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Eight Legitimate and Lawful Transfer Modes:
A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges: (the 7th & 8th modes & two additional methods of transfer)
(This is probably one of the most profoundly certain claims on earth, and it is elaborated, verified and confirmed in great detail throughout the website.)
I was told by experts that this case was incontrovertible and legally impeccable. All I really needed to do was to do the research and let this solemn truth be known.
The most recent discovery is that this case was also transferred by cession, not merely by the other conclusive methods: (1) adverse possession through the power of private international law, (2) international occupation, (3) non-violent conquest, (4) proprietary estoppel, (5) prescriptive law, and (6) becoming the highest right holders on earth through the abandonment – each mode being binding, definitive and conclusive.
Seriously could any transfer be so completely and absolutely sure when seven legally valid acquisition laws each individually gave it to us? Just one method was needed to validly and legitimately transfer every regal right. But here we have seven automatic and unfailing transfer modes finalize and conclude a complete change of ownership. All the laws, circumstances, documents and many living witnesses altogether send a sure message. It really happened, and because it did, the math experts, using probability, could say that there is only one in a 1.1 trillion chance it could be wrong.
Discovering what the legal scholars insisted was a verifiable and absolute fact has been truly an amazing and enjoyable journey. The investigation has proved that the legal experts were totally right.
There are five major reasons for this website:
(1) The first is to teach correct principles as there are serious falsehoods taught in the field of nobility and chivalry. (See "Problems and Solutions: The Future of Nobility and Chivalry" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/id108.htm) Pope Felix III wrote, "Not to oppose error is to approve it, and not to defend the truth is to suppress it." In other words, silence implies consent and promotes error and distortions.
(4) The fourth reason is this website is a well-written and documented doctoral project on international and domestic law. A university doctoral degree requires that one make a "significant original contribution to knowledge." In our case, this dissertation, which is, in fact, this website, provides proof far "beyond a reasonable doubt" that our claim is absolutely true, and the important laws that determine when a case is authentic, valid and genuine. Thus fulfilling an international law requirement. (See "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and False Claim")
(5) And fifth, because my good name (Donald E. Goff, Ph.D., DBA, D.Litt. (eq.) and our claim have been unfairly attacked on the internet, the true facts needs to be published and made known. It is, as Edmund Burke solemnly declared, "All that is needed for the forces of evil to win, is for good men to do nothing." It is hoped that the real truth will prevail, not error or inaccuracies. Hence, a good reason for this website. (See "Problem -- Misinformation" and starting with http://www.nobility-royalty.com/beware_of_false_claims_of_sovereignty.htm on the website of The International Commission on Nobility and Royalty)
To fulfill all these important purposes:
George Washington declared, "Truth will ultimately prevail [but only] where there [is a concerted effort] to bring it to light." Every single relevant point will be examined in great detail, so that the reader can easily see that all the legal facts are more than adequately substantiated, verified and confirmed.
This website is about the lawful transfer of all the international land rights, distinctions and honors of the principality of Halberstadt, which claim has been vetted and recognized by scholars as being legally valid and legitimate.
(See "The First of Seven Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges
") In other words, this case is not based on hunches, speculation, guesswork, or suspicion. Nor it is not based on myth, legend, fabrication, or make believe. It is based on numerous cold, hard, verified facts -- the law itself. Including the fact that, not just one, but eight legitimate and lawful conveyance or acquisition laws transferred the title and rights thereof to our family. Thus, our claim is not only compelling, but it is truly beyond any reasonable doubt, because no other logical explanation can be derived from the facts, and expert legal witnesses have validated the claim as genuine and accurate.
(See "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim
" and "Documents: Testaments and Witnesses to the Truth
In other words, this case is not questionable or problematic. The proof is not imaginary. It is as close to being flawless that is possible in this life.
Contents: (Every section and subsection in one way or another provides verified evidence of the truth)
The Seventh Legal Transfer of Rights: Cession
In discussing this seventh mode of transfer, I will assume the reader has a background for this short report by reading and assimilating the material found in other web pages. This report is an abbreviated account, but, at least, it brings out the main legal points making our claim concerning the transfer rightful and profoundly true from this method alone.
"There is a fairly well-developed set of doctrines circumscribing how states can lawfully acquire and lose territorial sovereignty." They are occupation, cession, accretion, prescription and conquest. But alongside the classic list above are ". . . arbitration or adjudication, as well as acquiescence, recognition and estoppel. . . ." (Bridget L. Coggins and Ishita Kala, "The Economics of State Emergence and Collapse," Economic Analysis of International Law, Eugene Kontorovich and Francesco Parisi, eds., 2016, footnote 41, pp. 78-79) Acquiescence, recognition and estoppel are involved cession claims.
Cession is one of the recognized ways to transfer sovereignty (the supreme right to rule and govern) from one entity to another. Because a deposed proprietary monarchy still legally owns all the rights to their former kingdoms or principalities as property owners in international law, he or she can convey it to anyone of his or her choosing.
[A proprietary] Prince may transfer his Right of governing such a Realm on any Person, whom he shall choose; and consequently may appoint any Method of Succession that shall be agreeable to his Judgment or Inclination.
(Samuel Freiherr von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations
, Book 7, chapter 6, no. 16., Barbeyrac, notes., Basil Kennett, trans., . (See "De jure Corporeal Ownership in International Law
" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges
. . . In a monarchy, the question is whether or not the land of the realm is the patrimony—or property—of the king. . . . In such cases, kingdoms [or principalities] were included in the kings’ [or prince's] patrimony [or ownership], “of the alienation of which at their pleasure rulers had received the power to dispose [sell, transfer or give away], because this was understood to be a part [of his rights as an owner] of the highest force of dominion” or, one may query, sovereignty. . . . [Thus, such] a king [or sovereign prince] can transfer his right over such a kingdom [or principality] to whomsoever he pleases. (Andreas Rahmatian, "Indirect Sovereignty through Property Rights," Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 7. Issue 2, art. 4, p. 77)
According to the Treaty of Westphalia this includes ". . . their seigneuries, and their regalian rights, [that is, their vassals, titles, royal distinctions and prerogatives, or everything pertaining to the sovereign entity].
