defense of the Case of Allegiance to a King in Possession, 1691, p. 50)  Even  ". . . Providence does not alter the Legal Right of the K[ing] de jure, but leaves him still K[ing] de jure by Legal Right. . . . (Ibid., p. 57) The point is, ". . . A Prince, unjustly deposed . . . hath still a Right to his Kingdom. . . ." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 8, chapter 9, no. 9) Vattel explained that for a royal house to maintain this right, "Protests answer this purpose [that is, to preserve the right to rule]. With sovereigns it [the protest] is usual to retain the title and arms of a sovereignty or a province, as an evidence that they do not relinquish their claims to it. (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 2, chapter 11, no. 145) "Such de jure [or constructive] possession of sovereignty continues so long as the de jure ruler or government does not surrender his sovereignty to the usurper." (Ibid., Stephen P. Kerr) (See also Johann Wolfgang Textor, Synopsis Juris Gentium, Chapter 10, Nos. 9-11) The dispossessed royal house must continue to use their titles and arms which preserves their rights and can do so forever, endlessly or without any end. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" and "Deposed Sovereignty and Royalty: How to Preserve it and How it may be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm)

          Both reigning and non-reigning sovereignty are governed by the international laws that have dominion over acquisition and loss of that sovereignty through such laws as non-belligerent occupation, international prescription and non-violent conquest. Further, neither recognition or court involvement activate or finalize any of these transfer modes as they operate automatically on a legal basis. But the rights must, by law, of necessity be maintained effectively in full accord with the nature of the possession. Non-reigning sovereignty is preserved by the consistent public use of the royal title and national arms. (See "Recognition is Immaterial or Irrelevant to the Situation" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" or "Recognition Unessential to being Legitimate and Valid" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
          In conclusion, the de jure sovereign right was lawfully transferred to us as required by law. The following eight domestic and international acquisition laws initiated the legal transfer of the principality of Halbsrstadt. All that is needed is for one of the methods to be valid to make the transfer work. Yet they were all legally applicable and relevant to the Principality. They are as follows with the dates when they were completed or achieved:

(1) the 1st Binding Transfer: English private international law and English adverse possession (2001 in part, 2002 in part, and fully in 2014) . (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(2) the 2nd Binding Transfer: non-beligerant occupation (2002). (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(3) the 3rd Binding Transfer: going from the second-best right on earth to the highest right on earth after the abandonment (2002). (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(4) the 4th Binding Transfer: proprietary estoppel and equitable rights, (2012). (See "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")
(5) the 5th Binding Transfer: non-violent or peaceful conquest (2001, 2002, 2006, 2012, 2014) (See "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality"), and
(6) the 6th Binding Transfer: international prescriptive law (2002). (See "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality")
(7) the 7th Binding Transfer: cession by abandonment and recognition (2012). (See "A Seventh and Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges")
(8) the 8th Binding Transfer: annexation (2000, 2001 & 2002). (See "A Seventh and Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges")

          ". . . Each "mode" affords . . . a factual or juridical process which international law . . . acknowledges to be capable of creating a "title" to [or ownership of] -- or basis of -- territorial sovereignty [the right or entitlement to rule]." (Linda J Pike, Encyclopedia of Disputes Installment, vol. 10, "Territory, Acquisition," 2014, p. 496)

When you think about it, how many people have such a powerful base of evidence that a deposed sovereignty entity, still intact in international law, was transferred to them, not merely through one, but via eight different authentic and legitimate ways? Who else has a probability rating above 1.1 trillion to one that the legal situation -- the transfer, could not be anything but completely and absolutely true? This claim is as sure as any other royal claim that ever existed on the earth. It is that profound. Our case could hardly be stronger. It means we own about 600 square miles of sovereign territory, not in domestic law, but under international law. (See "Maps pf Noble and Royal Territories belonging to Halberstadt" and "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law"  in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges")
          In fact, we also qualified for four more valid international transfer modes, "novation," "consolidation of title," "highest entitlement on earth on an international level," and "international proprietary estoppel" as well. Since each is composed of similar principles involved in most of the other acquisition laws mentioned above, we have not listed them. Nevertheless, this means there are, in fact, four more powerful witnesses to the truth of the transfer. There is now a total of twelve valid domestic and international conveyance methods involved. Novation and consolidation of title are explained on the web page: "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges" and international proprietary estoppel and international highest right on earth is described in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality")

          Not one of the transfer methods mentioned above require court action or other legal involvement to activate them. Once completed, each of the eleven are legally an accomplish fact -- binding, eternal, and endless as long as they are maintained as the law mandates for de jure sovereignty. (See "Court Involvement is not Required for any International or Domestic Law to Effect Changes in Sovereignty" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality" and "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")

The grand and obvious conclusion is that this is one of the most profoundly certain claims on earth based on verified, confirmed, and extensive evidence.

 Underlying Purpose

           It is socially risky to reveal that one holds valid royal titles. It would be a lot more comfortable to operate below the radar, merely claim our rights privately, and not stick our necks out, but international law requires or obligates that one publicly assert his or her rights or lose them. In other words, to maintain what is considered to be of great value and worth to us personally, we must obey the law. By this means, it is possible to preserve deposed legal sovereignty from generation to generation, but such obedience ". . . imposes on him an obligation to make known his rights." (Hugo Grotius, The Law of Nations, Book II, chapter 11, no. 141) . (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership" on this website or "DEPOSED SOVEREIGNTY AND ROYALTY: How to Preserve it  and How it can be Lost" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm and also Dr. Kerr's book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law at http://www.the-entitlement-to-rule.com)

          The Law of Nations also requires or behooves one to provide solid proof, or a claim is considered to be no better than a family fairy tale, a phony pretense, or mere make believe. Thus, we have this website to fulfill these two important legal mandates: a public presence and solid proof, which proof was certified as valid by legal experts and the numerous citations and explanations of legally verified facts as found throughout this website. (For the requirement of proof, see "Proof is Necessary" in "The Law makes the Difference between a Solid and a Questionable Claim," and "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")

          Even though Halberstadt is a small sovereign regal entity, the ownership of ". . . sovereignty is not of like character with other things, rather, in its exalted rank, it far exceeds other things." (Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 12, no. I) It is something truly magnificent -- there is something supreme and wonderful about it, which is above most things in life. ". . . The ruler or sovereign of a State [reigning or deposed] is, in international law, . . . considered as representing, in his person, [all] its sovereign dignity [honor and glory] . . . ."  (William Teulon Swan Stallybrass, A Society of States,Sovereignty, 1919, p. 32) The point is, "All the majesty of the nation resides in the person of the prince. . . ." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, chapter 15, no. 188) "Every thing that emanates from the throne ought to bear the character of purity, nobleness, and greatness." (Ibid.)

However, ownership of a real sovereign title does not make a man important, great, or good deep inside himself. Truly noble people are people with integrity, good works and compassion for what is right. We highly value what we have, but true nobility or inner greatness is earned, not bestowed, conveyed or transferred.

Our house rules mandate that no knighthoods will be conferred on non-family members, no titles will be given out to people outside of the family, nothing of regal importance will be sold or bartered. The claims, although public titles under international law, will not be flaunted, although they must be used as required by law. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership")

For those unfamiliar with the legal concepts discussed herein, which is most of us, it is extremely easy to misunderstand what is written on this website. To avoid such, you are cordially invited to ask questions and make comments. We also welcome corrections.