" (Ibid. p. 76) Thus, a private person can be the recipient of the highest secular right on earth. (See "Private Individuals can become Royal Sovereigns
" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality
By definition "cession
" is the assignment of property or rights to another entity. It is "a yielding or giving up; surrender; relinquishment of property or rights. . . .
" (Black's Law Dictionary, Online; 2018: https://thelawdictionary.org/cession
) "As far as the Law of Nations is concerned, every State [reigning or deposed] . . . can cede [that is, transfer] a part of its territory . . . [even cede] the whole of it. . . .
" (Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise
, vol. 1, 3rd ed., Ronald E. Roxburgh, ed., 2005, p. 377) ". . . The right of transferring its territory is a fundamental attribute of the sovereignty of a State. The cession may comprise a portion of the territory of the ceding State or the totality of its territory.
" (Academike, Articles on Legal Issues; 2018: https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/sovereign-state-territory
) Anything owned can be conveyed or transferred to another. Both reigning and non-reigning sovereign entities in international law can do this, because a deposed proprietary royal house owns and therefore can sell its rights to the whole and complete territory. (See "Non-Reigning Royal Rights can be Transferred to Others Under International Law
" in Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality
") The natural law of prescription, which is part of international law makes this possible. (See " Natural and International Law
It governs both the maintenance and the destruction of the highest right to rule and/or own the land of a territory. (See also "De jure Corporeal Land Ownership in International Law
"The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges
In modern international law, cession is a voluntary mode generally for the supreme right of sovereignty to be given to another. Cession cannot now be considered valid or legitimate, if done by force or threat. This rule has been added as a permanent part of the Charter of the United Nations.
"The act of cession maybe . . . in the nature of a gift, sale, exchange or lease.
" (International Law: Acquisition of Territorial Sovereignty: 2018: http://internationallawu.blogspot.com
) Normally, a cession is accomplished by a treaty or deed of transfer. That is, it can be by sale or conveyance. In fact ". . . territorial cession on the basis of purchase [sale], barter and similar agreements was not unusual [in history]. . . .
" (Wilhelm Georg Grewe, The Epochs of International Law
, Michael Byers, trans., 2000, p. 543) In ceding sovereign territory, ". . . International law is indifferent as to whether there is a quid pro quo [a favor or advantage granted or expected in return for something] or not."
(Myres Smith McDougal and William Michael Reisman, International law in contemporary perspective: the public order of the world community: cases and materials
, 1981, p. 660) As stated, cession can be a gift, a sale, an exchange or lease with or without any obvious profit or gain to the ceding authority.
"International law prescribes no set format for cession to occur. The essential point under this mode is that the transfer must take place with the full consent of the governments concerned." (Daniel K. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic, 1998, p. 32) The following is one of the known lawful and rightful ways to cede a sovereign territory:
The relinquishment of a claim to a territory [which happened in our case -- the abandonment in 2002], coupled with recognition of the successor[s] . . . sovereignty over the territory, is tantamount to [or the equivalent to a lawful and rightful] cession. . . . (Boleslaw Adam Boczek, International Law: A Dictionary, vol. 2, 2005, p. 209) (emphasis added)
Cession is the complete and total transfer of all rights of sovereignty and ownership. It is a done deal -- a conclusive and binding transaction, which is both permanent and ever-lasting as long as it is maintained. Acts of abandonment and recognition by the ceding entity has the same legal impact as a formal treaty of cession.
. . . A State [or sovereign entity such as the deposed Imperial family] relinquishes its rights of sovereignty over territory whenever, by any means, it gives them up or renounces its claim to them, whether, for example by abandonment or by the recognition [of another as holding the right, which can be done by acquiescence or silence about the matter]. . . .” (Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, vol. 1, 1922, p. 191) (emphasis added)
The Imperial family gave up their rights or officially renounced their claim of ownership of the principality in 2002. This is central, or at the heart of the cession along with the principle of implied recognition through acquiescence to create a situation that is "tantamount to [or the equivalent to a lawful and rightful] cession.
" It is how cession took place in our situation. By their silence concerning our claim to their former sovereign possession, the Imperial family tacitly ceded the principality to us. This legal act of abandoned or the discarding of their international property rights is an established and obvious fact. (See "Abandonment
" in "Letters from the Imperial Family and Abandonment
") These facts completely takes care of the relinquishment
mandate for this type of cession. But what about recognition
part? ". . . Tacit [understood or implicit] recognition [can legally come by] . . . a failure to react in any way, on an occasion that called for a reaction in order to . . . preserve title [or ownership]. . . .
" (From the Temple of Preah Vihear before the International Court of justice 15 June 1962 as quoted in William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law
, 6th ed., 2011, p. 298) For example, ". . . silence, on an occasion where there was a duty or need to speak or act, implies agreement, or waiver of rights, and can be regarded as representation to that effect.
(Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in the Temple case as quoted in Muaz Ahmed M. Tungo, The Ilemi Traingle: Sudan-Kenya disputed International Boundary
, 2008, pp. 102, 142) In other words, "When anything is transacted, in which a man is concerned, if he is present [or knows about it] at the time, and does not contradict it, the presumption from his silence is, that he consents to it.
" (Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law: Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacit
, 1832, pp. 63-64) Legally, acquiescence is the lawful recognition and acceptance of a new owner of, in our case, a small, but legitimate regal and sovereign entity in international law. (See "The Principality of Halberstadt was and is a Sovereign Entity and therefore a Royal Realm
" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges
Like recognition, acquiescence [silence or a lack of protest] produces an estoppel [it precludes or bars any change] in circumstance when good faith would require that the state concerned should take active steps of some kind in order to preserve its rights [but they didn't]. . . . (Itamar Bernstein, Delimination of International Boundaries: a Study of Modern Practice and Devices from the Viewpoint of International Law, 1974, p. 51)
However, the Imperial family, after denying ownership of what they owned in international law, made it clear that they would not fight the conveyance or transfer of it, interfere in any way, or take any legal action against it to prevent the transfer, and they did as they declared they would. No protest or legal action ever took place. The result:
Failure to protest . . . in order to assert, to preserve or to safeguard a right . . . signif[ies] acquiescence or tacit recognition: [such a] State [or deposed sovereign entity] concerned [therefore] must be held barred [precluded] from claiming . . . the rights it failed to assert or to preserve when they were openly challenged by word or deed.
(Elihu Lauterpacht, International Law Report
, vol. 50, 1976, p. 411) (emphasis added) (See "Failure to Protest
" -- its legal implications in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges
The primary purpose of acquiescence [or silence when one should speak up about a legal issue] is evidential . . . its value lies in the fact that it serves as a form of recognition of legality [the recognition of a legal fact that a cession actually took place as in our case]. . . .
(I. C. MacGibbon, "The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law
, vol. 31, 1954, p. 143) (emphasis added)
". . . Acquiescence [is so profound that it is used] in order to ascertain the existence of a title and its strength." ("The Conceptualization (Construction) of Territorial Title in the Light of the International Court of Justice Case Law," Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 19, no. 4, December 2007, p. 1059)
[W]hen one State [or a private individual through English private international law] engages in activity, by means of which it seeks to acquire a right or change an existing [legal] situation [as we did], a lack of reaction [acquiescence] by another State [the Imperial family in our case] at whose expense such activity is carried out [that is, to their loss of the full rights to the Principality], will result in the latter [the Imperial family] forfeiting the rights which it could have claimed. (Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration, Award, 19 Oct 1981, Court of Arbitration, 91 ILR 543)
"'Implied consent' is defined to be . . . inaction or silence, which raises a [legal] presumption that the consent [or recognition] has been given." (Judicial and Statutory Definitions of Words and Phrases, vol. 4, National Reporter System, eds., 1904, pp. 3427-3428) Because there was a true and complete acquiescence or silence for more than ten or twelve years, the right to change this is now legally precluded, or barred.
In other words, ". . . transferring sovereignty [is valid if there is] implied consent of the [regnant or deposed] State holding the original title." (Philippe Couvreur, The International Court of Justice and the Effectiveness of International Law, 2016, p. 154) That is, ". . . the implied consent of the former sovereign to the new state of affairs [is a legally binding method of recognition]." (Daniel K. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic, 1998, p. 32) This took place in our case.
In conclusion, both "relinquishment
" and legal "recognition
" are established and verified legal facts. They both took place. This means our case "is tantamount to [or the equivalent to a valid and legitimate] cession
" in international law which automatically gave us everything -- transferred all the sovereign and regal rights. That is, ownership came to us by powerful binding laws. (See "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and a Fraudulent Claim
") And it is immediate and final, that is, "ceding territory forthwith comes under the complete and absolute sovereignty of the nation [individual or juridical entity] to which it has been ceded. . . .
" (Vicente J. Francisco, Introduction to Law
, 1959, p. 266) It is conclusive and final.
The Eighth Legal Transfer of Rights: Annexation
It is amazing that so many of the methods of sovereignty acquisition in international law apply to this case, but the modes are so closely related, so similar, and are composed of so much latitude and flexible that they are nearly equivalent or highly interchangeable. (See "Non-Belligerent Occupation, International Prescription, Non-violent Conquest and Peaceful Annexation have much in Common as Sovereign Acquisition and Loss Modes
" in "In addition, Two more Legally Binding Methods Transferred all the Rights to the Principality
") Therefore, I reviewed, or looked at, them again and realized that annexation also fits our situation with the same precision as the others. Thus, an eighth method entirely and rightfully gave us the ownership rights to Halberstadt. The following is description of annexation:
Annexation, a formal act whereby a state proclaims its sovereignty over territory hitherto outside its domain. Unlike cession, whereby territory is given or sold through treaty, annexation is a unilateral act made effective by actual possession. . . .
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, Annexation; 2019: https://www.britannica.com/topic/annexation
Annexation is one of the ways territorial rights are obtained. "The following acts or further legally relevant facts can operate as titles by which territorial sovereignty can be (a) acquired: . . ." (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 347) Annexation is one of the five acquisition modes listed in international law: ". . . 3. Annexation or Incorporation. . . ." (Ibid.)
Annexation is often associated with unlawful conquest, but there is such a thing as a peaceful lawful incorporation of either reigning or non-reigning sovereignty. But because of that association: "Under modern international law annexation is gradually assuming the character of an unlawful act. . . ." (Ibid., p. 356) However, ". . . [an] annexation by peaceful means would not be an offence against the peace and security of mankind.” (United Nations: International Law Commission, "58th Meeting – 30 June 1950," Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1958, p. 137) It is not a crime. However, this is true only as long as there was no threat of violence, force or intimidation involved. Otherwise, such an act would be void.
An example of peaceful annexation was the Louisiana Purchase from France in 1803, and an example of violent annexation was the annexation of most of the southwest including California, New Mexico, and Arizona from Mexico in the mid-nineteenth century as a result of the Mexican-America War (1846-1848). (Philip Q. Yang, Ethnic Studies: Issues and Approaches, 2000, p. 65)
Another good example of a peaceful, valid and legitimate annexation in modern times was the incorporation of East Germany into West Germany to form a united nation.
Everything in our claim was completely voluntary, non-violent and peaceful in our annexation or occupation of the rights of the principality. Legally, "in the case of abandonment [as took place in our case], there is no usurpation . . . ," that is, there was no wrongdoing, no theft, no offense or legal breach involved. (James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 8th edition, 2008, p. 230) It was aboveboard in every sense of the word. That is, annexation can ". . . still produce the normal effects of a juridical [or binding legal] act [conveying the right to rule a territory]. . . ." (J. H. W. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 356) The point is, ". . . In peace time annexation of parts of foreign State territory still occurs occasionally in our own age. . . . In former centuries such annexations of parts of foreign State territory in time of peace were much in use." (Ibid., p. 358) "In all these cases a new [sovereign] territory is acquired by the annexing [or incorporation by a] State. . . ." (Ibid., p. 363)
Further, "The annexation of a whole State by another in time of peace . . . can have very different causes and take different forms. . . ." (Ibid. p. 363) This is because "the formalities of annexation are not defined by international law. . . ." (Op.cit., Encyclopaedia Britannica) Including in these "very different causes" was the fact that we received a valid English Deed of Transfer in the year 2000 naming us as the rightful owners. This "different cause" gave us permission to claim all the rights to it as our own. "Different forms" includes the incorporation of a "whole" deposed principality into our possession. This "different form" was an authentic, still valid, sovereign entity under international law, holding the supreme right to rule.
That is, we annexed, incorporated, or took over all the rights to the principality in the year 2000 after receiving the English legalized Deed of Transfer. We then proclaimed. This possession was strengthened in 2001 when the right became a lawful English adverse possession case, and was made permanent with the abandonment of the principality and all its rights and regal privileges thereof in 2002, leaving us as the only valid and rightful claimants on earth. (See "3rd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth
" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality
The abandonment was actually a "relinquishment,
" by definition, because it was done in the face of the fact that we had a legalized claim upon it in England "in Rem
" or "good against the whole world,
" and they were aware of this claim before I wrote to them according to their first official letter to me in 2001.(See "Letters from the Imperial Family and the Abandonment
Relinquishment is the giving up of a claim to territory in face of what is thereby acknowledged to be a better claim, or at least a subsisting [continuing or ongoing] one [such as ours]. (James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law, 8th edition, 2008, p. 230)
In conclusion, an eighth legal mode lawfully completed the transfer of the Principality of Halberstadt to us, which is another powerful witness to the truth.
Again, Recognition is Unessential to being Totally and Completely Legitimate and Valid
Sovereignty is the highest secular right on earth, hence, this transfer of rights is a most valuable possession and entitlement. Recognition of this fact, however, is nice, but totally unnecessary. Both common sense and international law tells us that, ". . . Sovereignty is neither created by recognition nor destroyed by nonrecognition.
" (The New Encyclopaedia Britannica
, edition 15, part 3, vol. 17, 1981, p. 312) International law denies that diplomatic or political recognition confers sovereignty, nor can nonrecogntion destroy it. In other words, recognition cannot make something utterly false into something utterly true, nor can it make something genuine and authentic into a counterfeit or false claim. Recognition is not, and never has been, the determining factor. Countries and individuals may have their opinions, but reality is reality.
The point is, "Courts agree that sovereignty can exist in the absence of recognition by any state. . . ." (Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law: a Concise Introduction, 1979, p. 120) In other words, "No recognition of . . . the exiled government [or any deposed monarchy] . . . is necessary." (Ernst Wolff, "The International Position of Dispossessed Governments at Present in England," The Modern Law Review, vol. 6, no. 4, December 1943, p. 208) ". . . Sovereignty is not something that is decided by other countries. They can only recognize it or not." (Frank Muyard, Director, Taipei Office, French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC), April 1-2, 2005)
"States to exist do not require to be recognized by other States." (Can the Independent Chiefs of Savage Tribes cede to any Private Individual the whole or a part of their States, together with the Sovereign Rights which belong to them in conformity with the Traditional Customs of the Country?, 1884, p. 11) "Sovereignty is acquired by a State either at the time of its formation, or when it legitimately frees itself from a condition of dependence. To be valid it does not require to be recognized or guaranteed by any foreign power, provided that the claim shall not be defective." (Ibid., p. 5)
The point is in the words of Emilio Furno an advocate in the Italian Supreme Court of Appeal:
The qualities which render a deposed Sovereign a subject of international law are undeniable and in fact constitute an absolute personal right of which the subject may never divest himself [without his consent] and which needs no ratification or recognition on the part of any other authority whatsoever. ("The Legitimacy of Non-National Orders", Rivista Penale, No.1, January 1961, pp. 46-70)
"States [reigning or deposed], to [rightfully] exist, have no need to be recognized by other states. [They] . . . are sovereigns, and therefore have the right to exercise the right of sovereignty. . . ." (Senator Morgan, “Report 393” of March 26, 1884, United States Senate, Reports of Committees: 48th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 3, 1884, pp. 33-34) "These rights [the rights of internal de jure sovereignty] are all absolute, and quite independent of any recognition of the external sovereignty by other States. . . ." (Charles St. Julian, The International Status of Fiji, 1872, p. 3) This is the highest secular right on earth. Recognition does not change this all important legal reality.
In 1933, Declarative theory
has been acknowledged as an international law. It states that the existence of the sovereign right to rule is independent of recognition by others. In other words, "The [Montevideo] Convention codifies [that is, establishes] the declarative theory of statehood as accepted as part of customary international law.
" (Encyclopedia Westarctica, Montevideo Convention; 2018: http://www.westarctica.wiki/index.php/Montevideo_Convention
) (emphasis added) Since this time, ". . . The declaratory approach has remained predominant in mainstrean theorizing on recognition throughout the post-1945 period.
" (From a selection of widely used textbooks in English, French, and Russian, see A. Cassese, International Law
, 2nd ed., 2005 pp. 73-74; P. Daillier and A. Pellet, Droit International Public Law
, 7th ed., 2002, pp. 556–557; V. P. Panov, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo
, 2009, p. 113) Again, "In international public law, the act of recognition does not have the effect of conferring rights, but it is merely declarative in character.
" (Carsten Thomas Ebenroth and Matthew James Kemner, “The Enduring Political Nature of Questions of State Succession and Secession and the Quest for Objective Standards,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 17, no. 3, Fall 1996, p. 761)
Brief Summary Statement: Recognition is unnecessary. What is true, genuine and authentic is true, genuine and authentic. Recognition cannot change reality. Outside validation or external acknowledgment is irrelevant to the questions of sovereignty and legitimacy according to international public law. Nevertheless, the confirmation of validity by Dr. Kerr, the foremost international expert on de jure sovereignty, and others is helpful, which includes the official registration of the coat of arms with the German government as a "royal princely house."
Novation Law: Another Testament to the Transfer
Novation is another way the rights of the Principality were transferred to the us. But because it is literally a combination of the other laws already elaborated, it will not be listed with them. Nevertheless, it is another testimony and witness to our rightful claim.
In one way or another each of the eight transfer methods were "novations" of sort. They all support and sustain one another and are similar, to the point, that some jurists have theorized that all or most of the modes of sovereign transfer could be combined into one law. This is because, "The distinction between these . . . is sometimes rather blurred." (William R. Slowmanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 6th ed., 2011, p. 300) Making one unified law was never done, but it was considered. (Alexander George Roche, The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case: An Analysis of the Decision of the International Court of Justice, 1959, pp. 21, 23) Verzijl (1888-1987), a well-known Dutch jurist and professor, introduced the term "novation" as a mode of transferring supremacy or governing rights:
The following juridical acts [a list of transfer laws] or further legally relevant facts can operate as titles by which territorial sovereignty can be (a) acquired: . . . [or] lost. (J. H. W. Verzjl, International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 3, 1970, p. 347)
He then listed the usual international methods with the addition of number 7 -- the principle of "novation,
" which can transfer all the rights to a sovereign entity "Novation [is] the substitution of a new obligation for an old one.
" (Dictionary.com, Novation; 2018: https://www.dictionary.com/browse/novation
). It means "make new
" or is an innovation or change. It has, like the other modes, the power to revise and transform sovereign ownership rights. "Verzijl refers to 'novation' as a distinct mode of acquisition and defines the principle thus
" (Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law
, 2008, p. 154):
It consists in the gradual transformation of a right in territorio alieno [in a foreign territory], for example a lease, or a pledge, or certain concessions of a territorial nature, into full sovereignty without any formal and unequivocal instrument to that effect intervening [to change things]. (Op.cit., Verzijl, p. 384)
The title to [sovereign] property might therefore arise by novation, as the result of the loss of title by the original state through ineffective exercise of authority [like failure to maintain it by a non-reigning royal house or by abandonment], and [therefore a] substitution [a change] of the title of the occupying state. The essence of this mode is, however, the bona fide of the acquired state [that is, the actual or constructive occupation of it], and a long period of undisturbed possession [if the rights were not officially abandoned and therefore lost long ago]." (N. A. Maryan, International Law, 1987, p. 198)
The "concessions of a territorial nature
" in our case was the abandonment of ownership and the acquiescence in regard to it by the Imperial House. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family
") The point is, at the time of their relinquishment of all rights, or renunciation of ownership, we lawfully and rightfully possessed, or already owned, the second highest legal right to the territory, which is legally "good against the whole world.
" That is, constructive occupation, or factual possession, means that everyone must recognize our legal rights or the lawful ownership thereof. That is the law:
In the case of unregistered land the adverse possessor is regarded as having an estate in fee simple from the moment when he first takes possession (Leach v Jay (1878) 9 ChD 42 at p. 45) although until the limitation period has been completed, his title is always liable to be defeated by the owner. Thus even before the period is completed, the squatter has the right and powers of an owner, against everyone except the person he has disposed.
(InBrief, Acquisition of an Estate by Adverse Possession; 2019: https://www.inbrief.co.uk/land-law/estate-acquisition-by-adverse-possession
Since no one held a higher secondary legal right than we did since 2001 through English adverse possession, the consequences or result of the official abandonment in 2002 was that we then immediately and automatically held the highest and greatest right to it on earth -- a right above all others. (See "3rd Legally Binding Transfer of Rights 2002: Highest Entitlement on Earth
" in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality
") This is because:
If . . . a state [regnant or deposed] abandons its sovereign title to territory, but the territory does not become terra nullius, because other states [reigning or dispossessed] . . . have valid claims to title in such territory [and] have not abandoned their claims, [the] title must vest in the state [again whether reigning or deposed] that has the best relative claim to the territory. (Seokwoo Lee, "Territorial Disputes Among Japan, China and Taiwan Concerning the Senkaku Islands," Boundary & Territory Briefing, vol. 3, no. 7, Shelagh and Clive Schofield, eds., 2002, p. 24) (emphasis added)
In summary, since we had "the best relative claim to the territory" and no one else did, therefore, after the official abandonment, the rights vested in us.
There were a number of other "novations" in the eight modes, other than the above, which changed the ownership of Halberstadt from the Imperial House of Hohenzollern to the Goff/Harradine family. The chief, above all other, ingredients in novation of sovereignty are abandonment (dereliction & alienation) and acquiescence (silence & neglect).
The eight modes of legitimate and legal transfer are listed below after the next section on consolidation. However, as with all the transfer modes ". . . subsequent ineffectiveness may deprive the state [reigning or deposed] of that title.
" (N. A. Maryan, International Law
, 1987, p. 198) The rights must be maintained as mandated and required by international law or ownership is forfeited without a possibility of being restored. (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership
However, "What will constitute good evidence of title and maintenance of title will vary according to the nature of the territory in question.
" (John McHugo, "How to Prove Title to Territory: A Brief, Practical Introduction to the Law and Evidence," Boundary & Territory Briefing
, vol. 2, no. 4, 1998, p. 2) An international corporeal right, based on constructive or factual possession such as our, must, by the laws of justice and equity, have a different requirement than a reigning de facto
entity. For example, "If the territory is remote, and was historically considered of small importance [like a deposed lawful right], surprisingly little may be adequate in order to establish and maintain title.
.) We have complied to the fullest extent of the law. Our claim is unquestionable and deeply rooted in the laws that establish and honor rightful possession. (See "The Law makes all the Difference between an Authentic and a Fraudulent Claim
Consolidation of Title: An Additional Witness to the Transfer
Through the regular transfer modes of international law, "relative titles may be transformed into absolute [total and complete] titles [of ownership]. The more absolute a title becomes, the more apparent becomes the multiplicity of its roots." (Georg Scharzenberger, "Title to Territory: Response to a Challenge," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 51., no. 2, April 1957, p. 324) In other words, the more absolute, sure and solid the right of sovereignty becomes, the more likely several transfer methods probably establish it as an undeniable fact.
All states [or sovereign entities], in the course of their history, found their territorial claims on various grounds: on discovery, on intended possession, on constructive possession, on actual possession. . . . States seek to found their claims to title on as broad a basis as possible, and to include as many of these factors as they are able. This collection of diversified claims to title is recognized in international law and is called "historical consolidation." The term represents the gradual perfection of title. . . . (Ivan L. Head, “Canadian Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in the Arctic,” McGraw Law Journal, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 225-226)
For example, in our case eight modes were discovered and have perfected our title though ". . . a gradual process in time . . . [often] described [by some] as historical consolidation of title." (Op.cit., Scharzenberger)
Historic title can be a possession from time immemorial beyond the memory of any living person on earth. Or, "the possession [of the original ancient sovereign title] may . . . exist but is defective. For example, the original proprietor has neglected [or abandoned] his title." (Ma Xuechan, "Historic Title Over Land and Maritime Territory," Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies, vol. 4, no. 1, Winter/Spring 2017, p. 33) When such a situation occurs, it would, by law, produce a transfer of the supreme right to own and rule the land in question. Historic title or consolidation, as a conveyance mode, is generally recognized to have this power.
However, there is some hesitancy in the matter. In spite of the 1998 Eritrea/Yemen international arbitration case, which approved of "consolidation of title
" as a valid transfer mode, ". . . the accepted view is that consolidation does not exist as a concept independent of the established rules governing effective occupation and prescription."
(Ian Brownlie and James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law
, 8th ed., 2008, p. 236) Therefore, like "novation
" above, we are not presenting "consolidation of title
" as one of the ways we have obtained all the rights and privileges of de jure
sovereignty. Nevertheless, we meet the requirements for consolidation just as we did for novation.
International courts and tribunals have generally concluded that "historic title" or "consolidation of title" comes primarily ". . . by a process of prescription, or acquiescence, or by possession so long continue as to have become accepted by the law as a title." (Op.cit., Ma Xuechan, p. 37) In the Arbitration between Eritra and Yemen case, ". . . the Tribunal held that there were various kinds of historic titles." (Ibid., p. 36) Acquiescence is one of the ways that consolidation takes place. It happens ". . . where a sufficiently prolonged absence of opposition [or lack of protest] exists." (Ibid., p. 38) What "sufficient" amount of time is has the power to determine the outcome, so it is highly important.
". . . Consolidation is normally a gradual process." (George Schwarzenberger, Title to Territory: Response to Challenge, The American Journal of International Law, vol. 51, no. 2, April 1957, p. 311) But not if it is through the acquiescence mode. That is, there is one ". . . process of consolidation . . . in which the mere passage of time plays no part." (R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1st ed., 1963, p. 37) Instantaneous acquiescence has been sustained and upheld. (See "Acquiescence," Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol. 7, 2nd ed., 1984, p. 6) ". . . The reaction of the state raising a claim [a protest] over [their] territory should be immediate," not years afterwards. (Sophia Kopela, "The Legal Value of Silence as State Conduct in the Jurisprudence of International Tribunals," Australian Year Book of International Law, vol. 29, 2010, p. 129) (emphasis added) That is, "The first thing that a state must do when the authorities of another state enter its territory is to make a protest and send it police force to put an end to these actions." (Duvai/Sharjah Board Award, 91 ILR, 1993, p. 620) The reaction must be done quickly. A delay of years is the same as a consent to the transfer and results in a renunciation of all rights.
When acquiescence is the primary transfer mode, it is often confused with prescription. Ordinary international prescriptive law normally can take between 20 to 100 years. However, acquiescence can be completed in a much shorter period. The special characteristics of acquiescence in relation to the doctrine of historical consolidation of title is that it removes the difficulty that the doctrine of prescription faces, i.e., the passage of a fixed period of time. (Charles L.O. Buderi and Luciana T. Ricart, "The Gulf Islands Dispute IRAN-UAE: A Journey through International Law," Queen Mary Studies in International Law, vol. 29, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Sarah Singer, eds., 2018, p. 167) In other words, through the dominance of acquiescence, time is not a factor. In other words, "The only time factor involved with acquiescence is the length of . . . time required for . . . formulating the objection which would have been reasonably expected from it, had it wished to signify its disapproval. . . ." (Yehuda Z. Blum, Historical Titles in International Law, 1965, p. 191)
The response, or failure to respond to the juridical challenge, is the major determiner in the outcome. All that is basically needed for a consolidation is, "the display of continuous sovereignty [whether reigning or deposed], in which the other party acquiesces, will lead to consolidation." (John McHugo, "How to Prove Title to Territory: A Brief, Practical Introduction to the Law and Evidence Boundary & Territory Briefing," Boundary & Territory Briefing, vol. 2, no. 4, Clive Schofield, ed., 1998, p. 9)
Estoppel is involved as well in creating a bar against any change after an acquiescence takes place. The point is:
Estoppel [is] . . . closely intertwined with acquiescence [in a "consolidation of title" case, that is]: if [sovereign entity] A [the Imperial house in our case] acquiesces [is silent or neglectful] in [regard to] . . . B’s [or our] claim, it can no longer change its mind and make a protestation, since . . . B [the Goff/Harradine family] has relied on its [the Imperial house’s lack of protest or promise not to interfere]. . . . [The point is, sovereign entities] must react in all circumstances in order to maintain their title, especially if another title could be invoked [as in our case]. . . .
(Giovanni Distefano, "The Conceptualization (Construction) of Territorial Title in the Light of the International Court of Justice Case Law," Leiden Journal of International Law
, vol. 19, no. 4, December 2007, p. 1063)
In international law, the term "acquiescence" -- from Latin 'quiescere' (to be still) -- consent. It concerns a consent tacitly conveyed by a State, unilaterally, through silence or inaction, in circumstances such a response expressing disagreement or objection in relation . . . would be called for. Acquiescence is thus consent inferred from a juridically relevant silence or inaction.
(Oxford Public International Law: Acquiescence; 2019: http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1373
. . . Acquiescence is silence, inaction or failure to protest that may in appropriate circumstances give rise to a rebuttable presumption of acceptance or recognition of a legal right or position claimed by another state. A conclusion that there has been acquiescence requires actual or constructive knowledge of a notorious claim [which the Imperial family did]; sufficient duration of the acquiescence; and circumstances rendering the alleged acquiescence legally significant [such as a adversarial claim based on law]. . . .
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed that silence is consent,
". . . but only if the conduct of the other state [or situation] calls for a response.
(Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v Singapore)  ICJ Rep 51 ) In our case, a response was absolutely called for. That is, if the Imperial family wanted to keep their international property rights to the principality of Halberstadt, they had to take legal action. But instead, they remained perfectly silent. The Imperial family, therefore, legally consented to the transfer or loss of their rights by their sheer neglect, as they were informed about what was happening in England, but did nothing about it. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family
" and "Failure to Protest
" in "The First of Eight Transfer Modes Legally Conveying all Rights and Privileges
As stated, acquiescence, in the face of another who is in possession of their international or territorial rights, removes the difficulty which confronts prescriptive law -- that is, the requirement of a fixed period of time. (Yehuda Zvi Blum, Historic Titles in International Law
, 1965, p. 330) The law of acquiescence does not require much time. In fact, the law of acquiescence says nothing in regard to time. It only applies when a response is called for, and does not take place, which can happen in less than a year. In our case, it has been far too many years -- 19 years as of 2019. The Imperial House did not protest -- they stated they would not contest it or take legal action to alter or stop it. And they went even further to renounced ownership of their legal, international property right. (See "Letters from the Imperial Family
") By this act, the die was cast, the transfer took place. Thus, ten acquisition modes over a period of 12 years merged or joined together to create an historic consolidation of title -- all bearing a powerful witness and testimony that the rights, royal privileges and prerogatives of the principality became the rightful and lawful property of the Goff/Harradine family.
Consolidation can be a combination of modes or merely one mode over a period of time. In our case, it is a combination of eight modes qualifying as a "consolidation of title" claim.
The use of a critical date is when there is a valid dispute over a claim. However, there is no dispute in our case, but if the Imperial family instigated one in the future, the "critical date" would block anything done by them after 2014. This means all the eight transfer modes, all the legal protections, such as estoppel and their juridical actions, our maintaining of title and arms publicly as mandated, the consolidation of title laws, the fact that there is over a 1.1 trillion to one probability that our claim could be wrong making our case far far beyond any reasonable doubt -- the highest level of proof possible on earth, etc. -- all these things and more would make such a dispute absurd and fruitless. Note the following on this powerful legal protection set up to create justice in the earth.
The whole point, the whole raison d’ ê·tre, of the critical date rule is, in effect, that time is deemed to stop at that date. Nothing that happens afterwards can operate to change the situation that then existed. Whatever that situation was, it is deemed in law still to exist; the rights of the Parties are governed by it. (Giovanni Distefano, "Time factor and territorial disputes," Research Handbook on Territorial Disputes in International Law, Marcelo G. Kohen and Mamadou Hébié, eds., 2018, p. 400)
In international law the point of time falling at the end of a period within which the material facts of a dispute are said to have occurred is usually call the "critical date." It is also the date after which the actions of the parties to a dispute can no longer affect the issue. [That is] it is exclusionary, and it is terminal. (L. F. E. Goldie, "The Critical Date," The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 4, October 1963, p. 1251)
In other words, what has happened is a done deal. It is finished, completed, and final. For example, "protests made after the critical date are irrelevant. . ." – the die is cast – nothing more can be done legally. It cannot be altered at this point. The transfer has been completed and stands as an accomplished fact. (D. H. Johnson, "Acquisitive Prescription in International Law," British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 27, note 4, 1950, p. 342) The point is, ". . . Facts occurring [after the critical date] are excluded from having any operative effect." (Op.cit., Goldie, p. 1254) They are legally barred or made to be of very little impact, value or importance.
Critical date is similar to the doctrine of ". . . Laches [under equity law, which ] . . . will bar a claim if the claimant has been guilty of such delay as to prejudice the other to a degree that that claim ought in justice to be disallowed." (English Private Law, 3rd ed., Andrew Burrows, ed., p. 292) It goes with the legal maxim: "Equity aids the vigilant, not the sleeping ones [that is, those who sleep on their rights]" who do nothing to protect them during the critical period.
The critical date is the date when things have crystallized and become final as pertaining to the rights and privileges of sovereignty. In our case, this took place in 2014 when all the transfer methods consolidated or were unitedly combined declaring the rock solid truth of the transfer. "The critical date is the date at which the question of sovereignty is to be assessed," which again is 2014. (Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 6th ed., 2007, p. 157) This date has, among with other important legal facts, made our ownership undeniable and incontestable. In other words, the time is past and no changes can be legally forced upon us, because of so many just and fair legal protections.
Eight Legal and Lawful Methods Transferred all the Rights
Deposed de jure
or legal sovereignty are both a private law rights as well as public law rights. Whereas, reigning sovereignty is exclusively under public jurisdiction, deposed sovereignty is governed by both public and private law. As a direct result, both private law transfer methods, and public law modes of conveyance, had the full legal power to transfer all the honors, privileges and distinctions of the principality of Halberstadt. (See "Public and Private Law as it relates to the Transfer of the Principality of Halberstadt
in "The Public and Non-Public Use of Titles in International Law
It is most impressive that not just one or two, but eight different, equally binding acquisition modes, unitedly and perfectly transferred the principality and all its regal rights to the Goff/Harradine family. These laws are listed as follows along with the dates when they were achieved:
The transfer is an established fact -- each of the above perfected the change in ownership in its own unique way.
This claim is as sure as any other royal claim that ever existed on the earth. It is that profound. Our case could hardly be stronger.
In fact, we also qualified for four more valid international transfer modes, "novation,
" "consolidation of title,
" "highest entitlement on earth on an international level,
" and "international proprietary estoppel
as well. Since each is composed of similar principles involved in most of the other acquisition laws mentioned above, we have not listed them. Nevertheless, this means there are, in fact, four more powerful witnesses to the truth of the transfer. There is now a total of twelve valid domestic and international conveyance methods involved. Novation and consolidation of title are explained on the web page: "A Seventh and an Eighth Method also Transferred all the Rights and Privileges
" and international proprietary estoppel and international highest right on earth is described in "Three More Legally Binding Methods Transferred All the Rights to the Principality
The grand and obvious conclusion is that this is one of the most profoundly certain claims on earth based on verified, confirmed and extensive evidence.
(See The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim")
It would be a lot more comfortable to operate below the radar, merely claim our rights privately, and not stick our necks out, but international law requires or obligates that one publicly assert his or her rights or lose them. In other words, to maintain what is considered to be of great value and worth to us personally, we must obey the law. By this means, it is possible to preserve deposed legal sovereignty from generation to generation, but such obedience ". . . imposes on him an obligation to make known his rights.
" (Hugo Grotius, The Law of Nations
, Book II, chapter 11, no. 141) (See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership
" on this website or "DEPOSED SOVEREIGNTY AND ROYALTY: How to Preserve it and How it can be Lost
" at http://www.nobility-royalty.com/the_sovereign_rights_of_deposed_kings__monarchs_and_sovereign_princes.htm
and also Dr. Kerr's book The Entitlement to Rule: Legal, Non-Territorial Sovereignty in International Law
The Law of Nations also requires or behooves one to provide solid proof, or a claim is considered to be no better than a family fairy tale, a phony pretense or mere make believe. Thus, we have this website to fulfill these two important legal mandates: a public presence and solid proof, which proof was certified as valid by legal experts and the numerous citations and explanations of legally verified facts as found throughout this website. (For the requirement of proof, see "Proof is Necessary
" in "The Law makes the Difference between an Authentic and a Fraudulent Claim,
" and "The Mathematical Certainty of the Claim
Even though Halberstadt is a small sovereign regal entity, the ownership of ". . . sovereignty is not of like character with other things, rather, in its exalted rank, it far exceeds other things." (Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Book 2, chapter 12, no. I) It is something truly magnificent -- there is something supreme and wonderful about it, which is above most things in life. ". . . The ruler or sovereign of a State [reigning or deposed] is, in international law, . . . considered as representing, in his person, [all] its sovereign dignity [honor and glory] . . . ." (William Teulon Swan Stallybrass, A Society of States,Sovereignty, 1919, p. 32) The point is, "All the majesty of the nation resides in the person of the prince. . . ." (Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book I, chapter 15, no. 188) "Every thing that emanates from the throne ought to bear the character of purity, nobleness, and greatness." (Ibid.)
However, ownership of a real sovereign title does not make a man important, great, or good deep inside himself. Truly noble people are people with integrity, good works and compassion for what is right. We highly value what we have, but true nobility or inner greatness is earned, not bestowed, conveyed or transferred.
Our house rules mandate that no knighthoods will be conferred on non-family members, no titles will be given out to people outside of the family, nothing of regal importance will be sold or bartered. The claims, although public titles under international law, will not be flaunted, although they must be used as required by law.
(See "Maintaining Deposed Sovereignty and De jure Ownership
For those unfamiliar with the legal concepts discussed herein, which is most of us, it is extremely easy to misunderstand what is written on this website. To avoid such, you are cordially invited to ask questions and make comments. We also welcome corrections.